Dynamic Competition and Public Policy

Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues

During the 1990s, U.S. antitrust policy began to take greater account of economic theories that emphasize the critical role of innovation and change in the competitive process. Several high-profile antitrust cases have focused on dynamic innovation issues as much as or more than static economic efficiency. But does dynamic competition furnish a new rationale for activist antitrust or a new reason for government to leave markets alone? In this volume, leading scholars with extensive antitrust experience explore this question in the context of the Microsoft case, merger policy, and intellectual property law.

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Edited by

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In addition to the contributors who authored chapters, a number of other individuals played a key role in making this volume a reality. Authors received helpful feedback from the many individuals who commented on papers at the conference where they were first presented: Manus Cooney, Michael Etchison, Harold Furtchgott-Roth, Michael Klass, William Kovacic, Robert Raben, Erik Sirri, Greg Vistnes, and Greg Werden. Mike Etchison also deserves special thanks for asking some probing questions about practical applications of dynamic competition theories that eventually prompted us to explore the idea of holding the conference in the first place.

At the Mercatus Center, Tom Reardon and Rob McCutcheon did yeoman's work in organizing our first ever symposium held specifically for economists and attorneys in federal antitrust and economic regulatory agencies. LaTrease Williams stepped in at the last minute to provide the extra help we needed to make the conference work. Graham Barron provided some last-minute editorial assistance in preparing the manuscript for publication, and Chris Grengs, Kirstin Lindsey, Colleen Morretta, and Felipe Ward rectified some significant eleventh-hour problems.

Thanks also go to the Mercatus Center and the James Buchanan Center at George Mason University for financial support. I am especially indebted to the president of the Institute for Humane Studies, David Nott, for understanding and supporting this project at a time when it was still vaguely formed in my own mind.
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