CHAPTER 1

Thinking local

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At some point near the middle of the second century CE, probably in Rome, the renowned orator Aelius Aristides delivered an oration in praise of the city as an imperial capital. The surviving speech lays particular emphasis upon the political and cultural unity of the world under Rome. Where once there was regional difference, now all are harmoniously united, as if they shared one enormous city: 'The whole inhabited world, as it were, attending a national festival, has laid aside its old dress and the carrying of weapons, and has been authorised to turn to adornments and all kinds of pleasures.'[1] According to this vision, the peoples of the empire have willingly sacrificed their local culture in their grateful obedience to Rome. Less than a generation later, however, Pausanias would write up his account of a tour of Greece, placing a very different emphasis upon the diversity of even this one, small territory within the empire. His attempt to capture Greekness in its totality ('I must proceed in my *logos*, going through equally all the Greek things')[2] proceeds by agglutination of various regional sites along the length and breadth of the mainland. In this account, local culture is endlessly varied and unstandardised, not to say bizarre.

How do we interpret the apparent discrepancy between two contemporary authors, one describing a culturally homogeneous world, the other creating a kaleidoscopic portrait of local cultures? Clearly, the two writers have very different agendas, one celebrating the efficiency of Rome's empire, the other the persistence of Greece's native culture. There is no objective way of describing the world: all accounts will be shaped by ideology. At a deeper level, however, we might consider these two perspectives as complementary. Each might be taken as a response to the 'globalisation'

[1] καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ πανηγυρίζουσα πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν φόρημα, τὸν σίδηρον, κατέθετο, εἰς δὲ κόσμον καὶ πάσας εὐφροσύνας τέτραπται σὺν ἐξουσίαι, Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 26.97. The translation is a modification of Behr's.

[2] δεῖ δέ με ἀφικέσθαι τοῦ λόγου πρόσω, πάντα ὁμοίως ἐπεξιόντα τὰ Ἑλληνικά, 1.26.4. This famous phrase alludes to Hdt. 1.5.3.

that followed the imposition of the *pax Romana* over much of the known world. Pausanias' vision of Greek culture as fragmented into myriad, atomised locales, on this interpretation, becomes a counter-imperial response to the Aristidean vision of global uniformity, a reminder that the reach of world empires has its limits.

The *idea* of the local is, after all, obviously created by supralocal perspectives.[3] A people living in isolation on an island would not think of themselves as 'local' – in fact, they would be much more likely to think of themselves as the blessed possessors of the cosmos. It is only when the missionary, anthropologist or oil company arrived that they would begin to view themselves, through the eyes of the outside world, as local. It follows, at least as a working hypothesis, that a phase of rapid globalisation will also see an intensification of consciousness of localism; and perhaps also an increased awareness of, even questioning of, the power dynamics between the local and non-local.[4]

We need to look only briefly to contemporary culture to see how closely related are the processes of globalisation and localisation. On the one hand, communication, trade, knowledge transfer and human mobility have increased on an unprecedented scale. These processes, however, have created a contrary effect, a privileging of regional variation. 'Never underestimate the power of local knowledge', runs the slogan of HSBC, the self-proclaimed 'world's local bank'. This highly successful advertising campaign – launched in March 2002, and still going strong in updated form in 2010 – was originally designed to communicate 'HSBC's philosophy that the world is a rich [*sic*] and diverse place in which cultures and people should be treated with respect'.[5] 'Think global, act local' is a business cliché, employed not only because of the need to protect diverse markets but also because of the internationalisation of labour and capital.[6] The cooptation of the rhetoric of localism by multinationals, however, has been fiercely

[3] As widely discussed in modern scholarship: see esp. Appadurai (1990); Hannerz (1990); Friedman (1990); S. Hall (1991); Bird et al. (1993); Robertson (1994), (1995); Miller (1995); Wilson and Dissanayake (1996); Cvetkovich and Kellner (1997); Kapur (1998). Kearney (1995) provides an efficient overview.

[4] See esp. Appadurai (1990); Hannerz (1990).

[5] www.hsbc.com/1/2/newsroom/news/news-archive-2002/new-campaign-for-the-worlds-local-bank.

[6] Dirlik (1996) 31–4. The phrase is routinely dignified with roots in the Japanese concept of *dochakuka*, i.e. adapting agricultural techniques to local conditions (Featherstone (1996) 64; Salazar (2005) 630), but this is surely an example of late-capitalist institutions' desire to conceal their power behind a veneer of rootsy localism. According to the myth-history of the marketplace, an unnamed chief executive of Coca Cola once claimed that 'we're not multinational, we're multilocal', a *topos* that has been reworked endlessly, e.g. Unilever: 'multi-local multinational' (www.unilever.com/ourvalues/); Sony: 'I don't like the word "multinational". I don't know what it means. I created a new term: "Global localization". That's our new slogan' (*Newsweek* 9 Oct. 1989, 66); McDonalds: 'I like to

contested by numerous interest groups (principally socialist, cooperative, religious and ecological) who promote local culture in *opposition* to the 'cocacolonisation' of the global economy. Consciousness of local identity in the global era has of course been largely produced (and contorted into new shapes) by the very process of globalisation itself, but that does not prevent local identity from being reclaimed as a site of resistance: the 're-affirmation of cultural "roots" and the return to orthodoxy has been one of the most powerful sources of counter-identification'.[7] Pausanias, perhaps, is alive and well.

This volume addresses itself to a strange gulf that has emerged in recent years. There is, of course, a considerable body of scholarship on regional identities in the Roman empire.[8] There has, however, been very little engagement between this tradition and the equally significant scholarship on Greek identity during the same period.[9] Interestingly, the word 'local' seems to have a precise semiotic status within modern scholarly discourse too, denoting those communities that were neither Greek nor Roman, traces of whose identities can only be accessed through the material record.[10] This phenomenon is related to a larger polarising tendency in classical scholarship, which places on the one side elitism, Graeco-Roman culture, imperialism, literature/art and cultural constructedness, and on the other the sub-elite, the colonised, resistance, material culture and (in some versions) 'real life'. In focusing on local identity within the Greek (or at least Hellenised) world, the contributors in this volume have sought in their different ways to question such polarities. It is not just that most contributors work with both material and literary evidence; all, in their different ways, deal centrally with the fundamentally *relational* nature of identity, with the constant traffic between elite and non-elite, between centre and periphery. In sum, it is the central contention of this volume that local identities are not static, 'authentic', immured against change, but in constant dialogue with the translocal. An account of local identity cannot be written without an awareness of the 'globalising' forces that create, structure and (to an extent) oppose it. We should indeed, as the

call us multilocal' (James Cantalupo in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 1991; quoted from Watson (2002) 353).

7 S. Hall (1992) 313. Examples include Franz Fanon's classic assault on the hypocrisy and rapaciousness of colonialism, *Black Skin, White Masks*: 'Every colonized people – in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality – finds itself face-to-face with the language of the civilizing nation' (Fanon (1967) 18).

8 For egregious recent examples see Millar (1993a); Parca (2001); de Ligt et al. (2004); Howgego et al. (2005); Wallace-Hadrill (2008) 73–143.

9 See esp. Bowie (1974); Flinterman (1995); Swain (1996); Goldhill (2001); Whitmarsh (2001a).

10 Implicit, e.g., at Wallace-Hadrill (2008) 13–14.

advertisers advise us, never underestimate the *power* of local knowledge, both the power that stimulates it and that which it generates.

THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE

The Roman empire was far from antiquity's first empire, but it was the largest, indeed the largest in history until the British empire. At its peak it stretched from Spain to central Asia, from north Africa to Britain. This was not the entirety of the known world, but Romans liked to think of it as such: from the time of Augustus onwards, depictions of global dominance became common in art, literature, triumphal processions and representations on public architecture.[11] Most vivid of all is perhaps the Ashqelon sculpture of Victory standing over a globe supported by Atlas.[12] These symbolic representations of a 'globalised' empire were matched at the level of real geography by a network of trade routes, military roads and waterways (including the Mediterranean itself), now dominated and protected by Rome. At the levels of politics, economy and the law, the empire was a vast bureaucracy, a pyramidal system with the emperor at the top; less formally, a large Roman diaspora (businessmen, tax collectors, veterans) across the provinces mediated unofficially between locales and centre.[13] Culturally, the centrifugal drive towards regional differentiation vied with centripetal pull of the common heritage of the empire: shared styles of public architecture, iconography and epigraphy,[14] and (particularly in the east) the 'received' dialect of the elite and the perception of a common literary and cultural heritage. (The latter were of course coded as Greek, but this Hellenism is to be seen not necessarily as distinct from, and certainly not as conflicting with, 'Romanism': see below.) Rome learned to manage a huge, diverse empire by looking to its predecessors, the Hellenistic and even Achaemenid kingdoms; but it greatly exceeded its precedents in terms of both scale and durability.

The empire as described in the previous paragraph is as Aristides would have recognised it. This assessment is shared by certain modern scholars.

[11] Nicolet (1991) 29–56, with his accompanying plates; Hardie (1986) on Virgil's *Aeneid*; Murphy (2004) 154–60 (using the triumphal procession as the dominant metaphor); and more generally Ando (2000) 277–355. For Rome as 'world-city' see Edwards and Woolf (2003). For Agrippa's celebrated 'spectacle of the whole world' see Plin. *HN* 3.17; Brodersen (1995) 268–87 argues that it was an inventory rather than a map.

[12] Schneider (1986) pl. 21.4; the type of Atlas supporting the globe is relatively common (pls. 20, 21.1–3).

[13] Purcell (2005).

[14] See esp. Zanker (1988) 297–333: 'from the foundation of the monarchy [=principate], a uniform visual language began to develop' (330).

One of the contributors to this volume, Clifford Ando, has written a rich and full account of the social, political, legal, religious and cultural mechanisms that united the empire, with relatively little provincial sedition, for over four centuries.[15] The general trend of the last fifteen years, however, has been Pausanian, emphasising the diversity of practice and the extent of local control. Let us take one example to focus our discussion, that of the *Res Gestae* (*Achievements*) of Augustus, an inscription first set up at the Mausoleum at Rome (Suet. *Aug.* 101.6) and apparently reproduced across Rome's empire, sometimes in the original Latin (as in a surviving version from Pisidian Antioch – a colony for Roman veterans), sometimes translated into Greek (as at Pisidian Apollonia), and sometimes in both (as at Ancyra).[16]

Clearly at one level this was an Aristidean statement, that the world was united under one man. When inscriptions started playing a significant role in the Greek imaginary, in the archaic and particularly classical periods, they served primarily to represent the local community to itself. An inscription like this, however, emanating not from the city's officials but from the imperial hub, punctured the civic bubble and reminded citizens that they were also provincials of the empire.[17] 'The *Res Gestae* imposed upon the inhabitants of cities of Asia Minor an uncompromisingly Roman picture of the city, the emperor and the world.'[18] Even the notoriously 'bad' (i.e. Latinising) Greek detected by scholars in the translations has been interpreted as a token of imperial dominance.[19] The *Res Gestae* is defiantly non-local: nowhere in the surviving versions is there any reference to the specific, local environment in which the inscription was placed. You read this text as a citizen not of Ancyra, Apollonia or Antioch, but as a subject of the Roman empire. Such inscriptions could, then, serve as the ancient equivalents to what global theorists call 'hyperspaces',[20] where the

[15] Ando (2000). For provincial unrest see Bowersock (1987).

[16] It is a curiosity, but perhaps a mere accident, that all of our evidence comes from modern Turkey. At the time of writing, Alison Cooley's edition of the *Res Gestae* is keenly awaited.

[17] On the ideological role of communication from Rome in maintaining provincial loyalty, see esp. Ando (2000) 73–130. This use of inscription was not, of course, distinctive to the Roman empire: parallels can be found in the Hellenistic world, and in, e.g., Egyptian, Hittite, Assyrian and Babylonian imperialism.

[18] Elsner (1996) 35–8.

[19] 'It is far more likely [i.e. than interpretations based on supposed incompetence] that the translators stuck (or were instructed to do so) as closely as possible to the wording of the originals, in disregard of the nature of the Greek idiom. If the documents were given in this way a distinctive Romanness, so much the better. The non-Greek idioms bring out the Roman indifference to the sensibilities of their subjects' (J. N. Adams (2003) 471).

[20] Kearney (1995) 553: 'environments such as airports, franchise restaurants, and production sites that, detached from any local reference, have monotonous, universal qualities'. Kearney's formulation is

bounded space of a local community is punctured by lines joining them to myriad others: globalisation in action.

Alison Cooley, however, has recently offered a more Pausanian interpretation, which stresses the role of local initiative. Starting from the premise that inscriptions were set up by communities and not by Romans, she argues that '[t]he most important aspect of a monumental inscription . . . is that the monument presents a local interpretation of a document, and that what is otherwise a Roman document becomes a local one'.[21] This forms the basis of an argument that emphasises the *differences* between local versions of texts such as the *Res Gestae* and explains them as creative interpretations tailored to the needs of individual communities. Perhaps most significant of all, in this connection, is her observation that the Latin version downplays the role of provincial communities and stresses the power of Rome, while the Greek versions avoid mention of world conquest and subjugation.

The question to ask of the *Res Gestae*, we might conclude, is not *whether* it is imperial or local, but *how* the local manifestation of a document emanating from Rome manages to interface between centre and periphery. Let us take another example. Across the eastern empire (particularly in the first two centuries CE), many cities had temples devoted to the cult of the Roman emperor;[22] in addition, there were 'many ways of incorporating the emperor into local religion that stopped short of a public cult', such as the housing of imperial statues in the temples of Olympian deities.[23] Scholarship on the imperial cult since S. R. F. Price's influential *Rituals and Power* (1984) has tended to view it principally as an organic local response to the external phenomenon of the Roman principate, an attempt to integrate a new phenomenon into the traditional 'language' of civic cult (as mediated by its Hellenistic developments) and a symptom of competition between local elites and *poleis*. There are good reasons to take this (broadly Pausanian) approach, reasons rooted in a desire to avoid the top-down, Rome-centred perspective assumed by earlier scholarship.[24] It is, however, equally important not to overestimate the autonomy of civic communities. As Stephen Mitchell has noted generally *à propos* of building projects in the east (including imperial cult centres), the evidence for both the original initiatives and the subsequent financing suggests a complex cooperation

rather more supercilious than I would wish for imperial inscriptions. (And maybe even for airports and franchise restaurants too; I am not quite sure what is meant by a 'production site'.)

[21] Cooley (2007) 204.

[22] This is the theme of S. R. F. Price (1984); further discussions in den Boer (1972).

[23] Woolf (2008) 246–7, at 246; S. R. F. Price (1984) 146–56.

[24] The creativity of local communities is a central theme of, for example, Dench (1995).

between private, civic, provincial and imperial parties.[25] Particularly in remote places, 'it is hard to imagine how such ambitious programs of public building could have been possible without a deliberate injection of imperial finance, and without importing the skilled craftsmen and artisans that such sophisticated constructions required'.[26]

The question of whose initiative lay behind the imperial cult is a complex one: information is rare, and when it exists problematic (can we really believe in spontaneous local outbursts of enthusiasm for foreign domination?). But the motives of the initiators are, in any case, only half of the story. What matter even more, arguably, are the likely effects on those who viewed the monuments and participated in the festivals. These will surely have experienced a keen sense of the interconnectedness of the empire. Inscriptions vividly express the perceived reliance of local success upon the bounteous benevolence of the emperor. For example, one such inscription, set up by the assembly of the *koinon* of Asia (probably in 10 or 9 BCE) to commemorate the introduction of a new calendar beginning on Augustus' birthday, avers that 'the providence which divinely ordered our lives created with zeal and munificence the most perfect good for our lives by producing Augustus and filling him with virtue for the benefaction of mankind . . .'[27] The same inscription proceeds to identify Augustus as 'the god'. This civic acknowledgement of the divinity of a non-local ruler, on the occasion of the introduction of a non-traditional calendar proposed by a foreign official, will surely have communicated a powerful sense of the unity of empire. 'Emperor cults', wrote Keith Hopkins, 'and all that they involved . . . provided the context in which inhabitants of towns spread for hundreds of miles throughout the empire could celebrate their membership of a single political order and their own place within it.'[28]

Celebrations of the emperor were thus among the most translocal of events in a Greek city. Matters are, however, more complex. Participants were not simply celebrating the emperor, but also enacting their own city's or *koinon*'s celebration of the emperor. Translocalism was mediated through local expression, often (as Price emphasises) in implicit or expressed

[25] Mitchell (1987) esp. 340–2, 362–3.
[26] Mitchell (1987) 362–3. This comment relates specifically to Pisidian Antioch, which was a veteran *colonia* and hence arguably a special case; but the broad point, that the skills and resources required for monumental architecture were not always readily available locally, has a wider validity.
[27] *OGIS* 458.2. See further Laffi (1967) esp. 21–3; translation from S. R. F. Price (1984) 54.
[28] Hopkins (1981) 242.

competition with other polities. The imperial cult characteristically fused local elements (traditional cult) and imperial iconography.[29] Sometimes the iconography itself was conspicuously hybrid. At Aphrodisias, for example, the south building of the imperial cult complex has two registers: the upper mixes recognisably Roman depictions of imperial conquest with Greek mythological scenes, while the lower one represents only Greek mythology.

In the cases of both the *Res Gestae* and the imperial cult, then, we see (in different ways, and with different emphases) the mutual interreliance of what I have called the Pausanian vision of the diversity of local expression and the Aristidean vision of global unity.

ROMAN AND GREEK MODELS OF GLOBALISATION

If we focus on the imperial cult, we shall end up with a model of a powerfully reticulated empire centred on Rome. Yet there were also other forces at work: from another perspective, the unifying actions of the Caesars can be seen as determined by, rather than determining, cultural change. A certain amount of homogenisation, at least at the elite level, was occurring anyway. As Greg Woolf observes, from the Augustan age

> common cultures began to emerge creating a set of élite values that transcended the divide between Greek and Latin literary culture. The diet of the well off was broadly similar across the empire. They shared a taste in domestic architecture, created large slave households partly staffed by highly specialised (and expensive) personal attendants. The powerful hunted, at great expense, employed entertainers and teachers, patronised and sometimes competed in athletic and musical competitions . . . Olive oil was used everywhere even though olives could not grow in many parts of the empire. Wine replaced beer even where vines could not be cultivated. Papyrus, flax, and marble were available everywhere . . .[30]

As Woolf stresses, it is not clear to us – nor was it clear to the ancients – whether this movement towards cultural convergence among the elite should be seen as a sign of Hellenisation or Romanisation, or of a blend of the two. On the one hand, the roots of this process lay deep in the Hellenistic Greek world, with its promotion of an elite Greek *koinē*; perhaps even in the fourth century with the ecumenical Hellenicity of figures

[29] Zanker (1988) 300: 'While the architecture, as well as forms of ritual and ceremony, were largely traditional, honorific statues for the emperor and his family were apparently often imitative of models originating in Rome.'
[30] Woolf (2005) 111.

such as Isocrates.[31] Cultural Hellenism was heavily influential on Rome itself: the development in the mid-republican period of Roman literature, for example, has been plausibly linked to a manipulation of the cultural prestige of Hellenism in competition with other Italian states (which were themselves Hellenising in different ways).[32]

Yet the ecumenical culture that spread under the empire also had a distinctively Roman accent. This was visible not just in recognisably Roman activities such as law and civic munificence – *panem et circenses* – which was also exported to the Greek elites, but also in the 'vertical' model of ambitious social climbing that such munificence both presumed and stimulated. Indeed, even those activities that were *prima facie* unambiguously Greek were absorbed into a Roman framework of reference. As is well known, Greeks in the imperial period expressed their Greekness primarily through 'culture' (art, music, literature, gymnastics); but so far from expressing an identity discrete from Roman power (as so often assumed in 'Second Sophistic' scholarship), this process of self-definition actually replicates imperialist ideology. It was the Romans who first decreed that Greeks should do culture and Romans power.[33] The apostles of Greek *paideia* – Plutarch, Dio, Lucian, Aristides, Philostratus and others – were Roman citizens too, and they were replicating the same divisions of labour (politick as a Roman, write as a Greek) as westerners such as Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius. This does not mean that there were never any frictions felt in practice between Greek 'culture' and Roman 'power' – of course there were[34] – merely that, in relation to the general trend towards the cultural homogenisation of the elite, the two were broadly complementary. The development of a hyperspatial empire, then, was not simply a reflex of Roman imperialism; rather it emerged from a long and complex historical processes.

[31] Cf. the famous claim at *Paneg.* 50 that 'the name of Greeks belongs more to cast of mind than to descent, and that it is those who share our education (*paideusis*) who are called Greeks rather than those who share our common nature'. The idea of a fourth-century shift towards more ecumenical versions of Hellenism on the Isocratean model is widespread, but it is sometimes seen as rather too sudden, uncontested or complete a process (e.g. J. M. Hall (2002)).

[32] Feeney (2005). The classic collection of papers on Italian Hellenism is Zanker (1976); see also Dench (1995).

[33] Most famously expressed in Anchises' words to Aeneas: 'Others, for so I can well believe, shall hammer forth more delicately a breathing likeness out of bronze, coax living faces from the marble, plead causes with more skill, plot with their gauge the movements in the sky, and tell the rising of the constellations. But you, Roman, remember that you have to guide the nations by your authority (*imperium*), for this is to be your skill, to graft tradition onto peace, to shew mercy to the conquered, and to wage war until the haughty are brought low' (Virgil, *Aen.* 6.847–53, trans. Jackson Knight).

[34] See esp. Bowie (1974); Swain (1996); Whitmarsh (2001a).

Yet we need also to nuance this idea of a trend towards cultural homogenisation. At one level, certainly, we see as a general trend, towards a pan-imperial culture. The clearest sign of this is the expansion of Roman citizenship, which was gradually extended outwards to aristocratic sympathisers in key areas, first in Italy, then in the empire; and ultimately, in 212 CE, Caracalla's famous *Constitutio Antoniniana* granted it to all free-born inhabitants of the empire.[35] Certainly after the *Constitutio* we can see a 'loosening of local identity', which 'coincided with a centralizing of power about the emperor'.[36] But the strengthening of political ties to Rome did not mean all aspects of local identity were weakened. If anything – and here the analogy to modern 'glocalisation'[37] is particularly apposite – centralisation fostered an increased sense of regional diversity.[38] The local and the imperial were two sides of the same coin – quite literally, as numismatists remind us.[39] Christopher Jones has emphasised that Greek intellectuals of the imperial period had a 'complex and multi-layered' identity, consisting not only of the Greekness so beloved of modern criticism, but also of 'civic, regional, and sometimes "barbarian"' elements.[40] This is the case not just in metropolitan areas with prestigious histories such as Athens (Gleason, this volume), but also in such marginal locales as Crete (Romeo, this volume), Paphlagonia (Mitchell, this volume) and Termessos (van Nijf, this volume).

THE (RE)CONSTRUCTION OF THE LOCAL: AUTHENTICITY AND SIMULACRA

Do all such cases represent authentic local traditions, or cynical constructions? Doubtless there was a good deal of manipulation. Lucian, the merciless satirist of the second century CE, presents the Paphlagonian cult of Glycon as a smoke-and-mirrors show invented by one particular fraud (*goēs*: see Mitchell, this volume) bent on promoting himself and his city. 'Fraud', however, is of course highly loaded language, and represents the

[35] On Roman citizenship see Sherwin-White (1973). Garnsey (2004) offers a subtle account of the effects of the *Constitutio*.
[36] Swain (1997) 7, writing specifically of the third century CE.
[37] Robertson (1994), (1995).
[38] See, e.g., Hingley (2005) 111 on the 'transformations that reassert self-identity at a local level' in the Roman empire.
[39] 'The imperial/local mode – emperor, wife of Caesar on the obverse, local image on the reverse – is the norm. Such iconography served to locate the community in relation to both Roman power and local tradition . . .' (Howgego (2005) 15).
[40] Jones (2004b) 14.