Recent work in artificial intelligence has increasingly turned to argumentation as a rich interdisciplinary area of research that can provide new methods related to evidence and reasoning in the area of law. In this book, Douglas Walton provides an introduction to basic concepts, tools, and methods in argumentation theory and artificial intelligence as applied to the analysis and evaluation of witness testimony. He shows how witness testimony is by its nature inherently fallible and sometimes subject to disastrous failures. At the same time, if used properly, such testimony can provide evidence that it is not only necessary but inherently reasonable for logically guided legal experts to accept or reject a claim. Walton shows how to overcome the traditional disdain for witness testimony as a type of evidence shown by logical positivists and the views of trial skeptics who doubt that trial rules deal with witness testimony in a way that yields a rational decision-making process. This book will be of interest to those who work in the areas of analytical philosophy, informal logic, artificial intelligence, and law.

Douglas Walton is professor of philosophy at the University of Winnipeg. An internationally recognized scholar of argumentation theory and logic, he is the author of many books, most recently *Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law* and *Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation*. Dr. Walton’s research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Isaak Walton Killam Memorial Foundation.
Witness Testimony Evidence

Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence, and Law

DOUGLAS WALTON

University of Winnipeg
For Karen, with love.
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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for support of this work through a series of research grants. The first grant, for the project “The Dialogue Structure of Legal Argumentation”, was held over the period of 1998 to 2001. The writing began with an early draft composed in 1998, expanded during the spring term of 2001 while I was visiting professor in the Communication Department at the University of Arizona. Having access to the law library at the University of Arizona during that period, I was able to collect new material and make a second draft. For conversations that were helpful during that period I would like to thank Hans Hansen, Scott Jacobs, Sally Jackson, and Chris Reed. Michael Dues helped to provide resources and a congenial setting for my work during my time in Tucson. Discussions with these colleagues, and with John Pollock, proved to be helpful to the book.

Parts of the development of the book were supported by a second research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the project “Argumentation Schemes in Natural and Artificial Communication”, held during 2002 and 2003. I would like to thank Chris Reed and Floriana Grasso for organizing the workshop ‘Computational Models of Rational Argument’ at the ECAI (European Conference on Artificial Intelligence) held on July 22, 2002, in Lyon, France. Discussions with some of the participants during and after the workshop were especially valuable in helping me to learn about the latest developments in AI. In addition to Chris and Floriana, I would like to thank Subrata Das, Tangming Yuan, David Moore, Alec Grierson, Henry Prakken, Francisca Snoek Henkemans, Helmut Horacek, Antonis Kakas, Pavlos Moraitis, Fiorella de Rosis, and Giuseppe Carenini. A third research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to work on the project “Dialogue Systems for Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence and Law” began in 2005, and supported my work during the stages of making
revisions as I prepared a series of versions of the book manuscript for publication.

Input from colleagues who are specialists in law has been extremely helpful during all phases of the book, and indeed the book would not have been possible without them. At various times, discussions with Henry Prakken, Bart Verheij, and Arno Lodder have proved to be valuable, and it is obvious that the book has benefited from their written works as well. I would like to thank Craig Callen for organizing and chairing the conference “Visions of Rationality in Evidence Law”, held at the DCL College of Law, Michigan State University, April 3–6, 2003. Craig was very helpful in giving me advice on looking for material on relevance in evidence law, and it turned out that the conference helped me a great deal to get a better knowledge of current issues and principles of rational argument in evidence law. The book has also benefited a good deal from discussions with other participants in the conference, both during the conference and afterward by e-mail. I would like to thank Richard Friedman, Erica Beecher-Monas, Mike Redmayne, Greg Mitchell, Michael Risinger, Michael Saks, Roger Park, Ron Allen, Myrna Raeder, Eleanor Swift, and Bruce Burns.

I would like to thank the program committee of the Seventeenth Annual Conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems (JURIX 2004) held in Berlin, December 8–10, 2004, for inviting me as keynote speaker. For helpful discussions during and after my talk on argumentation schemes at the meeting I would particularly like to thank Trevor Bench-Capon, Floris Bex, Wolfgang Bibel, Alison Chorley, Tom Gordon, Ronald Leenes, Henry Prakken, Bram Roth, Burkhard Schafer, Bart Verheij, and Radboud Winkels. During the summer of 2005, I collaborated in presenting a paper and two workshops at the ICAIL 05 Conference in Bologna, Italy, and the discussions at these sessions with Trevor Bench-Capon, Arno Lodder, John Zeleznikow, Floris Bex, and Paul Dunne turned out to be helpful in refining some points as I rewrote this book manuscript. For comments and discussions at the conference on Graphic and Visual Representations of Evidence and Inference in Legal Settings in New York City on January 28–29, 2007, I would like to thank Philip Dawid, Tom Gordon, Henry Prakken, Tom Gordon, John Josephson, Ron Loui, John Pollock, David Schum, Peter Tillers, Vern Walker, and Bart Verheij.

I would like to thank Burkhard Schafer for providing material on corroboration of testimony in Scots law and for helpful discussions of this and other topics related to evidence. Throughout the whole project, continuing collaborative research efforts with Tom Gordon, Henry Prakken, and Chris Reed improved my understanding of many aspects of computer modeling of legal argumentation. I would like to offer special thanks to Professor Roger C. Park, who gave me advice on examination of trial witnesses in American law that helped me to considerably refine my treatment of these matters in the book.
None of the material in the book has previously been published, except for two sections of Chapter 5. Sections 9.1 and 9.2 of that chapter use some material from my article, “The Interrogation as a Type of Dialogue”, Journal of Pragmatics, 35, 2003, 1771–1802. I would like to thank the editor of the Journal of Pragmatics, Professor Jacob Mey, for permission to reprint these passages.