The World Bank is dedicated to the promotion of sustainable economic development and to poverty reduction throughout the developing world. It faces new challenges as capital shortages are replaced by large but volatile capital flows. The contributors to this volume argue that the Bank's greatest asset is its accumulated knowledge and experience of the development process, and propose that it organise itself around the concept of a 'Knowledge Bank'. They propose a shift in priority, away from lending with conditionality imposed on borrowing governments, towards assistance to governments in devising good development strategies. Part One examines the existing structure of the Bank and considers the World Bank as an institution. In Part Two the effectiveness of World Bank assistance is evaluated. This book provides essential reading for politicians, civil servants, workers in the non-official sector, and academics and students involved or interested in the development process.

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The World Bank
Structure and Policies

edited by
Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines
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This is the third of a series of books produced under the auspices of the Global Economic Institutions Research programme of the UK Economic and Social Research Council. The first two titles have been about Europe, East Asia and regionalism, and about the IMF and international financial crises. There will also be an overview book on global architecture and the reform of global economic institutions, and further volumes may follow.

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In early 1994, the UK Economic and Social Research Council (the ESRC) launched the Global Economic Institutions (GEI) Research Programme, with the objective of funding academic research on the functioning of multilateral economic organisations and about the global institutional structures within which economic activity takes place. As part of this programme, a group of researchers has been considering the structure and policies of the World Bank. This book, which brings together that work, is edited by Christopher Gilbert (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, Queen Mary and Westfield College, London and CEPR), who has led the research, and David Vines (Balliol College, Oxford, Australian National University and CEPR), who is Director of the GEI Programme.

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