General introduction

Galen: biographical summary and position of ‘psychology’

Galen (Galēnos) was born in Pergamum in Greek-speaking Asia Minor under the Roman Empire in 129 CE, but spent most of his mature years (after 161) in Rome, where he probably died, some time after 200.¹ His father was a well-to-do architect, and his own early studies (after some training in geometry, mathematics and the usual Greek linguistic–literary education of the time) were in philosophy before he took up medicine. Both philosophical and medical studies took place first in Pergamum and then (from 149 to 157) abroad, especially in Smyrna and Alexandria.²

After four years back in Pergamum, as physician to the gladiators (157–161), he left for Rome. In transit between the two, he also extended his knowledge (and collection) of the herbal and mineral remedies of his time, visiting a wide range of places, especially in the eastern Mediterranean region, including Cyprus and Palestine. At Rome he seems quickly to have established a reputation on the basis of public debates and demonstrations

¹ For a good recent summary of Galen’s life and works see Hankinson (2008c); and for a still fuller one Boudon-Millot (2007a vii–xc (‘Biographic’). Still valuable as a framework is Ilberg (1889–1897), though with the provisos made below on date, and, more specifically, the revision to the dating of Affections and Errors; see below, pp. 34–41; much more detail on the early chronology is provided by Nutton (1973); for arguments in favour of a date after 210 (instead of the traditional 199/200) for Galen’s death, see Nutton (1984). See now also Mattern (2013).

² The evidence (as, to a large extent, for the facts of Galen’s biography more generally) is from Galen’s own accounts; see esp. Aff. Pecc. Dig. 28,9–21 DB (V.41–42 K.), Lib. Prop. 140–141 BM (XIX.16–17 K.) and Ord. Lib. Prop. 98–99 BM (XIX.57–58 K.). In Pergamum he studied with representatives of all four major schools (Platonist, Stoic, Aristotelian, Epicurean), and with a doctor called Satyrus; then in Smyrna with a Platonist philosopher (Albinus) and another doctor, Pelops; Pelops was a pupil of Numisianus, in whose teaching Galen was particularly interested, and in search of which he also visited Corinth and Alexandria. It is during this ‘study tour’ that Galen must have acquired his serious training in anatomy, as well as his knowledge of the ‘latest’ physiological theories of the Hellenistic world, especially those of Herophilus and Erasistratus. For more detail on Galen’s anatomical education, see Rocca (2008).
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(which involved anatomy as well as disquisition) and spectacular feats of ‘prognosis’; and simultaneously to have gained the patronage of certain important figures in Roman society. And to this first period in Rome belongs also the first phase of composition of his great work on ‘psychology’ in relation to physiological function, *The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*. He left Rome in 166 after an outbreak of plague; but returned (via a brief period spent with the army on campaign in Aquileia) to the capital at the summons of the imperial family in 169; and probably spent the rest of his professional life there, much of it working with the status of physician within the imperial family. It is to this second period in Rome, and more specifically to that part of it which coincided with the emperor Marcus Aurelius’ absence on military campaign (169–176), that the composition of a large part of Galen’s major medical and scientific works can be dated. The works assembled in the present volume, however, probably belong rather to Galen’s later life, the earliest of them written after 192.

In spite of losses (some of them detailed in *Avoiding Distress*, below pp. 84–87), the extent of Galen’s surviving works is huge, with treatises of more than a hundred pages – in several cases, many hundreds of pages – devoted to each of: logic and scientific method; anatomy; physiology; theory of the fundamental elements (or mixtures); disease classification; techniques of diagnosis and prognosis (in particular by the pulse); therapeutics; ‘hygienic’ (i.e. the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle – diet in its broadest sense); pharmacology or drug lore; and last, but by no means least, commentary on works by Hippocrates. Again, the works in this volume belong not to that huge body of medical/scientific (or scholarly) work, but to a smaller-scale, more ‘occasional’ type of literary production.3

Galen had a serious engagement with philosophy, which was for him both an additional accomplishment, to be taken as seriously as his medical work,4 and something intimately (and complicatedly) involved with

3 See further below, pp. 10–15 on genre. The above summary is basically of the works that survive, although in some of those categories (esp. that of logic) there are significant works that do not; and there are also cases of works that survive only in Arabic and/or only in fragmentary form. In addition to this list, there is quite a large number of ‘occasional’ or shorter philosophical works, similar to those in this volume, that do not survive; and whole categories of works (esp. scholarly ones on use of language and on rhetoric, and summaries or commentaries on philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus) which have perished almost completely (a commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus* survives in fragmentary form). See esp. *Lib. Prop.* chs. 15–20 [12–17], with discussion of genres of Galen’s works below pp. 10–15, as well as Galen’s own account of the works lost in the fire in 192, *Ind.* 5–11 BJP.

4 The importance of philosophy in Galen’s self-image is famously illustrated by the perception of him which, in his self-publicizing work *Prognosis*, he attributes to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius: ‘first among doctors, but the only philosopher’, *Praen.* 128,28 N. (XIV.660 K.). It should also be
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and informing his medical and scientific thought. Indeed, how far, how successfully, and in precisely what ways various philosophical discourses are assimilated into his medical–scientific thought is a major question for Galenic studies, as we shall see – at least in the context of his works of psychology – in what follows. The main contexts in which philosophy surfaces in his work are those of (a) logic and scientific method; and (b) the soul. It is to this latter context that the works in this volume essentially belong.

Now, it should be understood at the outset that the English terms ‘soul’ and ‘psychology’ both refer, in Greek terms, to the same subject area: that of the ψυχή. This term, though indeed usually translated ‘soul’, corresponds to a range of connected concepts in Greek, the central of which could more accurately be translated ‘mind’. Even the term ‘mind’, however, is really too narrow, since ψυχή in Greek biological thought – and in particular in Galen – is responsible for a range of physiological functions; and indeed not just ‘neurological’ ones (to use an anachronistic modern approximation) but also a number of other functions necessary for the maintenance of life. In The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato the functions of both heart and liver are, in a sense, ‘soul’-functions. Relatedly, the term ψυχή – in both traditional and philosophical usage – has a fundamental connotation, not just of ‘mental’ or ‘emotional’ activity, but of ‘life’ or ‘that by virtue of which one is alive’.

There can thus be – as neither the term ‘soul-theory’ nor the term ‘psychology’ would readily suggest – both a philosophical and a medical discourse regarding the soul in Greek (and the latter in the senses both of a physiological theory and of a medical psychopathology and psychotherapy); and indeed Galen engages in both (or, all three). In the area of soul/psychology, then, as we shall see, that question of ‘assimilation’ of philosophy to medicine is particularly complex. For the question of opposition and/or assimilation arises, not just in relation to discussion of the soul versus discussion of more obviously medical/scientific matters, but also within Galen’s discussions of the soul themselves, since the ‘soul’ can mentioned that this self-image is not a straightforward one, and that there are times when Galen seems to put himself in a group which is aggressively opposed to ‘philosophers’: see below, Aff. Pecc. Dig. 51.23 DB (V.75 K.); 59, 23–27, DB (V.88 K.); 62.6 DB (V.92 K.); 67, 10 DB (V.101 K.); and (though controversially) 68.5 DB (V.104 K.), with notes. For detailed discussion of this subject see now Singer (2014).

5 But discussion of the fundamental components (elements or qualities) of both the universe and the human body was a topic within the philosophical tradition; and Galen draws on this tradition in his own discussion of these questions. This, too, then, can be viewed as in a sense a philosophical discourse.
be viewed both in a physiological light (explaining aspects of the functioning of the body) and in a moral or ethical light. In the latter case, moreover, connections may or may not – in different contexts – be made between the nature of the soul and the state of the body.

The works in the present volume belong in the category of ‘philosophy’, and are so categorized by Galen himself. They seem clearly distinct in kind from those works in which Galen goes into the details of medical, physiological or anatomical questions, and in particular from the works which represent the core of his medical curriculum; the distinction will become clearer in what follows (pp. 11–13). At the same time, one must acknowledge that such boundaries of genre or theme are not rigid in Galen; and that The Capacities of the Soul (QAM), in particular, shows considerable overlap in content and style with Mixtures – which definitely is central to that curriculum.

Galen as philosophical writer in his cultural context

In approaching Galen’s works of a philosophical character, then, and attempting to locate them in a historical and cultural context, we are faced with a fairly complicated set of data. This complexity is due, to a very large extent, to the multi-faceted and multifarious nature of Galen’s own works and, to a somewhat lesser extent, to the complexities of the culture of his time. It may be helpful to identify two main types of opposition, in relation to which Galen has, in varying ways, been placed by modern scholarship.

The first is that between contemporary Roman society and traditional Greek culture; the second, which arises within the latter pole of that opposition, is between the broad literary–rhetorical culture (sometimes referred to as the ‘Second Sophistic’) of the Graeco-Roman world of his period and the much more specific philosophical culture.

The second opposition, then, is one between the literary–rhetorical world – the world of public debates, display speeches and highly literate engagement with the ‘classical’ tradition, the world of authors like Lucian, Dio of Prusa, Aelius Aristides, Maximus of Tyre – and the established ‘schools’ of philosophy – Stoics, Platonists and Aristotelians, Epicureans, Sceptics – with their more technical and abstract debates.

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6 See below, p. 12 with n. 26.
7 One may, further, make the opposition between either or both of the above literary backgrounds and specifically medical traditions of writing. Such an opposition, or relationship, is certainly of enormous importance in Galen, but it is not of great relevance to the works considered in the present volume.
Within this context, the relevance to Galen of the philosophical, and more specifically of the Platonist, tradition, has tended to receive the most scholarly attention until fairly recently. There have been attempts to characterize Galen’s position within a Platonic (and at points an Aristotelian, or ‘Aristotelianizing’) framework of thought; to establish the relevance of a Stoic model of the soul and its affections (a model which Galen explicitly rejects but which seems to intrude on his ‘official’ Platonist model in various ways); and to clarify the complexities arising from Galen’s synthesis, in his ‘psychology’, of the terminology of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics—as well as the complexities arising from the synthesis of that psychology with physiological ideas which are developments of theories of Alexandrian doctors. Such attempts have proceeded from a number of different scholarly or philosophical standpoints. These analyses are relevant to all the opuscula contained in this volume, and also, in a rather different way, to the physiological/psychological magnum opus, *The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (PHP). We shall consider this area of enquiry below, in the context of the relationship between the disparate works brought together here, pp. 18–33; and we shall look in more detail at the philosophical positions and alignments of each text in the individual introductions.

The other pole of our second opposition, that is to say, the literary culture known as the ‘Second Sophistic’, has also received considerable attention in more recent years. The question posed by our first opposition—Greek culture versus Roman Empire—has also been the focus of some scholarly attention. In this latter context, some have pointed to Galen’s apparent isolation from Roman society (even while working at its very heart—within the Imperial court); his insistence on Greek culture; his predominantly Greek and/or ‘Eastern’ social milieu. The impression of social insularity may seem to be heightened by a sort of temporal insularity: his
tendency to engage in debate, explicitly, with philosophers or doctors from a more or less distant past, rather than with those around him in Rome. Thus, it is Chrysippus (not contemporary Stoics) that he attacks, openly and in detail, regarding Stoic doctrine, and Plato (not the Platonists of his own time) that he enlists as sharing his opinions. It is certainly true that more recent, even contemporary, figures are mentioned from time to time in his work, but usually anonymously, and often in vague terms; and even where, as at the beginning of Affections, a specific contemporary philosopher is mentioned by name – which is quite a rare case – insufficient detail is given to enable us to construct any clear picture of him; as the argument unfolds (here, as also in The Capacities of the Soul and Character Traits) the concrete individuals mentioned and named are Plato and others from the classical past.

One may feel, though, on closer consideration, that both these forms of ‘insularity’ are more illusory than real. In the latter, Galen is using ‘the ancients’ to conduct contemporary debates. Although, in (for example) Affections and Errors (‘people professing philosophy’, etc.) and The Capacities of the Soul (‘so-called Platonists’), his contemporary opponents are shady, unnamed individuals, it can hardly be doubted that these contemporary individuals were the target of his writing.

Just as Galen’s ‘temporal isolation’, then, is something of a smokescreen (and often a frustrating one, making it impossible to know who, actually, Galen is talking to or about), so too the opposition ‘Roman society versus Greek culture’ may tend to disappear on closer analysis. The insistence on a distinctively Greek culture is certainly an interesting phenomenon of Galen’s time, and one to which he enthusiastically subscribes (it is, for example, difficult to find any clear evidence that he read a Latin author); and there was undoubtedly a certain cultural snobbishness in play. At the same time Rome, specifically, and Roman Imperial institutions more generally, provide the framework for Galen’s extraordinarily successful career; there was, arguably, considerable permeability of the two cultures, and
transfer of information between them; one very prominent function of the Roman Empire in Galen’s time was precisely that of supporting and providing stability for specifically Greek cultural institutions, especially in the East but also in Rome itself; and Galen can be seen, in fact, as one of the most successful beneficiaries (or exploiters) of the set-up which can be crudely characterized as ‘Roman power patronizes Greek culture.’ It must, surely, be acknowledged that Galen excels spectacularly at using his specifically Greek skills of philosophically based argumentation – and of medical expertise – in a way which brings him status and influence in Rome; and, further, that he excels at this precisely in that intensely competitive environment which was specific to the Graeco-Roman world of his time – the same competitive environment in which Dio, Maximus, Aelius and Polemo also excelled, and by the same kind of process of polemical, public engagement – albeit with a very different kind of claim to knowledge. That, in a sense, provides the clearest answer to the nature of Galen’s relationship, both with Rome and with (whether one approves the term or not) the ‘Second Sophistic’.

A parallel question, then, arises when we consider Galen’s works, especially those in the popular–moral vein. More specifically: to what extent is he engaging, in a quasi-medical way, with the world around him, with the problems which arise among his acquaintances and in (mainly Roman) society, and to what extent rather with the world of Greek philosophical texts and the problems which arise within schools – the technical debates over thorny issues? The question is in a sense unanswerable: we have, as it were, only his word for it that the philosophical concepts and debates he engages were important among his friends and society in the way that he says they were. Certainly, a classical Greek philosophical language – a set of terms which have mostly existed in the philosophical tradition for four hundred years or more, albeit (arguably) developed in subtly different

13 See e.g. Marrou (1956) 265 ff. (on the adoption of Greek educational norms by the Romans); ibid. 293–294 (on the extent to which the Roman Empire supported and perpetuated Greek notions of civilization).


directions during the Roman Imperial period – provides the categories which Galen uses in his analysis of contemporary individuals’ actions and ‘affections’. Moreover – a point which will be developed further in the introduction to *Affections and Errors* – this language, in relation to human emotion, is lacking in richness and variety when compared with that employed by some of his near-contemporaries within the same philosophical tradition (Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius). In other words, there are, arguably, other authors who have adapted the philosophical language in more subtle ways to the phenomena they are trying to address.

Still, Galen presents us with vivid anecdotes which suggest that, in his mind and in the minds of at least some of the people around him, the philosophical language he employs does have a genuine contemporary significance. In the consideration of the ‘social reality’ underlying such texts, we may argue, too, that writers such as Plutarch, and even more so Epictetus – who ran a school in the provinces to which individuals, including wealthy or important Roman citizens, could, in theory at least, ‘retreat’ from public life in the attempt to gain peace of mind, or ‘cure their souls’ – provide evidence for a genuine social context to this kind of discourse. Still more so, arguably, the spectacular – and directly contemporary – example of Marcus Aurelius: one can hardly, it might be thought, have better evidence of the social and political relevance of Greek ethical philosophy than the production of a work in that category by the incumbent Emperor.

So, Galen is employing the (traditional) philosophical language of his culture as the glass in which contemporary society is reflected – however adequate or inadequate one may feel that glass to be. An interesting further question then arises (related to those considered above) as to whether this language, and the project of improvement which Galen proposes, is one that may have been applied – by Galen, at least – within the ‘Greek’, or Greek-speaking, community, rather than that of Romans. The answer to

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16 For various aspects of the adaptation of Greek philosophy to the Roman context see Griffin and Barnes (1989), Braund and Gill (1997), Barnes and Griffin (1997); also Rutherford (1989); for Roman ethical norms more generally, and from a not specifically philosophical perspective, see Edwards (1993).

17 One may, too, wish to take an example from a couple of generations before Galen – one which does, in a sense, cross the divide between Greek and Roman culture – that of Seneca. On such parallels, see below, pp. 210-217. Such examples, however, do not simply confirm the ‘relevance’ thesis, but arguably raise problems for it, in a way which we do not have space to explore here. One might wish to say, for example, that the particular way in which Marcus Aurelius deploys those ethical concepts – put crudely, the absence from his text of anything of clearly contemporary political relevance – points away from the ‘real’ contemporary importance of that philosophical project. For recent discussions of Marcus Aurelius see Rutherford (1989); Gill (2007b).
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this must be speculative. It is true that most of the people Galen explicitly addresses in *Affections and Errors* are probably in some sense Greek (on the *personae* of that text see below, pp. 218–219); on the other hand, there is the prominent example given of the Emperor Hadrian (not that anyone is actually attempting to cure his anger); and, in fact, the world of the treatise’s *personae* and addressees is too shady to admit of any precision.\(^\text{18}\) If Galen’s dismay at, or contempt for, the corrupt souls of those about him is to some extent also a contempt for the specifically Roman nature of those souls, that is a theme that is so deeply submerged as not to be clear in the texts that we have.

Perhaps, though, it is legitimate to point out that the ‘powerful people’, attendance upon whom is a sufficient condition for being regarded as corrupt, would be overwhelmingly Roman people; and perhaps it is true, too, that the kinds of dinner-party excess adverted to may be more specifically Roman than Greek (the corruption of the capital, as opposed to the comparatively innocent ways of places outside it, was, of course, a commonplace already in Galen’s time). Whether the dismissive remarks about people’s education these days, about people being unable to follow the simplest logical argument, and about people with false pretentions to philosophy, have specifically Roman individuals in their sights, again, the text does not allow us to answer. Certainly it is a specifically Greek education that is needed to solve these problems; but the remark to the effect that any layman with ‘the kind of education approved by the Greeks from the beginning’ would be superior to these *soi-disant* philosophers may express a nostalgia for a time when this education could (supposedly) be taken for granted, rather than for a place distinct from Rome – let alone a comment on the education of Romans as opposed to Greeks within Rome.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{18}\) On the society within which Galen moved see now Schlange-Schöningen (2003). The most vivid picture of Galen’s involvement with actual individuals remains his own account in *Prognosis*, which does include ‘Greeks’ (Eudemus, in fact a fellow Pergamene) and ‘Romans’ (Sergius Paulus, Flavius Boethus – both men of high rank), though the latter are also imbued with Greek culture. That work in any case relates to Galen’s earliest period in Rome, and specifically chronicles his rise to favour within the higher echelons of Roman society. For more detail on the personalities involved, see the notes on the relevant individuals in Nutton (1979); and see now Singer (2014).

\(^{19}\) *Aff. Pecc. Dig.* 52,1 DB (V.75 K.), p. 296 below, with n. 82. See the remark in the preface to *Lib. Prop.* 135,6–9 BM (XIX.9 K.): ‘This kind of laziness existed many years ago too, when I was a young man, but it had not yet reached the extreme state it has now’; and indeed, earlier in the same passage, 134,14–135,2 BM (XIX.9 K.), the terms in which someone is praised who was able correctly to identify a work as inauthentic: ‘Galen’, ‘schooled in the fundamental early education which Greek children always used to be given by teachers of grammar and rhetoric’.
Galén’s literary production: genre and orality

Genre

Let us try to be a bit more specific as to how the above phenomena relate to our actual texts, and in the process attempt to investigate a little more of their genres.

The category of ‘genre’ is an important one in relation to Galen, but at the same time a problematic one. We can detect large differences in the style, intellectual tradition and, apparently, audience and context of production of different Galenic works. Galen works simultaneously within a tradition of medical writing that stretches back to the Hippocratic corpus, while also being informed by a vast range of treatises and intellectual developments of the Hellenistic period, and a tradition of philosophical writing which stretches back to Plato, and is at least equally diverse. He also shows some literary features which belong very much to the culture of his own period. It is not, however, the case that there is any set of clear genre-categories into which any given work can be fitted;20 nor is the relationship between written text and oral presentation a clear one – though it is clear that there is some such relationship.

Three things, at least, may be stated fairly uncontroversially: first, that the social reality of public debate provides one crucially important framework for the understanding of Galen’s literary production;21 secondly, that there are certain pre-existing styles of literary production, with which Galen’s works have a (more or less complicated) relationship; thirdly, that, in relation to both these frameworks, Galen presents his own very particular ‘take’ – partly because of his very discursive argumentative style, which is difficult to discipline within a formal structure, and partly because of his peculiar intellectual interests and projects. No other author that we know of combines serious philosophical ambitions, advanced knowledge of medical theory and practice, and a sophisticated scholarly engagement

20 See Schenkeveld (1997) for an analysis of ‘genres’ of ‘philosophical prose’ within the rhetorical context. While such an account (including such terms as protreptikos, parainesis, diatribe, thesis) seems to be the closest we can get to a view of the officially established ‘genres’ in Galen’s time, it emerges from such analysis how fluid (and in some cases reliant on later interpretation) these categories are – a caution which is re-emphasized, in the particular case of Galen, by the very clear and incisive analysis of von Staden (1998), esp. 91–92. See now also Curtis (2009) for further exploration of genre in Galen; and cf. Nutton (1972) 56 ff. and (1979) 59 ff. on the problematic genre of Prognosis in relation to the category of autobiography and to other kinds of contemporary parallel in the field of ‘moral diatribe’, e.g. works by Lucian.

21 See further below, esp. n. 30.