In this book Anne Margaret Baxley offers a systematic interpretation of Kant's theory of virtue, whose most distinctive features have not been properly understood. She explores the rich moral psychology in Kant's later and less widely read works on ethics, and argues that the key to understanding his account of virtue is the concept of autocracy, a form of moral self-government in which reason rules over sensibility. Although certain aspects of Kant's theory bear comparison to more familiar Aristotelian claims about virtue, Baxley contends that its most important aspects combine to produce something different—a distinctively modern, egalitarian conception of virtue which is an important and overlooked alternative to the more traditional Greek views which have dominated contemporary virtue ethics.

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KANT’S THEORY OF VIRTUE

The Value of Autocracy

ANNE MARGARET BAXLEY

Washington University, St. Louis
To my parents, Charlene and William Baxley,
for their abiding love and support
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments xi
Abbreviations and translations xiv

Introduction 1

1 The good will, moral worth, and duty: concerns about Kant’s rationalist moral psychology 7
1.1 The good will, moral worth, and duty 8
1.2 Is Kant’s practical conception of the self overly moralistic? 17
1.3 Can one have a good will and have morally favorable inclinations in accordance with duty? 30
1.4 Why is inclination not a genuine moral motive for Kant? 34
1.5 Is Kant’s account of the good will simply a recipe for continence? 40

2 Kant’s conception of virtue and the autocracy of pure practical reason 48
2.1 Kant’s conception of virtue: virtue requires autocracy 50
2.2 The main worry about an account of virtue understood in terms of autocracy 61
2.3 A better understanding of Kantian autocracy and the real opponent to morally good character 67
2.4 Kantian virtue involves rational self-governance, not the extirpation, suppression, or silencing of inclination 75
## CONTENTS

2.5 How Kant can distinguish virtue from continence in his own terms 79

3 Virtue, human nature, and moral health: Kant’s dispute with Schiller 85
3.1 Schiller’s challenge in “On Grace and Dignity”: virtue requires the full psychic harmony of reason and sensibility 87
3.2 Kant’s reply to Schiller: virtue requires the sovereignty of reason over sensibility 98
3.3 Competing conceptions of human nature and moral health 115
3.4 Rival political approaches to moral psychology 120

4 The moral psychology of Kantian virtue 124
4.1 Kantian autocracy and its three main functions 125
4.2 Moral pleasure and rational desire in *The Metaphysics of Morals* 136
4.3 Moral feeling, conscience, love, and respect as conditions of moral agency 145
4.4 Love, respect, beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy as Kantian virtues 155
4.5 How sympathy might function within a Kantian-inspired ethics of virtue 163

Conclusion: Kant’s considered account of moral character and the good will reconsidered 172

*Select bibliography* 180

*Index* 187
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ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS
USED FOR WORKS BY KANT

References to Kant’s writings are cited in the body of the text according to the volume and page number, given by arabic numerals separated by a colon, in the standard edition of Kant’s works, *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (KGS), edited by the Royal Prussian (later German, then Berlin-Brandenburg) Academy of Sciences, 29 vols. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900–). This standard edition of Kant’s works is traditionally referred to as the Academy Edition. The Academy Edition pagination is reproduced in most recent English translations of Kant’s writings. The abbreviations and English translations of Kant’s works cited are listed alphabetically below. In the body of the text, they are referred to immediately following the reference to the volume and page of the Academy Edition. Translations of citations from *Moral Mrongovius II* (KGS 29) in Chapter 1 are my own, as are translations of citations from Powalski’s lecture notes from Kant’s ethics course, *Praktische Philosophie Powalski* (KGS 27), and citations from Kant’s unpublished notes and reflections found in *Vorarbeiten zur Religion* (KGS 23), *Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre* (KGS 23), and *Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie* (KGS 19).

**Anthro**


**Aufklärung**

ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS


Collins

Frieden

Gr

KprV

KU

Mrongovius II

MS

Rel
<table>
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