The globalization dialectic

Some readers may have memories of postwar Alexandria and Cairo or will have read Lawrence Durrell's *Alexandria Quartet* – the tales of a cosmopolitan high society. Egypt appeared in the mid-1940s to be as economically developed as war-torn Greece and equally ready to catch up with the rest of Europe. To the north, Turkey was singled out like Greece for special assistance under the Truman Doctrine (March 1947) and seemed virtually a part of Europe. To the west, in “French” Algeria, Algiers was at least as prosperous as the rest of France, and, further west, Casablanca was home to big French industrial interests poised to transform the picturesque Moroccan protectorate into Europe’s California. At the eastern end of the Mediterranean, a newly independent and polyglot Lebanon was fast becoming the West’s principal commercial gateway to Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf. Riding on the postwar oil boom in those states, Lebanon would become the Middle East’s Switzerland in the 1950s and 1960s and apparently exemplify an easy “modernization without revolution” (Salem 1973). Beneath snow-covered mountains, on the unspoiled shores of a clear and relatively unpolluted Mediterranean Sea, Beirut was as pretty as Geneva in those days, at least in the richer parts of the city, and livelier than Calvin’s home. Inland, to the east of Lebanon’s two mountain ridges, the open Syrian economy boomed with new manufacturing and agricultural development in the 1950s (Sachs and Warner 1995: 34). Morocco and Turkey also grew rapidly during this period because their open economies took advantage of expanding world markets. Of all the new states in the region, however, Iraq had the most promising prospects for balanced development. It was endowed in 1960 with the world’s fourth largest proven oil reserves, the most water of any country in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) including Turkey, some of the richest alluvial soils, a strong British educational system, and a relatively large, skilled workforce. Further east, Iran had three times the population and a diversified economy with oil reserves slightly more plentiful than Iraq’s and very substantial natural gas deposits as well (OPEC 2008, Table 9). Captivated by the cash flows, the young
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shah would dream of making his country into the world’s third or fourth mightiest military power.

But over the decades of the Cold War (1946–89), various conflicts within the region dashed any hopes of catching up with Europe. Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Turkey closed their economies to foreign trade and investment, whereas Greece opened up in 1959 (Sachs and Warner 1995: 79). Consistent with the international model prevailing in the 1960s, most of the MENA states embarked on policies of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Their statist experiments generally resulted in heavier, more bloated bureaucracies than those of other third world countries and more wasteful projects because the financing was so easy. Oil rents or foreign aid – strategic rents of the Cold War – also supported big military complexes and served to inflate their officer corps. When, shocked by the 1982 international debt crisis, the prevailing international consensus changed in the Thatcher-Reagan years to favor market economies and export-oriented development, the MENA states were slower than others to readjust their economic strategies and structures. Shielded directly or indirectly by the region’s oil revenues and strategic rents, they took longer than their East Asian or Latin American counterparts to engage in the various forms of structural adjustment advocated by international financial institutions. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the only countries in the MENA reaching Greek levels of individual prosperity and welfare were little states that had not even existed in the immediate postwar period, Israel and the Greek part of Cyprus. Much of the Arab world was suffering poverty on levels not far removed from those of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

This book assesses the prospects for reversing these tendencies and accelerating economic development in light of the major regional and international changes currently influencing the region. The end of the Cold War, the new international economic and political order, the increasing attention of Europe to its “Mexico,” the occupation of Iraq, the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process, and renewed oil rents coupled with global recession may have major impacts on the region’s domestic political economies. All of its regimes are faced with the challenges and opportunities of globalization, yet they also share a defensive legacy ingrained by more than two centuries of interaction with major European powers, joined in the past half-century by the United States. Many Middle Easterners view the globalization of finance and business as a threat to their national, religious, or cultural identities comparable to that of an earlier period of globalization prior to 1914, when the foreign intrusions were associated with European imperialism. The Anglo-American invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq reinforced this impression.
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The dialectics of globalization

The working hypotheses of this book are that politics drives economic development and that the principal obstacles to development in the region have been political rather than economic or cultural in nature. Political rather than economic factors have been the primary cause of the rate and method by which countries of the region have been incorporated into the globalized economy within the framework of the Washington Consensus. Those political factors result from strategies of incumbent elites seeking to retain power – strategies that bear remarkable similarity to those of the “defensive modernizers” of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, faced with similar challenges and opportunities of financial globalization prior to 1914. These strategies of “controlled openings” tend to segment the political economy, so that the degree to which various sectors of the economy are globally integrated varies widely. Further differentiation sustains the globalization dialectic, deepening the objective grounds for dividing populations and their elites into globalists and moralists while opening up new opportunities for potential synthesizers.

The drama of globalization is a continuation of the colonial dialectic played out by earlier generations of indigenous elites. Indeed, the most distinctive feature of the MENA region – defined here as the non-European parts of the old Ottoman Empire, plus its respective western, southern, and eastern peripheries in Morocco, Arabia, and Iran – may be not so much Islam – or Arab culture in its heartland – as the tradition of external intervention in the region. As Leon Carl Brown observed,

For roughly the last two centuries the Middle East has been more consistently and more thoroughly ensnared in great power politics than any other part of the non-Western world. This distinctive political experience continuing from generation to generation has left its mark on Middle Eastern political attitudes and actions. Other parts of the world have been at one time or another more severely buffeted by an imperial power, but no area has remained so unremittingly caught up in multilateral great power politics. (Brown 1984: 3)

In the earlier era of financial globalization lasting until 1914, the encounters tended to produce tensions and fragmentation. The region was too strategically situated to be ignored, yet the Great Powers generally prevented their rivals from definitive conquests while fighting each other for influence, thereby exacerbating internal divisions within the various states or former provinces of the Ottoman Empire. With the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908, then in Bahrain and Iraq in the 1920s and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1938, the region acquired a new strategic importance for international superpowers. During World War I the British coined
the term *Middle East* for their Cairo regional command post. Outmaneuvering their French ally’s military and diplomatic administrative bureaux of the “Proche Orient” (Near East), they politically and symbolically redefined the region as if to anticipate the world’s energy needs. Oil discoveries, coupled with new transport and communications technologies, spread the stakes of Great Power competition out from the Near East to the Middle East, and eventually to North Africa as well. In World War II, Winston Churchill understood the entire region to be Europe’s “soft underbelly,” and the Allies’ campaign to liberate Nazi Europe started in North Africa. The American and British forces converged on Tunisia in 1943, driving Rommel’s forces out, before liberating Sicily, Italy, and eventually France.

Outside parties rarely established responsible local government institutions because they were too busy competing with each other for power and influence. In other parts of the world they usually achieved colonial hegemony – the Spanish and Portuguese in Latin America, the British in India and much of North America, and the Dutch in Indonesia. The stakes of conquest were higher in the MENA than elsewhere, however, because it was closer to the European heartland of the Great Powers. And where one power did prevail, the impact on the local society was often more savage than elsewhere, except in the Americas. The French decimated the Muslim populations of Algeria in the mid-nineteenth century, and the Italians followed suit in Libya after World War I. The British protection of harbors along sea-lanes to India was more benign but concerned only a very small fraction of the MENA’s population: Aden, Kuwait, Qatar, and other little Trucial States that comprise the United Arab Emirates today. Britain’s control over other parts of the region was either transitory (Palestine 1918–48) or veiled in various ways (Egypt 1882–1954, Iraq 1918–58, Iran 1921–53). French rule over Algeria (1830–1962), Tunisia (1881–1956), and Morocco (1912–56) was more durable and transparent, but its control of Lebanon and Syria lasted a bare quarter of a century (1920–46). Italy stayed longer in Libya (1911–43) but was then displaced by the British until 1951. Whether or not the United States crossed the line between technical assistance and veiled control over Saudi Arabia, Aramco, a company registered in Delaware, ran its oil fields until 1990, and the U.S. government helped to establish much of its accompanying state infrastructure (Vitalis 2007).

In short, most of the MENA states were penetrated by a variety of outside parties vying for commercial, cultural, or strategic influence and establishing beach-heads through the various local communities. One widespread effect of these rivalries was to put indigenous business elites at risk. Selective foreign “protection” of local minorities, including grants
The globalization dialectic of foreign citizenship, strengthened them against their local governments and business competitors but ultimately left them vulnerable to retaliation by popular majorities. Another impact was increased sectarianism. Lebanon illustrated how confessional differences, recognized for limited purposes by the Ottoman millet system, were exacerbated by alliances with external powers – the Maronites with the French, the Greek Orthodox with the Russians, the Druze with the British. With the formal freeing of much of the region after World War II, regional powers, including Iran, Israel, and Turkey as well as Arab states, supplemented traditional interventions of the Great Powers vying for influence over their smaller neighbors. The United States, eager to check advances by the Soviet Union, joined the fray and learned to outbid its British and French allies. More external and regional influence peddling and subversion further compounded the divisions of weak states such as Lebanon, the Sudan, and Yemen and provoked others, such as Iraq and Syria, into becoming police states. The rise of transnational Arab and Islamic movements in turn amplified regional and local conflicts.

Whereas colonial rule in the non-Western world usually had a beginning, a long period of insulation from the outside world, and a conclusion, many MENA elites are products of a different legacy. Only the Turks, Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans, and Israelis can claim to have really won their independence, achieving a degree of national closure, at the expense of either settler or other minorities or, in the case of Israel, the national majority of Palestinians. Others still fear the subversion of foreign powers and interference from their neighbors. Any closure was gained at the expense of local business elites rather than the colonizer. Military coups toppled nominally independent regimes, and then the officers proceeded to restructure their respective political economies. The MENA’s special legacy of external intervention has impeded the internal development of public accountability.

Yet just as colonialism gave rise to movements of national liberation assimilating Western forms of political organization to struggle against Western domination, so the dialectics of globalization may integrate countries in the region into the world economy while also emancipating them. To do so in the new context is to assimilate, negate, and through the hard work of negation to supersede the Washington Consensus rooted in Anglo-American capitalism – perhaps by “Islamizing” it. Dialectic here is understood to comprise sets of ideas and attitudes defining elite-mass relationships rather than material forces, though economic interests obviously play a part. In a dialectic of emancipation (modeled after Hegel’s master-slave relationship) ideas may – but do not necessarily – gain ever-wider social audiences, achieving what Antonio Gramsci
Globalization and the politics of development called hegemony (Lustick 1999). In colonial situations, a nationalist elite may mobilize the entire nation, transforming a population defined by colonial borders into a people experiencing civil society.

Schematically the colonial dialectic describes three basic stances (or Hegelian “moments”) of a native elite toward the colonizer’s political culture. The first stance is that of acceptance associated with efforts to be assimilated into the new elite. But emulating alien values may in turn engender a backlash by those excluded from it. This negative moment of a counter elite asserts its claim to hegemony in the name of indigenous values. Under continued colonial pressure, however, new divisions within this elite may lead to the emergence of an alternative elite that is no longer content to articulate the traditional values of an imagined past. The third moment may more effectively combat the imposition of alien rule by assimilating its positive elements, such as skills and values derived from a Western education, and using them to overcome foreign domination. This deeper assimilation of the colonizer’s values plays on the contradictions of colonialism so as to undermine its authority and achieve independence.

Much of the MENA fell under the influence of Western powers without experiencing the full effects of colonial rule. It was in French North Africa that the colonial dialectic was most fully articulated because the colonial presence was more intrusive and protracted than elsewhere. The schema is best illustrated in Tunisia, where French rule lasted long enough to provoke not only emulation and negation but also a nationalist synthesis, yet was not so overpowering that it altogether undermined the authority of any indigenous elite, as in Algeria. Successive generations of educated Tunisians chronologically expressed the logic of the three dialectical moments. Before 1914 aristocratic Young Tunisians emulated French modernity and sought liberal reforms within the system. After World War I a predominantly urban Destour (Constitution) Party rejected the French Protectorate on traditional and legalistic grounds. Then the Neo-Destour, its successor party, with roots in peasant villages, employed modern political methods to organize the entire country against the French occupation. At independence, in 1956, Tunisia had the most deeply rooted nationalist party and trade union federation of any Arab country.

Tunisia was the exception. When, as in much of the Middle East, the “colonial” domination was veiled in technical and military relationships with outside powers, the colonial dialectic could not be completed for lack of a unifying target of opposition or incentive for emancipation. Even in Tunisia, the synthesis led to new tensions and contradictions after independence. Habib Bourguiba’s successful movement eventually
The globalization dialectic engendered resistance from social sectors and actors who felt excluded. Once in power, the third generation of nationalists became vulnerable to attack by new generations of rejectionists who could point to the internal contradictions between the incumbent elite’s ostensible Western liberal values and the regime’s authoritarian practices. But Tunisia’s Islamist opposition, progressive by Arab standards, is a legacy of Tunisian modernization: Rashid Ghannoushi can be seen as Bourguiba’s “illegitimate offspring” (Zghal 1991: 205). Tunisia’s special advantages deserve further scrutiny.

The critical factors for Tunisia’s success were the duration of the colonial situation (1881–1956) and the capacity of political elites to forge durable linkages with mass constituencies before independence. Colonial conflict was sufficiently protracted and its education benefits sufficiently extensive to enable a modern educated provincial elite (sons of peasant freeholders) to displace the traditional urban elite of absentee landlords, merchants, and religious figures. The new nationalist elite succeeded in mobilizing broad popular support because the continued French presence offered a convenient focus for mobilization and coalition building. The timing was critical. It took three generations of nationalist struggle for the educated sons of the provincial elite to acquire sufficient weight to displace and absorb the other educated children of the traditional urban elite in the new middle classes (Montety [1940] 1973). Their Moroccan equivalents would not have time to achieve such social and political prominence before independence. Other new middle classes, defined as being not only educated but of predominantly provincial origins outside the old elite strata, did not achieve political hegemony before independence. In the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, only Algeria, Aden, Egypt, Palestine, and Sudan experienced comparable periods of European (or Israeli) colonization. The colonial situation was too veiled in Egypt, however, and too prone to settler violence in Algeria and Palestine for their respective new middle classes to achieve hegemony. If they were to achieve it there or elsewhere in the MENA, it would be after independence and under less auspicious circumstances. In Palestine, however, the Jewish settlers, detached from Europe yet still mostly European, telescoped their nationalism into a third-moment victory over Britain within a generation.

Pervasive Western influence, first exercised through the Ottoman Empire and then more directly by means of mandates from the League of Nations, usually strengthened the hold of urban absentee landowner-merchants over the countryside. Turkey was the prime exception. Ottoman bureaucracy contained them, and an Anatolian third-moment elite then displaced traditional authorities and achieved independence in
1923 through a successful war of national liberation. In most countries, however, the emergent elites benefiting from Western education did not have time to displace the old urban ones before independence: in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, the prime “nationalists” and beneficiaries of independence were the urban landowners; in Iraq they included urbanized tribal leaders. Despite a lengthier history of Western intrusion, Egyptian nationalism was also dominated by its landowners until divisions in the Wafd presaged the end of the monarchy in 1952.

Except in the Levant, the colonial powers tended to establish monarchies if they were not already in place. In the Persian Gulf, the British protected ruling families and even imported the Hashemites from Mecca to Jordan and Iraq. The British also disposed of Italy’s former colony by uniting Libya under a new monarchy in 1951. Monarchy was usually the sign of a colonial dialectic that had not run its full course. Had the French stayed a generation longer in Morocco, they would doubtless have discredited the venerable Sharifian monarchy by overuse against rising social forces. Instead, they accidentally raised its prestige by exiling the sultan to Madagascar in 1953. Conversely, had the French left Tunis for good during World War II, Moncef Bey might have kept his throne and prevented Bourguiba from founding a republic. The British and subsequently the Americans also strengthened Pahlavi Iran without ever turning it into a formal protectorate. There as elsewhere, the monarchies had trouble coping with the new middle classes nurtured in Western education. Despite his White Revolution, the shah was unable to mobilize support from the countryside to offset them. In Morocco, by contrast, the monarchy came to dominate both the old urban merchants and the new middle classes after independence by manipulating provincial notables to its advantage (Hammoudi 1997; Leveau 1985).

Israel, Tunisia, and Turkey were the only countries where a third-moment elite consolidated itself with independence. Afterwards it would be more difficult for new middle classes, the normal carriers of civil society, to forge durable linkages with other social sectors, whether among peasants, workers, or students. In Iran a genuine revolution was needed to expel the monarchy, but much of the new middle classes then fell victim to the victorious coalition of merchants and religious leaders. Elsewhere they invariably achieved power by plotting within their respective military establishments. Nasser and his Free Officers led the way in Egypt in 1952; after many military coups and countercoups, Hassan Bakr (with Saddam Hussein) and Hafez al-Asad took power in Iraq and Syria in 1968 and 1970, respectively. The officers in turn suppressed civilian politicians and intellectuals who might have deepened their respective civil societies by creating new associations and political spaces. The
degree of oppression or liberality of their respective regimes was a function of the potential oppositions they faced. The extent of their economic intervention and financial repression also reflected the strength of their respective merchants and landowners and the degree to which they had coalesced as a class of local capitalists. Thus intervention was heaviest in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Algeria. In fact it is often forgotten that Algeria’s more protracted colonial situation had given rise to higher concentrations of Algerian as well as French settler landholdings than in neighboring Morocco. The economic hand of the military was lighter in the Sudan and Yemen, where capitalism was less developed.

The new dialectics of globalization feeds on an unachieved colonial dialectic. Its thesis is the Washington Consensus, shared by “serious” economists irrespective of nationality and vigorously, if selectively, imitated by certain of the local business and political elites as well. It seems hardly coincidental that the countries governed by third-moment elites at independence – Israel, Tunisia, and Turkey – were the quickest to adopt the Washington Consensus. Reform teams of technocrats, supported at least initially by their political leaderships, also made some progress implementing various structural reforms in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. The Washington Consensus, however, engendered significant backlash in these and other countries. The “globalizers” almost inevitably provoke “moralizers,” who seek solutions in cultural authenticity by affirming a religious or ethnic identity, or at least by reaffirming traditional nationalism. Since Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi began speaking of a “Third Way” in the 1970s, the siren call of a distinctive, unique, culturally authentic model has gained considerable appeal, and writings on Islamic economics have proliferated.

Much like second-moment responses to colonial situations, however, moralism remains abstract and ineffective unless it can contest the global economy on its own grounds. Most of the “moralizers” seem unable to devise effective alternative economic policies. Moralism takes the form either of Arab nationalism harking back to the command economies of the 1960s or of Islamic revivalism. On the nationalist track, Arab economists have enjoyed only limited success in promoting a free-trade zone as a counterweight to being integrated piecemeal into the international economy (Bolbol 1999). Mainstream Islamism, on the other hand, seems to be more preoccupied with culture than with economics. The moralizers, whether in government or opposed to it, can put globalizers on the defensive, but they rarely promote alternative policies.

Nor do the moralizers have much opportunity to do so. Hesitant moves toward greater political liberalization in the 1980s were sharply reversed in most MENA countries in the 1990s. Tunisia, followed in turn by
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Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan, severely restricted the Islamist oppositions. There could be little overt, public debate between globalizers and their opponents inside and outside their respective governments, and efforts to incorporate mainstream Islamist oppositions into the political process ceased, except perhaps in Jordan and Morocco. Tunisia perfected the art of running a contemporary police state by claiming to be democratic while preemptively harassing, imprisoning, and routinely torturing its opponents and their families (Beau and Tuquoi 1999).

Indeed, the political conditions prevailing in most Arab states since the American-led liberation of Kuwait – and intensified by America’s “war of choice” on Iraq – resemble those of a colonial situation – with the Islamists now playing the role of the erstwhile nationalists. It is an odd reversal of roles, a further unfolding of the colonial dialectic. In colonial situations Islam provided the implicit mobilizing structures of Western-inspired nationalism (articulated in Tunisia, for instance, through the modern Quranic schools), whereas today nationalism acquires an overtly Islamist form. Incumbent rulers, however, are both Muslim and indigenous nationals. They all seek legitimacy as Muslim rulers, even in once “radical” republics such as Syria or Iraq. Most of them therefore feel obliged to tolerate limited public Muslim spaces, such as Friday prayers and shari’ah courts, even though the message delivered in those prayers is strictly controlled, as are the judiciaries.

The colonial dialectic, in sum, gave rise to independent states of three different types: praetorian republics (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen and, as President Ahmadinejad’s re-election in 2009 clarified, Iran), monarchies (Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and democracies (Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey). The monarchies preserved their traditional elites and international capitalist legacies. The praetorian republics tended to reject theirs in favor of new political economies, although there were significant differences between Algeria and Iraq at one extreme and Egypt and Tunisia at the other. The “bunker” states, such as Algeria and Iraq, rule primarily by coercion – from their metaphorical or, in some cases, actual bunkers – because the state lacks autonomy from social formations. The “bully states,” Egypt and Tunisia, insulated by relatively strong administration, are largely autonomous from social forces, whether traditional or modern, although they, too, depend principally on military/security forces. The democracies were more selective in their treatment of local capitalists and landowners. The regimes that left their capitalist legacies intact were technically better able to cope with the new challenges of globalization that have steadily gathered pace since the 1980s; the monarchies of Jordan and Morocco.