Introduction

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Shakespeare and Early Modern Political Thought is the first collaborative attempt to situate Shakespeare’s works within the landscape of early modern political thought. It brings together intellectual historians and literary scholars to engage in a common enquiry that both sides have, until recently, pursued apart, if they have pursued it at all. Intellectual historians who have followed the so-called ‘contextualist’ method of intellectual history have generally focused their attention on recovering the historical meanings of texts canonically collected under the heading of political theory: that is, for the early modern period, works by such figures as Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas More, Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, James Harrington and John Locke. This style of intellectual history emerged originally as the means to interpret formal works of political argument, the great majority of which were composed as prose treatises: its first practitioners mostly overlooked other genres of early modern texts that also contain political reflection, most notably poetry and the drama. Literary scholars have generally been more open to applying the findings of intellectual history to their objects of study: indeed, placing works by such canonical figures as Edmund Spenser, Philip Sidney, Ben Jonson, John Milton and Andrew Marvell in dialogue with early modern political thought has been one of the major achievements of literary and historical scholarship since the 1980s.1 However, until very recently one major early

modern writer has not been treated systematically as a participant in the political thought of his time: William Shakespeare.

To be sure, Shakespeare criticism has long treated such figures as Machiavelli and Montaigne as the poet’s interlocutors, but rarely has their impact been subject to sustained analysis on the level of political thought. There have been those influenced by the work of the political philosopher Leo Strauss who have aimed to extract timeless political wisdom from Shakespeare’s plays.¹ There was also an influential group of (mostly British) Marxist critics who sought to unmask the politics in the plays under the rubric of ‘cultural materialism’.¹ And a few germinal essays appeared in the 1980s placing Shakespeare’s works within historical discourses of republicanism, monarchy and resistance theory.¹ Shakespeare’s political thought was never entirely neglected during the following quarter-century or so of highly productive work in cultural materialism, New Historicism, the new textual criticism and the new theatre history of performance and production, but it inspired few monographs and almost no collective volumes, in contrast, for example, to studies of Shakespeare’s relation to the religious thought and practice of his time.³ These religious concerns have given fresh impetus to biographical work on Shakespeare; the closely related questions of political thought have only just begun to inspire similar study and debate.⁵

⁵ For the recent interest in Shakespeare’s religious thought see, for example, Stephen Greenblatt, *Hamlet in Purgatory* (Princeton, 2003); Richard Dutton, Alison Findlay and Richard Wilson, eds., *Theatre and Religion: Lancastrian Shakespeare* (Manchester, 2003); Dennis Taylor and David Beauregard, eds., *Shakespeare and the Culture of Christianity in Early Modern England* (New York, 2003); Julia Reinhard Lupton, *Citizen-Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology* (Chicago, 2005);
To locate Shakespeare’s engagement with early modern political thought, it is important to begin with an understanding that he and his contemporaries inhabited a moral world that was dramatically different from that which followed the American, French and Industrial Revolutions. Elizabethans and Jacobins were politically closer to the ancient Greeks and Romans more than one thousand years before them than they were to liberal individualism three hundred years later. They took the *studia humanitatis*, the classical corpus of texts on history, moral philosophy, rhetoric, grammar and poetry as their guide to political life. This classical learning had been revived in the Italian and, subsequently, northern European Renaissance.

Thus early modern Europeans were apt to agree with Aristotle that humans are sociable animals who are driven by their nature to live in communities and create cities. These sociable animals, not being born for themselves alone (as Plato put it), were expected to pursue the good of others, the common good. Early modern Europeans also broadly concurred with their Roman predecessors that the aim of political life was honour and glory and that these ends would be achieved through the performance of duties: that is, as Cathy Curtis shows in her chapter in this volume, through an active public life, or the *vita activa*. In order successfully to pursue that active life and so to realise the common good and achieve glory it was necessary to be virtuous: to exercise such qualities as wisdom, courage, justice and temperance. Virtue, after all, is what allows us to put others before our narrow self-interests; it drives our sociability. Virtue was not, however, believed to be innate or immune from corruption and depravity, neither was what counted as virtue invariant. Indeed, as Conal Condren and Jennifer Richards argue in their chapters, virtue was deeply contested. Following Cicero’s *On Duties*, Renaissance audiences understood that being virtuous frequently demanded overcoming conflicts between virtues, for example between truthfulness and decorum, so that the exercise of prudence – the art of judging how to act in given circumstances – was essential to virtuous action. It was argued, therefore, that education would be fundamental to the success of this system of politics that placed so much importance on personal qualities.


It was a central argument of classical and Renaissance political thought that virtue had to be instilled in subjects, citizens and, above all, princes. As Aysha Pollnitz shows in her chapter, Shakespeare directly engaged with the question of just what sort of education was necessary for a virtuous prince, although he turned conventional wisdom on its head.

This emphasis upon education led many early sixteenth-century humanists, such as John Colet and Desiderius Erasmus, to devote great effort to the foundation of grammar schools with curricula based upon the *studia humanitatis*. It was from studying the Greek and Roman texts in conjunction with biblical teachings that students were expected to learn habits of virtue. And it was from just these texts that Shakespeare himself received his political education. Elizabethan grammar schools, like the one in Stratford-upon-Avon, helped to establish a widely diffused audience of the educated. Education in the schools encompassed the ‘middling sort’ and the yeomanry, and in some cases the poor. These lower social orders, when adequately instructed, were charged with substantial responsibilities in maintaining the commonwealth. Their education prepared them for the possession of formal offices. Theirs was a political education, but it was also a moral one, for political thought was understood to be a branch of moral philosophy. Importantly, therefore, all moral questions were understood to have political implications. Moreover, the other disciplines of the *studia humanitatis*, history, poetry and rhetoric, were understood to be vehicles for moral philosophy, and they were all, therefore, organs of political reflection.

Here, then, is one of the fundamental distinctions between early modern and modern understandings of political life. From the early modern perspective, it was the character and spirit of those making up the polity that was crucial to its political health. In relative contrast, modern political analysis has put more stress on the institutional and constitutional arrangements of politics. In this sense, early modern politics was particularly personal, whatever its constitutional form. This contrast between modern and pre-modern polities, in their priorities and in their means of conducting politics, was largely shaped by the resources available to

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10 This point is frequently made by reference to the writings of Sir Thomas Smith (see below).

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The modern emphasis upon institutions roughly corresponds to the rise of the state. In sixteenth-century Europe, states and their various instruments (of taxation, legal enforcement, policing and so forth) were comparatively weak, sometimes almost non-existent. The participation of people in political life was accordingly necessary for the accomplishment of many tasks that would later be assumed by the state. Indeed, political thought immediately before and during most of Shakespeare’s lifetime focused not upon the state (which was only beginning to demand attention as a subject of political analysis) but on the city or the prince.

In addition to emphasising virtue, honour, duty and political participation, early modern political thought placed enormous emphasis upon the role of political counsel and persuasion in the proper functioning of politics, themes David Colclough, Cathy Shrank and Markku Peltonen explore in their chapters. The art of rhetoric was the guide to virtuous persuasion. Persuasion and counsel were the principal means through which personal politics could be conducted; they acknowledged the contingencies in political affairs and provided methods to control them. Moreover, in the absence of divine revelation in guiding everyday life, how best to distinguish between good and bad was itself a fundamentally rhetorical exercise. This faith in the importance of persuasion did not arise from an excessive attachment to pagan sources. Christianity was also defined by the word, and Catholic theologians such as Erasmus, as much as their Protestant counterparts such as Melanchthon, understood that Christian truth could be established only through persuasion. Persuasion and counsel were, as Colclough also argues, the very machinery and stuff of government.

Persuasion is of course necessary only where there are different points of view, at least two sides to a question. And throughout Shakespeare’s times, the notion of arguing both sides (in utramque partem) was a fundamental recognition of the contingency of political knowledge. On the Renaissance and especially on the Shakespearean stage, this contingency

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was effectively dramatised through the interplay of characters who could represent different positions, as the chapters by Richards, Peltonen and Condren illustrate. Consequently, drama was one of the main instruments of Renaissance political thinking, even if it later became marginal to the canons of the history of political thought. One of the aims of this volume is to show that Shakespeare's dramatisation of political debate can deepen our understanding of the texture of early modern political thought. For example, his theatrical presentation of political argument in utramque partem helps us to understand how the form of early modern political thought also shaped its content.

Such a deeply personal system of politics was, of course, open to corruption, and a concern with corruption (treated in the chapters by James, Curtis, Greenblatt, Fitzmaurice, Nelson, Condren, Richards and Colclough) was the obverse side of the politics of virtue. Indeed, as the sixteenth century progressed, anxiety about corruption deepened. In mainland Europe the Reformation divided not only the continent but, in decades of chronic warfare including civil war, it divided states, communities and even families. The human toll of the wars of religion was astonishing and remains so even next to the bloody history of the twentieth century. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that these wars shook the foundations of European political thought. The notion of human sociability became increasingly suspect, and that of the common good increasingly contentious. Shakespeare never registered these shocking facts with the immediacy of, say, Christopher Marlowe in his Massacre at Paris, but the shadows of civil war and human unsociability hang over many of his history plays (especially the first tetralogy) and Roman plays such as Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra.

Responding to the wars of religion, Europeans writing about politics increasingly emphasised survival as the goal of political life. The wars of religion did much to guarantee the success of Machiavelli's writings, although he wrote just prior to the Reformation and was motivated not by religious conflict but by the dangerous and unstable world of Italian city states. For Machiavelli, a prince should be virtuous in the sense that he or she should demonstrate a virtuoso ability to employ deceit, dissimulation

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and fear to secure his or her own survival and aggrandisement. Following Machiavelli, interest – meaning, variously, self-interest and the interests of state – became increasingly central to political debate in the second half of the sixteenth century. It is true that Cicero and followers of Cicero had emphasised prudence as a quality essential to navigate conflicts between virtues. But Ciceronians had also always insisted that a good citizen or subject must be a ‘good man’, what Cicero himself had called a *bonus homo*. As prudence became an increasingly valued skill in the sixteenth century, the virtues it was intended to secure became increasingly obscured. For the citizen or subject, self-interest replaced the *bonus homo*, and the ‘reasons’ or interests of state could be held to compete with the common good as the aims of the government. While virtue had never been monolithic in Ciceronian thought, Ciceronian prudence had given birth to a new form of political thought that was revolutionary in its rejection of what had preceded it.

Precisely because rhetoric was understood to be integral to political life, concern with corruption and self-interest extended to the role of oratory. For both classical and Renaissance authors, oratory was not only the means of good government, it was also an opportunity for flattery, dissimulation, demagoguery and tyranny. Self-interest could be cunningly disguised as good counsel. Tyrants could use oratory to control the mob. Rhetorical redescription could transform virtues into vices and vices into virtues. As Colclough argues, rhetoric made for a highly unstable moral world, one in which the participants were trying to navigate without a compass. According to Cicero, who was the Renaissance model for oratory, it was necessary for a good orator to be wise and good. This did not preclude dissimulation for a good end; but Machiavelli, who inverted so much of the moral order of the Renaissance, was necessarily obliged also to invert the rhetorical order. Dissimulation was necessary to the prince’s survival and consolidation of power: ‘one must be a great feigner and dissembler’. A ruler, he observed, need not possess all the political virtues, but ‘he must certainly seem to. Indeed, I shall be so bold as to say that having and always cultivating them is harmful, whereas seeming to have them is useful.’

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prince to sweat when the prince sweats, laugh when he laughs, and to use flattery and dissimulation to survive. Montaigne, and many of his contemporaries, including Justus Lipsius and Pierre Charron, argued that in a dangerous and corrupt world the virtuous pursuit of politics could lead to self-destruction. Good counsel could be treason and Cicero’s *bonus homo* a traitor. As Francis Bacon dryly commented in his essay *Of Goodness*, there are some men who are so good they are good for nothing.21

Rhetoric could also fail. While Shakespeare inhabited a world that had a profound faith in the power of rhetoric and that saw oratory as the machinery of government, he also explored a breakdown of persuasion, which was of course the breakdown of government. Amid corruption, as both Shrank and Peltonen argue, some subjects could prove so unresponsive to their duty that they would fail to be moved by appeals to their obligations and the virtues. A common cause for such a failure of rhetoric to persuade was perceived to be faction, one of the most corrupting of all political influences, according to Renaissance political thought.22 It was faction that had caused the decline in the political life of the Italian city republics, dramatised in *Romeo and Juliet*. Extremes of faction could be found where subjects responded only to their narrow interests, which, Peltonen argues, is the case with the aristocrats and commons in *Coriolanus*.

Living in a world populated by Machiavellian princes and a country rent by religious civil war, Montaigne for one had recognised that the subjects of such princes also needed special skills to survive. He dismissed the idea that it could still be possible for him to live as his father had done, devoted to formal offices, employing his virtue to pursue the common good.23 As David Armitage argues in his chapter, William Shakespeare similarly appears to have had no interest in holding any of the various public offices that his father John Shakespeare had held. For Montaigne, the Roman philosopher Seneca was one of the best guides to life in the dangerous world of the court, and for Montaigne’s contemporary, Justus Lipsius, much of this wisdom could be gained both from Seneca and from the Roman historian Tacitus, whose works Lipsius edited. Whereas Cicero’s writings had provided the model for a virtuous active life for much of the Renaissance, by the late sixteenth century Tacitus had for

many equalled and even surpassed the authority of Cicero. To survive, one was faced with a choice between the corrupt pursuit of politics and a withdrawal into the contemplative life. For Montaigne, this choice was necessarily self-interested and, as if to underline the point, his contemplative pursuit increasingly consisted of placing himself at the centre of his writing. His literary identity was a means of giving life to a new subject who was self-preserving.

Shakespeare likewise seems to have avoided the entanglements of political association, for there is no record of his holding any formal office. He nevertheless engaged political life at one step removed: namely, through verse and drama. In contrast to Montaigne, he also removed himself and almost all traces of himself from the literary record, and he pursued his political identity through the possession of property. Shakespeare, that is, seemingly abandoned the pursuit of his own political identity through office and duty, the dominant political language of the sixteenth century, and embraced a rights-based claim to political identity which, out of the transformations in political thought in his own time, would become fundamental to modern political thought.

Sixteenth-century England largely escaped the misfortunes that descended upon the European continent. The ideals of the northern Renaissance had been articulated by Thomas More in Utopia, in which he imagined a society devoted to the common good and driven to a remarkably radical degree by the Renaissance commonplace that virtue was the only true nobility (unsettling the notion that nobility was acquired through birth). Although More was one of the first victims of the English Reformation, his idealism was kept alive by the English commonwealth writers in the relatively tranquil years that followed his death. Chief amongst these mid-century ‘commonwealthmen’ was Sir Thomas Smith, who was able to portray England as a community, or a series of overlapping communities, in which political life was naturally sociable and in which political subjects (many of whom were also understood to be citizens), who were in Cicero’s terms good men, pursued the common good driven by a commitment to virtue and employing the tool of counsel.  

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26 On commonwealth writers see ibid., p. 215.

27 See Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583), ed. Mary Dewar (Cambridge, 1982); [Smith], A Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England (London, 1581).
At just the time in the 1590s when Shakespeare began his career, during what has been seen as Queen Elizabeth’s ‘second reign’, English political life was increasingly marked by growing religious tensions, war, impoverishment and mounting anxieties over the succession, anxieties whose effects Shrank and Pollnit trace in their chapters. This deterioration was accompanied by a growing pessimism and anxiety in political reflection. Not surprisingly, European writers such as Montaigne, who had explored political interest, now found an audience in England marginalising the idealistic images of England presented by the commonwealth writers. Similarly, as on the continent, the classical authors who had most deeply explored interest and corruption, particularly Tacitus and Seneca, were increasingly used to challenge the moral authority of Cicero and Aristotle.

This does not mean that the idealism of the vita activa and the virtuous life was altogether extinguished. Rather, what ensued and endured through to the eighteenth century was a complex dialogue between interest and virtue. Shakespeare’s verse and drama were written and performed in the context of that dialogue, and it is within that dialogue that Shakespeare’s political thought acquired its meaning.

The concern with interest has been closely identified with the dangerous politics of the court. The culture of the court was devoted to problems of authority, resistance, obedience, legitimacy, prerogative and reason of state. The opaque world of the court was perceived to be disposed to corruption. At the same time, England was described by contemporaries as a republic, or as a ‘commonwealth’ (an Anglicisation of the Latin res publica). It was understood in this way because of the large number of public offices that could be held by men and women at the level of the parish, the city and the state. More than half the male population could expect to hold public office in their lifetime, and the moral language of office-holding spread well beyond formal offices to embrace even the practices of the poet and dramatist. The participation of women was