PART I

DO POWER-SHARING REGIMES WORK?

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What Drives Democracy?

Why do some regime transitions generate effective and successful democratic states which persist over many decades while other autocracies persist unreformed? This process can be illustrated during the last decade by developments in two neighboring states in West Africa, Benin and Togo, which took divergent pathways on the road traveled to democracy. Both Benin and Togo inherited the legacy of French colonial rule. Both are poor. Both are multiethnic societies. Both states gained national independence in 1960, and after a few short years as fragile parliamentary democracies, both became military dictatorships. Yet in the early-1990s, under a new constitution, one made the transition to a relatively successful democratic regime, experiencing a succession of elections during the last decade which observers have rated as free and fair, and a peaceful and orderly transition of power from governing to opposition parties. The other remains today an unreconstructed and corrupt military-backed autocracy.[1]

What caused the contrast? In particular, did the power-sharing constitution adopted in Benin during the early-1990s facilitate the development of a sustainable democracy? Proponents of power-sharing arrangements make strong claims that regimes which include elite leaders drawn from rival communities encourage moderate and cooperative behavior in divided societies.[2] Power-sharing regimes are widely believed to be valuable for democracy in all states, but to be vital for containing and managing intercommunal tensions in multiethnic societies emerging from civil conflict, thereby helping to sustain fragile democracies. Similar assumptions have influenced the outcome of many recent peace settlements and treaties in deeply divided societies, for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Kosovo in 2001, and Northern Ireland in 1998.[3] Theories about the virtues of power-sharing regimes for multiethnic societies have been developed in the work of Arendt Lijphart, Eric Nordlinger, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Klaus Armingeon, and others, conceptualized alternatively as 'consociational democracy', 'consensus

democracy', 'proportional democracy', or 'negotiation democracy'.[4] Today the more common concept is a focus upon 'power-sharing regimes', a term which is used here since it has been widely adapted in international relations and political science. Despite important differences embedded in these notions and arguments, the primary idea is that in multiethnic societies divided into different linguistic, religious, or national communities, power-sharing institutions and procedures turn political opponents into cooperative partners, by providing communal leaders with a guaranteed stake in the democratic process. By contrast, power-concentrating regimes offer rival communities a zero-sum game, where losers have fewer incentives to work within the conventional political rules.

These claims have always proved controversial, however, generating heated debates about the core concept and its consequences and the classification of cases. A chorus of skeptics have expressed serious doubts about the assumed virtues of power-sharing regimes and emphasized the breakdown and failure of these arrangements, drawing upon historical examples concerning the outbreak of armed conflict in Cyprus in 1963, Lebanon in 1975, Northern Ireland in 1974, and Czechoslovakia in 1993.[5] Controversy has rumbled on in the research literature for almost 40 years. Contemporary debates focus upon the difficult cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq, and despite a wealth of case studies cited by both proponents and critics, many questions remain. Most importantly, do power-sharing regimes generally serve to dampen armed conflicts in deeply divided multiethnic societies and thereby produce a durable peace settlement, political stability, and the conditions under which sustainable democracy flourishes? Or may they instead, as critics charge, freeze group boundaries, heighten latent ethnic identities, hinder rebuilding the state in the early stages of recovery from violent internal conflict, and thereby fail to facilitate sustainable multiethnic democracies?[6] This unresolved debate raises critical issues both for academic researchers seeking to understand the underlying drivers of democratization and the causes of civil conflict and for policymakers concerned with negotiating effective peace treaties, supporting practical institutional reforms and constitutional settlements, and promoting sustainable democratic regimes.

Drawing upon this long-standing controversy, the aims of this book are twofold. The first is to update and refine theories of power-sharing regimes to take account of the flood of contemporary developments in state-building and institutional reforms which have occurred worldwide. The theory of consociationalism originally developed in the late-1960s to emphasize the importance of certain institutional arrangements which helped to maintain democratic stability in divided societies, including the existence of coalition governments, minority veto rights, proportional representation in public offices, and self-governing autonomy for territorial communities. Processes of regime change worldwide since the early-1970s and many recent negotiated constitutional settlements provide a wealth of natural experiments, operating under widely varying conditions. In a revision of the classic framework provided by the

original theory of consociationalism to take account of contemporary developments, types of power-sharing or power-concentrating regimes are defined and conceptualized in this study in terms of four formal institutional features:

- The basic type of *electoral system* (shaping patterns of party competition and coalition governments);
- The horizontal concentration of powers in the type of *executive*;
- The vertical centralization of power in *unitary or federal states*; and
- The structure and independence of the *mass media*.

Constitutions commonly lay down many other normative principles and institutional characteristics of regimes, by establishing the basic structure and rules governing the state, but these four aspects represent some of the most fundamental building blocks. Other formal institutions in civil society also play a vital role in sustaining democratic governance by linking citizens and the state, notably competition and bargaining among multiple interest groups, parties, voluntary organizations, and community associations, but these organizations exist outside the state and, other than the guarantee of freedom of association, regulations of parties, and the establishment of basic civil liberties, beyond the core principles established in most formal constitutions.

Building on this conceptual foundation, the book tests the impact of power-sharing institutions on patterns of democratization in all societies worldwide, as well as in multiethnic societies, using a wider range of evidence and indicators than previous studies, covering more countries and a longer time period. The book adopts a mixed research design blending quantitative breadth with qualitative depth.[7] A large-N pooled dataset establishes the big picture. The study systematically analyzes patterns of regime change for three decades since the early 1970s in 191 contemporary nation-states worldwide (excluding independent territories). Time-series cross-sectional data is invaluable for testing how far theoretical generalizations about the impact of power-sharing institutions hold across diverse conditions and types of society. It facilitates formal models with multiple controls which can be tested using standard econometric techniques suitable for cross-national time-series data. The broad-brush perspective facilitates comprehensive comparisons across nation-states and over time. Nevertheless, alternative interpretations of panel data are possible since the test results remain particularly sensitive to specification issues, such as the use of lagged variables. This global picture is therefore combined with autopsies of 10 particularly dramatic cases of success and failure in democratic consolidation, to poke about among the underlying blood and guts. The technique of focusing upon comparable societies which took divergent political pathways – with cases such as Benin and Togo, South Korea and Singapore, Uzbekistan and Ukraine, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, as well as India and Bangladesh – facilitates more fine-grained examination of the causal mechanisms and political processes underlying the statistical patterns. Cases drawn from different regions, eras, cultures, and contexts, including both relatively homogeneous and multiethnic societies, help us to understand historical

developments and processes of institutional changes within particular states, thereby adding a richer texture to the theory. Anomalies to general patterns also suggest possible revisions and extensions to the formal model. Before setting out the core argument and evidence in more detail, a brief comparison of the divergent West African cases serves to illustrate the classic issues at the heart of this study.

SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN BENIN VERSUS ELECTORAL AUTOCRACY IN TOGO

In 1960, after gaining independence, the French-administered section of Togoland became the nation of Togo. Although starting as a parliamentary democracy, Togo soon fell victim to a military coup. In 1963, when the army came out of its barracks, Togo saw the assassination of its first president, Sylvanus Olympio, a period of short-lived interim governments, and in 1967 the seizure of power in a military coup by Gnassingbe Eyadema, head of the armed forces. For subsequent decades, with the support of the security forces, Eyadema maintained his grip on power, banning all opposition parties and dissident movements. In the early-1990s, however, in line with the global wave of democratization, the international community put pressures on Togo to improve its human rights record, leading to the legalization of political parties in 1991. The following year, a new constitution established a presidential republic. In the presidential elections which followed, Eyadema won under the banner of the Rally of the Togolese People party (RPT), but only after the security forces suppressed the opposition and cheated in the polls. Democratic activists who mobilized with general strikes were met by armed troops, killing many protestors. Periodic clashes occurred between dissidents and the military, with an outbreak in 1994 causing an estimated 300,000 Togolese to flee to neighboring countries. The leadership of the opposition was hounded into exile abroad. In the 1998 presidential contest, when the possibility of a landslide victory for the opposition became apparent, the security forces halted the count and members of the Electoral Commission were forced to resign. Eyedema's main rival was banned from standing in the 2003 contest. The security forces maintained control through human rights violations, terror, and repression; Amnesty International reported many cases of political 'disappearances', arbitrary arrest, torture, and deaths in detention.[8] The National Assembly remains overwhelmingly dominated by the ruling party, providing no effective check on the executive: in 2002, the ruling Rally of the Togolese People party won 72 of the 81 seats.

In early-2005, after 38 years in power, when President Eyadema died in office, he was the longest serving ruler on the continent. His passing presented Togo with a short-lived opportunity for regime change but it was lost overnight. Bypassing the constitutional succession, the military immediately appointed his son, Faure Gnassingbe, as president. After an international outcry, a presidential election was held in April 2005, but the poll, which confirmed Faure Gnassingbe's grip on power with 60% of the vote, was widely regarded as

TABLE 1.1. *Key Indicators in Benin and Togo*

	Benin	Togo
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS		
Area	116,622 sq km	56,785 sq km
Pop., 2007	8.1m	5.7m
Pop. below poverty line (%)	33%	32%
GDP per capita (PPP US$), 2006	$1,100	$1,700
Life expectancy at birth, 2003	53 years	58 years
Human Development Index, 2003	0.431	0.512
Adult literacy (% of pop. 15+), 2001	34%	61%
Ethnic fractionalization (Alesina), 2002	.787	.709
POLITICAL INDICATORS		
Year of independence (from)	1960 (France)	1960 (France)
Liberal democracy, Freedom House Index, 1973	6.5	6.5
Freedom House classification, 1973	Not free	Not free
Liberal democracy Freedom House Index, 2007	2	5.5
Freedom House classification, 2007	Free	Not free
Control of corruption (Kaufmann), 2005	16	30
Government effectiveness (Kaufmann), 2005	31	6
Political stability (Kaufmann), 2005	57	12
Rule of law (Kaufmann), 2005	36	14
Voice and accountability (Kaufmann), 2005	55	13
Regulatory quality (Kaufmann), 2005	30	21

Note: See the Technical Appendix for details of these indices and sources of data. Freedom House Index 7-point scale (where 1 = high, 7 = low). The Kaufmann indices rank each country on 0–100 point scales where higher = better governance ratings.

Source: Daniel Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2006. *Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996–2005*. Washington, DC: World Bank. www.worldbank.org

rigged in favor of the ruling party. West African observers reported irregularities in voter registration, limited information available during the campaign with a censored media, and prohibition of independent electoral monitors.[9] To maintain control, the president subsequently appointed his brother as the defense minister. Protests were met by tear gas and live ammunition from the security forces; about 500 deaths were recorded following the contest, according to UN estimates; and around 40,000 Togolese fled to neighboring Benin and Ghana. Several radio and TV stations critical of the military-backed succession were closed and Web sites were blocked. Togo is categorized among the 45 states worldwide rated as 'not free' by the 2006 Freedom House index, with ratings of political rights and civil liberties which are similar to those of Qatar, Tajikistan, and Rwanda (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). It also performs weakly among African nation-states by the 2002 Kaufmann/World Bank indicators of voice and accountability (ranking 39th out of 49 in African states) and government effectiveness (ranking 40th), while being in the middle ranks of African nation-states for levels of corruption, regulatory quality, and rule of



FIGURE 1.1. West Africa by Type of Regime, Freedom House, 2004. *Source:* Freedom House. 2004. *Freedom in the World*. www.freedomhouse.org

law. It is characterized by official corruption, a weak judiciary and lack of rule of law, and abusive powers exercised by the security services.

Togo is not among the most repressive one-party regimes and military dictatorships around the world, and it has avoided the most extreme abuses found in Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, and Sudan – but neither has it registered sustained progress in human rights. It falls into the category of an 'electoral autocracy'. This important type of regime, which is neither fully autocratic not fully democratic, exists in an ambiguous gray zone which has been conceptualized by different authors alternatively as either 'electoral autocracies' (Diamond, Schedler), 'illiberal democracies' (Fareed), or 'competitive authoritarian regimes' (Levitsky).[10] Other common terms include 'hybrid' regimes,

'competitive authoritarianism', 'transitional democracies' (implicitly assuming that these regimes will eventually adopt broader institutional and political reforms in a progressive trend), or else as 'semi-free' states (Freedom House). These types of regime adopt some of the formal trappings of liberal democracy, notably holding flawed elections for legislative bodies which often function as powerless rubber-stamps, or rigged plebiscites to legitimate elite rule, but where in practice genuinely free and fair multiparty competition is restricted and basic human rights are widely abused.

After gaining independence from France, the neighboring state of Dahomey (which was renamed 'Benin' in 1975) started down a similar political road. In 1963, President Hubert Maga was deposed in an army coup led by Colonel Christophe Soglo. The country subsequently experienced a succession of half a dozen short-lived military and civilian regimes with a period of political instability which lasted until 1972, when Mathieu Kérékou seized power. The Parti de la Revolution Populaire du Benin (PRPB) established a one-party state in 1975, under an official Marxist-Leninist ideology, and appointed Kérékou president in 1980. The Kérékou government had a poor record on human rights although they started to liberalize the economy from state control, and in 1989 Marxism was abandoned as the official ideology. Under pressures from the international community and the opposition movement, in 1990 the government agreed to a new constitution and multiparty elections, with these changes approved in a popular referendum. Under the new arrangements, the president was to be directly elected for a five-year term, renewable only once, using a second ballot majoritarian system. The unicameral national legislature (Assemblée Nationale) was to be directly elected by party list proportional representation, using the largest remainder-Hare formula in multimember districts. An independent Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and High Court of Justice were established. Local areas were governed by 12 départements and 77 communes (with municipal elections introduced in 2002). The national conference established a transitional government headed by the prime minister, Mr. Nicéphore Soglo, an ex–World Bank official. After passage of the new constitution, 70 political parties officially registered, rising to more than 100 by 1998. The result of February 1991 legislative elections was that the opposition party, the Union for the Triumph of Democratic Renewal (UTRD), gained a plurality of seats. After the presidential elections of March 1991, organized in a multiparty system, the main opposition UTRD candidate, Nicéphore Soglo, was elected president of the republic with over 67% of the vote.[11] In 1996, presidential elections returned the former president, Mathieu Kérékou, to the presidency of the republic, and in 2002 he was reelected, against a field of 17 candidates, for his final term in office. By the time of the March 2006 presidential elections, however, President Kérékou had to retire as he was over 70, and thus disqualified from restanding by the constitutional age-limit. Mr. Soglo was also too old, leaving the field open to younger contenders. In total, more than two-dozen candidates stood in the first round before the field was narrowed to Thomas Yayi Boni (an Independent, former banker, and newcomer to politics),

who won with an overwhelming three-quarters of the vote in the second round, with Adrien Houngbedji (vereran leader of the Democratic Renewal Party) in second place. The presidential election represents another critical milestone in Benin's history. In April 2007, President Yayi Boni's coalition won control of parliament. Following this contest, the legislature contains a dozen parties, with 64 members of parliament acting as a seven-party coalition supporting the Presidential Movement while 19 members from five parties are on the opposition benches. The largest parliamentary party, the Cauri Forces for an Emerging Benin, gained 35 out of 83 seats (42%).

For more than a decade now Benin has experienced a series of legislative and presidential elections which domestic and international observers have reported as free, peaceful, and fair, including the transition bringing the opposition party into power. Today Benin is widely regarded as a successful African democracy with constitutional checks and balances, multiple parties, a high degree of judicial independence and respect for human rights, and a lively partisan press which is often critical of the government. The country is categorized as 'free' by the 2006 Freedom House index, comparable to Argentina, Mexico, and Romania in its record of civil liberties and political rights (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2). It also performs strongly against other African nation-states according to the Kaufmann/World Bank indicators of voice and accountability (ranking 10th out of 49 states in Africa), political stability (ranking 5th), and rule of law (ranking 14th). Benin still faces endemic poverty and many problems of governance common in African states, including corruption in the public sector, but several high-profile cases of malfeasance have been pursued by the courts. Benin has contributed toward peacekeeping in Cote d'Ivoire and helped to mediate political crisis in neighboring Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo. In short, from the 1991 transition onward, Benin has been widely regarded as a model country in sub-Saharan Africa for having successfully achieved a durable democratic transition without bloodshed and military coups. Will democracy eventually break down in Benin? The danger continues, as in any poor developing society, the future remains unforeseen, and the history of regime change in the continent suggests that democracy remains a fluid situation with steps forward and back. But a democratic regime has persisted in Benin since the early-1990s in the face of the odds.

EXPLAINING REGIMES IN THE CASES OF TOGO AND BENIN

So what caused the divergent political pathways taken by Togo and Benin, and what does this suggest more generally about the drivers of regime change and the conditions most favorable to building sustainable democracies and lasting peace?

Individual Leaders

Many historical accounts of the breakdown of autocracies emphasize the decisive contribution made by individual leaders in government or opposition who



FIGURE 1.2. Liberal Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970s and 2005. *Note:* The figures are the mean score of each country on the 7-point liberal democracy scale by Freedom House. *Source:* Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. www.freedomhouse.org (various years).

were committed to political liberalization and human rights, while unsuccessful democratic transitions have been blamed on the failure of ruling elites to adjust successfully to political change.[12] Without the role of particular leaders, it is often argued, countries would have followed a different track, as exemplified by the impact of Adolfo Suarez in post-Franco Spain, Constantine Karamanlis's position after rule by the military junta in Greece, Lech Walesa's leadership of Solidarity in Poland, and Nelson Mandela's statesmanship in post-apartheid South Africa, to name just a few key historical figures. From this perspective, the routes followed by Benin and Togo could possibly be explained by the contrasting actions and decisions of particular presidents: Kérékou, who obeyed the constitution by standing down as president in 1991, and Eyadema, who flouted any limitation on his power until he eventually died in office. Individual actors can obviously play an important role in historical processes of regime change, but if the Benin transition flowed simply from an idiosyncratic leadership decision, this would not explain why the ruling party elite retired to the opposition bench after the 1991 elections in Benin, while by contrast the Rally of the Togolese People party, backed by the security forces, continues to rule in Togo, even after Eyadema's demise.