This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Monika Nalepa is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. She is also Faculty Fellow of Notre Dame’s Kellogg Institute for International Studies, the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies, and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies. In 2006–2007 and 2009, she held an appointment as Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. Nalepa has guest co-edited a special volume dedicated to transitional justice in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and has contributed articles to the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the *Journal of Theoretical Politics* and chapters to numerous edited volumes devoted to transitional justice, including *NOMOS: Proceedings of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy*. 
Tadeuszowi Nalepie,
który pomógł mi zrozumieć że niczego nie muszę.
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

General Editor
Margaret Levi, University of Washington, Seattle

Assistant General Editors
Kathleen Thelen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Erik Wibbels, Duke University

Associate Editors
Robert H. Bates, Harvard University
Stephen Hanson, University of Washington, Seattle
Torben Iversen, Harvard University
Stathis Kalyvas, Yale University
Peter Lange, Duke University
Helen Milner, Princeton University
Frances Rosenbluth, Yale University
Susan Stokes, Yale University

Other Books in the Series

David Austen-Smith, Jeffrey A. Frieden, Miriam A. Golden, Karl Ove Moene, and Adam Przeworski, eds., Selected Works of Michael Wallerstein: The Political Economy of Inequality, Unions, and Social Democracy
Lisa Baldez, Why Women Protest: Women’s Movements in Chile
Robert Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa
Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State
Nancy Bermeo, ed., Unemployment in the New Europe
Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution
Carles Boix, Political Parties, Growth, and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy
Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930–1985

Continued after the Index.
Advance Praise for *Skeletons in the Closet*

“Monika Nalepa’s *Skeletons in the Closet* offers a groundbreaking analysis of transitional justice and its role in the consolidation of new democracies. Combining rigorous theoretical analysis with an impressive array of qualitative and quantitative evidence – including interviews with elites on both sides of transitions from communist rule in Eastern Europe, as well as original surveys of citizens – this book makes a compelling case for its argument: policies that pursue transitional justice are typically not driven by the demands of voters and citizens. Instead, they must be understood as strategic choices by political elites acting in the fog of an authoritarian legacy, characterized by great uncertainty about past collaboration of resistance leaders with the former regime. This approach allows Nalepa to offer convincing explanations of puzzling aspects of the timing and the scope of transitional justice policies that have largely gone unexplained to date. This book will force scholars to rethink common conceptions about transitional justice, and it should be read not only by those who study post-communist Eastern Europe, but by anyone with an interest in transitions from authoritarianism to democracy.”

Georg Vanberg, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

“Why weren’t former communist elites immediately punished after communism fell? In this excellent book, Monika Nalepa explains why justice was delayed and, paradoxically, why in the end it was the former communists that purged themselves. Through an impressive combination of formal theory, statistical analysis, and primary research in Eastern Europe, Nalepa finds that fears of collaboration within the ranks of non-communist parties drove the timing of punishment. Where such fears were high, these parties were inhibited from enacting such legislation; where they were low, the former communists preempted the passage of harsh measures with milder ones of their own. No one who reads this carefully argued and provocative book will think about transitional justice in quite the same way again.”

Jason Wittenberg, University of California at Berkeley
Skeletons in the Closet

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

MONIKA NALEPA

University of Notre Dame
Contents

List of Figures ii
List of Tables xii
Acknowledgments xv
List of East Central European Political Organizations xxi

1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Why Lustration? 4
1.2 First Puzzle: Skeletons in the Closet 11
1.3 Second Puzzle: Why Were the Promises of Amnesty Eventually Broken? 16
1.4 Third Puzzle: Why Did Post-Communists Lustrate? 20
1.5 Existing Explanations of Transitional Justice and Timing of Lustration 22
1.6 A Roadmap of the Argument 28
1.7 Terminology 29

Part I: Skeletons in the Closet 31

2 COMMITTING TO AMNESTY 33
2.1 A Simple Transitions Game 33
2.2 Limitations of STG 37

3 THE KIDNAPPER’S DILEMMA 42
3.1 The Kidnapper’s Dilemma in Pacted Transitions 43
3.2 The Transition with Secret Information Game 44

4 HOSTAGES AND SKELETONS IN POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC 58
4.1 Case Selection 58
## Contents

4.2 The Interview Data 59  
4.3 Empirical Implications 61  
4.4 Hostages and Skeletons: Analytic Narratives 62  
4.5 Evidence from Aggregate Data 84  
4.6 Summary of the Skeletons Argument 91  
4.7 Alternative Explanations 92  

**Part II: Out of the Closet** 97  
5 VOTERS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE DEMAND 99  
5.1 The East Europeans “Don’t Need That”? 102  
5.2 Surveys with Questions on Transitional Justice 106  
5.3 Summary and Descriptive Statistics 108  
5.4 Factors Associated with Demand for Lustration 113  
5.5 The Statistical Model 118  
5.6 Conclusions 124  
6 STRATEGIC ELITES: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SUPPLY 126  
6.1 The Origin of Pro-lustration Parties 128  
6.2 Lustration Policies and Parties’ Origins in Dissident Movements 134  
6.3 Do Parties Exhibit More Support for Lustration over Time? 146  
6.4 Do Younger Legislators Select Pro-lustration Parties? 150  
6.5 Alternative Explanations 153  
6.6 Conclusions 160  
7 THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE BILL GAME 162  
7.1 The Wave of Post-Communist Lustrations 163  
7.2 The Model 167  
7.3 Case Studies Explained by the Model 178  
7.4 Slovakia: Agenda Setting with an Atypical Status Quo 192  
7.5 Strategic Transitional Justice in the Baltics 200  
7.6 Conclusions 202  
8 STRATEGIC TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: BEYOND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 206  
8.1 Summary of the Argument in Part I 210  
8.2 Summary of the Argument in Part II 212  
8.3 Broader Implications 215  
8.4 Conclusions 226
Contents

9 EPILOGUE: BETWEEN AGENTS AND HEROES 230
Appendix A: Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 3 235
Appendix B: Answers of MPs and Their Constituents to “More Should Be Done to Punish People Who Were Responsible for the Injustices of the Communist Regime” 241
Appendix C: Sampling Technique and Transitional Justice Survey Questionnaire 245
Appendix D: Birth and Death of Parliamentary Parties by Their Position Regarding Lustration 255
Appendix E: Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 7 259
Appendix F: Lustration Laws by Target, Targeted Activity, and Sanction Type in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 267
Bibliography 271
Index 293
Figures

1.1 Lustration trajectories in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. page 20

2.1 A Simple Transition Game. 34

3.1 Transition with Secret Information Game. 47

3.2 Outcomes of the pooling and separating equilibria in the TSI game. 51

3.3 Transition with Secret Information (example). 52

4.1 Issues taken up by Hungarian parties according to the liberal electorate. 86

4.2 Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia as outcomes of the pooling and separating equilibria in the TSI game. 89

5.1 Timing of lustration and declassification in East Central Europe from 1990 to 2005. 100

5.2 Saliency of lustration in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, 1995 and 2004. 109

5.3 Demand for lustration according to TJS in December 2004. 111

5.4 Histogram of pro-lustration voting by country. 112

5.5 Changes in effects of transitional justice demand on pro-lustration voting, by fairness sensitivity. 123

6.1 Difference between FiDeSz and SzDSz in policy positions on twelve political issues (in percentages). 132

6.2 Trust and mistrust toward members of the opposition considered as candidates for Solidarity representatives at the roundtable talks. 145

6.3 Anti-lustration statements in party manifestos over time. 147

6.4 Survival of parties in East Central European legislatures by attitudes to lustration. 149
Figures

6.5 Downsian model of voter and political parties’ ideal points on the “joining EU” dimension. 156
6.6 PPMD scores on lustration policy and joining the EU sorted by attitudes toward EU joining. 158
7.1 The transitional justice issue space. 168
7.2 Game tree to the agenda-setting game with switching proposal power. 168
7.3 Transitional justice issue space in model with uncertainty. 170
7.4 The Transitional Justice Bill game. 173
7.5 Hypotheses about post-electoral behavior. 175
7.6 Hungary: composition of the legislature before and after the 1998 elections (in percentages of seatshare). 183
7.7 Hungary: anticipated median in legislative elections according to opinion polls taken from 1995 through 1997. 186
7.8 Poland: anticipated median in legislative elections according to 1997 opinion polls. 188
7.9 Poland: composition of the legislature before and after the 1997 elections. 190
7.10 The Polish post-communists’ mistake. 192
7.11 Slovakia’s transitional justice issue space with relevant actors’ ideal points. 194
7.12 Positions of legislative parties in Slovakia and distribution of seats (%) in two Slovak parliaments: ordering from anti- to pro-lustration. 198
8.1 Skeletons scenarios in regime transitions, and civil wars. 217
8.2 Skeletons in the closet in civil wars. 221
# Tables

1.1 Lustration and declassification in post-communist Europe: the first fifteen years after the transition.  

1.2 Predictions regarding lustration timing in transitional justice literature for post-communist Europe.  

1.3 Victims in major anticommunist protests in East Central Europe.  

3.1 Information and possible infiltration across types of political players.  

4.1 Operationalizing “how infiltrated is the opposition with secret collaborators?” (parameter $i$) in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  

4.2 Operationalizing “how attractive is refusing negotiations with the autocrats for the opposition?” (parameter $t_o$) in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  

4.3 Operationalizing “how attractive was holding out without initiating negotiations for the autocrats?” (parameter $N_A$) in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  

4.4 Perceptions of amnesty promises at roundtable negotiations in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  

4.5 The location of outcomes that took place in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia relative to the equilibria outcomes in the TSI game.  

5.1 Support for lustration among general public in Poland, 1994 through 1999.  

5.2 Summary statistics of the main variables.  

5.3 OLS regression of pro-lustration voting on variables of interest with interactions.
Tables

6.1 OLS regression of individual legislators’ attitudes toward lustration. ........................................ 152
7.1 Equilibrium outcomes of the subgames played between the proposer and median defined for four different medians and four types of reversion bills. ........................................ 175
7.2 Equilibrium outcomes in the Transitional Justice Bill game defined for three types of post-communist beliefs. ........................................ 177
7.3 Fitting the passage of lustration laws in East Central Europe to the model’s predictions for different combinations of beliefs, electoral outcomes, and rules of procedure. ........................................ 180
8.1 Interpretation of the Simple Transition Game for civil war settlements and pacted transitions. ........................................ 225
Acknowledgments

Many kind people and excellent scholars helped me write this book. Among the first were my advisers Jon Elster and John Huber. In my second year of graduate school, Jon Elster commented on a term paper I decided to share with him. We spent the entire meeting discussing a single sentence, mentioned in passing on the first page of that paper: Promises made at roundtable negotiations granting amnesty to outgoing autocrats are not credible. He tried to convince me at that time that addressing this dilemma would be a fascinating topic for a dissertation on transitional justice in post-communist Europe. Without his insistent urging, I would never have written the first part of this book. John Huber, aside from all his qualities as an outstanding comparativist, is one of the most patient people with whom I have been lucky enough to work. He read – literally – ten consecutive early versions of Chapter 7 of this book. John’s advice to write a book manuscript, as opposed to a series of articles on transitional justice, was also critical for the final decision to embark on writing a manuscript in a language that is not my native tongue. Columbia University offered, for me, the ideal environment in which to earn a Ph.D. in political science. I was lucky to learn formal methods from the top scholars of the field: Chuck Cameron, David Epstein, Macartan Humphreys, and Michael Ting. I was also fortunate to work with an amazing group of political theorists including Brian Barry, Jon Elster, and David Johnston. Erik Gartzke was critical to my discovery of the literature on credible commitments in international relations. At Columbia, I was always surrounded by a fabulous group of friends. Pablo Kalmanovitz, Ozge Kemahlıoğlu, Georgia Kernell, Mary McCarthy, Bumba Mukherjee, and Rebecca Weitz Shapiro were eager to offer comments and, at times, tough criticism on chapter drafts, helping me to develop rough ideas into a dissertation. I was extremely fortunate to have
such talented young scholars as peers. While still in graduate school at Columbia, I received both intellectual and financial support from the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) at the University of California in Irvine (UCI), directed at the time by Russ Dalton. The visiting researchship there helped me prepare for fieldwork in East Central Europe. I am also grateful to the CSD for providing me with numerous opportunities to present my work and for grants offered to develop other transitional justice ideas with Marek Kaminski. I also thank Bernie Groffman and Tony McGann, both faculty of the CSD. Among the students, special thanks go to Bruce Hemmer and Michael Jensen who welcomed me to the graduate student community at UCI. They not only extended their close friendship, but also took me hiking in California’s state parks to remind me of the world outside of Dietrich’s coffee shop.

Thanks to the National Science Foundation (SES-03–18363), the Institute for Humane Studies, the United States Institute of Peace, the Center for Conflict Resolution, and Harriman Institute at Columbia University, I was able to split nine months of fieldwork in 2003–4 among Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Many people in these three countries were incredibly helpful in setting up elite interviews and enabling my access to archives. In particular, I thank Andras Bozóki, Jan Holzer, Jan Kudrna, Grzegorz Lissowski, Wiktor Osiatyński, Filip Raciborski, and Artur Zawisza, as well as the Institute of Sociology at Warsaw University, the Helsinki Foundation in Warsaw, and the Open Society Institute in Budapest for providing me with an institutional home while I was away from Columbia.

Upon returning to the United States, I am grateful to the Columbia political science faculty for feedback on the results of my fieldwork, especially to David Epstein, Bob Ericson, Nisha Fazal, Macartan Humphreys, Jeff Lax, Sharon O’Halloran, Bob Shapiro, Jack Snyder, Michael Ting, and Greg Wawro. I also thank the political science departments of Florida State University, Rice University, and the University of Georgia; the politics departments of New York University and the University of Virginia; and the Harvard Academy at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Area Studies for feedback on my dissertation research. Special thanks go to Dale Copeland and Carol Merschon at the University of Virginia, Jaroslav Gryz at the University of Georgia, Sandy Gordon and Steve Brams at New York University, Mark Souva and Jeff Staton at Florida State University, and Cliff Morgan and Rick Wilson at Rice University.
Acknowledgments

I also thank the rest of my dissertation committee – in particular, Andrzej Rapaczynski of Columbia University’s Law School – who helped me realize that the way I had approached the credible commitment problem in the dissertation required significant rethinking.

Beyond graduate school, I thank Gerard Alexander, Barbara Geddes, Bob Powell, Piotr Swistak, and Georg Vanberg, who attended the Current Research Workshop sponsored by the Institute for Humane Studies in March 2006. I thank Nigel Ashford and Amanda Brand for organizing the workshop. The central model of the book was fleshed out there. I am grateful to Randy Stevenson, my senior colleague from Rice, for encouraging me to develop my idea of strategic transitional justice into a book and convincing me that I could write it quickly. I will always remain grateful to Ashley Leeds, also from Rice, for her ongoing support and for being such an inspiring role model for me to draw on as a budding assistant professor.

I was lucky to encounter the best mentors in the discipline. Anna Grzymala-Busse from the University of Michigan talked to me about framing the puzzle of delayed transitional justice into a book project in the summer of 2006. She commented on three prospectus drafts of the book and, eventually, on the entire manuscript. Another extremely important mentor was Jim Alt, who helped me develop the book prospectus in its final version in the fall of 2006 in Cambridge. Jim also read two very rough drafts of the manuscript.

Next, in chronological order, thanks go to Harvard Academy senior scholars Jorge Dominguez, Grzegorz Ekiert, and Jim Robinson, who met with me throughout the writing process to discuss specific chapters. I thank the Academy for offering me a fellowship along with the opportunity to be surrounded by such stimulating colleagues as Mary Alice Haddad, Saum Jha, Devra Moehler, Conor O’Dwyer, Kristen Roth-Ey, and Jocelyn Viterna. I am also grateful to the Senior Academy Scholars Bob Bates, Timothy Colton, and Susan Pharr for providing me with feedback on my prospectus following its presentation to the Harvard Academy. I thank the organizers of seminars in Cambridge and California, where I presented two early chapters of the book in the fall and winter of 2006–7: the Identity and Politics Workshop at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the Comparative Politics Workshop at Harvard, the Post-communist Politics and Economics Workshop at Harvard’s Davis Center, and the Political Science Departmental Colloquium at UCI. In particular, I thank for feedback at these seminars Nathan Cisneros, Kristin
Acknowledgments

Fabbe, and Roger Petersen from the MIT Political Science Department; Meg Ryan and Elina Treger from Harvard’s Government Department; and Gerald Easter from Boston College. I also wish to thank Marek Kaminski of UCI and Yoi Herrera of the University of Wisconsin in Madison for written comments on work I presented at their workshops.

My deepest thanks for their hard work go to Kathleen Hoover and Lawrence Winnie for organizing a book seminar following the completion of the first draft of the manuscript in May 2007. I am deeply grateful to the attendees of that day-long workshop: James Alt, Scott Desposato, Jorge Dominguez, Grzegorz Ekiert, Barbara Geddes, Anna Grzymała-Busse, Joshua Tucker, and Jason Wittenberg.

When, after revising the manuscript in the fall of 2007, I returned to Rice, my colleagues extended to me the warmest welcome but also organized another book workshop to offer more, but still much needed, comments. Royce Carroll, Lanny Martin, Cliff Morgan, Randy Stevenson, and Rick Wilson read the manuscript in its entirety and offered valuable comments and ideas for further revisions. Rice University also funded the research assistance of some of its best graduate students: Iliya Atanasov, Stephanie Burchard, and Carla Martinez.

I thank my new colleagues at the University of Notre Dame: Darren Davis, Michael Desch, Debra Javeline, Mary Keys, Scott Mainwaring, Sebastian Rosato, Christina Wollbrecht, and Michael Zuckert. I particularly thank Michael Coppedge for answering endless questions about manuscript preparation. I also thank the Russian and Eastern European Studies reading group at Notre Dame, in particular David Gasparetti, Alyssa Gillespie, and Mikołaj Kunicki for comments on Chapter 7. An article version of that chapter was presented at the American Political Science Association meeting in September 2008, where I received very valuable feedback from Jae-Jae Spoon. Alexandre Debs read and corrected my mathematical proofs to Chapter 3 after the Peace Science Society Meeting in October 2008. I also thank Milan Svolik and Scott Gehlbach for their comments on the model in Chapter 3.

I thank the two anonymous referees for their valuable feedback and for pointing out to me areas of the literature that I had overlooked and for helping me see the book from different angles. I also thank Rick Wilson, the chair of Rice’s Political Science Department, for providing me with office space at Rice over the summer of 2008 so that in the midst of my transition to Notre Dame I could implement revisions and comments from Cambridge’s two anonymous referees.
Acknowledgments

I am extremely grateful to Lew Bateman and Margaret Levi from Cambridge University Press for helping me write a book suitable for this prestigious series. They offered their own comments on more than one version of the manuscript and sought out exceptionally competent reviewers to whom I feel indebted for feedback.

I also thank Andy Saff for meticulous copyediting and Matthew Mendham for his outstanding research assistance with final edits and the index. Matthew’s work as well as the book cover design was supported by a grant from the Institute for the Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, College of Arts and Letters, University of Notre Dame Interim Miscellaneous Research and Material Grant.

Although political scientists were critical in developing this project, it would not have been nearly as enjoyable without the help and presence of Suyash Agrawal. An immigrant like myself, he has the deepest understanding of challenges facing someone striving to adapt to the American way of life while scaling the ivory tower of U.S. academia. He has been the most intellectually inspiring and passionate person an academic could fall in love with. I admire him for challenging my most established convictions, initiating debates in the middle of the most casual activities. Suyash read and edited the manuscript in its entirety. I feel indebted to him for discussing the manuscript with me at every stage of the writing process.

At bottom, this work is the product of countless supporters who encouraged and challenged me and contributed to it from its inception. But I, alone, remain responsible for any shortcomings or deficiencies.
**East Central European Political Organizations**

**Poland**

Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (AWS): Electoral Action Solidarity
Grupa Krakowska: Kraków Group
Komitet Obrony Robotników (KOR): Laborers’ Defense Committee
Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (KPN): Confederacy for Independent Poland
Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny (KLD): Liberal Democratic Congress
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR): League of Polish Families
Niezależny Związek Studentów (NZS): Independent Student Union
Niezależny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”: Independent Trade Union “Solidarity”
Obywatelski Komitet (Koło) Poselski(e) (OKP): Civic Parliamentary Committee
Platforma Obywatelska (PO): Civic Platform
Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (PZPR): Polish United Workers’ Party
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL): Polish Peoples’ Party
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS): Law and Justice
Ruch Obrony Rzeczpospolitej (RdR): Movement for the Republic
Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP): Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland
Ruch Wolności i Pokój (RWP): Movement for Freedom and Peace
Samoobrona (S): Self-Defense
Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polski (SdRP): Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD): Democratic Left Alliance
East Central European Political Organizations

Solidarność ’80 (S’80): Solidarity ’80
Solidarność Walcząca (SW): Fighting Solidarity
Studencki Komitet Solidarności (SKS): Student Committee of Solidarity
Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna (TKK): Temporary Coordinating Committee
Unia Demokratyczna (UD): Democratic Union
Unia Pracy (UP): Labor Union
Unia Wolności (UW): Freedom Union
Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego (WRON): Military Council of National Salvation

Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia
Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická (ČSSD): Czech Social Democratic Party
Charta 77: Charter 77
Demokratické Levice (DL): Democratic Left (Czech)
Demokratická Strana (DS): Democratic Party (Slovak)
Demokratická Unia (DÚDÚ): Democratic Union (Slovak)
Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko (HZDS): Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
Hnutie za samosprávnu demokraciu – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko (HISDSMS): Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Party for Moravia and Silesia
Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM): Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Komunistická Strana Československa (KSČ): Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Krestanská a demokratická Unie-Česka Strana Lidová (KDÚ-ČSL): Christian Democratic Union–Czech People’s Party
Krešťanskodemokratické Hnutie (KDH): Christian Democratic Movement (Slovak)
Levý Blok (LB): Left Bloc (Czech)
Liberálně sociální unie (LSU): Liberal Social Union (Czech)
Občanská Demokratická Strana (ODS): Civic Democratic Party (Czech)
Občanské Forum (OF): Civic Forum (Czech)
Sdružení pro Republiku – Republikánska strana Československa (REP): Union for Republic – Republicans’ Party of Czechoslovakia
Slovenská Demokratická Koalice (SDK): Slovak Democratic Coalition
East Central European Political Organizations

Slovenská Národná Strana (SNS): Slovak National Party
Strana Demokratickej L’avice (SDL): Party of the Democratic Left (Slovak)
Strana Občanského Porozumění (SOP): Party of Civic Understanding (Slovak)
Strana Zelených na Slovensku (SZS): Green Party of Slovakia
Unie Svobody (US): Freedom Union (Czech)
Združenie Robotníkov Slovenska (ZRS): Association of Slovak Workers

Hungary

Bajcsy Zsilinszky Endre Baráti Társaság (BZSBT): Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friends’ Association
Ellenzéki Kereszttal (EKA): Opposition Roundtable
Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (FiDeSz): Alliance of Young Democrats
Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Párt (Fidesz-MPP): Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party
Független Jógasz Fórum (FJF): Independent Lawyers’ Forum
Független Kisgazdapárt (FKgP): Party of Independent Smallholders
Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP): Christian Democratic People’s Party
Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF): Hungarian Democratic Forum
Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP): Hungarian Justice and Life Party
Magyar Szocialista Munkás Párt (MSzMP): Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSzP): Hungarian Socialist Party
Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SzDSz): Alliance of Free Democrats