# Part 1

# Strategy and policy

# 1

# Towards a 'new world order'

## *Global political, strategic and peacekeeping developments: 1988–91*

On 21 August 1990 the Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, rose to address Parliament. Less than three weeks earlier Iraq had invaded its small neighbour, Kuwait; on 6 August the United Nations had voted to apply sanctions against Iraq, and four days later Hawke had gravely announced the deployment of three Australian warships. Now, belatedly, and conscious of the responsibility of sending forces overseas to potential conflict, he was justifying his decision in Parliament, and he made the case firmly in the context of the dramatic changes in the international system taking place at that time. He explained that 'over the past few years the frightening rigidities of the Cold War have dissolved and the threat of global war between the superpowers has receded'. The task therefore was 'to construct a new world order which will guarantee that the end of the Cold War will bring an era of peace'. He argued that as the Cold War faded the United Nations was moving 'back to the position its founders intended for it', and in the future Australia might need to depend on the principles of the United Nations Charter to protect its interests. Australia was 'not sending ships to the Gulf region to serve our allies; we are going to protect the international rule of law which will be vital to our security however our alliances may develop in the future'.[1]

The previous November, at the time of the remarkable collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Foreign minister, Senator Gareth Evans, had talked optimistically about 'a quite fundamental transformation in East–West relations'.[2] By then the changes were clear. The end of the Cold War had first become likely in April 1988 with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and it would be confirmed in December 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The deployment of ships in 1990 brought home in a stark manner the way Australian defence and foreign affairs were being affected by these events. Between 1988 and 1991 there was also to be a complete transformation in

1 Ministerial statement, R.J.L. Hawke, Prime Minister, *CPD*, H of R, 21 August 1990, p. 1128.

2 Reply by Senator Evans to question without notice, *CPD*, Senate, 21 November 1989, p. 2868.

Australia's approach to supporting peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, this volume seeks to describe Australia's role in the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations that resulted from the end of the Cold War; it covers the missions that began between 1988 and 1990, and follows them through to their end.

At the beginning of 1988 little more than a dozen Australian Defence Force personnel were deployed on multinational peacekeeping operations – all of them as part of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which had been supervising the various ceasefire arrangements between Israel and its Arab opponents since 1948.[3] Also in that year, fewer than two dozen Australian police were serving in the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). There was nothing remarkable about this very limited peacekeeping commitment. Beginning in 1947, Australia had been involved in peacekeeping in fifteen countries, but these had generally been observer missions requiring the deployment of only small numbers of Australian military personnel and, in the case of Cyprus, Australian police.[4] The numbers had risen occasionally, when Australia contributed to the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai in the late 1970s, to the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Southern Rhodesia in 1979–80, and to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai between 1982 and 1986.[5] But for forty years peacekeeping had not figured prominently in Australia's strategic calculations.

For most of that time Australia's strategic focus had been elsewhere. Australia had deployed comparatively large forces to Japan (as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force), to the Korean War, to the Malayan Emergency, to Malaysia during Confrontation, and to the Vietnam War.[6] After its withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972 it seemed that Australia had resolved never again to send substantial forces overseas for other than purely peacekeeping duties. The long-standing practice of basing of an infantry battalion in Malaysia and then Singapore ended in 1973.[7] It is true that Australia had been prepared to send an infantry company to Cyprus in 1974, and to send 300 personnel to Namibia in 1979 (they were not deployed until 1989) for peacekeeping tasks, and did send 150 military observers to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe that year; but, as will be discussed in chapter 2, Australia's defence policy was one of reluctance to deploy forces beyond Australia. Yet in the period of two and a half years between August 1988 and February 1991 Australia sent almost 2,400 military personnel to peacekeeping and other operations in Iran, Namibia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and Kuwait.[8]

3 Australian observers had served in UNTSO since 1956.

4 The fifteen 'countries' were Indonesia, Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Congo, West New Guinea, Yemen, Cyprus, Southern Rhodesia and Uganda.

5 For a list of peacekeeping missions in which Australia was involved between September 1947 and September 2007 see appendix A.

6 For Australia's involvement in these conflicts see the official histories: O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War 1950–53*, 2 vols, and Edwards (General Editor), *The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975*, 9 vols. There is no official history of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force deployed to Japan after the Second World War. Its activities are described in Horner, *Duty First*, and Wood, *The Forgotten Force*.

7 Horner, *Duty First*, p. 201. The RAAF squadron(s) at Butterworth in Malaysia remained until 1988, and Australia continued to retain use of the base (Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*, pp. 69–70).

8 For detail of the numbers of personnel see the Conclusion of this volume, note 20.

The reason for this surge in international peacekeeping, and Australia's expanded involvement, can be found in the changes wrought by the end of the Cold War. This chapter is concerned primarily with explaining the developments in the global strategic and political environment during this period, while chapter 2 will discuss the effect on Australia.

## IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR

For forty-five years following the Second World War the international system was dominated by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, each supported, willingly or unwillingly, by their allies.[9] Historians differ over the date of the beginning of the Cold War. Some argue that elements of it were already present well before the end of the Second World War.[10] One convenient date is March 1946, when the former British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, spoke about the 'iron curtain' that had fallen across Eastern Europe, while the term 'Cold War' was already being used publicly in the United States in April 1947.[11] Yet others suggest that it reached its full manifestation only by the time of the Berlin Blockade in 1948.

Ironically, the beginning of the Cold War broadly corresponded with the establishment of the United Nations Organisation, the charter of which was approved by fifty countries in San Francisco in June 1945. The United Nations was the successor to the League of Nations, which had been established after the First World War but had been ineffectual in preventing the Second World War. The drafters of the UN Charter hoped that the organisation would be able to prevent the outbreak of wars around the world by diplomatic pressure and negotiation and, if necessary, that the organisation would take military action against aggressors that might upset the new world order. Such action was covered in chapter VII of the UN Charter, headed 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'. Article 42 of the chapter referred to 'action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'. The action needed the approval of the UN Security Council, where any of the five Permanent Members – the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China (the Republic of China from 1945 to 1971 and then the People's Republic of China) – could exercise a veto over the council's resolutions. As most conflicts during the following decades had a Cold War context, one of the Permanent Members generally applied, or threatened to apply, its veto to any UN action to resolve the conflict, and the United Nations was thus denied the power to intervene. The UN intervention in Korea in 1950 was an aberration from this pattern, as the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time. It was the last time the Soviet Union did so.

The United States and the Soviet Union did not confront each other on the battlefield, but fought the Cold War by proxy through numerous small wars around the world. Wars of national liberation or insurgencies in such countries as Greece, the Philippines,

9 There are numerous histories of the Cold War and of international relations during this period. In writing this section the author has relied heavily on Young and Kent, *International Relations Since 1945*, as a basic text. For a useful accessible history see Issacs and Downing, *Cold War*.

10 For example see Levering, *The Cold War*, p. 20.

11 Ball, *The Cold War*, p. 2.

China, Vietnam, Malaya, Southern Rhodesia and Aden became Cold War conflicts in which there was little scope for UN intervention. These wars were generally resolved by the victory of one side or the other; but by the mid-1980s there were many other conflicts where no resolution seemed possible. In 1979 the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan to support a Marxist regime there, and soon found itself bogged down in a campaign against US-armed insurgents. In El Salvador and Guatemala, US-backed governments were fighting against Soviet-backed insurgents, while in neighbouring Nicaragua the reverse was the case. In Mozambique guerrillas supported by South Africa opposed a Marxist government. In Angola the Soviet Union's staunch ally, Cuba, deployed forces to help the government deal with US-backed rebels. Across the border in South West Africa, South African forces opposed a Soviet-supported liberation organisation. The Soviet Union supported a repressive Marxist regime in Ethiopia fighting against separatists in Ethiopia and against its southern neighbour, Somalia, itself an earlier Soviet client state. In the dispute over Western Sahara the United States supported Morocco while the Soviet Union supported the national liberation movement. In 1978 Vietnam (backed by the Soviet Union) invaded Cambodia, but the West continued to recognise the previous Khmer Rouge regime. There was a clear pattern to these wars, for during the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soviet Union had worked to expand its influence around the world, and this had brought a predictable response from the United States. The Australian strategic analyst Dr Coral Bell summed up the impact of the Cold War on world politics: 'The two superpowers were like two "anchor-men" of a vast global tug-of-war. Any government, no matter how shaky, disreputable, and ideologically repellent, had to be seen as a potential recruit for the other side, and therefore if it could be bought, persuaded or coerced, a potential addition to one's own team.'[12]

Of course, not all wars fitted easily into the Cold War framework. The 1982 Falklands War, for example, was fought by two countries – Britain and Argentina – that were both allies of the United States. Although the United States backed Pakistan and the Soviet Union was allied with India, the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 were caused by local issues. The Arab/Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982 were even more complex, even though the Arabs had a clear aim of eliminating Israel as a sovereign nation. It is certainly true that the United States supported Israel, and the Soviet Union favoured the Arab states in several wars. But in general, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wished to see the area as one of superpower competition, and with exceptions they were both content to allow the deployment of UN peacekeepers to the region. Nonetheless, even in wars where neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was involved, there could be barriers to the deployment of UN peacekeepers. For example in the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), France could apply its veto and thus prevent UN peacekeeping activities, had these been contemplated. As Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, UN Secretary-General from 1982 to 1992, recalled, the Cold War 'seemed to congeal international relations into a kind of slow-moving glacier that challenged any redirection. The Security Council was largely frozen in its grip.'[13]

12 Bell, 'The Cold War in retrospect: Diplomacy, strategy and regional impact', p. 15.

13 Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, p. 13.

While the Cold War hindered the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in many conflicts, it also kept the lid on others. The United States and the Soviet Union could apply pressure to their client states to forestall or limit wars that might have exacerbated Cold War tensions. Further, strong central communist governments in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia prevented the outbreak of ethnic violence between rival nationalist groups in each country. The solidarity of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances in Europe brought forty-five years of peace and stability in Europe, albeit with a Soviet blockade of West Berlin that might have led to hostilities and repression in Eastern Europe, whose countries were invaded or threatened by the Soviet Union.

In 1985 the influential and respected International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) concluded, in its annual *Strategic Survey*, that while 'there were few signs of progress towards solving outstanding East–West problems, there were even fewer regarding peace in troubled regions such as Lebanon, the Gulf, Afghanistan, Kampuchea [Cambodia], Chad, Southern Africa and Central America'. The *Survey* acknowledged that much depended on the attitudes and actions of local parties, but when the superpowers saw 'their own interests as directly affected, peace [became] even more elusive'.[14] The *Strategic Survey* for the following year was equally pessimistic: 'The past year has seen a multiplicity of regional conflicts and disputes many of which have implications for the global balance, and nearly all of which show signs of continuing for many more years.'[15] Yet within a few years, following the rapid end to the Cold War, most of these disputes were on the way to being resolved.

## END OF THE COLD WAR

Just as historians disagree about the beginning of the Cold War, it is equally difficult to distinguish one point as marking its end. By the end of 1988 many apparently intractable conflicts were being resolved, leading the IISS to observe that future historians might well conclude that the Cold War 'ended' during that year.[16] To many members of the general public, however, the most dramatic image was the shattering of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, while others with a more 'official' approach regarded the Malta summit between Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the following month, when Bush said that the United States no longer considered the Soviet Union an enemy, to be 'the symbolic end of the Cold War'.[17] A crucial moment was reached in July 1990, when Gorbachev (along with the other former Second World War allies) accepted the reunification of Germany. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter (1977–81), however, thought that the key occasion was the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe in Paris on 19 November 1990, when Gorbachev described the reunification of Germany as 'a major event'. 'This was', according to Brzezinski, 'the functional equivalent of the act of capitulation in the railroad car in Compiègne in 1918 or on the USS *Missouri* in 1945, even though the

14 *Strategic Survey 1984–1985*, pp. 1, 2.

15 Ibid, pp. 12, 13.

16 Ibid, p. 5.

17 Powaski, *The Cold War*, p. 270.

key message was subtly couched in friendship.'[18] Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 made it unequivocally clear that the war was over.

In retrospect, the end of the Cold War had been approaching since the mid-1980s. By then the Soviet economy was beginning to collapse and could no longer sustain the Soviet defence establishment. Many analysts believe that competing with the United States' massive defence expenditure and particularly its commitment to the Strategic Defence Initiative – known as Star Wars – placed the Soviet economy under intolerable strain.[19] Others assert that the inherent weaknesses and corruption of the Soviet system meant that it was going to collapse anyway. As the historian Dana Allin put it: 'By the 1970s, the Soviet Union had become a vast Potemkin [ie sham] village, not only in the stagnation and rot of its domestic political economy, but also in its ability to maintain its power and influence in the world at large.'[20] The Australian Soviet analyst Paul Dibb captured this idea in his 1986 book, *The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower*.

The main agent for change was the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party on 11 March 1985 at the age of 54. Gorbachev believed that he needed to overhaul the Soviet economic system so that it could survive. At home his policies were driven by two ideas, *glasnost*, which called for more openness about the problems of Soviet society, and *perestroika*, which involved the restructuring of society so that it became more efficient and disciplined – for example by reducing alcoholism. Internationally, he worked closely with his Foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, whom he appointed in July 1985. They believed that they needed to halt the arms race and reduce confrontation if they were to have any chance of restructuring Soviet society.

In his early years Gorbachev delivered mixed messages about his foreign policy, and while some Western leaders – Margaret Thatcher of Britain was one – and many commentators were optimistic about his intentions, others, especially US President Ronald Reagan (1981–89) and some of his key advisers, believed that the communist leopard would not change its spots. They reasoned that the United States had to apply even more pressure, especially in the area of numbers of nuclear weapons and their capability, although Reagan's Secretary of State, George Shultz, thought that an arms deal was possible.

During 1985 and 1986 a series of contradictory events and decisions indicated that the Cold War was still very much alive, but also suggested that progress might be made. On the negative side, the United States supported a guerrilla campaign against the Nicaraguan government (a trade embargo was instituted in May 1985), conducted air strikes against Libya (April 1986) and arrested a Soviet embassy official for spying in the United States (August 1986). The Soviets seized an American journalist in

18 Brzezinski, 'The Cold War and its aftermath', p. 34.

19 Others argue that the support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, the decision to deploy new and highly accurate intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and the initiation of a human rights campaign in Eastern Europe, which began during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, were the first steps in turning the tables on the Soviets. For example, see ibid. For the argument that there is some continuity in the policies of the last years of the Carter Administration and those of the Reagan Administration see Westad, *The Global Cold War*, p. 331. Westad also argues (p. 364) that US pressure made it more difficult for the USSR to 'find a way out of its Third World predicament'; i.e., the high cost of supporting Third World countries.

20 Allin, *Cold War Illusions*, p. xi.

retaliation. But there were also positive indicators. Arms reduction talks were renewed. Gorbachev suspended new deployments of nuclear missiles, urging NATO to do the same; he initiated a moratorium on nuclear tests, and accepted the 'zero option' for the destruction of Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) systems (missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,000 kilometres). The summit meetings between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva in November 1985 and at Reykjavik in October 1986 were inconclusive, but the latter meeting came close to a spectacular breakthrough, hindered only by disagreement about the US's Strategic Defence Initiative program. Prospects were even more encouraging the following year. In February 1987 Gorbachev offered to eliminate all INF systems. In April he advocated a 'common European home', in which the countries of Europe would live peacefully together despite their different social systems and their membership of opposing military–political blocs. And in December in Washington, he and Reagan signed a treaty to eliminate all INF systems. This was a true disarmament measure, even though it actually reduced the numbers of nuclear warheads controlled by the superpowers by less than 7 per cent.

While this progress towards arms reduction was welcome and eased tensions, it did not of itself resolve the many conflicts around the world. In March 1983 Schultz had advised Reagan that 'a litmus test of Soviet seriousness in response to our concerns would be whether they are moving seriously toward a real pull-back from one of the positions gained in the 1970s'.[21] In particular the Reagan administration wished to reverse the communist advances in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua, and had actively supported anti-communist forces in most of those areas. Even before coming to power Gorbachev had been critical of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, but he could not begin a precipitate withdrawal, fearing a reaction from Communist Party hard-liners. Eventually, Gorbachev overcame the hard-liners, and in April 1988 the Soviet Union signed an agreement by which the Red Army would withdraw from Afghanistan within nine months.

For almost twenty years there had been numerous efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola and Namibia, but they were complicated by the involvement of Cuba and South Africa and the United States' determination to link Namibian independence to Cuba's withdrawal from Angola. While the United Nations conducted most of the negotiations, in May 1988 US and Soviet officials agreed on a deal by which the Cubans would leave Angola in return for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia. The accords were signed in August. Across the continent, in June 1989 the Soviets announced the withdrawal of their military advisers from Mozambique by the end of 1990.

During the mid-1980s the United States had supported the Contra guerrillas in their campaign against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. When the US Congress cut off all funds for the Contras, the US National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, and one of his staff, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, illegally helped raise money from US and foreign donors to maintain funding. The United States also secretly sold arms to Iran, which was then at war with Iraq, to facilitate the release of American hostages in Lebanon; the money raised went to the Contras. When these schemes became known publicly in late 1986, the ensuing scandal threatened the Reagan presidency, giving Reagan greater incentive to find foreign policy successes elsewhere. Starved of funds,

21 Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 266.

the Contras agreed to a ceasefire in March 1988. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had cut back its aid to Nicaragua, ending all military assistance during 1989. The scene was set, with UN sponsorship and assistance, for the gradual end to conflicts in Central America in the early 1990s.

In 1979 the United Nations had demanded that Vietnam withdraw from Cambodia. Vietnam had agreed, provided that the Khmer Rouge, the previous brutal rulers of Cambodia, were eliminated as a political force and that its border with China was guaranteed. China would not accept these conditions, but Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia was proving costly and, after withdrawing some troops in 1987, Vietnam announced further withdrawals in May 1988. Meanwhile, the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations – another Gorbachev initiative – gave the Soviets less incentive to maintain their support for Vietnam, and privately the Soviets were urging Vietnam to leave Cambodia. In January 1989 Vietnam announced that it would withdraw all its troops by September. Meanwhile talks were initiated among the various parties aimed at a final settlement in Cambodia.

Another major and long-running conflict – the Iran–Iraq War – came to an end in 1988. During the 1970s the Shah of Iran had been supported by the United States as the regional Western-oriented strongman. By contrast, Iraq, under the dictator Saddam Hussein, signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, and used its enormous oil wealth to purchase arms from the Eastern bloc and from France. The Shah pursued a hard line with Iraq over border disputes and forced Iraq to agree to a new border. In February 1979 the Shah was overthrown, and Islamic revolutionaries seized the US Embassy in Tehran, taking its staff hostage. The United States attempted to free the hostages by military action, but failed in a humiliating manner. The new Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini denounced Saddam Hussein, whose Ba'ath Party had a secular and Arab socialist philosophy, as an 'enemy of Islam', and his forces shelled Iraqi positions. Saddam Hussein saw an opportunity to readjust the border, and on 22 September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran.

For both superpowers the war was initially a sideshow. The United States had no sympathy for Iran but did not want to see the Soviet Union benefit from an Iraqi victory. For several years the war ebbed and flowed around the southern Iraqi waterways, with the United States gradually supporting Iraq. Casualties were heavy, and by 1986 both sides were attacking each other's oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Then Iran decided to target Iraq's Gulf allies by laying mines in the Gulf and attacking ships of all countries bound for Kuwait. In March 1987 the Kuwaiti Government sought assistance from both the United States and the Soviet Union, and Kuwaiti ships began operating under American and Soviet flags. Soon US and Western European warships were escorting neutral commercial vessels through the Gulf. With relations between the superpowers improving, the United States and the Soviet Union supported a UN resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and a return to the 1980 border. In July 1988 Iran and Iraq agreed to the ceasefire. The war might have continued even longer except for the growing cooperation between the superpowers.

The Soviet Union's willingness to compromise was an indication of a fundamental change in its approach to international affairs. On 7 December 1988 Gorbachev addressed the United Nations in New York and spoke about the 'emergence of a mutually connected and integrated world'. Further world progress was 'now possible only through the search for a consensus of all mankind, in movement toward a new world

order'. He denied that the Soviet Union was abandoning its communist ideology, but he referred to a different world where 'force and the threat of force can no longer be . . . instruments of foreign policy'. He also announced large-scale cuts in Soviet armaments and the withdrawal of some troops from Eastern Europe.[22] The term 'New World Order' had been used before, for example by US President Woodrow Wilson after the First World War, and at the establishment of the United Nations at the end of the Second World War.[23] In more recent times, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, had also used the term. But it was Gorbachev who gave it prominence, and engendered hope that it might actually eventuate.

The new US President, George H.W. Bush, who took office in January 1989, was slow to embrace fully this latest initiative from Gorbachev. But events soon made it clear that there could be no turning back from the process of liberalisation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In January non-communist parties were legalised in Hungary. In March and April the Soviet Union conducted its first elections for a Soviet Congress of People's Deputies. Also in April, the Polish Government agreed to recognise the trade union organisation Solidarity and to elect an assembly. For most of the Cold War the communist governments of Eastern Europe had been kept in power by the force or threat of force of the Soviet Army. When in August Poland elected the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev refused to intervene (as has been the case with the Soviet Union in earlier times). Other countries in Eastern Europe noted this new attitude. In October the Communist Party of Hungary formally disbanded. In November, under immense pressure as East German 'tourists' moved through Hungary to the West, the East German Government opened the Berlin Wall. Before the end of the year there was a new government in Bulgaria, the dissident Vaclav Havel had become President of Czechoslovakia, and the Rumanian President, Nicolae Ceauşescu, and his wife had been executed. These events also influenced activists to agitate for liberalism in the People's Republic of China, leading to the 'Tiananmen Square massacre' on 3 June 1989 in which Chinese troops killed several hundred demonstrators.

How did the United States react to these events? As mentioned, initially the Bush Administration moved slowly. Indeed Bush's Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, and others argued that the best approach was to wait and see how events in the Soviet Union developed. Finally, on 12 May 1989, after a comprehensive review of US foreign policy, Bush declared: 'We are approaching the conclusion of a historic post-war struggle between . . . tyranny and . . . freedom.' The American policy of 'containment' had worked but had now ended. American policy would now aim at 'integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations'.[24] Discussions with the Soviets quickened, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations resumed in June 1989. But even when the Berlin Wall came down, Bush was reluctant to celebrate an event that was greeted with high emotion almost everywhere else.[25] After the summit meeting in Malta between Bush and Gorbachev early in December 1989, a Soviet spokesman

22 Gorbachev, 'Address to the UN General Assembly', p. 459; also Gorbachev, 'USSR arms reduction: Rivalry into sensible competition', pp. 229–36.

23 Freedman, 'The Gulf War and the new world order', p. 197.

24 Quoted in Young and Kent, *International Relations Since 1945*, p. 588.

25 Isaacs and Downing, *Cold War*, p. 391.