Prolegomena

A. Some Ground Clearing

Gareth Stedman Jones refers to the "one-sidedness of most modern treatments of Engels. . . . For, from at least the end of World War I, assessment of Engels's particular contribution to Marxism had become a highly charged political question. After a period of unrivalled prestige, between the 1880s and 1914, Engels's reputation suffered first in the revolutionary leftish critique of the failings of the Second International and subsequently in the non-communist or anti-communist critique of the excesses of the Third" (1982: 290–1). Kircz and Löwy have phrased the state of affairs with felicity:

> Too often we have seen attempts to create a kind of Holy Duality with semi-religious connotations. This type of hagiography, typical of the tradition of the Second and especially the Third International, not only hampers the proper understanding of the dynamics and historical role of the two friends, but also blocks the continuation and expansion of the program they started. As a reaction to this attitude we also encounter numerous attempts to artificially separate the two men, mostly with the objective of promoting Marx to the position of universal (and therefore politically neutralized) thinker and to degrade Engels to the position of an operationalist schema-builder and moral founder of social-democratic degeneration and the Stalinist nightmare. (1998: 5)

Hunt laments that "in certain ideological circles [Engels] has been landed with responsibility for the terrible excesses of twentieth-century Marxism-Leninism. For as Marx's stock has risen, so Engels's has fallen. Increasingly, the trend has been to separate off an ethical, humanist Karl Marx from a mechanical, scientistic Engels, and blame the latter for sanctifying the state crimes of communist Russia, China and south-east Asia" (2009: 5).

Beyond all this there is the frequently encountered condemnation of Engels as "revisionist" traitor to the cause, and also the suggestion that Engels (in the terms of Steger and Carver in their account of the state of play) "in his later writings – either mistakenly or intentionally – embarke[d] on a substantial reinterpretation of Marx's work, thereby significantly departing from the latter's intellectual

venture" (1999: 6). Publication of the original manuscripts relating to *Capital* in the *Karl Marx–Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA) edition has exacerbated matters by suggesting to some that Engels's editorial work on the last two volumes is unreliable (see Chapter Six, p. 308), which charge – if proven justified – would render the present work, based as it is on the *Marx–Engels Collected Works* (MECW), correspondingly suspect.[1] Further muddying the waters is what has been termed "the current fashion of Engels-baiting, which normally rests upon an exaggeration of Marx's Hegelian background, and vulgarization of Engels" (Duncan 1973: ix).

Against the assertion of a divorce between Marx and Engels, for one reason or another, stands an equally persistent body of opinion treating Engels merely as His Master's Voice (see below, p. 22). It will be a main objective of this work to seek a path between these extremes. Before proceeding to a review of the essays, though, let us briefly survey the first contacts between Engels and Marx and the course of their respective transformations into "communists."

Engels first mentions Marx in print in November 1843. In his article "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent" for *The New Moral World*, he writes that "[a]s early as autumn, 1842, some of the party" – referring to the so-called Young or New Hegelians, and apparently including himself in the number – "contended for the insufficiency of political change, and declared their opinion to be, that a *Social* revolution based upon common, property, was the only state of mankind agreeing with their abstract principles . . . " (MECW *3*: 406). Although this trend did not yet include the party leaders (Bauer, Feuerbach, and Ruge), nonetheless "[c]ommunism . . . was such a *necessary* consequence of New Hegelian philosophy, that no opposition could keep it down, and, in the course of this present year [1843], the originators of it had the satisfaction of seeing one republican after the other join their ranks. Besides Dr. [Moses] Hess, one of the editors of the now suppressed *Rhenish Gazette* [*Rheinische Zeitung*], and who was, in fact, the first Communist of the party, there are now a great many others" – including "Dr. Marx, another of the editors of the *Rhenish Gazette*".[2] As for Hegel himself, he had been

[1] The charge goes back a long way, Kautsky alluding in 1926 to "[c]onjectures" that "Engels had not always completely caught Marx's train of thought and had not always arranged and edited the manuscript in accordance with the this train of thought," though adding that had he undertaken the "gigantic" editorial task, as some had advised, "and that I came to another result than Engels on one or another point," there would be "no guarantee that my version was truer to Marx's train of thought than was Engels'" (cited in Vollgraf and Jungnickel 2002 [1994]: 39).

[2] On the Young Hegelians, see Mayer (1969 [1936]: 18–24), McLellan (1973: 30–3, 34–40), Stedman Jones (2002: 74–98), and Hunt (2009: 54–60). What Engels intended by the New Hegelian philosophy is not here spelled out, but presumably it includes the principle – said to reflect an evolution from Hegel's philosophy – that "[a]ll the basic principles of Christianity, and even of what has hitherto been called religion itself, have fallen before the inexorable criticism of reason" (1842; "Schelling and Revelation," MECW *2*: 197).

On the significance of Engels's first encounter with Hess, in summer 1844, see Stedman Jones (2002: 55–7).

"so much occupied with abstract questions, that he neglected to free himself from the prejudices of his age – an age of restoration for old systems of government and religion" (404), while adding that "the philosophical efforts of the German nation, from Kant to Hegel . . . must end in Communism" (406).[3]

Hobsbawm makes the point that Marx and Engels "were relative late-comers to communism," considering that "by the early 1840s a flourishing socialist and communist movement, both theoretical and practical, had existed for some time in France, Britain and the USA" (1982a: 1). The impression we have from Engels's account is that Marx turned to communism, independently of (and a little later than) Engels himself, sometime in 1843, possibly – this, however, is not stated explicitly – in consequence of Young Hegelian influence.[4] Now, according to Engels's retrospect half a century later, the first encounter between Engels and Marx – in the Cologne offices of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, in November 1842 – was a "chilly" one, for Marx had very recently "taken a stand against the Bauers, i.e., he had said he was opposed not only to the *Rheinische Zeitung* becoming predominantly a vehicle for *theological* propaganda, atheism, etc., rather than for political discussion and

[3] What is implied here is not properly explained, but most pertinent is a retrospective account provided decades later "of the true significance and revolutionary character of Hegelian philosophy . . . the termination of the whole movement since Kant," namely "that it once and for all dealt the death blow to the final products of human thought and action"; for

> all successive historical states are only transitory stages in the endless course of development of human society from the lower to the higher. Each stage is necessary, and therefore justified for the time and conditions to which it owes its origin. But in the face of new, higher conditions which gradually develop in its own womb, it loses its validity and justification. It must give way to a higher stage, which will also in its turn decay and perish. Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition and the world market dissolves in practice all stable time-honoured institutions, so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of absolute states of humanity corresponding to it. Against it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure against it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away, of ascending without end from the lower to the higher. (1888; *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, MECW *26*: 359–60)

Similarly, in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (1892 [1880]: MECW *24*: 302).

In the manuscript *Dialectics of Nature* (1873–82), Engels reduces to three the laws of dialectics, all traced to Hegel: "The law of the transformation of quantity into quality, and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites; The law of the negation of the negation" (MECW *25*: 356). The objection to Hegel is that "these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, has to conform to a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite stage of development of human thought. If we turn the thing around, then everything becomes simple, and the dialectical laws that look so extremely mysterious in idealist philosophy at once become simple and clear as noonday."

[4] Marx's original commitment to the proletarian cause is reflected in "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Law*," written late 1843 to January 1844 and published in the *Deutsch-Französiche Jahrbücher* in 1844. That his new position was ultimately based on Hegel's philosophy has been denied, "however much his language may be that of Young Hegelian journalism" (McLellan 1973: 96–7).

action, but also to Edgar Bauer's hot air brand of communism, which was based on a sheer love of 'going to extremes' and was soon replaced by Edgar with other kinds of extremist hot air. Since I corresponded with the Bauers, I was regarded as their ally, whereas they caused me to view Marx with suspicion" (to Mehring, April 1895; see "Correspondence," MECW *50*: 503). One is given to understand that the difference between Engels and Marx had been based on a misunderstanding, because Engels had already abandoned what has been termed "the bohemian anti-Christian excesses" characterizing the club known as the *Freien* (the free) and had turned away from Edgar Bauer's "frequent denunciations of the politics of a *juste milieu*" or liberal political compromise (Stedman Jones 1982: 302; 2002: 55, 140; also McLellan 1973: 51; Hunt 2009: 57–60).

As for Marx's actual position on communism at this time, Engels says only that he opposed the "hot air" brand and sought to discuss practical politics. In fact, Marx, partly under the influence of German immigrant workers living in Paris, where he had arrived in October 1843, was himself in the process of converting to communism (McLellan 1973: 86–7; Hobsbawm 1982a; Stedman Jones 2002: 145–76). Thus, though as late as October to November 1843, when Engels composed the *Outlines*, he still belonged in Marx's eyes to "la gauche hégélienne," from which he had broken away on ideological grounds (Bottigelli 1969: xx), he would have become aware of Engels's actual position from the manuscript that he published in his new (short-lived) journal, the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* early in 1844. When in September Marx and Engels met again, there was ample common ground for the commencement of their collaboration (see Hunt 2009: 120).

The notion of a Marx imbued with Hegelianism to a greater degree than Engels does not ring true. We have seen, in the first place, that at the outset in 1842–3 Engels traced his own adoption of the communist option to Young Hegelian influence – and possibly attributed the same transition process to Marx. Now the following year, it is true, Engels focuses on aspects of Hegelianism that he had come to oppose, insisting that "'Man' will always remain a wraith so long as his basis is not empirical man. In short we must take our departure from empiricism and materialism if our concepts, and notably our 'man,' are to be something real; we must deduce the general from the particular, not from itself, or *à la* Hegel, from thin air" (to Marx, 19 November 1844; see "Correspondence," MECW *38*: 12).[5] This letter to Marx suggests that the initiative derived from Engels; in any event, that Marx did not dispute this critical perspective is apparent from the joint critique of Hegel's idealist philosophy in *The Holy Family* – written September to November 1844 – with its striking reference to "the cage of the Hegelian way of viewing things," and applause for Feuerbach's recognition that "*History* does *nothing*, it 'possesses *no* immense wealth,' it 'wages *no* battles.' It is *man*, real, living man who does all that,

[5] See also "A Fragment of Fourier's on Trade" (written in the second half of 1845), referring with approval to Fourier's "great hatred of philosophy," and criticizing Hegel's theory that "arranges past history according to its liking," and (yet more strongly) the Post-Hegelian "speculative constructions . . . [that] no longer make any sense at all" (MECW *4*: 641–2).

who possesses and fights; 'history' is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve *its own* aims; history is *nothing but* the activity of man pursuing his aims" (1845; MECW *4*: 92–3). In the same vein, the joint *The German Ideology*, in spelling out the premises of the materialist conception of history, refers to "real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life . . . premises [which] can thus be verified in a purely empirical way" (1845–6; MECW *5*: 31). Furthermore, Marx himself refers to Proudhon's inability "to follow the real course of history," and his creation of a "dialectical phantasmagoria . . . [a]nebulous realm of the imagination [which] soars above time and place. In a word, it is Hegelian trash, it is not history" (28 December 1846; see " Correspondence," MECW *38*: 97).

Engels, in the final resort, found an honorable place for Hegel's historical perspective in general, as will be apparent from the extract given in note 3 from *Ludwig Feuerbach*. Indicative too is the defense made in *Anti-Dühring* (1894) of the most celebrated of propositions in *Capital*, whereby the "monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated" (MECW *35*: 750, cited in MECW *25*: 123–4). To be noted, in particular, is Engels's insistence that Marx does not actually base himself directly on dialectical reasoning as Dühring mistakenly believed, but rather "shows from history . . . that just as formerly petty industry by its very development necessarily created the conditions of its own annihilation, i.e., of the expropriation of the small proprietors, so now the capitalist mode of production has likewise created the material conditions from which it must perish" (124). The process as such is thus a historical one. But it is "at the same time a dialectical process . . . ," for "after Marx has completed his proof on the basis of historical and economic facts," he proceeds to restate the process in Hegelian or dialectic terms: "The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer [laborer], but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and the means of production" (MECW *35*: 751).

That Engels accurately represented Marx's position is confirmed by Marx himself when protesting a review of *Capital* by Dühring: "he practises deception. . . . He knows full well that my method of exposition is *not* Hegelian, since I am a materialist, and Hegel an idealist. Hegel's dialectic is the basic form of all dialectic, but only *after* being stripped of its mystical form, and it is precisely this which distinguishes *my* method" (to Kugelmann, 6 March 1868; see "Correspondence," MECW *42*: 544).

The substantive objections to Hegel of the 1840s are thus by no means erased. When reviewing Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Engels explains retrospectively that it had been "essential to subject the Hegelian method to thoroughgoing criticism," but once that was achieved the merits of Hegel's mode of thinking emerged: "However abstract and idealist the form employed, the development of his ideas runs always parallel to the development of world history, and the latter is indeed supposed to be only the proof of the former. Although this reversed the actual relation and stood it on its head, yet the real content was invariably incorporated in his philosophy" (1859; MECW *16*: 474). Similarly, in the Preface to the second (1885) edition of *Anti-Dühring*, Engels writes of "the laws which Hegel first developed in all-embracing but mystic form, and which we made it one of our aims to strip of this mystic form and to bring clearly before the mind in their complete simplicity and universality" (MECW *25*: 11–12).[6]

It must be pointed out that the break from the radicalism of the Young Hegelians, and the subsequent objections to Hegelian "idealism," did not prevent Engels from reliance on the dialectical development of the concept of private property (see Stedman Jones 1982: 305–6; Claeys 1984: 224; Hunt 2009: 103). Indeed, later, in the discussion of historical materialism, Engels represents what amounts to causal interdependence as Hegelian "dialectics" (see Chapter Seven, pp. 330, 332–3). In any event, as far as concerns technical economics, and even (as we have seen from *Anti-Dühring*) evolutionary tendencies, what Schumpeter said of Marx applies equally to Engels: "He enjoyed certain formal analogies which may be found between his and Hegel's argument. He liked to testify to his Hegelianism and to use Hegelian phraseology. But this is all. Nowhere did he betray positive science to metaphysics" (Schumpeter 1950: 9–10; also Aarons 2009: 61–4).

A second supposed contrast, between a "humanistic" Marx vis-à-vis a "positivist" Engels concerned only with socialism as means to enhancing productivity, has been effectively contested by Rigby (1992: 5, 81, 207). Two almost identical citations from the early *Principles of Communism* and the later *Anti-Dühring* must suffice here to make the point with regard to Engels: "large-scale industry and the unlimited expansion of production which it makes possible can bring into being a social order in which so much of all the necessaries of life will be produced that every member of society will thereby be enabled to develop and exercise all his powers and abilities in perfect freedom" (1847; MECW *6*: 347); "the colossal productive forces created within the capitalist mode of production which the latter can no longer master, are only waiting to be taken possession of by a society organized for co-operative work on a planned basis to ensure to all members of society the

[6] By "universality" Engels intends the relevance of dialectical laws to nature, though "there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it" (MECW: *25*: 12–13). See also note 3 on this matter. I have been unable to corroborate Hunt's affirmation that "Marx had been drawn back to the work of Hegel in the 1870s and was the first to make the claim that the dialectical law applied to both nature and society" (2009: 302).

means of existence and of the free development of their capacities, and indeed in constantly increasing measure" (1878; MECW *25*: 139).

B. The Essays

The first essay sets out by examining, from the perspective of its specifically economic content, Engels's first major work, the *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy* (the *Umrisse*), written October to November 1843 and first published in Marx's *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in 1844. The purpose of the exercise is to evaluate the extent of Engels's contribution to Marxian theory in the early years, and of Marx's recognition of that contribution.

Engels's early *general* influence on Marx is often enough asserted. Here is one example: "Engels's remarkable article *Outlines* . . . was in fact the starting point of Marx's economic studies" (Meek 1971: 53); the document "preceded all of Marx's writings . . . play[ing] a vital part in turning Marx's interests from philosophy to political economy" (Hutchison 1981: 3); Engels "made a very promising start in the early 1840s, when his *Outlines* . . . exerted a major influence on Marx" (Howard and King 1989: 8). More specifically, Stedman Jones maintains not only that Engels "was the first of the German philosophical left to shift the discussion towards political economy and to highlight the connections between private property, political economy and modern social conditions in the transition to communism," but also that his essay "strongly influenced Marx's own first reflections on Political Economy in the 1844 manuscripts" (1982: 305; see also 2002: 123). Moreover, Oakley maintains that the *Outlines* "gave Marx his first explicit insights into the nature of capitalism and stimulated his interest in political economy as the source of a critical comprehension of the contemporary human situations" (1984: 27).

Needless to say, the character of any influence will depend upon the character of the work in question. A word first on some modern reactions by historians. Schumpeter dismissed the *Outlines* as a "distinctly weak performance" (1954: 386), and Bottigelli writes that Engels "ne voit encore que l'aspect extérieur des choses et, sur ce plan, sa critique relève plus de l'indignation morale que de la science" (1969: xxi). Further, although Rubel recognizes Engels's contribution to "les grands thèmes de la future" (1968: lvi), he also minimizes its analytical content and represents it as the work of a moralizing pamphleteer: "Cet essai n'a rien d'une analyse objective; il se signale par la violence du moraliste pamphlétaire plutôt que par la rigueur du critique disséquant d'un système de production et d'échange" (lv). Berg represents the *Outlines* as "a loose compilation of the criticisms of political economy and the analysis of industrialization long popularized in the Owenite and unstamped press" (1980: 320). Oakley, at one stage, found that the *Outlines* "lacked sophistication" and that Engels's "observations were largely polemical and impressionistic" (1983: 25). Even Claeys – to whom we owe a debt for tracing Engels's probable sources – maintains that Engels was "ill-acquainted with political economy" (1984: 208). Sowell dismisses the work as "an obscure essay" (2006: 166).

In line with his emphasis on Engels's predominantly "non-scientific" orientation, Bottigelli says of the *Outlines* that it was "sans doute pour Marx la première critique socialiste approfondie de l'économie politique. . . . [S]i [elle] a eu une si profonde influence sur [Marx] . . . c'est qu'ils parlaient tous deux le même langage et qu'ils avaient les mêmes préoccupations" (Bottigelli 1969: xxi). Similarly, Rubel maintains that "le ton" of the *Notebooks* – referring to notes taken by Marx in 1844 – "rappelle parfois celui de l'*Esquisse* [*Outlines*], dont Marx adopte certaines idées"; he describes Marx's later approval, in his *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and in *Capital 1* (1867), as reflecting "l'hommage au premier auteur qui avait su sinon lui révéler une nouvelle vérité théorique, du moins partager avec lui la haine d'une morale déguisée en science pour justifier le scandale de la misère des masses et de la déchéance humaine" (Rubel 1968: lvi–lvii).

There is, in contrast, a large body of opinion that takes the work rather more seriously for its specifically analytical contribution (see, e.g., Mayer 1934 *I*: 158–9, 1969 [1936]: 55–6, 158–9; McLellan 1977: 67–8, 69; Hutchison 1981: 3–6; Stedman Jones 1982: 296; Carver 1983: 155; Oakley 1984: 27, 30–6; Hobsbawm 1998: 24–5; Steger and Carver 1999: 3–4; Hunt 2009: 117). There is indeed merit to this position. Admittedly, it is impossible to deny a pervasive "moralistic" or "humanist" flavor to the *Outlines*; the terms describing capitalistic private-property relations – egoism, cupidity, envy, greed, theft, pillage, violence, trickery, cheating, blackmail, terror, barbarity, crime, mistrust, sordid traffic, hypocrisy – make this clear. The discussion of the classical literature, particularly the representation of Malthusian doctrine as vile, infamous, hideous, blasphemous, and odious, further reinforces the polemical flavor of his contribution. But none of this should be allowed to disguise a serious and impressive analytical contribution – more extensive than is usually appreciated even in the literature sympathetic to Engels's achievements, which tends to focus on the cyclical component – and also a surprisingly sophisticated appreciation of the Ricardian and Sayian analyses of pricing. These contentions I shall support by a close scrutiny of the text with respect to value and distribution, demographics, the role of science, and macroeconomic instability. Thus my position is consistent with, but goes further and is more specific than, Hutchison's evaluation that the *Umrisse* "announced . . . what were to become two or three of the most interesting and least invalid themes of Marxist political economy (recognized even by Schumpeter [1950: 40–2])," alluding to Engels's perception of cyclical movements, business concentration, and an emphasis on technological change (Hutchison 1981: 3–5); or that of Hobsbawm, whereby Engels "brought to Marx the elements of a model which demonstrated the fluctuating and self-destabilizing nature of the operations of the capitalist economy – notably the outlines of a theory of economic crises" (1998: 24).

It will, therefore, be one of my tasks to specify with precision Marx's early "debt" to Engels, a debt extending beyond the implications of the private-property axiom (which Marx properly recognized) to conspicuous features of what was to make up Marxist theory more narrowly conceived – concentration of capital, the

reserve army of unemployed in relation to the cycle, inflows into the work force of various kinds, and falling living standards – and also to the Marxist vision of capitalist evolution. These latter contributions, I shall further maintain, Marx failed properly to acknowledge. Such neglect might well account for the "invisibility" of "the considerable independent contribution that Engels made to the development of Marxist theory" (Stedman Jones 1982: 296; see also Oakley 1984: 27).

I shall also address aspects of Engels's own obligations in the *Outlines* to earlier and contemporary works, particularly to the classical authors and the English socialists. The treatment here is carried further in Chapter Three, with particular reference to Owen, Gray, and Bray on economic organization and planning.

In Engels's more famous work, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, written between September 1844 and March 1845, will be found a wide range of "Marxian" theoretical issues, several of which make an earlier appearance in the *Outlines*, including the character of the industrialization process; the labor market, with particular reference to subsistence wages and the contrast between slave and "free" labor; the consequences of technical change; the reserve army of unemployed; worsening crises; the downward trend of the real wage; and inevitable revolution. Certainly – and here I corroborate the position expressed in Henderson (1976: 72) and Hunt (2009: 104) – much more is involved than a descriptive account of living conditions. As in the case of the *Outlines* I shall give a detailed account of the analyses, but I also take into consideration the objections in Hobsbawm (1964) to the celebrated critique of Engels by the "cheerful historians" Henderson and Chaloner in their 1958 edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, as well as the fair editorial evaluations by, inter alia, Hobsbawm (1998) and McLellan (1998) in their editions of the work. Again, the question of Engels's sources arises. Particularly interesting is the still-disputed question of his possible familiarity with Eugène Buret (1840).

Several of the major themes in *The Condition* will be found briefly summarized in the catechism *Principles of Communism*, composed by Engels in 1847 under the auspices of the League of Communists, and expanding on a Draft of a "Communist Confession of Faith" written earlier that year.[7] Although *The Condition* is a far richer work than the *Principles*, the latter is of the highest significance as providing the blueprint for the *Communist Manifesto*; see, for example, Laski (1967 [1948]: 19–20), Rubel (1963: 159), and Carver (1983, Chapter 3; 1998: 57). Mehring wrote more generally that "[a]s far as the style permits us to judge, it would appear that Marx had a greater hand in shaping its final form, but, as his own draft shows, Engels was not behind Marx in his understanding of the problems at issue and he ranks side by side with Marx as the author of it" (Mehring 1935 [1933]: 175). *Par contre* the linkage is minimized by Ryazanoff in his Introduction to the *Manifesto*: "When we compare the Manifesto with the sketch by Engels . . . we

[7] On the League of Communists and its predecessor the League of the Just, see Stedman Jones (2002: 39–49, 51).

realize how right Engels was when, writing after Marx's death, he declared . . . that 'the fundamental proposition which forms its nucleus belongs to Marx'" (Ryazanoff 1930 [1922]: 21). The editors of the MECW version allow no more than that "[i]n writing the *Manifesto* the founders of Marxism used some of the propositions formulated in the *Principles of Communism*" (MECW *6*: 684). Further, the importance of the document is insufficiently allowed by Oakley when he opines that the *Manifesto* was "written with some contributions from Engels" (1985: 284; see also 1984: 14). At all events, Beamish is right that the relationship between the *Manifesto* and the *Principles of Communism* "needs to be better understood than it has tended to be in the past" (1998: 219–20).

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In his Preface to *Capital 2* Engels refers, rightly I believe, to the theory of surplus value as "the pith and marrow" of Marxian political economy (1885; MECW *36*: 6). In his Introduction to *Anti-Dühring* in 1878, and in the extract published as *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* in 1880, Engels refers to Marx's "two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalistic production through surplus-value. . . . With these discoveries Socialism became a science" (MECW *24*: 305; MECW *25*: 27; see also "Karl Marx," 1877, MECW 24: 191–5). As for the second "discovery,"

> It was shown that the appropriation of unpaid labour is the basis of the capitalist mode of production and of the exploitation of the worker that occurs under it; that even if the capitalist buys the labour-power of his labourers at its full value as a commodity on the market, he yet extracts more value from it than he paid for; and that in the ultimate analysis this surplus-value forms those sums of value from which are heaped up the constantly increasing masses of capital in the hands of the possessing classes. The genesis of capitalist production and the production of capital were both explained.

The supreme importance of the surplus-value doctrine to Engels – on which see also Thompson (1984: 104–5) and Hunt (2009: 237–8, 299, 304–5) – justifies close examination of the precise sense of the attribution to Marx of "discoverer." This will occupy us in the second essay. There is a related issue, namely Engels's rejection of two charges by Karl Rodbertus-Jagetzow that Marx had plagiarized his work.[8] Because the theory of surplus value, with its foundation in the labor-power concept, lies at the heart of the entire Marxian enterprise, Rodbertus's accusation of plagiarism on Marx's part, if valid, would be devastatingly damaging. Rodbertus is an unfamiliar figure to many modern readers, troublesome thorn in the flesh though he was for Engels. The classic positions by Böhm-Bawerk, Marshall, Knight,

[8] The first complaint, which relates to *Zur Erkenntniss* 1842, is made in a letter to J. Zeller dated 14 March 1875, printed in *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, Vol. 35, 1879, p. 219. The second complaint relates to *Sociale Briefe an von Kirchmann. Dritter Brief* 1851, and it appears in a letter to R. Meyer dated 29 November 1871 (Rodbertus-Jagetzow 1881: 111). Engels takes for granted that the more specific second charge was also intended by the first, general charge.