

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia

The 1999 conflict between India and Pakistan near the town of Kargil in contested Kashmir was the first military clash between two nuclear-armed powers since the 1969 Sino-Soviet war. Kargil was a landmark event not because of its duration or casualties, but because it contained a very real risk of nuclear escalation. Until the Kargil conflict, academic and policy debates over nuclear deterrence and proliferation occurred largely on the theoretical level. This deep analysis of the conflict offers scholars and policymakers a rare account of how nuclear-armed states interact during a military crisis. Written by analysts from India, Pakistan, and the United States, this unique book draws extensively on primary sources, including unprecedented access to Indian, Pakistani, and US government officials and military officers who were actively involved in the conflict. This is the first rigorous and objective account of the causes, conduct, and consequences of the Kargil conflict.

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Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia

The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict

Edited by

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Contents

| | List of maps and tables | page ix |
|--------|--|---------|
| | List of contributors | X |
| | Preface | xiii |
| | List of abbreviations and acronyms | XV |
| 1 | Introduction: the importance of the Kargil conflict PETER R. LAVOY | 1 |
| | Why this study matters | 2 |
| | Controversies clarified | 5 |
| | The Kargil conflict in context | 14 |
| | Enduring rivalry in South Asia | 23 |
| | The nuclear revolution reconsidered | 29 |
| Part 1 | Causes and conduct of the conflict | 39 |
| 2 | The strategic context of the Kargil conflict: a Pakistani | |
| | perspective | 41 |
| | ZAFAR IQBAL CHEEMA | |
| | Introduction | 41 |
| | The historical rationale | 42 |
| | FCNA and the Northern Areas | 49 |
| | Contemporary rationale: the Siachen Glacier | 52 |
| | The Kashmir uprising: the Line of Control and the Neelum Valley | 55 |
| | Pakistan's official version | 57 |
| | Potential objectives of the Kargil conflict | 61 |
| | Conclusion | 62 |
| 3 | Pakistan's motivations and calculations for the Kargil | |
| | conflict | 64 |
| | FEROZ HASSAN KHAN, PETER R. LAVOY, AND | |
| | CHRISTOPHER CLARY | |
| | A history of grievance | 68 |
| | Restoring honor | 74 |
| | | v |



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| vi | Contents | |
|--------|---|---------------------------------|
| | The immediate cause of Kargil A new chain of command Assumptions and miscalculations Conclusion | 80 83 86 90 |
| 4 | Military operations in the Kargil conflict JOHN H. GILL | 92 |
| | Prelude to conflict Buildup: local and national Indian counteroffensive Combat operations: an assessment Observations | 93 105 114 120 123 |
| 5 | American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House BRUCE RIEDEL | 130 |
| | Prologue Introduction Kargil and Kashmir Nawaz calls for help The 4th dawns Aftermath: new deal in New Delhi, coup in Islamabad | 130 132 132 135 137 |
| 6 | Kargil: the nuclear dimension TIMOTHY D. HOYT | 144 |
| | Prelude to Kargil: the May 1998 tests Kargil as a nuclear crisis Post-Kargil interaction: the nuclear dimension Conclusion | 146 155 161 167 |
| 7 | Why Kargil did not produce general war: the crisis-management strategies of Pakistan, India, and the United States PETER R. LAVOY | 171 |
| | South Asia's nuclear revolution Pakistan's calculations India's conflict-termination strategy International diplomacy Conclusion | 172 177 190 197 204 |
| Part 2 | Consequences and impact of the conflict | 207 |
| 8 | Surprise at the top of the world: India's systemic and intelligence failure | 209 |



| | Contents | vii |
|--------|--|--|
| | The theory of surprise The fait accompli at Kargil Planning the fait accompli: the view from Pakistan Ripe for surprise: the view from India Problems with India's intelligence organizations Conclusion | 211 215 216 219 220 228 |
| 9 | Militants in the Kargil conflict: myths, realities, and impacts | 231 |
| | C. CHRISTINE FAIR | |
| | Background: origins of the myth Pakistan's internal dynamics Impact in the Valley of Kashmir Impact on Pakistan's foreign relations Conclusion | 231 236 244 248 256 |
| 10 | The impact of the Kargil conflict and Kashmir on Indian politics and society PRAVEEN SWAMI | 258 |
| | Popular culture The Kargil election The Kargil war and the conflict in Kashmir Conclusion: war, terrorists, and temples | 259 263 270 277 |
| 11 | The Kargil conflict's impact on Pakistani politics and society SAEED SHAFQAT | 280 |
| | The Pakistani print media's Kargil The domestic political impact The religious parties outflank the mainstream Political management and mismanagement The coup and its aftermath Conclusion | 282 289 290 296 304 306 |
| Part 3 | Lessons learned | 309 |
| 12 | The lessons of Kargil as learned by India RAJESH M. BASRUR | 311 |
| | Organizational lessons Strategic lessons Conclusion: lessons well learned? | 313 320 328 |
| 13 | The lessons of Kargil as learned by Pakistan HASAN-ASKARI RIZVI | 333 |
| | Military learning in South Asia | 334 |



| viii | | Contents | |
|------|----|--|--|
| | | Misperceiving others: Pakistani perceptions of international response The harsh spotlight Operational lessons Assessment of the conflict Conclusion: has Pakistan learned? | 337 340 346 349 350 |
| | 14 | The Kargil crisis: lessons learned by the United States RODNEY W. JONES AND JOSEPH McMILLAN | 353 |
| | | Lessons for US relations with India and Pakistan Lessons for nuclear stability and nonproliferation policy Lessons for future engagement Conclusion | 354 359 365 373 |
| | 15 | Kargil, deterrence, and international relations theory ROBERT JERVIS | 377 |
| | | Introduction Nature of the puzzle Routes to Kargil Surprise Nuclear weapons, nuclear wars Conclusion | 377 379 381 387 388 396 |
| | | Index | 398 |



Maps and tables

Maps

| 1.1 | Jammu and Kashmir | page 17 |
|------|--|---------|
| 2.1 | Indian ingress after 1972 and alleged Pakistani incursion | 50 |
| 2.2 | Unoccupied areas along the LoC | 59 |
| 4.1 | Mushkoh, Dras, and Kaksar sectors | 99 |
| 4.2 | Batalik sector | 100 |
| 4.3 | Chorbat La and Turtok (Hanif) sectors | 101 |
| | Tables | |
| 1.1 | The Kargil conflict's implications for nuclear-deterrence theory | 36 |
| 4 1 | Indian and Pakistani forces in the Kargil conflict | 127 |
| | Results in the 1998 and 1999 General Elections for major | 121 |
| 10.1 | parties | 265 |
| 10.2 | Voting patterns in four key states, General Elections 1998 ar | nd |
| | 1999 | 266 |
| 10.3 | An overview of the "pro-active" policy | 273 |
| 11.1 | Party share of votes: all-Pakistan National Assembly election | ns 291 |
| | | |



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xi

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xii List of contributors

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Preface

This volume took six years to research and compile. From the beginning, this study was a challenge. This crisis, in comparison to previous conflicts in the region, drew an unprecedented level of controversy, competing narratives, and implications for domestic politics specifically in Pakistan, but also in India and for the course of international relations in South Asia. For this reason alone, I owe a great deal of gratitude to those who contributed to this volume and many people who were forthcoming with their candor in formal interviews and private exchange of views with me and my colleagues over the past six years. This multi-authored volume is a testimony of the Clauswitzian proverb of "wading through the water" and an earnest attempt to provide the most objective and authenticated version and analysis of this conflict.

The project editor and authors interviewed dozens of policymakers, intelligence officials, and military officers in Pakistan, India, and the United States. They also received a formal presentation by the commander of the Pakistani formation that conducted the Kargil intrusion, Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), and several other civilian and military officials associated with the operation. Project authors presented preliminary findings and received helpful feedback from other scholars and various governmental and military representatives at conferences in Monterey, California in June 2002, at the United Services Institute in New Delhi in September 2002, and at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad in January 2003. Subsequent research trips and interviews in South Asia were undertaken to provide as complete and balanced an account as possible.

I am especially indebted to former Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and General Ved Prakash Malik, who were the respective Chiefs of Army Staff at the time of the conflict, for giving their candid views during my several meetings with them. Special thanks are owed to Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed and Lieutenant General Javed Hassan, commanders of the Pakistan army's 10 Corps and FCNA respectively at the time of the Kargil operation, for their extensive interviews

xiii



xiv Preface

with this author, and to Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmed, Commander of FCNA in 2003, for his detailed briefing and views in Gilgit at FCNA Headquarters. Without these insights, the Pakistani side of the story would have remained murky.

Finally, I owe a word of gratitude to the team of the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC), who in the past five years conducted extensive research, and kept pace with new events and narratives, just when they thought they had reached the final version. My special thanks go to Brigadier (retd.) Feroz Hassan Khan of the Pakistan army and Lieutenant Colonel (retd.) Surinder Rana of the Indian army, both senior researchers with CCC and having the experience of command in the area of operation, for their insights, inputs, edits, and comments. This research would have been incomplete without the relentless efforts of CCC researchers, Christopher Clary, Adam Radin, and Puja Verma. Lastly, a very special thanks to my wife Debra Lavoy and our two children for bearing the brunt of my distractions, midnight-oil burning, and their support. Debra never believed this would come to an end. Publication of this book is fulfillment of one promise among many that I vowed to her.



Abbreviations and acronyms

APP Associated Press of Pakistan
BBC British Broadcasting Company

BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BSF Border Security Force
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party

CCC Center for Contemporary Conflict CCS Cabinet Committee on Security

CDS Chief of Defence Staff

CENTCOM United States Central Command

CFL Cease-Fire Line
CGS Chief of General Staff
CI Counterinsurgency

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COAS Chief of Army Staff

COMINT Communications intelligence

CSDS Centre for the Study of Developing Societies

CSP Civil Service of Pakistan

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DCC Defence Committee of the Cabinet

DGMI Directorate General of Military Intelligence
DGMO Director General of Military Operations

DIA Defence Intelligence Agency
DMG District Management Group
ELINT Electronic intelligence

FCNA Force Command Northern Areas G-8 Group of Eight industrialized nations

GHQ General Headquarters

GOC General Office Commanding

GoM Group of Ministers
HUMINT Human intelligence
IAF Indian air force

IAS Indian Administrative Service

XV



xvi List of abbreviations and acronyms

IB Intelligence Bureau

IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
IMET International Military Education and Training

IMINTImagery intelligenceINCIndian National CongressIPSIndian Police Service

ISID Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
ISPR Office of Inter-Services Public Relations

ITBP Indo-Tibetan Border Police

JI Jamaat-e-Islami

IIC Joint Intelligence Committee

JUI-F Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (headed by Maulana Fazal-

ur-Rehman)

JUI-S Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (headed by Maulana Sami-

ul-Haq)

LoC Line of Control MAC Multi-Agency Centre

MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (six-party coalition of

Pakistani religious parties)

MoD Ministry of Defence

NBC Nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare or weapons

NCP Nationalist Congress Party NH-1A National Highway 1A NLI Northern Light Infantry

NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NSA US National Security Agency
NSAB National Security Advisory Board

NSC National Security Council

NSCS National Security Council Secretariat NTFO National Technical Facilities Organisation

NWFP North-West Frontier Province
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAF Pakistan Air Force

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif)

PPP Pakistan Peoples Party
PTV Pakistan Television

RAW Research and Analysis Wing RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SAD Shiromani Akali Dal SSG Special Services Group



List of abbreviations and acronyms

xvii

SSW Sub-sector West

TES Technology Experiment Satellite UAVs Unmanned aerial vehicles

UN United Nations

UNCIP United Nations Commission of India and Pakistan UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and

Pakistan

UNSC United Nations Security Council VCDS Vice Chief of Defence Staff

VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council)

VVFs Village Volunteer Forces

WASO Winter Air Surveillance Operations