

Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations  
under the GATT and the WTO:

Procedures and Practices

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## CHAPTER I

### LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS AND RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER GATT 1994<sup>1</sup>

1. Several articles of the General Agreement have a bearing on the process of tariff negotiations and renegotiations. An analysis of all these articles and the ways in which the provisions impinge on the commitments made during tariff negotiations and renegotiations is outside the scope of this work. We take up only those articles which have a direct bearing on the subject of our study.

#### A. Provisions Relating to Tariff Negotiations

2. While GATT 1947 (like GATT 1994) prohibited quantitative restrictions as a general rule, it allowed the use of "duties, taxes or other charges" for the regulation of trade. Furthermore, the national treatment provision which required that, once goods had been imported, they should be treated on equal terms with domestically-produced goods, served to ensure that all discriminatory taxes (i.e. tariffs) aimed at protection were applied in a transparent manner only at the border. The plan envisaged in 1947 for the liberalization of world trade was to prohibit the application of quantitative restrictions, to allow regulation of import (and export) through transparently-administered non-discriminatory tariffs applied at the border, and then to work for the progressive reduction of these tariffs through successive rounds of negotiations.

#### *Periodic tariff negotiations*

Article 17 of the Havana Charter provided, *inter alia*, as follows:

"Each Member shall, upon the request of any other Member, or Members, and subject to procedural arrangements established by Organization, enter into and carry out with such other Member or Members, negotiations directed to the substantial reduction of the general levels of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports, and to the elimination of the

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<sup>1</sup> The WTO Agreement provides that references to "contracting party" shall be deemed to read "Member". As for the term "CONTRACTING PARTIES" which refers to contracting parties acting jointly, it provides that, in the case of certain provisions (which are not of relevance in this study) the reference shall be deemed to be references to the WTO while, in the case of other provisions (which are of relevance in this study) the functions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be allocated by the Ministerial Conference. No such allocation has, however, been decided upon so far.

In describing the provisions of GATT 1994, therefore, we have substituted "contracting party" by "Member" and the "CONTRACTING PARTIES" by the "Ministerial Conference". Since the functions of the Ministerial Conference are carried out by the General Council in the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, for all practical purposes references to the Ministerial Conference should be deemed to be references to the General Council. References to contracting party and CONTRACTING PARTIES occur only when an account is being given of what happened during the operation of GATT 1947.

preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 16, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis."

3. The desiderata contained in this provision provided the basis for the initial rounds of tariff negotiations held under GATT 1947. It was not until the Review Session of 1954-55 that the present Article XXVIII *bis* was introduced, entering into force on 7 October, 1957. This Article envisages that from time to time the Ministerial Conference may sponsor negotiations directed to the substantial reduction of the general level of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports and in particular to the reduction of such high tariffs as discourage the importation even of minimum quantities. The report of the Working Party, on the recommendation of which this Article was added to GATT 1947, noted that "(t)he article would impose no new obligations on contracting parties. Each contracting party would retain the right to decide whether or not to engage in negotiations or participate in a tariff conference." Thus, under GATT 1947, participation in tariff negotiations was optional. The position remains unchanged in the WTO Agreement, even though the requirement for original membership of the WTO that contracting parties to GATT 1947 should have Schedules of Concessions and Commitments annexed to GATT 1994 besides Schedules of Specific Commitments annexed to GATS, made participation in the tariff negotiations (as well as the negotiations for specific commitments in GATS) obligatory during the Uruguay Round.

#### *Principle of reciprocity*

4. A central requirement of Article 17 of the Havana Charter and Article XXVIII *bis* of the General Agreement is that the negotiations be held on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis. There is no provision on the manner in which reciprocity is to be measured and even the rules of various rounds of negotiations did not spell out any guidelines on the issue. The understanding has always been that governments participating in negotiations should retain complete freedom to adopt any method for evaluating the concessions.

#### *Modalities of tariff negotiations*

5. On the modalities of tariff negotiations, Article XXVIII *bis* leaves it to participants to decide whether the negotiations should be carried out on a selective product-by-product basis or by the application "of such multilateral procedures as may be accepted by the contracting parties concerned". It envisages that the negotiations could result in the reduction of duties, the binding of duties at existing levels or commitments not to raise duties on particular products beyond specified levels. It stipulates further that "(t)he binding against increase of low duties or of duty-free treatment shall, in principle, be recognized as a concession equivalent in value to the reduction of high duties".

6. Article XXVIII *bis* also provides for the negotiations to take into account the diversity of situations of individual participating countries "including the fiscal, developmental, strategic and other needs" and the needs of developing

countries for tariff protection to assist their economic development and to maintain tariffs for revenue purposes.

*Concept of non-reciprocity*

7. In the 1960s and 1970s the concept of non-reciprocity was developed for trade negotiations between developed and developing countries and was embodied in paragraph 8 of Article XXXVI, which was introduced in Part IV of the General Agreement and became effective on 27 June 1966. This paragraph states that "(t)he developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties". An interpretative note adds that the developing countries "should not be expected, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, taking into consideration past trade developments". The interpretative note also extends the applicability of the concept of non-reciprocity to renegotiations under Article XVIII or XXVIII.

8. The concept was further elaborated in the Tokyo Round Decision on "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries", also known as the "Enabling Clause", which was adopted on 28 November 1979. This clause provided, *inter alia*, as follows:

"The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of developing countries i.e. the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade needs....Having regard to the special economic difficulties and the particular development, financial and trade needs of the least-developed countries, the developed countries shall exercise the utmost restraint in seeking any concessions or contributions for commitments made by them to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of such countries, and the least-developed countries shall not be expected to make concessions or contributions that are inconsistent with the recognition of their particular situation and problems."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> GATT, BISD, Twenty-sixth Supplement, p. 204.

*Supplementary negotiations*

9. In the years before Article XXVIII *bis* was introduced into GATT 1947, the practice had been established for negotiations to take place for tariff concessions even outside of general tariff conferences or rounds of negotiations. In fact, while adopting the procedures for the Torquay Tariff Conference, the CONTRACTING PARTIES had also established procedures<sup>3</sup> for negotiations between two or more contracting parties at times other than during general tariff conferences. These procedures require notification to other contracting parties about the date and place of negotiation and circulation of the request lists exchanged between contracting parties proposing negotiations. Other contracting parties are given the right to join in these negotiations. The procedures provide for a selective, product-by-product basis for the negotiations. These bilateral and plurilateral negotiations are known as supplementary negotiations and their results as supplementary concessions.

*Tariff negotiations during accession*

10. Although tariff negotiations are a substantial component of the process of accession of governments, neither Article XXXIII of GATT 1947 (which is now no longer relevant) nor Article XII of the WTO Agreement gives any guidelines on how such negotiations are to be conducted. The latter article provides simply, as the former had done until it ceased to be in force, for the accession to take place on "terms to be agreed" between the applicant government and the full membership. One of the terms is in every case commitments for market access, including reduction and binding of tariffs. The negotiations for securing tariff commitments are made on a bilateral basis between the applicant-government and its main trading partners.

*Tariff commitments on behalf of dependent territories*

11. The Protocol of Provisional Application of GATT 1947 provided for the acceptance of the Protocol by the contracting parties in respect of their metropolitan territories as well as on behalf of their dependent territories. Article XXVI 5(c) of GATT 1947 provided that when these dependent territories acquired full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations they would become contracting parties when the responsible contracting parties certified that such autonomy had been acquired. The States which became contracting parties through the succession route of Article XXVI 5(c) were bound by the tariff commitments made earlier on their behalf. On their becoming new contracting parties, a new schedule was established for them on the basis of the corresponding entries in the schedules of the contracting parties which had made the commitments on their behalf. The provision has not been carried forward into the WTO Agreement.

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<sup>3</sup> GATT, BISD, Vol. I, p. 116.



*Non-application*

12. Article XXXV of GATT 1947 provided for non-application of either the full Agreement or of Article II of the Agreement between two contracting parties if:

- (a) the two contracting parties had not entered into tariff negotiations with each other, and
- (b) either of the contracting parties, at the time either became a contracting party, did not consent to such application.

13. The prerequisites for non-application of GATT 1947 were so formulated as to provide for such non-application only at the outset (in January 1948) or at the time of accession of a new contracting party. The contracting party invoking the article had the option of providing for the non-application of the entire agreement or only of tariff concessions.

14. Article XIII of the WTO Agreement has a corresponding provision on non-application. However, it can be invoked between original Members of the WTO which were contracting parties to GATT 1947 only where Article XXXV of that Agreement had been invoked earlier and was effective as between those contracting parties at the time of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.

**B. Provisions Relating to Tariff Renegotiations**

1. Article XXVIII is the principal provision of GATT 1994 on renegotiations of tariff concessions. It provides for the possibility of modification or withdrawal of tariff concessions after negotiation (renegotiation) with:

- (i) Members with which the concession was initially negotiated; and
- (ii) Members which have a principal supplying interest. In addition consultations have to be held with Members which have a substantial interest in such concessions.

Such modification or withdrawal can be done:

- (i) on the first day of each three-year period, the first of which began on 1 January 1958;
- (ii) at any time in special circumstances on authorization; or
- (iii) during the three-year period referred to above, if the Member concerned has, before the beginning of the period, elected to reserve the right to renegotiate.

In the negotiations the Member seeking modification or withdrawal is expected to give compensatory concession on other products. If agreement is not reached, the affected Members get the right to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the Member making the changes.

*Initial negotiating rights (INRs)*

2. In the early days of GATT 1947, for every individual concession there were one or more contracting parties with INRs. When at a subsequent negotiation a concession was negotiated at a lower level of tariff on the same product, the contracting party or parties acquiring INRs could be the same or different depending on whether in the meantime there had been changes in the market shares of the product. Thus for each tariff line figuring in successive rounds of negotiations, there could be several layers of INRs held by the same or different contracting parties. The INRs other than those resulting from the latest negotiations are referred to as historical INRs.

3. In the first five rounds of tariff negotiations the technique used was that of item-by-item negotiations on a bilateral request-offer basis. In these negotiations, before the tariff concessions were consolidated in a Schedule, there used to be bilaterally agreed lists of concessions exchanged by participants. In these negotiations, therefore, it was easy to identify the contracting party which had initial negotiating rights (INRs). However, there was no such clarity when, in the Kennedy Round, important trading nations decided to adopt a linear reduction approach. The CONTRACTING PARTIES, therefore, adopted a decision on 16 November 1967 which provided as follows:

"In respect of the concessions specified in the Schedules annexed to the Geneva (1967) Protocol, a contracting party shall, when the question arises, be deemed for the purposes of the General Agreement to be the contracting party with which a concession was initially negotiated if it had, during a representative period prior to that time, a principal supplying interest in the product concerned."<sup>4</sup>

During the discussions of this decision in the Trade Negotiating Committee it was emphasized that the words "that time" referred to "when the question arises". Following the Tokyo Round in which a formula approach was also followed, a similar decision<sup>5</sup> was adopted on 28 November 1979 in respect of INRs. While another similar decision<sup>6</sup> was taken in 1988 in connection with the introduction of the Harmonized System, no such decision was adopted for the concessions agreed in the Uruguay Round.

4. As we shall see in the account of the practices and procedures adopted during the tariff negotiations, INRs have also become a bargaining chip and sometimes they are granted in bilateral negotiations as a reward for important reciprocal concessions or used as an element for topping-up in the exercise for bilateral balancing of reciprocal concessions. There have been other instances during accession negotiations in which INRs were specifically excluded in respect of items figuring in bilaterally-agreed lists of concessions. INRs are

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<sup>4</sup> GATT, BISD, Fifteenth Supplement, p. 67.

<sup>5</sup> GATT, BISD, Twenty-sixth Supplement, p. 202.

<sup>6</sup> GATT, BISD, Thirty-fifth Supplement, p. 336.

presumed to exist if any concession is mentioned in a bilateral list drawn up in rounds of negotiations, bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, accession negotiations or renegotiations unless indicated otherwise. Where there are no bilateral lists it is presumed not to exist unless specifically indicated in the Schedule.

5. The Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 made an addition to the concept of INRs. It is provided that, when a tariff concession is modified or withdrawn on a new product (i.e. a product for which three years' statistics are not available), a Member having initial negotiating rights on the tariff line where the product is or was formerly classified shall be deemed to have an initial negotiating right in the concession in question. The Understanding also adds the requirement that any Member having a principal supplying interest in a concession which is modified or withdrawn shall be accorded an initial negotiating right in the compensatory concessions, unless another form of concession is agreed by the Member concerned.

*Principal supplying interest and substantial interest*

6. Article XXVIII provides for the Ministerial Conference (CONTRACTING PARTIES ) to determine the Members having a principal supplying interest or substantial interest. However, the procedures adopted for renegotiations with which we shall deal in detail in Chapter IV provide that, if a Member makes a claim of principal supplying interest or substantial interest and the Member invoking Article XXVIII recognizes the claim, "the recognition will constitute a determination by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the interest in the sense of Article XXVIII:1".<sup>7</sup>

7. An interpretative note to paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII provides that a Member should be determined to have a principal supplying interest if it "has had, over a reasonable period of time prior to the negotiations, a larger share in the market of the applicant contracting party than a contracting party with which the concession was initially negotiated, or would...have had such a share in the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions maintained by the applicant contracting party". The interpretative note envisages that generally there would not be more than one or, in those exceptional cases where there is near equality in supplying status, two contracting parties with a principal supplying interest.

8. Another interpretative note mentions one other category of Member with a principal supplying interest: where the concession to be modified affects a major part of the total exports of a country. One more category of countries with a principal supplying interest has been created (and the possibility of consideration being given to yet another category on a future date has been envisaged) in the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of which provides as follows:

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<sup>7</sup> GATT, BISD, Twenty-seventh Supplement, pp. 26-28.

"For the purposes of modification or withdrawal of a concession, the Member which has the highest ratio of exports affected by the concession (i.e. exports of the product to the market of the Member modifying or withdrawing the concession) to its total exports shall be deemed to have a principal supplying interest if it does not already have an initial negotiating right or a principal supplying interest as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII. It is, however, agreed that this paragraph will be reviewed by the Council for Trade in Goods five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement with a view to deciding whether this criterion has worked satisfactorily in securing a redistribution of negotiating rights in favour of small and medium-sized exporting Members. If this is not the case, consideration will be given to possible improvements, including, in the light of the availability of adequate data, the adoption of a criterion based on the ratio of exports affected by the concession to exports to all markets of the product in question."

9. The Uruguay Round Understanding has clarified two aspects relevant for the determination of principal supplying or substantial interest. First, in the determination of principal supplying interest or substantial interest, only trade which has taken place on an MFN basis is required to be taken into consideration. However, trade which has taken place under non-contractual preferences (such as the GSP) will also be taken into account if the preferential treatment has been withdrawn at the time of the renegotiations or will be withdrawn before the conclusion of the renegotiations. Second, if a tariff concession is modified or withdrawn on a new product (i.e. a product for which three years' trade statistics are not available), for the determination of principal supplying and substantial interests and the calculation of compensation, production capacity and investment in the affected product in the exporting Member and estimates of export growth, as well as forecasts of demand in the importing Member, have to be taken into account.

10. There is no criterion laid down for determining substantial interest. The Interpretative Notes acknowledge that the concept is not capable of precise definition, but suggest that those Members could be construed as having a substantial interest when they have a significant share in the market. In practice, contracting parties (Members) having 10 per cent or more of the trade share have been recognized as having a substantial interest. Article XXVIII requires Members to negotiate modification or withdrawal with Members having initial negotiating rights or a principal supplying interest and to reach an agreement with them, and the Members with a substantial interest have only the right to consultation. But if there is no agreement with Members with INRs or a principal supplying interest, or if the Member with a substantial interest is not satisfied with the agreement reached among them, all have an equal right to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the applicant Member.

*Types of renegotiations: open season, special circumstance and reserved renegotiations*

11. As already mentioned, there are three types of renegotiations envisaged in Article XXVIII: three-year (open season) renegotiations; special circumstance renegotiations; and reserved renegotiations. Article XXVIII:1 provides that on the first day of each three-year period (the first period having begun on 1 January 1958 and the next one at the time of writing beginning on 1 January 2000) any Member may modify or withdraw a concession after negotiation and agreement with Members having initial negotiating rights and a principal supplying interest and consultation with those with a substantial interest. Any other period may also be specified by a decision of the Ministerial Conference. The second type of renegotiations are those authorized in special circumstances by the Ministerial Conference under Article XXVIII:4. The third type of renegotiations envisaged in Article XXVIII:5 are those that may be held at any time before the end of the three-year period if any Member elects to reserve the right before the beginning of the period. In such cases other Members also get the right to hold renegotiations on concessions initially negotiated with the Member which has reserved the right.

12. The substantive requirements in all three types of renegotiations are essentially the same. However, there is a major difference in regard to time limits. In the three-year renegotiations the notification about the intention to withdraw or modify has to be made no later than three months (but no earlier than six months) before the first day of the period and the whole process has to be completed before that date. The modification or withdrawal (whether or not after agreement) takes effect on that date. Thus in the three-year negotiations normally the request has to be made during the period from 1 July to 30 September, the renegotiations have to be completed before 31 December and the modification and withdrawal take effect on 1 January of the following year. Time limits are also prescribed for special circumstance negotiations. A decision on a request for such renegotiations has to be made within thirty days of its submission. The renegotiations have to be completed within 60 days of authorization, but a longer period may be prescribed if a large number of items is involved. If no agreement is reached within the prescribed period, the applicant Member has the right to refer the matter back to the Ministerial Conference for its examination and recommendations. Any determination in such renegotiations that a Member has unreasonably failed to offer adequate compensation must also be made within thirty days of the submission of the matter. As for reserved renegotiations, there are no time limits at all regarding when they are to be begun or concluded.

*Compensation and retaliation*

13. The central requirement underlying the negotiation for compensatory concessions by the Member proposing a modification or withdrawal is the maintenance of "a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement

prior to such negotiations". When a developing country Member needs to modify or withdraw a concession, the provision in Article XXXVI:8 regarding the concept of non-reciprocity has to be taken into account. No other guidance is provided on the level of compensation. Some clarity is provided in the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 in respect of those renegotiations which involve the replacement of an unlimited tariff concession by a tariff rate quota. Paragraph 6 of the Understanding provides as follows:

"When an unlimited tariff concession is replaced by a tariff rate quota, the amount of compensation provided should exceed the amount of the trade actually affected by the modification of the concession. The basis for the calculation of compensation should be the amount by which future trade prospects exceed the level of the quota. It is understood that the calculation of future trade prospects should be based on the greater of:

"(a) the average annual trade in the most recent representative three-year period, increased by the average annual growth rate of imports in that same period, or by 10 per cent, whichever is the greater; or

"(b) trade in the most recent year increased by 10 per cent.

"In no case shall a Member's liability for compensation exceed that which would be entailed by complete withdrawal of the concession."

14. The right of a Member to modify or withdraw a concession is absolute, provided the prescribed procedures are followed. It is not dependent on an agreement being reached with the Members with INRs and a principal supplying interest. However, as mentioned already, if the Member seeking a modification or withdrawal does go ahead without having reached an agreement with the Members with INRs or a principal supplying interest, these Members get the right to withdraw "substantially equivalent concessions" initially negotiated with the applicant Member. The Member with a substantial interest also gets the same right either when no agreement is reached, or even if an agreement is reached with the Members having INRs or a principal supplying interest but the Member with substantial interest is not satisfied with it. However, there are two time limits to be respected: first, the retaliatory withdrawal must take place within six months of the withdrawal or modification of the concession; and second, a 30-day period should be allowed after notification by the retaliating Member.

15. An Interpretative Note to Article XXVIII makes an important point regarding the date of entry into force of the compensatory concession. When a modification or withdrawal of a concession is made, the legal obligation of the Member changes. The implication is not that the actual level of applied tariff is changed on that day: the Member may choose to delay the implementation of the applied level in light of the new commitment. If a tariff change following renegotiation is delayed, the Member concerned has the right to similarly delay the entry into force of the compensatory concession.

*Renegotiation for promoting the establishment of a particular industry*

16. Article XVIII:7 of GATT 1994 is another provision for renegotiation of concessions, but it is open only to developing countries and can be used only for the purpose of promoting the establishment of a particular industry. This provision may be invoked by a developing country at any time and no authorization is needed. The Article requires the Member seeking to modify or withdraw the concession to enter into negotiations with Members with INRs and those having a substantial interest. It would be noted that, unlike in Article XXVIII, there is no reference to Members with a principal supplying interest and the requirement is to negotiate equally with Members with INRs and a substantial interest. In substance, however, these differences are of no consequence. In the event of disagreement the matter may be referred to the Ministerial Conference for prompt examination. The Member invoking Article XVIII:7 may proceed with the modification or withdrawal if it is found that the compensatory adjustment offered is adequate, or when it is not adequate if it is determined that the Member has made every reasonable effort to offer adequate compensation. The right of affected Members to withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions is the same as in Article XXVIII.

*Renegotiations in the context of formation of customs unions*

17. Article XXIV:6 stipulates that if, in the process of the formation of a customs union the duties have to be raised beyond the bound level in one or more of the constituent territories, the procedures for renegotiations in Article XXVIII are to be followed. In providing for compensatory adjustment in such renegotiations, due account has to be taken of the reduction brought about in the corresponding duty by other constituents of the union, sometimes referred to as internal compensation. The Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 adds little of substance to the provision in Article XXIV:6. On the question of a time-frame for the renegotiations, it reaffirms that the procedures must be commenced before tariff concessions are modified or withdrawn. If the renegotiations cannot be concluded within a reasonable period of time, the customs union can proceed with the modification or withdrawal of the concession, giving the affected Members the right to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions.

*Withdrawal of concessions*

18. The last provision for modification or withdrawal is contained in Article XXVII of GATT 1994. This Article allows a Member to withhold or withdraw a concession which was made during general tariff conferences or during multilateral rounds of trade negotiations if the participating government with which the concession was negotiated does not eventually become a Member or, having become a Member, ceases to be one. There is no time limit for the invocation of the Article but the Member concerned has to consult with Members which have a substantial interest in the product concerned. This provision has been generally incorporated in the Protocols embodying the results

of tariff negotiations, including the Marrakesh Protocol on the Uruguay Round concessions.

### C. Other Provisions Relating to Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations

#### *Most-favoured-nation treatment*

1. Tariff negotiations under the General Agreement are to be held on a non-discriminatory basis as provided for in Article I, on general most-favoured-nation treatment. This article requires that in all matters connected with imports and exports, including customs duties and similar charges, international transfer of payments, method of levying such duties and charges, rules and formalities, internal taxes or charges and regulations affecting internal sale, purchase, transportation, distribution and use of imported products,

"any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in, or destined for, any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in, or destined for, the territories of all other contracting parties".

2. Thus, a WTO Member has not only to treat all other Members equally, but has to extend to each of them the best treatment it accords to any trading partner. An important element of the obligation is that the extension of any concession or favour to all Members has to be immediate and unconditional. All tariff concessions made by Members in the course of negotiations and renegotiations have to be extended to all other Members on a non-discriminatory basis. It follows also that all modifications and withdrawals of tariff concessions, including retaliatory withdrawals, must be applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

3. Although the MFN clause barred the grant or maintenance of any tariff preference, an exception was made for the "historical" preferences which were listed in Article I and Annexes A to F of GATT 1947. The most extensive of the excepted preferences were those of the Commonwealth countries and of France. While these preferences were allowed to be maintained, an important advance was made in keeping with the spirit of the MFN clause, insofar as margins of preference were frozen at the levels indicated in the schedules of tariff concessions, or, where such a margin had not been indicated in the schedules, at the historical level that existed on the dates mentioned in the text of, or annexes to, GATT 1947.

4. Article I exceptions were of considerable economic importance at the time GATT 1947 came into being, but their importance rapidly dwindled. Preferential margins were eroded as the MFN tariffs were reduced in successive negotiations and in most cases preferential tariffs were not. Moreover, other developments, such as the formation of the European Economic Community, led to the absorption of some of the preferences in such arrangements as the Lomé Convention, for which now waivers, and not the historical preferences, provide the legal basis. When the UK acceded to the EEC, the Commonwealth



preferences were largely withdrawn. Some residual preferences continue to exist even now, but their economic importance is very small. Still smaller are the lists of preferential concessions on which commitments continue in schedules of WTO Members.

#### *Schedules of concessions*

5. After tariff negotiations have taken place, the results are incorporated in the schedules of concessions of the participant concerned. Each WTO Member has a schedule of concessions unlike in GATT 1947, when several contracting parties which had followed the route of succession under Article XXVI:5(c) did not have any schedules. The schedule of each Member is given a number in Roman numerals by order of accession. Under GATT 1947 at the outset the schedules had two parts: Part I for MFN concessions and Part II for preferential concessions. Two more parts have been added since then: Part III lists concessions on non-tariff measures and Part IV lists the specific commitments made during the Uruguay Round on domestic support and export subsidies in agriculture. The obligations in respect of concessions and commitments incorporated in the schedules are contained in Article II of the General Agreement. The fundamental aim of this article is to ensure the predictability and security of tariff commitments contained in the schedules. The most important implication of a tariff concession is that there is a commitment not to apply customs duty upon the importation of the product above the level indicated in the schedule. This tariff level is thus "bound" against an increase.

#### *Other duties or charges (ODCs)*

6. Article II provides for the products listed in the Schedules, on their importation, to be "bound" against an increase not only in the ordinary customs duty but also in respect of all "other duties or charges of any kind" (ODCs) beyond those (i) imposed on the date of this Agreement, or (ii) directly or mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing country on that date. The level and the nature of the ODCs which a contracting party to GATT 1947 could levy on tariff items subject to concessions consistently with its obligations were not recorded in any international instrument. If and when a dispute were to arise on the issue, the contracting party concerned would have had to produce evidence from its national records to show that the ODCs were indeed in force at the particular level on the date of the Agreement or were "directly or mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date". The Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 brought about a major change in respect of this provision. Now all ODCs have to be recorded in the Schedules and, where no such entry has been made in the relevant column of the Schedule, it is presumed that there are no ODCs on the tariff item. The Uruguay Round Understanding provides as follows:

"In order to ensure transparency of the legal rights and obligations deriving from paragraph 1(b) of Article II, the nature and level of any

"other duties or charges" levied on bound items, as referred to in that provision, shall be recorded in the Schedules of concessions annexed to GATT 1994 against the tariff item to which they apply. It is understood that such recording does not change the legal character of "other duties or charges".

7. The reference date in Article II of the General Agreement in respect of ODCs is "the date of this Agreement". For the purposes of the concessions negotiated in 1947, the date of the Agreement is 30 October 1947, as provided for in Article XXVI:1. For subsequent negotiations under GATT 1947, the reference date is the date of the Protocol to which the relevant schedules are annexed, be they accession negotiations or rounds of multilateral trade negotiations or other negotiations. Thus the date applicable to any concession for the purposes of Article II is the date of the instrument by which the concession was first incorporated into the General Agreement. The Uruguay Round Understanding specifies a particular date as the reference date for the concessions negotiated during the Round and makes the position clear about the future negotiations and renegotiations:

"The date as of which "other duties or charges" are bound, for the purposes of Article II, shall be 15 April 1994. "Other duties or charges" shall therefore be recorded in the Schedules at the levels applying on this date. At each subsequent renegotiation of a concession or negotiation of a new concession the applicable date for the tariff item in question shall become the date of the incorporation of the new concession in the appropriate Schedule. However, the date of the instrument by which a concession on any particular tariff item was first incorporated into GATT 1947 or GATT 1994 shall also continue to be recorded in column 6 of the Loose-Leaf Schedules".

8. It may be added that the new rule does not affect the position of ODCs with respect to pre-Uruguay Round concessions. The WTO Member retains the right as envisaged in Article II:1(b) with respect to such concessions. However, earlier concessions do have an implication for the level of ODCs to be recorded in future. Where a tariff item has previously been the subject of a concession, the Uruguay Round Understanding requires the level of ODCs recorded in the Schedule not to be higher than the level obtaining at the time of the first incorporation of the concession. A three-year time limit after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, or after the date of deposit of the instrument incorporating the Schedule into GATT 1994, whichever is later, was given to any Member to challenge the existence of an ODC on the grounds that no such ODC existed at the time of the original binding, as well as the consistency of the recorded level with the previously bound level, but no such challenge was made.

9. As a broad definition of "other duties or charges" it has been accepted that only those levies that discriminate against imports are covered, e.g. stamp duty, development tax, revenue duty etc. In GATT 1947 panels, import deposit schemes and charges on transfer of payments imposed by governments have also

been found to be covered by the limitation on imposition of ODCs in respect of the products on which tariff commitments have been made.

10. Article II of the General Agreement allows the introduction of terms, conditions or qualifications in the Schedules in respect of tariff commitments. Yet it has been recognized in practice that Article II creates for the Members "the possibility to incorporate into the legal framework of the General Agreement commitments additional to those already contained in the General Agreement and to qualify such additional commitments, not however to reduce their commitments under other provisions of the General Agreement".

*Levies that do not impinge on bound concessions*

11. Article II clearly itemizes the categories of levies on imports which do not impinge on bound concessions. Thus, notwithstanding bound concessions in the Schedules, contracting parties (Members) have the freedom to impose the levies mentioned below:

- (a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III regarding national treatment;
- (b) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of Article VI;
- (c) fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered.

12. Article VIII of the General Agreement separately stipulates that all fees and charges imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation shall be limited to the approximate cost of the services rendered. Thus, if fees are imposed in respect of bound tariff items which are disproportionate to the services rendered, they will infringe the obligations under both Articles VIII and Article II.

13. It needs to be mentioned here that any additional duty imposed pursuant to the special safeguard provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture and price-based measures imposed for balance-of-payments reasons under the Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments provisions of GATT 1994, also do not affect Article II commitments.

*Import monopolies*

14. Tariff concessions incorporated in the schedules have an implication not only for customs duties and ODCs but also for the pricing practices of import monopolies. Article II provides that such monopolies shall not "operate so as to afford protection on the average in excess of the amount of protection provided for in that Schedule". Specific arrangements relating to the operation of monopolies can also be negotiated and inscribed in the Schedules. An interpretative note to Article II, paragraph 4, states that the paragraph will be applied in the light of the provisions of Article 31 of the Havana Charter. This provision envisaged that Members of the ITO would negotiate "arrangements

designed to limit or reduce any protection that might be afforded through the operation of the monopoly to domestic producers of the monopolized product". In fact, in the 1947 Geneva negotiations and the 1950 Torquay negotiations, the Benelux countries and France made concessions on monopoly duties, minimum imports by an import monopoly or domestic selling prices of products subject to a monopoly. In such cases, the specific entries in the Schedules with respect to the operations of the monopoly determine the extent of the commitment.

*Domestic court ruling on classification*

15. Paragraph 5 of Article II provides for consultation and negotiations for compensatory adjustment in the event domestic courts or quasi-judicial authorities in a Member rule on a classification question in a manner which is at variance with the concession embodied in the Schedule. This paragraph is really a provision for renegotiation of commitments made already. However, an important difference from other renegotiation provisions which we have considered earlier is that here the renegotiation can be done after the change in tariff, as against the requirement in Article XXVIII for renegotiation to be completed before the modification or withdrawal of the concession.

*Specific duties and depreciation of currency*

16. Tariffs can be bound in *ad valorem* or specific terms. In cases in which they are expressed in specific terms the real incidence of tariffs can be affected by a depreciation of the currency. In the days of fixed exchange rates Article IV of the original Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund required each member of the Fund to state a par value for its currency in terms of gold or US dollars of a fixed gold value. A change in the par value of a member's currency could be made only after consultation with the Fund. Paragraph 6 of Article II of GATT 1947 provided that in cases in which the par value was reduced consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (from such value prevailing on "the date of this Agreement") by more than 20 per cent, the specific duties could be adjusted to take account of such reduction, provided that the CONTRACTING PARTIES concurred that such adjustments would not impair the value of the concessions. The "date of this Agreement" here has the same connotations as the "date of this Agreement" with reference to Article II:1(b) described earlier. Pursuant to this provision certain contracting parties were authorized to make adjustments nine times between 1950 and 1975.

17. After the system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned, Article IV of the IMF Articles was revised so as not to require the stating of par values but instead to stipulate that "each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates". Some members of the Fund have floating exchange rates, while others maintain the exchange rate against one other currency, a basket of currencies or an international unit of account. To take into account this

change in the international monetary system, a decision was adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in 1980 providing as follows:

"In the present monetary situation the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall apply the provisions of Article II:6(a) as set out below unless they consider that this would not be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case, for example, because it would lead to an impairment of the value of a specific duty concession.....

"If a contracting party, in accordance with Article II:6(a) of the General Agreement, requests the CONTRACTING PARTIES to concur with the adjustment of bound specific duties to take into account the depreciation of its currency, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall ask the International Monetary Fund to calculate the size of the depreciation of the currency and to determine the consistency of the depreciation with the Fund's Articles of Agreement....

"The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be deemed to have authorized the contracting party to adjust its specific duties...if the International Monetary Fund advises the CONTRACTING PARTIES that the depreciation calculated as set out above...is in excess of 20 per cent and consistent with the Fund's Articles of Agreement and if, during the sixty days following the notification of the Fund's advice to the contracting parties, no contracting party claims that a specific duty adjustment to take into account the depreciation would impair the value of the concession...."<sup>8</sup>

*Schedules of concessions an integral part of GATT 1994*

18. Article II makes the annexed Schedules of Concessions an integral part of Part I of the General Agreement, which consists of Articles I and II of the Agreement. One of the consequences of this in GATT 1947 was that amendments to Schedules required acceptance by all contracting parties, as required in Article XXX of GATT 1947. The position has not changed in the WTO Agreement as it is provided that, in respect of certain articles (including Articles I and II of GATT 1994), amendments shall take effect only upon acceptance by all Members. We shall examine later the pragmatic ways in which GATT contracting parties dealt with the requirement of unanimity for the amendment of Schedules.

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<sup>8</sup> GATT, BISD, Twenty-seventh Supplement, pp. 28-29.