Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule

This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework, which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders’ use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history, and political philosophy.

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Murphy Institute Studies in Political Economy

General Editor: Richard F. Teichgraeber III

The books in this series are occasional volumes sponsored by the Murphy Institute of Political Economy at Tulane University and Cambridge University Press, comprising original essays by leading scholars in the United States and other countries. Each volume considers one of the intellectual preoccupations or analytical procedures currently associated with the term “political economy.” The goal of the series is to aid scholars and teachers committed to moving beyond the traditional boundaries of their disciplines in a common search for new insights and new ways of studying the political and economic realities of our time. The series is published with the support of the Tulane-Murphy Foundation.

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Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule

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To Sam Beer

a constitutionalist for the ages
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