Introduction: the historiography of the unconscious

We want to make the I into the object of this investigation, our most personal I. But can one do that?¹

The historiography of psychoanalysis needs radical revision. This book poses the question: where does psychoanalysis begin? Which is to ask both when can we begin with it historically, and how exactly does it emerge? The conventional answer to those questions has, for many decades, been the one provided by Freud himself: that it begins in Vienna, out of a combination of Freud’s private clinical work with neurotics, his collaboration with Josef Breuer in the treatment of hysteria, and the period of depression which inaugurates his own self-analysis in the 1890s, all of which fed into the genesis of the Interpretation of Dreams—the work which for many marks the opening of the ‘Freudian’ century.² More recent scholarship has greatly extended our knowledge of Freud’s formative contexts, including the publication of his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, and studies of the intellectual ambience of the Viennese medical school and Freud’s earliest work on neuro-anatomy, as well as the crucial impact of his period of study with Charcot in Paris.³ Psychoanalysis, evidently, has broader roots than Freud’s own

¹ Sigmund Freud, Studienausgabe, vol. I: Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse und Neue Folge, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1982), 497. The translation is that given by Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester University Press, 1990), 59.
² See, for instance, Lionel Trilling’s Introduction to Lionel Trilling and Steven Marcus (eds.) and abridged, Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (London: Penguin, 1964), 12: ‘But the basic history of psychoanalysis is the account of how it grew in Freud’s own mind, for Freud developed its concepts all by himself.’
Introduction

self-investigation. Two reassessments, George Makari’s *Revolution in Mind* and Eli Zaretsky’s *Secrets of the Soul*, both draw on such revisions in psychoanalytic scholarship and shift the focus of study away from Freud’s own biography and towards colleagues, collaborators and the broader cultural climate. Even so, there remains a seemingly unshaken consensus that psychoanalysis is born out of the melting pot of late nineteenth-century Viennese modernity. According to Zaretsky, ‘we have still not historicized psychoanalysis’, but he takes this to mean exploring the breadth of its appeal and its contradictory impact on twentieth-century culture. Carl Schorske’s *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna* is, for Zaretsky, still the greatest attempt to ‘grasp psychoanalysis historically’.

Equally, for Makari, what is needed is a lateral broadening of the frame of inquiry in order to identify the many different fields from which Freud ‘pulled together new ideas and evidence… to fashion a new discipline’. None of these works, with the exception of Sonu Shamdasani’s ground-breaking reassessment of the work of C. G. Jung, pay any attention to the longer-range history of the ‘unconscious psyche’, or tie Freud’s work back into the earlier nineteenth century’s fascination with the obscure tiers, functions and forces at work below the level of consciousness, the secret histories of the self. It is as if these notions emerge wholly unannounced in the 1890s.

The object of this study is to provide a new and more complex account of the emergence of the idea of a psychic unconscious, and so to explore the possibility of giving psychoanalysis a much deeper historical context. There are good grounds for locating this moment historically at the threshold of the nineteenth century in Germany, under the wings of Romanticism and post-Kantian idealism. Here, at the very least, one finds the initial integration of a theory of the unconscious with the mind’s inner medium, named as the ‘psyche’ or the ‘soul’ (*Seele*, the word still used by Freud to indicate the psychical apparatus). Both of these terms, already at this time, were set in the context of a psychological theory and a therapeutic practice which developed out of and alongside a concern with mesmerism and animal magnetism. Here, too, in the work of figures such as the idealist F. W. J. Schelling and


Introduction

the nature philosopher and anthropologist G. H. Schubert, one finds many of the characteristic idioms associated with psychoanalytic theory in the twentieth century: the notion of an internal mental division and a dialogue between a conscious and an unconscious self; the sense of concealed or repressed aspects of one’s moral nature; a new concern with memory and the past, and with both developmental accounts of the self and reconstructions of the origins of consciousness. The first two items listed here – the unconscious and repression – are those suggested by Freud as the principle cornerstones of psychoanalytic theory, according to his 1923 Encyclopaedia article on ‘Psychoanalysis’, the other two being the theory of sexuality and the Oedipus complex.

Moreover, though Zaretsky sees in Freud ‘the first great theory and practice of “personal” life’ and Makari finds him trying to win for science ‘the inner life of human beings’, both accounts strangely eclipse that moment, a hundred years earlier, which saw the production of Rousseau’s Confessions, Fichte’s theory of subjectivity, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and Wordsworth’s Prelude. This same period gave rise to both the various kinds of self-investigation practised by German Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel, J. W. Ritter and Novalis, and also J. C. Reil’s coinage of psychotherapie, Carl Moritz’s Magazine for Empirical Psychology and many other similar initiatives, all organised around the secular investigation of personal and interior life. Finally, there emerges at this time a specific theoretical focus on the foundation of consciousness in earlier, more primitive and unconscious stages (both from the point of view of individual development, and as an issue for cultural history as a whole), as well as a new kind of psychological interest in peculiar or pathological states of mind, including forms of madness, but also sleep, dreams and trances.

Various writers have at times suggested more distant points of inception for the basic concepts of psychoanalysis, including Lancelot Law Whyte in his slim 1960 volume The Unconscious Before Freud, and more importantly Henri Ellenberger, whose still unparalleled scholarship in The Discovery of the Unconscious traces the therapeutic contexts of depth

7 Throughout this book, ‘anthropologist’ will be used in the early nineteenth-century sense of a general science of man.
9 Zaretsky, Secrets of the Soul, 5.
10 Makari, Revolution in Mind, 3.
11 For more details see Matthew Bell, The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought, 1700–1840 (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
psychology back through various nineteenth-century trends to the
vogue for mesmerism in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{12} Ellenberger’s work
and that of Odo Marquard in the 1980s, both of which I will consider
further below, provide important accounts of the way in which psycho-
analysis links back to Romantic intellectual contexts.\textsuperscript{13} Yet still surpris-
ingly little work has been done on the interconnection of the various
Romantic and idealist notions of the psyche and the unconscious, their
links to an emerging field of psychology, or their relation to a ‘Freudian
unconscious’ at the other end of the century.\textsuperscript{14} Whatever contemporary
interest there is in influences running between psychoanalysis and the
epoch of Romanticism has come not from the history of ideas, or the
history of psychology, but from contemporary debates in literary theory
and continental philosophy. Two obvious examples are \textit{The Indivisible
Remainder} by Slavoj Žižek and \textit{Schelling and Modern European Philosophy}
by Andrew Bowie, both of which have wanted to make a case for the
close links between the work of Schelling and the conceptual apparatus
of psychoanalysis.\textsuperscript{15} For Žižek, for instance, Schelling’s \textit{Ages of the World
[Weltalter]} is ‘a metapsychological work in the strict Freudian sense’.\textsuperscript{16}
Such publications undoubtedly brought this rather obscure backwater
in intellectual history on to the contemporary agenda and were the first
indications of a more recent Schelling revival.\textsuperscript{17} More recently, Joel


\textsuperscript{13} For parallels in historical work on psychiatry, see the suggestion in F. G. Alexander and S. T. Selesnick, \textit{The History of Psychiatry: an Evaluation of Psychiatric Thought and Practice from Prehistoric Times to the Present} (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 135, that: ‘In their new and enthusiastic concern over the nature of the psyche, the Romantics brought psychiatry to the threshold of modern concepts and techniques’.

\textsuperscript{14} Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds.), \textit{Thinking the Unconscious: Nineteenth-
Century German Thought} (Cambridge University Press, 2010) is a recent work which
brings together essays by Sonu Shamdasani, Paul Bishop, Matthew Bell and others,
as an attempt to start to piece together perspectives on the nineteenth-century field.

\textsuperscript{15} Slavoj Žižek, \textit{The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters}
(London: Verso, 1996); Andrew Bowie, \textit{Schelling and Modern European Philosophy}

\textsuperscript{16} Žižek, \textit{The Indivisible Remainder}, 9.

\textsuperscript{17} Žižek wrote a major interpretive essay to accompany the first translation of Schelling’s
1813 draft of \textit{Ages of the World} (Slavoj Žižek/F. W. J. von Schelling, \textit{The Abyss of Freedom/Ages of the World}, trans. Judith Norman, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997) (hereafter, Schelling, \textit{Ages}) and since then there have been a
spate of publications fostering dialogue between the work of Schelling and that of
Freud, Lacan and also Heidegger, Deleuze and Levinas, and between Romantic phil-
osophy and postmodern theories of the subject. See, for instance, Judith Norman and
Introduction

Faflak’s *Romantic Psychoanalysis* has advanced similar theoretical arguments, this time drawing on the work of British Romantic writers such as Wordsworth, Coleridge and De Quincey.18

There are, however, a number of reasons why such works are not particularly helpful to this investigation. One is that the idea of psychoanalysis which they seek to identify in the works of Romantic authors is not so much Freud’s, but Freud read through the lens of Lacanian and postmodern continental theory. (For Bowie, psychoanalysis is one out of many areas of modern theory in relation to which he is keen to establish Schelling as a foundational thinker – others include deconstruction, Marxism and the postmodernism of Richard Rorty.) This is not just a dispute over the roots of psychoanalysis – ‘Lacan versus Freud’. The problem is rather that psychoanalysis is assimilated too directly to the terms of the European philosophy of the subject. It is frequently a question of mapping post-Lacanian theory on to an older idealist and post-idealist philosophy (by which it had already been informed via figures such as Alexandre Koyré and Alexandre Kojève) rather than investigating the way in which proto-psychoanalytic concepts themselves emerge in the early nineteenth century, and what their original implications were. Faflak’s *Romantic Psychoanalysis* is an intricate and thoughtful study, thoroughly immersed in the task of unearthing the relevance of Romantic forms of psychological and aesthetic reflection for contemporary debates on the ‘fragility’ or structural elusiveness of subjectivity. However, he uses the term ‘psychoanalysis’ in the wider sense given it by the philosophers and literary critics of deconstruction, for whom it means submitting the grounds of subjectivity to a process of infinite inquiry. Such analyses are in turn directed towards establishing the historical groundlessness of subjectivity, or an ‘interiority inconsistent with itself’.19 What is at stake in such texts, then, is really an argument about the postmodern ‘de-centred subject’, and a (plausible) attempt to locate certain anticipations of this debate within Romanticism. Likewise Žižek and Bowie equate the terms and structures of Romantic philosophy directly with those of contemporary theory. But in making the connection between psychoanalysis and German idealism, such works are not primarily pursuing the genealogy of psychoanalytic concepts at all. What is missing is a concern with how and why the terminology of the unconscious psyche emerges in this Romantic context in the first place.

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19 Ibid., 13.
Introduction

Where does it emerge from, and how and why does it begin to function so centrally within psychological theory? A second problem is that such works tend to deal with psycho-theoretical questions in a way that abstracts them from frameworks of historical enquiry, beyond the bare essentials of descriptive contextualisation. This means that they fail to incorporate a dynamic and critical sense of the shifting cultural connotations of such crucial terms as 'psyche', 'personal identity', 'spirit' and 'individual existence', over the course of one or two centuries, likewise the striking shift in assumptions about the nature of 'self-consciousness', 'independence', 'individuality' itself, and so on. They fail, that is, to give an adequate representation of the ideological pressures which, over time, have pulled the 'unconscious' and the 'psyche', one way or another, into different signifying contexts which fundamentally change their meaning. Positioning Schelling's work in relation to Kant, Žižek is nonetheless keen to read Schelling's work radically out of context as exhibiting a 'double non-contemporaneity to his own time'. But though formal accounts of the structure of psychic and subjective life may beg to be read philosophically and trans-historically, there are serious problems with such an approach. Do terms such as 'subjectivity' and 'psyche' mean the same things in the nineteenth, twentieth and now twenty-first centuries? What would 'metapsychology' have meant for Schelling, and could he ever have intended it in the Freudian sense?

By abstracting such concepts from wider debates in nineteenth-century psychology, anthropology, political theory, religion and from metaphysics, or from cultural and aesthetic theory, one loses crucial interpretive factors. What is really being argued through the notion of an unconscious? What issues are thinkers attempting to resolve as they reorganise their theory of mind? It may be that cultural and socio-political factors are crucial in accounting for the way the notion of a psychic unconscious moves centre-stage at this point in time, casting its shadow back over the Age of Reason. When Žižek describes Schelling’s ideas as emerging in a brief flash, which ‘renders visible something that was invisible beforehand and withdrew into invisibility thereafter’, he may

20 Faflak is most concerned not with psychology at all, but with the ‘poetics of psychoanalysis’, meaning these broader questions of identity linked to post-structuralist philosophies of the subject. He argues that these trends are implicitly there in Freud, though repressed beneath ‘his confirmed scientism’, Romantic Psychoanalysis, 14.
21 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder, 8.
22 Ibid., 8.
The broader unconscious

be suggesting that the historical emergence of new concepts must itself sometimes be modelled on the obscure and unknowable irruptions of the unconscious itself, but such an assumption forecloses any attempt to give the unconscious itself a history.

The broader unconscious

In wanting thus to recognise how concepts of the psyche and the unconscious function in more general currents of intellectual and cultural history in the early nineteenth century, I am not aiming simply to temper contemporary perspectives with a more sensitive reconstruction of the past. Rather my concern is that the angle of vision has been much too narrow. The study of the unconscious – which Buchholz and Gödde have termed the ‘Zentralmassiv of psychoanalysis’\(^23\) – requires to be opened up, vastly, before we can begin to make sense of such issues as the emergence of a strictly ‘psychoanalytic’ unconscious and the rationale for its appearance in modernity. We need to look beyond the Freudian and Jungian paradigms, let alone the Lacanian or Derridean, to the outlines of a broader nineteenth-century interest in the unconscious for which there is no single logic and no single history. The unconscious we associate with psychoanalysis – and which remains one of the most fundamental concepts in contemporary psycho-dynamic theory, of whatever persuasion – is a fragment of a much larger puzzle. By the end of the century, it had in fact become so ubiquitous a concept that the question is not so much ‘did Freud inherit the unconscious from earlier in the century’, but which versions of it did he inherit?

Already in the late eighteenth century there emerged notions of a life force which governs the organic and developmental functions of the body – described by Herder as ‘the inner genius of my being’\(^24\) – and which is either entirely distinguished from the soul, or imagined to represent unconscious capacities within it. As the nineteenth century advances, such ideas are partly translated into the discourse of an ‘unconscious’, an example being the writings of Carl Gustav Carus, whom C. G. Jung cited as a forerunner to his own work. Besides such vitalist ideas there is the Romantic medical and philosophical interest in the phenomena of mesmerism and somnambulism, documented by


Introduction

Ellenberger and others, and connected with this are various attempts to theorise the different unconscious forces, functions and powers governing trance and hypnoid states reported in the burgeoning literature on psychopathology. On a different front there are philosophical debates running throughout the century, from the immediate post-Kantians to figures such as J. S. Mill and later Franz Brentano, which are concerned to establish the limits of reason, or to argue for or against the possibility of unconscious ideas. Yet another avatar of the unconscious, which increases its hold as one moves through the century, is the evocation of the buried past of the mind, to which we could add a broader sense of the unconscious as the primeval, the inherited, or the deep historical past. Also of great importance to any survey of the nineteenth-century unconscious is Schopenhauer’s more metaphysical portrait of nature as a vast organism with its own unconscious will, which was further developed in the light of evolutionary theory by Eduard von Hartmann in his *Philosophy of the Unconscious* which ran to eleven German editions between 1868 and 1904 and was first translated into English in 1884. Another crucial tributary of the concept is Johann Friedrich Herbart’s descriptions of the way ideas in the mind are thrust above or below the threshold of mental perception according to particular degrees of mental force – notions which fed through into Gustav Fechner’s psychophysical investigations of the 1850s. Both of these writers influenced some of Freud’s earliest ideas on repression in terms of the vicissitudes of quantities of psychical energy. Somewhere we must also take into account Romantic theories of genius and creativity as emanations of unconscious life, as well as such poetical and spiritual descriptions of the unconscious as ‘the darkness in which the roots of our being disappear, the insoluble secret in which rests the magic of life’.

Many of these languages of the unconscious tend towards the overtly religious or metaphysical – at times the unconscious signals nothing less than the immanent and mysterious power of a divine creator, or of ‘nature’ or the ‘absolute’ which come to stand in for this in only partly secularised ways. But equally, and from early on in the century, the unconscious is used in a more limited and empirical way to indicate automatic functions such as reflexes. Further into the Victorian period, neurological and physiological usages emerge, such as ‘unconscious cerebration’, and finally from the 1880s onwards there are the new psychiatric and psychological coinages emerging in the work of

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The broader unconscious

Pierre Janet, F. W. H. Myers and others, including the subconscious, the subliminal, and the dissociated aspects of the self.  

Attempts to trace the impact of these instances of the unconscious through to Freud and to Jung have been necessarily piecemeal. Jung openly acknowledged his debt to many of these precursors, particularly the work of Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Carus. But there are also obvious traces in Freud's writings of the legacy of mesmerism and psychophysics, Romantic literature and the philosophy of nature. As Buchholz and Gödde argue, ‘Freud was in no way prepared to content himself with a clinical psychology. The claims of his metapsychology aim far beyond that and lay claim to a terrain that had been traditionally leased to theology and philosophy’.

A complete understanding of the rationale for the development of the unconscious in the nineteenth century would require nothing less than a cultural history of the nineteenth century itself, and a sensitivity not only to ‘influences’ of various generations of thinkers on each other, but also to confluences between radically different yet cognate terms, and various permutations and infiltrations across disciplinary fields. This would hardly amount to a ‘tradition’ – certainly, nothing so clear as a tradition linking Freud to the Romantics. Such a study could at most sketch the evolution of a set of ideas and problems, linked to a term distributed across quite far-flung contexts. The unconscious pervades psychiatry, medicine and psychology, but also philosophy, religion and metaphysics and theories of nature and history, as well as more popular psychological and cultural elaborations in novels, poems and moral essays, in such a way that one can hardly begin to describe its ‘specific’ provenance. Did Freud imbibe the term in a medical context, or from student discussions of Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, from his interests in myth and Victorian anthropology, or even from youthful readings in Jean-Paul Richter, E. T. A. Hoffmann and Ludwig Börne.

For these reasons, this book is not so directly concerned with tracking a specific ‘line of influence’ from Schelling to Freud. But why, then, turn to intellectual shifts in Germany in the early 1800s? What specifically can be found there to inform us of what is going on later in the century? My conviction is that there is something instructive about

27 For details of Janet’s work on the subconscious and dissociation, see Ellenberger, Discovery, 331–417; for subliminal consciousness, see F. W. H. Myers, ‘The Subliminal Consciousness’, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 7 (February 1892), 289–355.
28 Buchholz und Gödde, Macht und Dynamik, 18.
Introduction

Examining the inception of a concern with the unconscious. It is true that one can trace instances of this concern back indefinitely, and certainly late eighteenth-century thinkers interested in an unconscious were aware of certain specific precursors – most obviously Leibniz's notion of petites perceptions, the mass of smaller details which go to make up the quality of more general sense perceptions, but of which, taken individually, we may be unconscious. However, something happens in the early nineteenth century which introduces some dramatic changes to the way in which such a discourse of the unconscious functions. Its usage and usefulness is greatly expanded – many of the different versions of the unconscious listed above are already in operation in this early phase, as subsequent chapters will show. The term is also already tied to a new interest in the psyche and starts to take on a quite novel central role within psychological, philosophical and metaphysical argument about the nature and development of subjective identity. From having been a side issue, the unconscious becomes a fulcrum for certain tendencies within the natural and human sciences, and Friedrich Schelling is central to this development.

Certain things are also apparent in the early 1800s that will be harder to make out one hundred years on, partly because by then, even though it remains a highly contested idea in some fields, aspects of the unconscious (conceptually, ideologically and metaphorically) will have become part of the general background of late Victorian cultural and scientific understanding. By going back to the beginning of the century it is possible not only to trace more clearly the logic by which philosophical and psychological notions of the unconscious emerge and begin to interact, but also to learn from informative debates on the necessity of the unconscious as a core principle for the human sciences, and even more particularly in psychology. In examining such arguments, we can see that the unconscious is not just implicated in psychology insofar as psychology becomes interested in acknowledging and investigating phenomena on or beyond the fringe of consciousness – such as dreaming and madness. Right from the start, an unconscious within the individual is central to psychology for additional reasons, one of which is the role it plays in enabling philosophers and psychologists to conceive of autonomy, spontaneity, creativity or self-development within individuals. Here Zaretsky's insight that Freud 'gave expression to possibilities of individuality, autonomy, authenticity and freedom that had only recently emerged' is perhaps crucial.30 Where Zaretsky is at fault, though, is in his timing which places the emergence of these concerns

30 Zaretsky, Secrets of the Soul, 7.