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Contents

List of figures		page x1	
Pre	eface		xiii
I	Ass	umptions, distinctions, and a map	I
•	1 133	Physicalism and naturalism	1
	2	Functionalism and theory-theory	5
	3	Some distinctions: kinds of consciousness	9
	_	A route map: the tree of consciousness	22
2	Perspectival, subjective, and worldly facts		27
	I	Perspectival and 'myness' facts	27
	2	On facts and properties	32
	3	Necessary identities	39
	4	Logical supervenience	49
3	Explanatory gaps and qualia		59
	I	Cognitive closure	59
	2	The explanatory gap	64
	3	The knowledge argument	71
	4	Inverted and absent qualia arguments	76
4	Naturalisation and narrow content		88
	I	Neural identities and consciousness boxes	88
	2	Naturalisation by content	95
	3	Wide versus narrow content	104
	4	Phenomenal consciousness and narrow content	109
5	First-order representationalism		114
	I	FOR theory: elucidation	114
	2	FOR theory: defence	122
	3	Non-conceptual content versus analog content	129
	4	More varieties of FOR theory	136
6	Against first-order representationalism		147
	I	Non-conscious experience: the case from common sense	147
	2	Non-conscious experience: the scientific case	154
	3	A trilemma for FOR theory	168
	4	Non-conscious phenomenality?	175

ix



Cambridge University Press 0521781736 - Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory Peter Carruthers Table of Contents More information

x	Contents		
7	Higher-order representationalism: a first defence	180	
	 Overview and preliminaries 	180	
	2 HOR theory and qualia irrealism	184	
	3 Of animals, infants, and the autistic	193	
	4 Moral consequences?	203	
8	Dispositionalist higher-order thought theory (1): function		
	I Higher-order experience (HOE) theory	210	
	2 Actualist HOT theory	219	
	3 Dispositionalist HOT theory	227	
	4 Dispositional theory and categorical experience	233	
9	Dispositionalist higher-order thought theory (2): feel		
	I HOE theory and feel	236	
	2 Actualist HOT theory and feel	239	
	3 Consumer semantics and feel	241	
	4 Elucidations and replies	259	
10	Phenomenal consciousness and language		
	I Reflexive thinking theory and language	271	
	2 Higher-order description (HOD) theory	278	
	3 The Joycean machine	282	
	4 The independence of structured HOTs from language	288	
II	Fragmentary consciousness and the Cartesian theatre	297	
	I Multiple drafts <i>versus</i> integrated contents	297	
	2 Fragmenting the Cartesian theatre	307	
	3 Time as represented <i>versus</i> time of representing	313	
	4 Objective <i>versus</i> subjective time	318	
	Conclusion		
Refe	References		
Aut	Author index		
Sub	Subject index		