Index

 2×2 generic games, 403 fictitious play in, 423-5 reinforcement learning and replicator dynamics in, 403 - 5smooth fictitious play in, 430-2 adverse selection, 244-5 in the insurance market, see Rotschild-Stiglitz adverse selection model allocations, 83-4 aggregate feasibility of, 87, 98 efficient, 84 individual feasibility of, 87 individual optimality of, 98 Lindahl, 89 Walrasian, 97-8 assessment, 118 consistent, 129-31 asymmetric information, see incomplete information asymptotic stability, 367-8 auctions, 254 double, 271-5 and efficiency impossibility, 266-7 first-price, 267-71 and income equivalence theorem, 254-7, 275 modified first-price, 266 revenue-maximizing, 262-7 second price and modified second price, 266 backward induction, 111 and credibility, 112 in finitely repeated games, 281-2 vs. forward induction, 124 bargaining bilateral, 159 outcome vs. Walrasian allocation, 169-70 parallel, 166 Rubinstein-Stahl model of, 159-65 Rubinstein-Wolinsky model of, 166-71 battle of the sexes game, 2 "burning money" version, 126-7 extensive-form representation of, 10 incomplete information version, 188-9, 193-4, 198 sequential version, 3 signaling version, 210-3 strategic-form representation of, 15

Bayesian games, 191-3 continuation strategies in, 192 Harsanyi's formalization of, 192-3 in the insurance market, see Rotschild-Stiglitz adverse selection model and interim situations, 191-2 Nature, role of, 191-2 perturbed, 220-1 strategies in, 193 types and private information in, 191-3 Bayes-Nash equilibrium, 196-8 definition of, formal, 197 existence of, 198 and interim optimality, 197 beer-quiche game, see breakfast in the American West game behavioral strategies, 18 and mixed strategies, 18-21 and strategic equivalence, 21-3 beliefs, 118-19 and consistent assessments, 129-31 credibility of, 120-1 Grain of Truth condition in, 434 Bertrand oligopoly model, 78-83 and Bertrand's paradox, 79 under capacity constraints, 153-9 with heterogeneous goods, 81-3 and Hotelling model, 176 Nash equilibrium in, 80-1 perfect competition outcome in, 81 Bertrand oligopoly model, repeated, 334-5 collusive behavior in, 335-6, 337-41 trigger strategies in, 335-6 under imperfect observation, 336-41 under perfect observation, 334-6 best-response correspondences, 39, 427 and smoothed best-response functions, 427-8 better- and best-response dynamics, 415-20, 449 in bilateral coordination games, 459-66 in Cournot oligopoly, 469-70 in dominance solvable games, 416 in minimum-effort game, 466 nonconvergence of, 420-1 in ordinal-potential games, 418 in round-robin context games, 419

508 Index

breakfast in the American West game, 205-6, 215-17 carrot-and-stick strategies, 327-8 centipede game, 146 chain-store game, 297-300 incomplete information version, 299-300 reputation effects in, 298-9 coalition-proof equilibrium, 55 constant-sum games, 45 continuation payoffs, 164 continuation strategy, 192 conventional strategy spaces, 438-40 and neutrality condition, 439 cooperative games, 23-5 characteristic function in, 24 coordination failures and Keynesian equilibria, 99 - 104coordination games, bilateral, 414, 449-50 best-response dynamics and equilibrium selection in, 459-66 under centralized interaction, 451, 464-6 under global interaction, 450, 454-62 learning by imitation and equilibrium selection in, 454-9, 462, 464 under local interaction, 451, 462-4 pure-, see pure-coordination games core solution. 23-25 correlated equilibrium, 56-61 existence of, 60 Cournot oligopoly model, 72-8 vs. Bertrand competition, 154 discretized and symmetric version of, 413-14, 452-3, 467 experimental evidence on, 472-4 under incomplete information, 189-90, 194, 198-200 iterative elimination of dominated strategies in, 77 - 8Nash equilibrium of, 73 reaction functions in, 76, 213 as signaling game, 213-15 vs. Stackelberg solution, 153 Cournot oligopoly model, repeated, 324-5, 413-14 best-response dynamics and equilibrium selection in, 469-70 carrot-and-stick strategies in, 327-8 collusive behavior in, 328-9, 331-4 learning by imitation and equilibrium selection in, 468-9 trigger strategies in, 325-6 under imperfect observation, 329-34 under perfect observation, 324-9 dominance solvable games, 35, 38, 416 and better-response dynamics, 416

dominated strategy, 30-4, 136-9 iterative elimination of, 34-5, 77-8 in pure strategies, 33, 380 and rationality, 31-2 strongly, 32 weakly, and iterative elimination of, 136-9, 381-2 ε -Nash equilibrium and ε -subgame-perfect equilibrium, 309-11, 435-7 ε -perfect equilibrium, 121–2 equilibrium path, 114-15 evolutionary model, canonical, 476-7 cost function in, 476 speed of convergence in, 479 stochastic stability and long-run dynamics in, 477-9 evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), 357-61 and asymptotic stability in RD, 369-70 and Nash equilibrium, 358-9 nonexistence of, 360 and perfect equilibrium, 359-60 evolutionary systems, social, 372-82 payoff monotonicity property in, 376-7 regular and payoff-monotonic, see RPMES regularity property in, 378 two-population RD, 376 vs. RD, 372, 376 extensive-form representation, games in, 4-8, 11-13 and backward induction, 111-12 events in. 4 game trees for, 3, 5-6 history in, 5 information sets in, 7 nodes in, 5-6 order of moves in, 6 strategic-form representation of, 12-13, 135, 140, 142 fictitious play, 421-7 in 2×2 generic games, 423-5finite games, 35 folk theorems, 283, 286 with finite horizon, 291-4, 307-11 under incomplete information, 312-15, 317-19 with infinite horizon, 287-91, 300-4 and subgame perfection, 300-11 forward induction, 124-5, 127-8 vs. backward induction, 124 and deviations as signals, 127-8 and elimination of weakly dominated strategies, 128, 137-8 example of, 123-4 and the intuitive criterion, 221-4 and alternative theories of play, 124-5 free rider problem, 85-6 Glazer-Ma allocation mechanism, 179-82 Grain of Truth assumption, 434-9

Nash equilibrium uniqueness in, 38

in pure strategies, 381

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Index

509

hawk-dove game, 361-2 Nash equilibrium and ESS in, 362 RD and asymptotic stability in, 370-1 Herfindhal index, 74-5 highest-card game, 11 extensive-form representation of, 12 strategic-form representation of, 15 Hotelling oligopoly model, 171-6 and Bertrand model, 176 interpretation of, 171-2 SPE in, 175-6 imitation learning dynamics, 414-15, 448 in bilateral coordination games, 454-9, 462, 464 in Cournot oligopoly, 468-9 in minimum-effort game, 466-7 perturbed process of, 454 implementation problem, see also mechanism design, 90-1 Bayesian, 258-9 Nash, see Nash implementation problem with single-valued SCR, 182 income equivalence theorem, 266-7 incomplete information, see also Bayesian games, 113, 191-2 battle of the sexes under, 188-9, 193-4 Cournot duopoly under, 189-90, 194 individual rationality condition, 263, 273, 287 interim optimality, 197 interim situations, 191-2 intuitive criterion, 217, 221-4 definition of, formal, 223-4 and forward induction, 221-2 signaling equilibrium satisfying it, existence of, 224 Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, 51 Kalai-Lehrer theorem, 436 King Solomon's dilemma, 94, 177-82 implementation possibility of, see Glazer-Ma allocation mechanism Nash implementation impossibility of, 94, 177-9 Kuhn's Theorem, 23, 433 labor market and efficiency wages model, 341-51 repeated game with imperfect observation in, 347 - 51repeated game with perfect observation in, 344-7

stage game in, 342–4 Leontieff technology, 99 Lerner index, 75–6 Liapunov stability, 368 limit invariant distribution, 454, 477 Liouville's theorem, 431–2

Markov chains, 474–6 ergodicity in, 475 invariant distribution of, 475 matching-pennies game, 9 extensive-form representation of, 9 fictitious play in, 423 perturbed version, 219-21 repeated, 218 strategic-form representation of, 14 maximin value, 46-50 mechanism, 91-2, 257-8 definition of, formal, 91 direct, 258 outcome function in, 91 mechanism design, 90-91, 176-82 for indivisible object, allocation of, 176-182 and Nash implementation, see Nash implementation problem for public-good, allocation of, see public-good allocation set of environments in. 91 social choice rule in, 91 minimax payoff, 287-9 minimax value, 46-50 minimum-effort game, 451-2 best-response dynamics and equilibrium selection in, 466 experimental evidence on, 471-2 imitation learning and equilibrium selection in, 466 - 7risk-dominance and efficiency in, 467 mistakes, 121-3, 132 in strategic-form, 139 mixed extension of a game, 16-18 and extensive-form representation, 18 and strategic-form representation, 17 expected payoffs in, 17 mixed strategies, 16-17 vs. behavioral strategies, 18-21 discussion of, 217-18 and strategic equivalence, 21-3 support of, 33 monotonicity condition, 93 Nachbar theorem, 440 Nash equilibrium, 35-9 and best-response correspondences, 39-44 and correlated equilibria, 60-1 criticisms of, 126 definition of, formal, 37, 39 discussion of, 36-7

in dominance solvable games, 38 existence of, 38, 43–5, 50–3 as a fixed point, 39, 50–1 and mechanism design, *see* Nash implementation

problem in mixed strategies, 39, 217–18 pure strategy, 37–8, 53 and rationalizability, 64

refinements of, 110, 115, 117, 120, 128, 131, 135 uniqueness of, 38, 123

CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press 0521772516 - Economics and the Theory of Games Fernando Vega-Redondo Index More information

510 Index

in weakly undominated strategies, 136 in zero-sum games, 47-50 Nash implementation problem, 90-9, 176-7 canonical mechanism for, 95-7 definition of, formal, 90-2 and full information extraction, 97 in King Solomon's dilemma, impossibility of, 94, 177-9 and monotonicity condition, 93 and No Veto Power condition, 93, 95 necessary conditions for, 93, 177 sufficient conditions for, 95 and Walrasian SCR, 98 No Veto Power condition, 95 normal-form representation, see extensive-form representation, games in oligopolies, 72-83, 151-159 Bertrand model of, 78-83, 334-41 Cournot model of, 72-8, 324-34 Hotelling model of, 171-6 price competition under capacity constraints model of. 153-9 Stackelberg model of, 151-3 order beliefs, 62 overtaking criterion, 285n payoff dominance, 32, 136 payoffs, 7 in mixed extension, 17 payoffs, intertemporal, 282-5 and overtaking criterion, 285n discounted, 284 limit average, 285 time-average, 284 perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 120 perfect equilibrium, 121-2, 131-4, 139-42 consistency and subgame perfection of, 134 definition of, formal, 132 discussion of, 121-12 existence of, 133-4 in strategic form, 139-42 perfect recall, 18, 116-17 definition of, formal, 21 and strategic equivalence, 21-3 perturbed Markov processes, 474-82 canonical model of, 476-7 Markov chains in, 474-6 pooling equilibrium, 212-3 potential and ordinal-potential games, 417-19 prisoner's dilemma, 1, 281 coalition-proof equilibrium in, 55 experimental evidence on, 492-5 incomplete information version, 295-6 RD in, 387-93 reinforcement learning and equilibrium selection in, 407-10, 485-90 repeated, finitely, 281-2, 294

repeated, infinitely, 282-3 reputation effects in, 295 strong equilibrium, nonexistence of, in, 54 trigger strategies in, 434, 493 tit-for-tat strategies in, 296, 434, 494 proper equilibrium, 122-3, 133-4 consistency and subgame perfection of, 134 definition of, formal, 133 discussion of, 122-3 existence of, 133-4 in strategic form, 142 pseudo-stationary equilibrium, 164 public-good allocation, 83-90 benevolent planner in, 83 Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition in, 84-85, 89 efficient allocations in, 83-4 free rider problem in, 85-6 Lindahl Equilibrium in, 88 subscription mechanism for, 85-6 Walker's efficient mechanism for, 86-90 pure-coordination games, bilateral, 411-12 reinforcement learning and equilibrium selection in, 490–2 purification of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, 218-19 and smoothed best-response functions, 428 rational agents, 1-2, 103 rational expectations, 104 rational learning model, 433-41 conventional strategy spaces in, 438-40 Grain of Truth assumption in, 434 and Kalai-Lehrer theorem, 436 and Nachbar theorem, 440 rationality and common knowledge, 31, 61-2 as dominated strategies avoidance, 32, 35 as payoff maximization, 1-2, 30, 62 order beliefs in, 62 rationalizability, 61-8 and common knowledge of rationality, 61-2 and iterative deletion of dominated strategies, 65-6 and Nash equilibrium, 64 and order beliefs, 62 and rationalizable strategies, 62-3 regular and payoff-monotonic evolutionary systems (RPMES), 378 dominance in pure strategies in, 380 Nash equilibrium in, 378-9 payoff monotonicity property in, 377 regularity property in, 378 trading complementarities under, 382-4 reinforcement learning dynamics, 399 with flexible aspirations, 406-12, 482-92 in prisoner's dilemma, 407-10, 485-90 in 2×2 generic games, 403–5 in pure-coordination games, 411-2, 490-1 with positive and fixed aspirations, 399-406

Index

511

renegotiation-proofness, 304-6 repeated games, 281-6 definition of, formal, 283-4 equilibrium multiplicity in, see folk theorems equilibrium robustness in, 314-15 under incomplete information, 295-300, 311-19 and Kalai-Lehrer theorem, 436 labor market, see labor market and efficiency wages model patience in, 285, 287 payoffs in, intertemporal, 282-5 renegotiation-proofness in, 304-6 reputation effects in, see reputation effects SPE uniqueness in, 306-7 replicator dynamics (RD), 363-6 and asymptotic stability, 368 continuous-time version of, 365 and ESS, 369 and Nash equilibrium, 366-7 and payoff-monotonicity, 377 and reinforcement learning dynamics, 401-3 and social evolution, 372 and weak dominance, 381-2 properties of, 366 repeated prisonner's dilemma under, 387-93 risky trading under, 384-7 in 2 \times 2 generic games, 403–5 two-population, 376, 401 vs. social evolutionary systems, 372, 376 reputation effects, 294-300, 311-19 in chain-store game, 297-300 with a common time horizon, 311-14 and irrationality, 295-7, 311-12 in prisoner's Dilemma, 295-7 with single long-run player, 315-19 reservation price, 266 reservation values, 268 revelation principle, 258-62, 271 and direct mechanisms, 260 in one-side auctions, 262-3 and truthful revelation, 260 in two-sided auctions, 272 risk aversion, 246 risk-dominance, 450 rock-scissors-paper game, 28, 362-363 ESS nonexistence in, 363 Nash equilibrium uniqueness in, 363 RD and stability in, 371-2 Rotschild-Stiglitz adverse selection model, 244-6 under complete information, 247-9 under incomplete information, 249 pooling equilibrium nonexistence, 249-51 separating equilibrium, necessary conditions for, 251 - 2separating equilibrium, nonexistence, 252-4 strategies, 246 WPBE and pure-strategy WPBE of, 246-7 zero-profit condition, 247

round-robin context games, 414, 419 Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model, 159-65 Rubinstein-Wolinsky bargaining model, 166-71 separating equilibrium, 212 sequential equilibrium, 120, 128-31 and consistent assesments, 129-31 consistency and subgame perfection of, 134 definition of, formal, 131 existence of, 133-4 and proper equilibrium in strategic form, 142 - 3sex-ratio game, 394-5 Shapley value, 23-5 signaling equilibrium, 208-10 beliefs and pattern of beliefs in, 208 definition of, formal, 209 existence of, 210 and intuitive criterion, 221-4 separating and pooling types of, 212-13 and WPBE, 208-9 signaling games, 204, 206-8 definition of, formal, 206-8 labor market, see Spence signaling model messages in, 207 strategies in, 207 smooth fictitious play, 427-33 and smoothed best-response function, 427 in 2×2 generic games, 430–2 social choice rule (SCR), 90-1 and monotonicity condition, 93 and No Veto Power condition, 93, 95 Walrasian, 98 Spence signaling model, 231-2 under complete information, 232-3 hybrid type equilibria in, 239-40 under incomplete information, 233-44 and the intuitive criterion, 240-4 pooling type equilibria in, 235-6 separating type equilibria in, 236-9 signaling equilibrium in, 234 Stackelberg oligopoly model, 151-3 vs. Cournot model, 153 SPE in, 153 stage game, 281, 284 stochastically stable states, 454, 477, 479-80 Ellison's approach to, 481-2 Freidlin-Wentzell's characterization of, 480 Young's characterization of, 480-1 strategic-form representation, games in, 12-14 and extensive-form representation of, 12-13, 135, 140, 142 payoff function in, 14 players in, 13 strategy space in, 13 strategy, 12 behavioral, 18 definition of, formal, 13

512 Index

dominated and weakly dominated, see dominated strategies mixed, 16-17 pure, 13, 16 rationalizable, 62-3 semistationary, 167 strict Nash equilibrium, 135, 402-3 strictly competitive games, see zero-sum games strong equilibrium and Pareto efficiency, 53-5 subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE), 111-13 and backward induction, 111 definition of, formal, 117 existence of, 133-4 and WPBE, 115, 119, 128 subgames and proper subgames, 111-12, 115-16 symmetric bilateral games, 356-7 symmetric games, 413

time discounting, 160 tit-for-tat strategies, 296, 388, 434 tree, game, 3, 5–6 trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, *see* perfect equilibrium trigger strategies, 325–6, 335–6, 434 types, 191-2, 206-7 rare, irrational, 295, 312 virtual valuation, 265 Walker's mechanism, 86-90 Walras law, 100 Walrasian equilibrium, 452 and imitation learning in Cournot oligopoly model, 468-9 weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (WPBE), 114-15, 117 - 20definition of, formal, 119 and SPE, 115, 119 zero-sum games, 45-50 and constant-sum games, 45-6 definition of, formal, 46 and equilibrium interchangeability, 50 fictitious play in, 423 maximin and minimax values in, 46 Nash equilibria for, 47 value of the game for, 48