This first volume of *The Cambridge History of the First World War* provides a comprehensive account of the war’s military history. An international team of leading historians chart how a war made possible by globalisation and imperial expansion unfolded into catastrophe, growing year by year in scale and destructive power far beyond what anyone had anticipated in 1914.

Adopting a global perspective, the volume analyses the spatial impact of the war and the subsequent ripple effects that occurred both regionally and across the world. It explores how imperial powers devoted vast reserves of manpower and material to their war efforts, and how, by doing so, they changed the political landscape of the world order. It also charts the moral, political and legal implications of the changing character of war and, in particular, the collapse of the distinction between civilian and military targets.

*Jay Winter* is Charles J. Stille Professor of History at Yale University and Distinguished Visiting Professor at Monash University. He is one of the founders of the Historial de la Grande Guerre, the International Museum of the Great War, in Péronne, Somme, France. In 1997 he received an Emmy award for the best documentary series of the year as co-producer and co-writer of *The Great War and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century*, an eight-hour series broadcast on PBS and the BBC, shown subsequently in twenty-eight countries. His previous publications include *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (1995); *Remembering War* (2006) and *Dreams of Peace and Freedom* (2006).
THE HISTORIAL MUSEUM OF THE

GREAT WAR

PÉRONNE, SOMME

The Historial is an internationally acclaimed museum that presents the First World War in a unique way. Located on the battlefields of the Somme, the museum presents and compares the presence of the three main belligerent nations on the Western Front – Great Britain, France and Germany. It unfolds the story both of the front and of civilians under the pressure of war. The Battle of the Somme in 1916 caused over a million casualties in less than five months of fighting. The ground would be fought over again in 1918. By the end of the war, combatants from well over twenty-five nations had fought on the Somme, making it the place where the war truly became a World War.

Historial de la Grande Guerre/Thiepval
Château de Péronne
B. P. 20063
80201 Péronne Cedex
www.historial.org

Members of the Editorial Committee

STÉPHANE AUDOIN-ROUZEAU
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris

NICOLAS BEAUPRÉ
Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand and Institut Universitaire de France

ANNETTE BECKER
Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense and Institut Universitaire de France

JEAN-JACQUES BECKER
Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense

ANNIE DEPERCHIN
Centre d’Histoire Judiciaire, Université de Lille 2

CAROLINE FONTAINE
Centre international de Recherche de l’Historial de la Grande Guerre, Péronne, Somme
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

VOLUME I

Global War

Edited by

JAY WINTER
Charles J. Stille Professor of History, Yale University

and

The Editorial Committee of the International Research Centre of the Historial de la Grande Guerre
Contents

List of illustrations  page xi
List of maps  xiv
List of contributors  xv
Acknowledgements  xvii

General Introduction  1
JAY WINTER

Introduction to Volume I  11
JAY WINTER

PART I
A NARRATIVE HISTORY

Introduction to Part I  15
JAY WINTER

1  ·  Origins  16
VOLKER R. BERGHAHN

2  ·  1914: Outbreak  39
JEAN-JACQUES BECKER AND GERD KRUMEICH

3  ·  1915: Stalemate  65
STÉPHANE AUĐIN-ROUZEAU

4  ·  1916: Impasse  89
ROBIN PRIOR

VII
Contents

5  · 1917: Global war  110
   MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

6  · 1918: Endgame  133
   CHRISTOPH MICK

7  · 1919: Aftermath  172
   BRUNO CABANES

PART II
THEATRES OF WAR

Introduction to Part II  201
   ROBIN PRIOR

8  · The Western Front  204
   ROBIN PRIOR

9  · The Eastern Front  234
   HOLGER AFFLERBACH

10 · The Italian Front  266
    NICOLA LABANCA

11 · The Ottoman Front  297
    ROBIN PRIOR

12 · The war at sea  321
    PAUL KENNEDY

13 · The air war  349
    JOHN H. MORROW, JR.

14 · Strategic command  376
    GARY SHEFFIELD AND STEPHEN BADSEY

VIII
Contents

PART III
WORLD WAR

Introduction to Part III 403
JAY WINTER AND JOHN HORNE

15 · The imperial framework 405
JOHN H. MORROW, JR.

16 · Africa 433
BILL NASSON

17 · The Ottoman Empire 459
MUSTAFA AKSAKAL

18 · Asia 479
GUOQI XU

19 · North America 511
JENNIFER D. KEELE

20 · Latin America 533
OLIVIER COMPAGNON

PART IV
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, LAWS OF WAR
AND WAR CRIMES

Introduction to Part IV 559
ANNETTE BECKER AND ANNIE DEPERCHIN

21 · Atrocities and war crimes 561
JOHN HORNE

22 · Genocide 585
HANS-LUKAS KIESER AND DONALD BLOXHAM
Contents

23  ·  The laws of war  615
   Annie Deperchin

24  ·  Visual essay: Global war  639
   Jay Winter

Bibliographical essays  644
Index  687
Illustrations

8.1 Distribution of German forces 1914–18 by front

Plate section I

All illustrations are from the Collection of the Historial de la Grande Guerre, Péronne (Somme), unless otherwise stated.

Photography: Yazid Medmoun (Conseil Général de la Somme), unless otherwise stated.

1 German colonial clock: Our future lies on the seas.
2 Exhibition on German East-Africa, Leipzig, 1897.
3 Sir Edward Grey’s juggling act: dangerous diplomacy.
4 German toy model warship.
5 Jean Jaurès assassinated.
6 Great Britain Declares War, Daily Mirror, 5 August 1914.
7 Britain and France giving Germany a final rinse on the Marne, 1914.
8 Allied military leaders 1914, painted ceramic plate.
9 German military commanders 1914, painted ceramic plate.
10 Two British naval victories, 1914.
11 Hindenburg and Ludendorff celebrating the victory at Tannenberg.
12 Dardanelles defended, 1915, ceramic plate.
13 German sailors in Ottoman uniforms on horseback.
14 HMS Chester with damage from the Battle of Jutland.
15 Pitcher: Haig, the man of push and go.
16 Air war: Captain Guynemer in flight.
17 Air war: biplane over Compiègne.
18 German soldier near Fort Vaux at Verdun.
19 Péronne town hall destroyed, 1917.
20 Panel left on destroyed town hall of Péronne by German soldiers, 1917: ‘Don’t be angry just be amazed’.
21 The decorated ceiling of the Scuola di San Rocco in Venice destroyed by Austrian fire.
22 Statuette of Lenin.
23 ‘Anti-Semitism is the enemy’: Russian revolutionary poster.
List of illustrations

24 Black American troops in France.
25 Allied signatories of the Armistice at Compiègne, 11 November 1918.
26 Homecoming.
28 Model submarine made of bullets.
29 Figurine of an African soldier.
30 North African soldier’s family war album.
31 Model airplane.

Plate section II

24.1 Soldiers of the French Empire in a German prisoner-of-war camp, 1917.
© Musée d’histoire Contemporaine, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Paris
24.2 French African soldier transported to a German casualty clearing centre for the evacuation of the wounded, 1914.
© Musée d’histoire Contemporaine, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Paris
24.3 Indian soldier signing up for military service with his thumb print.
© Imperial War Museum, London
24.4 Egyptian physicians treat an Asian labourer for beri-beri.
© Musée d’histoire Contemporaine, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Paris
24.5 Postcard of a black French soldier with a white nurse.
© Musée d’histoire Contemporaine, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Paris
24.6 Dying Serbian soldier, Isle of Vido, near Corfu.
© Musée d’histoire Contemporaine, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Paris
24.7 Charon’s barque, Isle of Vido, Corfu.
© Musée d’histoire Contemporaine, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Paris
24.8 A Jewish family in a field, Volhynia.
© Leo Baeck Institute, New York
24.9 Jewish prostitutes, Volhynia.
© Leo Baeck Institute, New York
24.10 Austro-Hungarian mountain troops in the vertical war on the Italian Front.
© Musée d’histoire Contemporaine, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Paris
24.11 The white war, the Kosturino Ridge on the Macedonian front.
© Imperial War Museum, London
24.12 All quiet on the Eastern Front, Volhynia.
© Leo Baeck Institute, New York
© Leo Baeck Institute, New York
List of illustrations

24.14 Airplane hauled by horses, Volhynia.  
© Leo Baeck Institute, New York

24.15 HMS Inflexible, near the Falkland Islands, 1914.  
© Imperial War Museum, London

24.16 A Japanese cruiser off the coast of Vancouver, British Columbia, 1917.  
George Metcalf Archival Collection © Canadian War Museum, Ottawa

24.17 Horses stuck in the mud, Western Front.  
© Imperial War Museum, London

24.18 Passchendaele, 1917.  
© Imperial War Museum, London

24.19 The uncanny: part of a horse in a tree.  
© PH coll. 781, University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections

24.20 Horses bringing provisions and supplies to soldiers on the Western Front.  
© Imperial War Museum, London

24.21 Poster announcing a Grand Carnival in aid of sick and wounded war horses, December 1917.  
© Imperial War Museum, London

24.22 A broken-down tank near Passchendaele, 1917.  
George Metcalf Archival Collection © Canadian War Museum, Ottawa

24.23 Flame-throwers on the Eastern Front.  
© Leo Baeck Institute, New York

24.24 Gas attack on the Western Front, I.  
© CBWInfo

24.25 Gas attack on the Western Front, II.  
© Science Photo Library Ltd, London

24.26 French soldiers with gas masks.  
Artist: Maurice Le Poitevin (1886–1952)  
Aquarelle and charcoal drawing

24.27 Mules and soldiers wearing gas masks.  
© Imperial War Museum, London

24.28 A soldier wounded by mustard gas.  
© Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa

24.29 Children who survived the Armenian genocide, Erevan, 1919.  
© Melville Chater/National Geographic Stock

24.30 American aid for the survivors of the Armenian genocide, 1919.  
© Melville Chater/National Geographic Stock

24.31 Food aid carried by a camel column for victims of the famine in Russia.  
© Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University

Every effort has been made to contact the relevant copyright-holders for the images reproduced in this book. In the event of any error, the publisher will be pleased to make corrections in any reprints or future editions.

The colour pages can be found between pages 334 and 335 and pages 622 and 623.

xiii
Maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 The Battle of Verdun and its aftermath</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 The Nivelle offensive, April 1917</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Passchendaele: waterlogged areas</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Advances by the Central Powers on the Eastern Front, 1917–18</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Territorial divisions under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March 1918</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 German spring offensive, 1918</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 The Armistice, 1918, and position of opposing forces in France and Belgium</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 German operations in France and Belgium, 1914</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 The Battle of the Somme, 1916</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 German withdrawal, 1917, Operation Alberich</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 The German offensive, 1918</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5 Breaking the Hindenburg Line, autumn 1918</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 The Eastern Front, 1914–18</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 The conquest of Poland and the Battle of Gorlice-Tarnów</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3 The Brusilov offensive</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1 The war in Italy, 1915–18</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2 Caporetto and after</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3 Retreat of the Italian army after Caporetto</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4 Lines reached by the Italian army in late 1918</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1 The Gallipoli campaign</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2 Anzac landing area</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.3 Deployment of Allied forces landing at Gallipoli, 23–25 April 1915</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1 Major naval engagements in the North Sea, 1914–16</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2 Allied losses in the Mediterranean, 1917</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.3 Allied convoy routes in the Atlantic</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.4 British merchant shipping sunk, 1917</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.1 Strategic bombing of Britain, 1914–18</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1 The war in East Africa, 1917–18</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.1 The war in Asia</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.2 Sources of manpower for British Labour Corps, 1914–18</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.1 The Armenian genocide</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contributors

Holger Afflerbach is Professor of Central European History at the University of Leeds.

Mustafa Akçakal is Associate Professor of History and Modern Turkish Studies at Georgetown University.

Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau is Directeur d'études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, and President of the Centre International de Recherche de l'Historial de la Grande Guerre at Péronne.

Stephen Badsey is Professor of Conflict Studies at the University of Wolverhampton.

Annette Becker is Professor of Modern History at the University of Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense and a senior member of the Institut Universitaire de France. She is Vice-President of the Centre International de Recherche de l'Historial de la Grande Guerre at Péronne.

Jean-Jacques Becker is Professor Emeritus at the Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense and founding President of the International Research Centre of the Historial de la Grande Guerre, Péronne, Somme.

Volker R. Berghahn is Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University.

Donald Bloxham is Richard Pares Professor of European History at the University of Edinburgh.

Bruno Cabanes is Associate Professor in the Department of History at Yale University.

Olivier Compagnon is Professor of Contemporary Latin American History at Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3.

Annie Deperchin is Professor of Law at the Centre d'Histoire Judiciaire, Université de Lille 2.

John Horne is Professor of Modern European History at Trinity College Dublin, where he was the first Director of the Centre for War Studies, 2008–10.

Jennifer D. Keene is Professor of History and Chair of the History Department at Chapman University, Orange, California.
List of contributors

Paul Kennedy is J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director of International Security Studies at Yale University.

Hans-Lukas Kieser is adjunct Professor of Modern History at the Universität Zürich, specialising in the late Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, and on interactions between the Near East and the transatlantic world in general.

Gerd Krumeich is Professor Emeritus of Contemporary History at the Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf and Vice-President of the International Research Centre of the Historicall de la Grande Guerre, Péronne, Somme.

Nicola Labanca is Professor of Contemporary History in the Department of Historical Sciences at the Università degli Studi di Siena.

Christoph Mick is Associate Professor of History at the University of Warwick.

John H. Morrow, Jr. is Franklin Professor and Chairman of the History Department at the University of Georgia.

Bill Nasson is Professor of History at the University of Stellenbosch.

Michael S. Neiberg is Professor of History in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Robin Prior has been Visiting Professorial Fellow at the School of History and Politics at the University of Adelaide since 2007.

Gary Sheffield is Professor of War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton.

Jay Winter is Charles J. Stille Professor of History at Yale University and Distinguished Visiting Professor at Monash University.

Guoqi Xu is Professor of History at the University of Hong Kong.
The completion of this three-volume history of the First World War would not have been possible without the support and assistance of the staff of the Historial de la Grande Guerre, Péronne, Somme, France. This museum, opened in 1992, was the first international museum of the 1914–18 conflict to give equal treatment to both sides and to its global character. The fruit of a generation of work in cultural history, the Historial was designed and its museography developed through its Research Centre, which began its work in 1989. We historians were at the heart of the project throughout its inception and remain so today.

The Historial is funded by the Conseil Général de la Somme. It reflects local pride and a commitment to the preservation of the traces of the Great War embedded in the landscape and cultural life of the Department of the Somme and of the wider world that shared the catastrophe of the Great War. In the Conseil Général, we are indebted to Christian Manable, Président, and Marc Pellan, Directeur de la Culture. At the Historial itself, thanks are due to Pierre Linéatte, Président, Historial de la Grande Guerre; Marie-Pascale Prévost-Bault, Conservateur en chef; Hervé François, Directeur; and the following staff members: Christine Cazé (a very large vote of thanks); Frederick Hadley; Catherine Mouquet; Séverine Lavallard. In addition, Yazid Medmoun was of essential help in providing us with photographs of the Historial’s unique collection, visible in the illustrations selected for this three-volume history.

This transnational account of the history of the Great War was assembled through an editorial board composed of the members of the Comité directeur of the Research Centre of the Historial. As editor-in-chief of this project, I simply could not have even begun the task of creating this history without being part of a collective of historians with whom I have worked for more than two decades. Their shared vision is at the heart of these three volumes, and it is to these people and numerous other colleagues in the field of Great War studies working alongside us that the deepest vote of thanks is due. May I
add a special note of gratitude for Rebecca Wheatley for her help in preparing the maps we have used?

Our work took the following form. After the table of contents was set, and authors’ assignments distributed, each section of the book was placed in the hands of section editors, who were responsible for the development and completion of individual chapters and bibliographical essays for each chapter in their sections. The chapters they approved were sent to the editorial board as a whole, and I, as editor-in-chief, ensured their completeness, and the compatibility of their style and approach with our global and transnational objective. Helen McPhail and Harvey Mendelsohn did yeoman’s work and more in translating French and German draft chapters into English, respectively. An essential part of the coordination of this vast project rested on the shoulders of Caroline Fontaine, Director of the International Research Centre of the Historial de la Grande Guerre at Péronne. For any errors that still remain, I take full responsibility.
General Introduction

JAY WINTER

Writing history is always a dialogue. When historians put pen to paper, they carry with them the accumulated interpretations their colleagues have developed over time. Frequently, it is against the grain of these interpretations, in opposition to them, in exasperation with them, that historians decide to write. To be sure, there are many occasions when historians concur with their colleagues or draw their attention to previously untapped sources on matters of common interest. But most of the time historians argue, make objections, and present through their writing a portrait of the past different from those available in print.

This is true both within a generation of historians and between generations. Today’s scholars engage with colleagues still at work, and they do so dialogically. The critical point, though, that the dialogue is also with those historians in the past whose works still inspire reflection, confirmation, elaboration and, on occasion, refutation. We historians are part of a very long engagement with the Great War, an engagement that will continue long after we cease to practise our profession.

The dialogic nature of historical practice therefore makes it necessary to place one generation’s thinking about the Great War alongside those of early generations. And we are now the fourth generation of historians who have approached the history of the war of 1914–18.

There have been three earlier generations of writing to which current scholars refer, sometimes explicitly, most times, implicitly.¹ The first was what I will term ‘the Great War generation’. These were scholars, former soldiers and public officials who had direct knowledge of the war either through their own military service or through alternative service to their

country’s war effort. They wrote history from the top down, by and large through direct experience of the events they described. The central actor portrayed in these books was the state, either in its dirigiste forms at home or at the front. The most voluminous of these efforts was the 133-book effort to write the economic and social history of the war, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Most of these tomes were penned by men who helped run the war or who had to deal with its aftershocks.

This first generation was also composed of men whose memoirs went over the ground again for evident purposes of self-justification. This took many forms, from books by generals and cabinet ministers about their contributions to victory, to exculpatory reminiscences about those trying to evade responsibility for defeat. There were also official histories, many of which were written by former soldiers for the benefit of the various national staff colleges, trying one at a time to frame ‘lessons’ for the future. These works were frequently highly technical and so detailed that they took decades to appear. The delay diminished their significance for planning the next war in more efficient ways.

The second generation may be termed the generation ‘fifty years on’. This group of historians wrote in the late 1950s and 1960s, and wrote not only the history of politics and decision-making at the top, but also the history of society, defined as the history of social structures and social movements. Of course the two kinds of history, political and social, went together, but they were braided together in different ways than in the interwar years. Many of these scholars had the benefit of sources unknown or unavailable before the Second World War. The ‘fifty year rule’ enabling scholars to consult state papers meant that all kinds of documents could be exploited by those writing in the 1960s, which threw new light on the history of the war.

In the 1960s, there was much more use of film and visual evidence than in the first generation, though in the interwar years battlefield guides and collections of photographs of devastation and weaponry were produced in abundance. After the Second World War, the age of television history began, and attracted an audience to historical narratives greater than ever before. This became evident in the size of the audience for new and powerful television documentaries about the war. In 1964 the BBC launched its second channel with the monumental twenty-six-part history of the war, exhaustively researched in film archives and vetted by an impressive group of military historians. Many of the millions of people who saw this series had lived through the war. In 1964, the young men who had fought and survived were mostly above the age of seventy, but what made the series a major
General Introduction

cultural event was that the families of the survivors, and of those who did not come back, integrated these war stories into their own family narratives. The Great War thus escaped from the academy into the much more lucrative and populous field of public history, represented by museums, special exhibitions, films and now television. By the 1960s, the Imperial War Museum in London had surpassed many other sites as the premier destination of visitors to London. It remains to this day a major attraction in the capital, just as does the Australian War Memorial, an equally impressive museum and site of remembrance in the Australian capital, Canberra.

There was more than a little nostalgia in the celebration by survivors of ‘fifty years on’. By 1964, the European world that went to war in 1914 no longer existed. All the major imperial powers that joined the struggle had been radically transformed. The British Empire was a thing of the past; so was Algérie française, and the French mission civilisatrice in Africa and South Asia. The German Empire was gone, and so were most of its eastern territories, ceded to Poland and Russia after 1945. Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia were small independent states. And while the Soviet Union resembled Tsarist Russia in some respects, these continuities were dwarfed by the massive transformation of Soviet society since 1917.

The nostalgia of 1964 was, therefore, for a world which had fallen apart in the Great War. For many people, the blemishes and ugliness of much of that world were hidden by a kind of sepia-toned reverence for the days before the conflict. ‘Never such innocence, / Never before or since’, wrote Philip Larkin in a poem whose title referred not to 1914, but to the more archaic ‘MCMXIV’. This poem was published in 1964.

In much historical writing, as much as in historical documentaries, the dramatic tension derived from juxtaposing this set of pre-lapsarian images with the devastation and horror of the Western Front, and with the sense of decline, a loss of greatness, which marked the post-1945 decades in Britain and beyond. Whatever was wrong with the world seemed to be linked to 1914, to the time when a multitude of decent men went off to fight one war and wound up fighting a much more terrible one.

Decencies were betrayed, some argued, by a blind elite prepared to sacrifice the lives of the masses for vapid generalisations like ‘glory’ or ‘honour’. This populist strain may be detected in much writing about the war in the 1960s, and in the study of social movements which arose out of it. The fiftieth anniversary of the Gallipoli landing provoked a surge of interest in the Great War in Australia and New Zealand, where the loss of the battle was eclipsed by the birth of these two nations. Similarly heroic were narratives of
the Bolshevik Revolution, celebrating its fiftieth anniversary in 1967. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many scholars told us much more about the history of labour, of women, of ordinary people during the conflict than had scholars working in the interwar years.

The third generation may be termed the ‘Vietnam generation’. Its practitioners started writing in the 1970s and 1980s, when a general reaction against military adventures like the war in Vietnam took place in Britain and Europe as well as in the United States. This was also the period in Europe when public opinion turned against the nuclear deterrent, and when the 1973 Middle Eastern war had dangerous effects on the economies of the developed world. The glow of the ‘just war’ of 1939–45 had faded, and a new generation was more open to a view that war was a catastrophe to both winners and losers alike.

This was the environment in which darker histories of the Great War emerged. There were still scholars who insisted that the Great War was a noble cause, won by those who had right on their side. But there were others who came to portray the Great War as a futile exercise, a tragedy, a stupid, horrendous waste of lives, producing nothing of great value aside from the ordinary decencies and dignities thrown away by blind and arrogant leaders.

The most influential works were written by three very different scholars. Paul Fussell, a veteran of the Second World War who was wounded in combat, produced a classic literary study, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, in 1975. He was a professor of literature, who fashioned an interpretation of how soldiers came to understand the war they found in 1914–18 as an ironic event, one in which anticipation and outcome were wildly different. It was a time when the old romantic language of battle seemed to lose its meaning. Writers twisted older forms to suit the new world of trench warfare, one in which mass death was dominant and where, under artillery and gas bombardment, soldiers lost any sense that war was a glorious thing. Fussell termed this style the ‘ironic’ style and challenged us to see war writing throughout the twentieth century as built upon the foundations laid by the British soldier writers of the Great War.

Sir John Keegan produced a book a year later which paralleled Fussell’s. An instructor in the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, but a man whose childhood infirmities ensured he would never go to war, Keegan asked the disarmingly simple question: ‘Is battle possible?’ The answer, published in *The Face of Battle* in 1976, was perhaps yes, long ago, but now in the twentieth

---

General Introduction

century, battle presented men with terrifying challenges. The men who fought at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 could run to the next hill to save their lives. Foot soldiers converging on Waterloo four centuries later could arrive a day late. But in 1916, at the Battle of the Somme, there was no way out. Given the industrialisation of warfare, the air above the trenches on the Somme was filled with lethal projectiles from which there was no escape. Mass death in that battle and in the other great conflict of 1916 at Verdun, pushed soldiers beyond the limits of human endurance. Nothing like the set battles of the First World War followed in the 1939–45 war, though Stalingrad came close to replicating the horror of the Somme and Verdun. Here was a military historian’s book, but one whose starting point was humane and to a degree psychological. The soldiers’ breaking point was Keegan’s subject, and with power, subtlety and technical authority, he opened a new chapter in the study of military history as a humane discipline.

In 1979, Eric Leed, a historian steeped in the literature of anthropology, wrote a similarly path-breaking book. No Man’s Land: Combat and Identity in World War I4 borrowed subtly from the work of the anthropologist Victor Turner. He had examined people in a liminal condition, no longer part of an older world from which they had come, and unable to escape from the midpoint, the no-man’s-land, in which they found themselves. Here is the emotional landscape of the trench soldiers of the Great War. They were men who could never come home again, for whom war was their home, and who recreated it in the years following the Armistice. Here was the world of shell-shocked men, but also that of the Freikorps, militarised freebooters of the immediate post-war period, who prepared the ground for the Nazis.

In all three cases, and by reference to very different sources, the subject at hand was the tragedy of the millions of men who went into the trenches and who came out, if at all, permanently marked by the experience. They bore what some observers of the survivors of Hiroshima termed the ‘death imprint’; the knowledge that their survival was a purely arbitrary accident. Here we may see some traces of the anti-nuclear movement, putting alongside one another Japanese civilians and Great War soldiers. The moral and political differences between the two cases are evident, but the wreckage of war, so these writers seemed to say, is at the heart of the civilisation in which we live. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that these three books, alongside others of the time, helped create a tragic interpretation of the Great War, one in which victimhood

and violence were braided together in such a way as to tell a fully European story of the war, one to which the founders of the European Union clearly reacted. From the 1970s on, European integration was an attempt to move away from the notion of the nation-state as that institution which had the right to go to war, as Raymond Aron put it. The result has been a progressive diminution of the role of the military in the political and social life of most European countries. James Sheehan asked the question in a recent book, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The answer is, they and most (though not all) of their leaders have fled from the landscape of war so devastatingly presented in the works of Fussell, Keegan, Leed and others.

Now we are in a fourth generation of writing on the Great War. I would like to term it the ‘transnational generation’. This generation has a global outlook. The term ‘global’ describes both the tendency to write about the war in more than European terms and to see the conflict as trans-European, transatlantic and beyond. Here was the first war among industrialised countries, reaching the Middle East and Africa, the Falkland Islands and China, drawing soldiers into the epicentre in Europe from Vancouver to Capetown to Bombay and to Adelaide. Here was a war that gave birth to the Turkey of Atatürk and to the Soviet Union of Lenin and Stalin. Demands for decolonisation arose from a war that had promised self-determination and had produced very little of the kind. Economic troubles arose directly out of the war, and these were sufficiently serious to undermine the capacity of the older imperial powers to pay for their imperial and quasi-imperial footholds around the world.

A word or two may be useful to distinguish the international approach, common to many of the older Cambridge histories, from what I have termed the transnational approach to the history of the Great War. For nearly a century, the Great War was framed in terms of a system of international relations in which the national and imperial levels of conflict and cooperation were taken as given. Transnational history does not start with one state and move on to others, but takes multiple levels of historical experience as given, levels which are both below and above the national level. Thus the history of

5 James Keegan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
mutiny, developed in Volume II, is transnational, in that it happened in different armies for different reasons, some of which are strikingly similar to the sources of protest and refusal in other armies. So is the history of finance, technology, war economies, logistics and command. The history of commemoration, cited in the discussion on remembrance in Volume III, also happened on many levels, and the national is not necessarily the most significant, not the most enduring. The peace treaties following the Great War, discussed in Volume II, show the meaning of the transnational in other ways. Now we can see that the war was both the apogee and the beginning of the end of imperial power, spanning and eroding national and imperial boundaries. Erez Manela’s work on ‘the Wilsonian moment’ is a case in point. He reconfigures the meaning of the Versailles settlement by exploring its unintended consequences in stimulating movements of national liberation in Egypt, India, Korea and China. Instead of telling us about the interplay of Great Power politics, he shows how non-Europeans invented their own version of Wilson in their search for a kind of self-determination that he, alongside Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando, was unprepared to offer to them. Who could have imagined that the decision these men took to award rights to Shandong province, formerly held by Germany, not to China but to Japan would lead to major rioting and the formation of the Chinese Communist Party?  

Historians of the revolutionary moment in Europe itself between 1917 and 1921 have approached their subject more and more as a transnational phenomenon, as we can see in Volume II. After all, both revolutionaries and the forces of order who worked to destroy them were well aware of what may be termed the cultural transfer of revolutionary (and counter-revolutionary) strategy, tactics and violence. In recent years, these exchanges have been analysed at the urban and regional levels, helping us to see the complexity of a story somewhat obscured by treating it solely in national terms. Comparative urban history has established the striking parallels between the challenges urban populations faced in different warring states. Now we can answer in the affirmative the question as to whether there is a metropolitan history of warfare. In important respects, the residents of Paris, London and Berlin shared more with one another than they did with their respective rural compatriots. These experienced communities had a visceral reality somewhat lacking even in the imagined communities of the nation.

Here we must be sensitive to the way contemporaries used the language of nation and empire to describe loyalties and affliations of a much smaller level of aggregation. A journalist asking British troops on the Western Front whether they were fighting for the Empire, got a ‘yes’ from one soldier. His mates asked him what he meant. The answer was that he was fighting for the Empire Music Hall in Hackney, a working-class district of London. This attachment to the local and the familiar was utterly transnational.  

Another subject now understood more in transnational than in international terms is the history of women in wartime, discussed in Volume III. Patriarchy, family formation and the persistence of gender inequality were transnational realities in the period of the Great War. Furthermore, the war’s massive effects on civilian life precipitated a movement of populations of staggering proportions, discussed in Volume III. Refugees in France, the Netherlands and Britain from the area occupied by the Western Front numbered in the millions. So did those fleeing the fighting in the borderlands spanning the old German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. One scholar has estimated that perhaps 20 per cent of the population of Russia was on the move, heading for safety wherever it could be found during the Great War. And that population current turned into a torrent throughout Eastern Europe during the period of chaos surrounding the Armistice. What made it worse was that the United States closed its gates to such immigrants, ending one of the most extraordinary periods of transcontinental migration in history. Thus population transfer, forced or precipitated by war, transformed the ethnic character of many parts of Greece, Turkey, the Balkans and the vast tract of land from the Baltic states to the Caucasus. Such movements antedated the war, but they grew exponentially after 1914. This is why it makes sense to see the Great War as having occasioned the emergence of that icon of transnational history in the twentieth century, the refugee, with his or her pitiful belongings slung over shoulders or carts. The photographic evidence of this phenomenon is immense, as we see in the photographic essays accompanying all three volumes.

This three-volume project is transnational in yet another respect. We live in a world where historians born in one country have been able to migrate to follow their historical studies and either to stay in their adopted homes or to migrate again, when necessary, to obtain a university post. Many of the authors of chapters in these volumes are transnational scholars, practising
history far from their place of birth and enriching the world of scholarship thereby. Seeing the world in which we live at a tangent, in the words of the Greek poet Kafavy, opens up insights harder to identify from within a settled order. The world of scholarship today may be described in many ways, but the term ‘settled’ is not one of them. This unsettledness is a major advantage, one which someday will enable more transnational histories to emerge alongside national histories, and for each to enrich the other.

It is important to repeat that these new initiatives in transnational history have built on the work of the three generations of scholars that preceded them. The history of the Great War that has emerged in recent years is additive, cumulative and multi-faceted. National histories have a symbiotic relationship with transnational histories; the richer the one, the deeper the other. No cultural historian of any standing ignores the history of the state, or of the social movements which at times have overthrown them; to do so would be absurd. No military historian ignores the language in which commands turn into movements on the field of battle. War is such a protean event that it touches every facet of human life. Earlier scholars pointed the way; we who have collectively constructed this three-volume history acknowledge their presence among us in our effort to take stock of the current state of knowledge in this field.

The potential imbedded in this transnational approach is reflected as well in one institution explicitly committed to going beyond the strictly national confines of the history of the war: the Historial de la Grande Guerre at Péronne, France. The Historial is a museum of the war, designed by historians and presented in three languages – English, French and German – located at the site of German Headquarters during the Battle of the Somme, that vast bloodletting in 1916, which the German writer Ernst Jünger termed the birthplace of the twentieth century. Together with four historians of the Great War from France and Germany – Jean-Jacques Becker, Gerd Krumeich, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker – I joined a collective which reached out across national frontiers to create a new kind of museum, one which treated the Great War as a transnational catastrophe. This blending of different national viewpoints and emphases suited the new Europe of the 1990s, when it became apparent that to understand the integration of Europe at
the end of the twentieth century, you had to understand the disintegration of Europe at its beginning. It is this optic which guides these three volumes, as it has guided the Historial in the first generation of its existence.

The board of directors of the International Research Centre of the Historial de la Grande Guerre served as the editorial committee which guided this book through its long gestation. We note that all authors and editors have foregone payment in order to direct the royalties these volumes earn into a fund for postgraduate work in First World War studies anywhere in the world. It is to the young scholars whose work we have supported and to those still to come, those whose perspectives are still unfolding, that this transnational project is dedicated.
Introduction to Volume I

JAY WINTER

A global war needs global history to bring out in high relief its conduct, its character and its manifold repercussions. The first volume of this global history of the 1914–18 conflict focuses on the war in time and space. First, we present a narrative of the war as an unfolding catastrophe, growing year by year in scale and in destructive power far beyond what anyone had anticipated in 1914. Secondly, this volume considers the war in spatial terms, and shows the ripple effect of the conflict throughout the world. We explore how imperial powers devoted huge reserves of manpower and materiel to their war efforts, and how, by doing so, they unintentionally transformed the global world order of 1914 into something radically different four years later. Emphasising the Eastern European and the extra-European character of the conflict enables us to escape from a narrow definition of the war as that which took place on the Western Front alone.

By a global war, we mean the engagement in a conflict of fifty months’ duration of the world’s great empires and industrialised or industrialising economies. Historians of globalisation point to 1914 as the moment of rupture of the first phase of globalisation, entailing the movement of goods, capital and people on an order of magnitude the world had never seen before. It was only after 1945 that this first phase of globalisation was succeeded by another, which is still in motion today. Our approach to global war is therefore one which is dialectical in character: it examines the way the war ended one of the most remarkable periods of the expansion of capitalism, and the way it channelled the remarkable energies of the world’s economies into the greatest destructive campaign to date. Innovation and structural change compensated to a degree for the destruction of capital, land and lives in wartime, and created new forms of state capitalism and communism which came to govern economic and political life for the rest of the century. The history of the war in time and space in Volume I thus prepares the ground for Volume II, where we focus primarily on the wartime transformation of the institutions of the state.
The war we present has a history that cannot stop at the confines of the European continent. Our intention is to introduce readers to a war made possible by globalisation and imperial expansion, a war which left its unmistakeable imprint on the way global affairs have developed ever since. We conclude this volume with a discussion of the moral, political and legal implications of the changing character of war, and in particular of the collapse of the distinction between civilian and military targets, reaching its nadir in genocide.