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Richard Grassby

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Introduction: Models and Myths

England is often described as the first modern society—a classic manifestation of the modernization model. Whether the great discontinuity is identified with industrialization or with capitalism, it is assumed that England during the seventeenth century made a qualitative transition from an organic, natural order to an artificial, monetary civilization, from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*. An agrarian, immobile, self-sufficient, traditionalist, fully integrated, regional society, based on custom, reciprocity, hierarchy, and status, is alleged to have been replaced by an individualistic, rational, impersonal, mobile, heterogeneous, literate, urbanized, profit-maximizing, national society within a large-scale market economy, based on the division of labor, specific roles, contract, competition, and private property rights.¹

In the modernization model of the “big ditch,” which employs the classic rhetorical device of bipolarization, relationships formulated on historical experience and cultural norms are juxtaposed with those based on the exercise of rational will and anticipation of the future.² It is both descriptive and prescriptive; since change is institutionalized as the norm and regarded as irreversible, any regressions are treated as irrational aberrations. By postulating a fundamental and universal break in human

¹ The original theory is usually attributed to F. Toennies, *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft*, ed. C. P. Loomis (East Lansing, 1957), 165. Both concepts were ideal types: see R. Heberle, “Ferdinand Toennies” in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, ed. H. E. Barnes (1965), 151. Emile Durkheim argued that the division of labor made society more complex but rejected the idea of *gesellschaft*, that a society could exist solely on contract and self-interest: see A. Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1971), 77. The most persistent advocate of the premarket economy is K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1985), 53–4, 70.

² J. A. Hall and J. C. Jarvie, eds., Introduction to *Transition to Modernity* (Cambridge, 1992), 4.

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evolution, the model in effect invents the very concept of modernity. It is so simple, convenient, and comprehensive that it has been borrowed, extended, and adapted by theorists with widely different agendas. It was even acknowledged in principle by theorists of social equilibrium; Parsonian models, for example, are both synchronic and diachronic. Historians preoccupied with dividing the past into periods and obsessed with categorizing changes of mentality as well as changes in the economy and society have adopted and merged it with the Whig concept of history as progress.

The original reason why Ferdinand Toennies developed his famous dichotomy was his belief and concern that both the family and the community in which it was embedded had been transmuted into civil society. At the core of the modernization model lies the assumption that the self-sufficiency and intimacy of the traditional family, which was extended and supported by a network of kin, was superseded by the nuclear family, based on the conjugal couple, individualism, and domesticity. At the same time, the traditional community, based on homogeneity, conformity, commensality, and consensus, is assumed to have been destroyed by the division of labor, the market economy, industrialization, and urbanization.

Empirical historians have, of course, queried both the chronology of the great transition and the reality of sudden and irreversible change. It has been argued that individualism and affection emerged in England long before the major economic changes of the early modern period.³ Family historians have emphasized the continuity of communal forms, that the nuclear family had a long history and coexisted with kinship, and that the household was different from the family.⁴ A substantial literature has emerged on the demography and structure of county families and provincial urban elites; a few monographs have even explored kinship networks in business.

³ A. MacFarlane, *The Culture of Capitalism* (Oxford, 1987), 133.

⁴ D. B. Smith, "The Study of the Family," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 39 (1982): 18–19; J. Demos, "Images of the American Family" in *Changing Images of the Family*, ed. V. Tufte and B. Myerhoff (New Haven, 1979), 59; T. K. Haveren, "The History of the Family," *American Historical Review* 96 (1991): 95–124; R. Wheaton, "Observations on Kinship History" in *Family History at the Crossroads*, ed. T. K. Haveren and A. Plakans (Princeton, 1987), 285–301; K. Wrightson, "Household and Kinship," *History Workshop* 12 (1981): 156; J. J. Hurwich, "Lineage and Kin" in *The First Modern Society*, ed. A. L. Beier et al. (Cambridge, 1989), 60; J. D. Faubion, "Kinship is Dead," *Comparative Studies in Social History* 38 (1996): 67–91. The contributions of many other historians of the family will become evident in the course of this book.

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A wide gulf still persists, however, between the generality of current theory and the particularism of the research into family and kinship at different social and occupational levels. It is not surprising that theorists rarely cite concrete archival documents because they believe that the past has to be imagined and cannot be distilled from vast numbers of facts. But historians have also sinned by displaying an eagerness to generalize casually about hundreds of thousands of people on the basis of a handful of indiscriminately selected examples.⁵ This is tantamount to writing fiction, a task that novelists are far better equipped to perform. Other historians openly admit the inadequacy of their sources as scholarly insurance but then proceed to ignore their own caveats.⁶

The hypothetical relationship between the family and capitalism has never been systematically tested in the urban business community, where it should be most visible. There has been much speculation about the “bourgeois” family as the harbinger and pacemaker of change but no satisfactory or comprehensive research into the business family. The primary purpose of this book is to remedy that omission by studying in depth business families and their kinship networks throughout the English-speaking world, during a period when England emerged as a global economic power. It will both describe and analyze the history of the business family over four generations: what happened to it, how it functioned and responded to events, when and where it changed or failed to change, and why and in what directions it developed. At the very least, this study will provide empirical data either to validate or disprove prior theories of how the modern family developed. At most, it will make the evolution of modern society more intelligible.

MAX WEBER AND KARL MARX

Most theories of the family follow the modernization thesis but emphasize different catalysts. Max Weber, for example, rejected the

⁵ M. R. Hunt, *The Middling Sort* (Berkeley, 1996), 47, claims somewhat recklessly that there are no records of “non elite” family life before 1650. Those who do not seek do not find. Although it is not clear what proportion of the population would have been adult members of the “middling sort” between 1680–1780, a guesstimate would be at least 750,000. Largely ignoring statistics compiled by other historians, the author generalizes instead from a minute number of random examples drawn from completely different occupations and often a generation apart.

⁶ L. Stone, *Family Sex and Marriage* (1977) and “Family History,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 12 (1981): 76. The Stone model is still widely used by literary critics, even though it has been totally discredited by historians: see D. Cressy, “Foucault, Stone,” *English Literary Renaissance* 21 (1991): 130.

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evolutionary approach and did not believe that the logical antecedents of any event constituted a causal explanation.⁷ Instead of searching for historical laws, like Karl Marx, he followed Heinrich Rickert and preferred to construct ideal types that were essentially historical models designed to illustrate secular change by analysis of particular events and actions.⁸ Weber thought that explaining the origins of any change in terms of that change was tautological; in his view a change of norms had to precede changes in behavior and any change of ethos required an external agent.⁹ For Weber, a culture could only be displaced by prior intellectual shifts. The market needed a concept of capitalism before it could become capitalist; therefore, its emergence could not be explained in terms of postcapitalist values.¹⁰

Weber nonetheless incorporated much of the modernist thesis. He thought that the family had evolved from clans and that it acquired its bourgeois character from Puritanism.¹¹ The concept of the “calling” depersonalized the family and the neighborhood and created emotional detachment, though in England the feudal and the patrimonial were combined.¹² In the seventeenth century the notion of private property emerged and was guaranteed by the state; the isolation of the household satisfied an essential prerequisite of capitalism.¹³ Romantic love, which he considered both irrational and uncontrolled (just like capital accumulation), emerged as a necessary antidote to individual alienation. On the other hand, Weber believed that the extended family stifled economic

⁷ R. Bendix and G. Roth, eds., *Scholarship and Partisanship* (Berkeley, 1971), 38.

⁸ G. Roth, “History and Sociology,” *British Journal of Sociology* 27 (1976): 316; T. Burger, *Max Weber’s Theory of Concept Formation* (Durham, N.C., 1987), 210, 227; F. Ringer, *Max Weber’s Methodology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), chap. 2. T. Parsons, *The Early Essays*, ed. C. Camic (1991), 22, 208, found two kinds of ideal type in Weber and treated Werner Sombart’s categories as ideal types. Few sociologists have in fact adopted Weber’s methodology because it formulated no laws and required empirical research. The category of “real types” as described by A. Spiethoff, “Pure Theory and Economic Gestalt Theory” in *Enterprise and Social Change*, ed. F. C. Lande and J. C. Riemersma (Homewood, Ill., 1953), 453, has been totally ignored.

⁹ G. Marshall, *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York, 1982), 133.

¹⁰ D. I. Kertzer, “Anthropology and Family History,” *Journal of Family History* 9 (1984): 209.

¹¹ M. Weber, *General Economic History*, trans. F. H. Knight (New York, 1961), 50. Schumpeter, on the other hand, thought that the bourgeois family was ultimately destroyed by capitalism: see J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1976), 157.

¹² R. Bendix, *Max Weber* (1960), 70, 375; L. D. Blustone, *Max Weber’s Theory of the Family* (Port Washington, 1987), 162.

¹³ R. Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory* (Cambridge, 1987), 291.

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development because it put the group before the individual.¹⁴ He considered nepotism, for example, to be a crime, because it impeded the emergence of a universalistic, meritocratic bureaucracy, whereas to kin selection theorists nepotism is a necessary genetic trait.¹⁵

Karl Marx and his followers identified the great divide with the triumph of the capitalist mode of production that separated work from the household; the family evolved in stages parallel to the stages of capitalism.¹⁶ In the seventeenth century ownership was divorced from use, and labor rather than patrimony became the basis of familial life. The antifeudal family became a unit of consumption, education, and procreation instead of production; external institutions operating in an impersonal market took over its economic functions.¹⁷ Any exceptions in the historical record were treated as abnormalities. The inability of the neofeudal English theater to realize the contradictions within the forces of production has been attributed, for example, to bourgeois “historical immaturity” and the “ideological resistance of feudalism” dismissed as “anachronistic.”¹⁸

To Marxists, rational profit-seeking and individual thrift were emphasized above collective responsibility in a capitalist society. To Crawford MacPherson, the introduction of private property and a free market for land and labor destroyed blood ties and enhanced individual autonomy. Free, equal, and randomly associated individuals now exchanged their labor and competed in an open marketplace. England became a society of possessive individuals who maximized their utility and were bound by contract rather than defined by status.¹⁹ John Locke, and to a lesser extent Thomas Hobbes, are credited with having provided an

¹⁴ Weber argued that the corporate kin group (the sib) throttled capitalism: see Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory*, 267–9.

¹⁵ R. Fox, *Kinship and Marriage* (1983), 6.

¹⁶ B. Fine and E. Leopold, *Women's Employment and the Capitalist Family* (1992), 8; M. McKeon, “Historicizing Patriarchy,” *Eighteenth Century Studies* 28 (1995): 295–322.

¹⁷ E. Zaretsky, *Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life* (1976), xi, 16–7; A. Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, 2d ed. (Stanford, 1995), 166; J. de Vries, “The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution,” *Journal of Economic History* 44 (1994): 265. Since Marxist histories follow the same script and cite the same secondary sources, one or two examples serves for all.

¹⁸ W. Cohen, *Drama of a Nation* (Ithaca, 1985), 3; S. Bercovitch, “New England's Errand Reappraised” in *New Directions in American Intellectual History*, ed. J. Higham and P. Conkin (Baltimore, 1979), 93.

¹⁹ C. B. MacPherson, *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford, 1964), 53–4, 64.

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intellectual justification for this demise of the cooperative, moral economy by privileging private property rights over communal ownership in civil society.²⁰ The “critical theory” of Jürgen Habermas postulates that capitalism separated the private from the public sphere and the family from the economy.²¹

Some contemporary Marxists have reacted to the worldwide rejection of their doctrines by roping themselves to the mast: “by grace of bourgeois culture in decline, Marxism has emerged as the last bastion of historical thinking.”²² Others in a desperate attempt to cling to their faith have downplayed structuralism and the modernization model and clutched at any new and seemingly popular radical theory that might reverse their decline, producing some strange hybrids.²³ Elite groups have been credited with the ability to create an ideology, which served their interests, and then by fixing the terms of the discussion and through their control of access to knowledge, persuade their inferiors to accept it as valid. The concept of mentalities, though treated as an inert force, has been gingerly accepted as a dialectic between the objective conditions of human life and the way that people narrate it. Ideologies are still considered the product of social forces, but it is now conceded that the egotistic ideology of the bourgeoisie was gender specific, that women in the household might have contributed to primitive accumulation, that reproduction of the species was a mode of production, and that the term *culture* could be employed as a shorthand for the activities of a class.²⁴

²⁰ N. Bobbio, *Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition*, trans. D. Gobetti (Chicago, 1993), 14; R. Holton and B. Turner, *Max Weber on Economy and Society* (1984), 166.

²¹ J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 19, 24; D. Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory* (Cambridge, 1980), 41. The idea that value is objectified by exchange is most brilliantly argued by G. Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, trans. T. Bottomore and D. Frisby, 2d ed. (1990).

²² E. Fox Genovese, “Literary Criticism” in *The New Historicism*, ed. A. Veese (1989), 213.

²³ R. Hamilton, *The Liberation of Women* (1978), 98.

²⁴ G. Therborn, *The Ideology of Power* (1980), 6, 57, 158; C. Middleton, “Patriarchal Exploitation” in *Gender Class and Work*, ed. E. Gamarnikow et al. (1983), 19; W. Secombe, *A Millennium of Family Change* (New York, 1992), 4; M. Pereleman, *Classical Political Economy* (Totowa, 1984), 26–7; C. Meillassoux, *Maidens, Meal, and Money* (Cambridge, 1981), xiii. Marxism has, like all religions, spawned many heresies; the Frankfurt School jettisoned both economic and class determination, while continuing to denounce patriarchalism and the bourgeois family. Marxists argue heatedly among themselves about internal inconsistencies in their theory: see, for example, C. Mooers, *The Making of Bourgeois Europe* (1994). But this is equivalent to debating the color and shape of a unicorn’s horn without questioning whether unicorns exist.

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GENDER THEORY

The central preoccupation of gender theorists has been the exclusion of women from power, often neglecting the family and economic dimensions.²⁵ The family nonetheless is at least an uninvited guest because it constituted the core of patriarchy. Marxism was linked to feminism through Friedrich Engels, who advanced the proposition that the victory of private over communal property had created patriarchy and the monogamous marriage—the exclusion of the wife from social production and the “subjugation of the one sex by the other.”²⁶ Passion could only occur in bourgeois social relations after the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The capitalist mode of production then divided women into either idle bourgeois, economically and emotionally dependent on their husbands, or into proletarians. By reducing wage earners to a proletariat, the bourgeoisie indirectly created subjectivity and therefore romantic love as well as boosting illegitimacy. Bourgeois civilization made the bourgeois woman.²⁷

These views, which were in fact based on the discredited theories of American anthropologist Lewis Morgan, had considerable influence on early gender models of the family.²⁸ Capitalism was blamed for regulating women’s reproduction and their access to economic power.²⁹ The market economy was credited with responsibility for converting property from a means of exchange between families into capital.³⁰ Capitalism is also alleged to have marginalized wives by divorcing them from the means of production and forcing them to lead pointless, idle lives in order to fortify the status of their husbands who paid the bills. The bourgeois individual is categorized not as economic man but as domestic woman.³¹ The bourgeois public sphere developed the conjugal family as

²⁵ P. Thompson, “Life Histories” in *Biography and Society*, ed. D. Bertaux (1982), 300.

²⁶ F. Engels, *The Origins of the Family*, trans. A. West and D. Torr (1940), 69; M. George, *Women in the First Capitalist Society* (Urbana, 1988), 4–5.

²⁷ K. Sacks, “Engels Revisited” in *Women, Culture, and Society*, ed. M. Z. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere (Stanford, 1974), 222. Elements of this model have also been adopted by A. Macfarlane, *Marriage and Love in England* (Oxford, 1986) and by E. Shorter, *Making of the Modern Family* (1976). It also features in general surveys such as M. Mascuch, “Social Mobility and Middling Self-Identity,” *Social History* 20 (1995): 55, and in an awkward and somewhat outdated form in D. C. Quinlan and J. A. Shackelford, “Economy and English Families,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 24 (1994): 431–63.

²⁸ Hamilton, *Liberation of Women*, 92–3.

²⁹ G. Lerner, *Creation of Patriarchy* (Oxford, 1986), 171.

³⁰ C. Jordan, *Renaissance Feminism* (Ithaca, 1990), 16.

³¹ N. Armstrong, *Desire and Domestic Fiction* (Oxford, 1987), 66.

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the site of a new form of subjectivity distinct from society.³² Women now had value in use and men value in exchange.

Gender theorists have also drawn, however, on the modernization model. One popular thesis has been that of Alice Clark who advanced the argument that capitalism marginalized women, but she also argued that they had enjoyed a productive role in an earlier “Golden Age” before the seventeenth century.³³ Followers of this school of thought were prepared to concede that the position of women had evolved, though not necessarily in one or the right direction.³⁴ Historians have argued, based on the evidence of literary sources and legal texts, that the vocational choices and property rights of women were deliberately narrowed by men in the early modern period.³⁵ The ideology of family love emerged to endorse male authority and female sacrifice—to control women and conceal their economic contribution.³⁶ Sexuality and companionate marriage were invoked to legitimate the class and gender hierarchy; the Renaissance woman with her spirit of rational equality became the subordinate wife of later centuries.³⁷ Traditional paternal patriarchy was converted into modern fraternal patriarchy.³⁸

Other theorists have chosen to regard patriarchal repression as omnipresent and changeless over time. Complex debates have occurred over whether or not patriarchy preceded capitalism and over the significance of contract.³⁹ The idealization of the family as a sanctuary of

³² T. Lovell, “Subjective Powers” in *The Consumption of Culture*, ed. J. Brewer and A. Bermingham (1995), 30.

³³ B. A. Hanawalt, ed., *Women and Work in Pre-industrial Europe* (Bloomington, 1986), xv, and “The Widow’s Mite” in *Upon My Husband’s Death*, ed. L. Mirrer (Ann Arbor, 1992), 40; M. K. McIntosh, *A Community Transformed* (New York, 1991), 289–90; S. O. Rose, “Proto Industry,” *Journal of Family History* 13 (1988): 192.

³⁴ A. J. Vickers, “Golden Age to Separate Spheres,” *Historical Journal* 36 (1993): 383–414.

³⁵ A. L. Erickson, *Women and Property* (1993), 227; R. E. Archer, “Women as Landholders” in *Woman Is a Worthy Wight*, ed. P. J. P. Goldberg (1992), 162; S. Staves, *Married Women’s Separate Property* (Cambridge, 1990), 35, chap. 4; E. Spring, *Law, Land, and Family* (Chapel Hill, 1993), passim; M. Berg, “Women’s Property,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 24 (1993): 243.

³⁶ L. S. Robinson, *Sex, Class, and Culture* (1978), 174.

³⁷ V. Wayne, introduction to A. Tilney, *A Brief Discourse* (Ithaca, 1992), 4.

³⁸ C. Pateman, *The Disorder of Women* (Stanford, 1989), 35.

³⁹ C. Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, 1988), 25–7, 37–8; S. Walby, *Theorizing Patriarchy* (Oxford, 1991), passim; H. Hartman, “Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation,” *Signs* 1 (1976): 137–69; R. Coward, *Patriarchal Precedents* (1983), 88; H. Hartmann, “The Unhappy Marriage” in *Women and Revolution*, ed. L. Sargent (1981), 1–41; J. S. Jaquette, “Contract and Coercion” in *Women Writers and the Early Modern British Political Tradition*, ed. H. L. Smith (1998), 216. R. MacKonnough and R. Harrison, “Patriarchy and Relations of Production” in *Feminism and Materialism*, ed. A. Kuhn and A. M. Wolpe (1978), 40, advocate a dual notion of patriarchy.

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sentiment is interpreted as a reinforcement of patriarchy. Men have been accused of criticizing women for participating in a system that was designed to entrap them by making marriage and consumption the only outlets for their energies.⁴⁰ Historians who argue that women enjoyed power in the household have been dismissed as “duped by the hierarchizing rhetoric of a gendered division of economic labor.”⁴¹

Other gender theorists have mixed economic with cultural determinism. To them, men conquer by internalizing norms and expectations rather than by enforcing obedience. They construct ideals to “uphold the developing apparatus of male bourgeois power”; the character of motherhood therefore has to be reconstructed by imagination, not from “actual material behavior.”⁴² Male authors have been accused of deliberately defining women’s power in terms of sex and their status in terms of desexualized idleness.⁴³ The importance of the family and kinship is rejected on the grounds that culture and not biology differentiate men from women.⁴⁴

FAMILY MODELS

The family can be regarded as a psychological, biological, social, economic, or political construct. It can be extended upward, downward, and laterally through intermarriage or by incorporating household servants. It can be restricted to male descendants who share the same surname (a house) or expanded to include offspring through daughters. It can consist of solitary bachelors, spinsters, widowers and widows, childless couples, single parents with young children, and coresident siblings. It has never been a rigid institution, and its structure has changed continuously with the life cycle, as its members move in and out, marry, age, and die. Any individual belongs to two families—the family of orientation into which he was born and the family of procreation created by marriage. The family is therefore a moving target and is best defined in terms of what it is not, as occupying all the space not filled by other social institutions.

Historians of the family have devised an elaborate classification

⁴⁰ L. T. Fitz, “What Says the Married Woman,” *Mosaic* 13 (1980): 10.

⁴¹ L. Hutson, *The Usurer’s Daughter* (1994), 23.

⁴² T. Bowers, *Politics of Motherhood* (Cambridge, 1996), 20.

⁴³ J. Wiltenburg, *Disorderly Women and Female Power* (Charlottesville, 1992), 257.

⁴⁴ J. F. Collier and S. J. Yanagisako, eds., *Gender and Kinship* (Stanford, 1983), 49.

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system to distinguish different forms and combinations of forms.⁴⁵ For analytical purposes these have been reduced here to three categories: the nuclear family, the extended family, and the household. The nuclear consists of parents, stepparents, or substitute parents, children, and stepchildren. The extended embraces all relations by blood (consanguinal) or marriage (affinal). There was no sharp line of differentiation in the early modern period between agnatic and affinal; the family was an entirety of persons connected by marriage or along filiation lines rather than a dynasty or succession of individuals.

The household was, however, separate from the family. The household was a unit of coresidence that might not include some family members but did include nonfamily members such as servants, apprentices, and lodgers. Grown sons and daughters might live temporarily or permanently in the parental household before and after marriage or move back to assist or replace a parent. From the point of view of the tax-collecting state, the family was a cluster of dependents living under the authority of a household.⁴⁶

Some family models are variations of modernization models. The Parsonian model is ahistorical and predicates a shift from universal to particular, from ascription to achievement, from diffuse to specific roles; the kinship system has to be destroyed and this is effected by industrialization.⁴⁷ The Stone model of change is historical but is still based on the proposition that the extended family was superseded by the nuclear family. It also incorporates an assumed psychological revolution in attitudes and sentiments, an idea originally propounded by Philippe Aries. A similar argument has been advanced by Shorter who surmised that the new capitalist society promoted egotism in the emotional sphere as well as in the market.⁴⁸ The emergence of sentimentalism in the family has also been interpreted as a mirror image of rationalism and the work ethic—dreaminess is associated with mothers and rational capitalism

⁴⁵ P. Laslett, "Family and Household" in *Social and Economic Aspects of the Family*, ed. R. Wall and S. Osamu (Cambridge, 1993), table 17.1.

⁴⁶ K. Wrightson, "The Policy of the Parish" in *The Experience of Authority*, ed. P. Griffiths, A. Fox, and S. Hindle (1996), 13.

⁴⁷ T. Parsons, *Family Socialization and Interactive Process* (Glencoe, 1955), 16, 20. Parsons had no "nostalgic conceptualization of *gemeinschaft*": see R. J. Holton and B. S. Turner, *Talcott Parsons on Economy and Society* (1986), 23, 218.

⁴⁸ Shorter, *Making of the Modern Family*, 259. The views of most academics are determined not by current events but by the political and personal traumas of their youth: see D. Chinot, "Changing Fashion" in *The State of Sociology*, ed. J. F. Short (Beverly Hills, 1981), 260.