The shaping of grand strategy

Within a variety of historical contexts, The Shaping of Grand Strategy addresses the most important tasks that states have confronted – namely, how to protect their citizens against the short-range as well as the long-range dangers their polities confront in the present and may confront in the future. To be successful, grand strategy demands that governments and leaders chart a course that involves more than simply reacting to immediate events. Above all, it demands that they adapt to sudden and major changes in the international environment, which more often than not involve the outbreak of great conflicts but at times demand recognition of major economic, political, or diplomatic changes. This collection of essays explores the successes and failures of great states attempting to create grand strategies that work and aims to achieve an understanding of some of the extraordinary difficulties involved in casting, evolving, and adapting grand strategy to the realities of the world.

Williamson Murray is Professor Emeritus of History at The Ohio State University. He has been the Centennial Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics, Secretary of the Navy Fellow at the Navy War College, Horner Professor of Military Theory at the Marine Corps University, and Harold Johnson Professor of Military History at the Army War College. At present he is a defense consultant and commentator on historical and military subjects in Washington, D.C. Murray is coeditor of The Making of Peace (2009, with James Lacey); The Past as Prologue (2006, with Richard Hart Sinnreich); The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (2001, with MacGregor Knox); Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (1998, with Allan R. Millett); and The Making of Strategy (1996, with Alvin Bernstein and MacGregor Knox).

Richard Hart Sinnreich retired from the U.S. Army in 1990. His active service included field artillery commands from battery through division artillery; combat in Vietnam; teaching at West Point and Fort Leavenworth; and assignments on the Army, Joint, and National Security Council staffs as assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and as the first Army Fellow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He helped establish and subsequently directed the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and has published widely on military and foreign affairs. Since retiring from the Army, he has worked as an independent defense consultant for both private industry and government agencies and as the regular defense columnist for the Sunday Constitution in Lawton, Oklahoma.

James Lacey has served for more than twelve years as an infantry officer on active duty and is recently retired from the Army reserves. He is a widely published analyst and Professor of Strategy at the Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Virginia. He has written several works on the war in Iraq and the global war on terrorism. He also teaches graduate-level courses in military history and global issues at Johns Hopkins University. Lacey was an embedded journalist with Time magazine during the Iraq invasion, traveling with the 101st Airborne Division. He has written extensively for many magazines, and his opinion columns have been published in the National Review, The Weekly Standard, The New York Post, the New York Sun, Foreign Affairs, and many other publications. He is the author of Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s 21-Day Assault on Baghdad (2007), which has been hailed as “a major and successful effort to fill in one of the major blank spots in our knowledge of Operation Iraqi Freedom”; Pershing (2008); and Keep from All Thoughtful Men (forthcoming). He is coeditor of The Making of Peace (2009).
The shaping of grand strategy

Policy, diplomacy, and war

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