Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization

Far from sweeping the globe uniformly, the “third wave of democratization” left burgeoning republics and resilient dictatorships in its wake. Applying more than a year of original fieldwork in Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Jason Brownlee shows that the mixed record of recent democratization is best deciphered through a historical and institutional approach to authoritarian rule. Exposing the internal organizations that structure elite conflict, Brownlee demonstrates why the critical soft-liners needed for democratic transitions have been dormant in Egypt and Malaysia but outspoken in Iran and the Philippines. When regimes maintain coalitions through ruling parties, democratization becomes an uphill battle against fortified incumbents. Systematic cross-regional comparison shows how the Egyptian and Malaysian regimes have become nearly impregnable through party-based coalitions. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic has seen open elite factionalism and the rise of a viable, although unsuccessful, reform movement. More hopefully, the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines demonstrates why an institutionally weak regime is vulnerable to opponents pushing for change forcefully rather than hesitantly, as Iran’s reform movement did. Party institutions long predate the third wave and promise to far outlast its passing. By establishing how ruling parties originated and why they impede change, Brownlee illuminates the problem of contemporary authoritarianism and informs the promotion of durable democracy.

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Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization

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To my parents,

Mac and Becky Brownlee
The nobles are to be considered in two different manners; that is, they are either to be ruled so as to make them entirely dependent on your fortunes, or else not. Those that are thus bound to you and are not rapacious, must be honored and loved. But when they are not bound to you of set purpose and for ambitious ends, it is a sign that they think more of themselves than of you; and from such men the prince must guard himself and look upon them as secret enemies, who will help to ruin him when in adversity...

– Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter IX

Almost everywhere, the trend after independence has been in one of two directions: toward a one-party state with consequent stability (if the resulting single party grouped the major elements) or toward a breakdown of the party system with consequent instability...

– Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC  Association of Combatant Clerics
AF   Alternative Front
ASU  Arab Socialist Union
COMELEC Commission on Elections
DAP  Democratic Action Party
DPI  Database of Political Institutions
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IIPF  Islamic Iran Participation Front
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IMP  Independence of Malaya Party
IRC  Islamic Revolutionary Council
IRP  Islamic Republican Party
KBL  Kilusang Bagong Lipunan [New Society Movement]
LABAN Lakas ñg Bayan [Power of the People] Movement
Lakas-NUCD Lakas ñg Sambayanan [Strength of People’s Power] – National Union of Christian Democrats
LP   Liberal Party
LR   Liberation Rally
MB   Muslim Brotherhood
MCA  Malaya Chinese Association
MCP  Malayan Communist Party
MIC  Malayan Indian Congress
MP   Member of Parliament
Namfrel National Citizens Movement for Free Elections
NDP  National Democratic Party
NEP  New Economic Policy
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Operations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Nacionalista Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPU</td>
<td>National Progressive Unionist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Parti Islam Se-Malaysia [Islamic Party of Malaysia]</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Philippine Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Parti Rakyat Malaysia [People’s Party of Malaysia]</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Reform the Armed Forces Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Society of Combatant Clergy</td>
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<td>UMNO</td>
<td>United Malays National Organization</td>
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<td>Unido</td>
<td>United Democratic Nationalist Organization</td>
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Acknowledgments

Many colleagues and friends in the United States and abroad supported me as I researched and wrote this book. Quite a few of them pushed me to explore much more intellectual terrain than I had planned, from elections to parties to social conflict. Although I remain fully responsible for the argument made here, as well as whatever errors linger, I gratefully acknowledge the role these persons played in making this book much more than it otherwise would have been.

My first thanks go to the members of my Ph.D. committee in Princeton University’s Department of Politics. Atul Kohli’s patient counsel played a critical role in the evolution of my ideas. At key points, he steered me back on course when my efforts would otherwise have gone astray. Nancy Bermeo supported my work with generous praise and incisive comments, boosting my enthusiasm while illuminating new challenges. Deborah Yashar helped me clarify fuzzy claims and inchoate ideas. Finally, Bob Vitalis graciously agreed to join the committee as an outside, and scrupulous, reader. He has taught me how to strengthen my work while enjoying it all the more.

Beyond recognizing this immediate circle of advisors, I thank three close colleagues who responded to rough drafts with sharp suggestions. Dan Slater welcomed me to “travel” beyond the Middle East and guided me into the region he knows so well. Moreover, he graciously commented on the entire manuscript, suggesting numerous improvements that I endeavored to make. David Waldner relentlessly pushed me to expand the theory’s scope, a charge I assumed with some reluctance but reflect on with deep gratitude. Completing this auxiliary committee is Ben Smith,
who helped me think about what makes autocracy work (and why we should study that more).

The list of individuals who have commented on or otherwise aided this project is at least twice as long as I am able to include here. I express my sincere thanks to Kamran Aghaie, Lisa Anderson, Michele Penner Angrist, Aslı Bâli, Will Barndt, Eva Bellin, Marc Berenson, Cathy Boone, Bill Case, Gladstone Cuarteros, Larry Diamond, Yoav Di-Capua, Tyler Dickovick, Kent Eaton, Charles Franklin, Barbara Geddes, John Gershman, Ellis Goldberg, Fred Greenstein, Jeff Herbst, Steve Heydemann, Amaney Jamal, Maye Kassem, Charlie Kurzman, Steve Levitsky, Evan Lieberman, John Londregan, Ellen Lust-Okar, Jim Mahoney, Eric McDaniel, Patrick McDonald, Nagla Mostafa, Pete Moore, Negin Nabavi, Marina Ottaway, Marsha Pripstein-Posusney, Elliot Ratzman, Liz Rosenberg, Nil Satana, Andreas Schedler, Oliver Schlumberger, Philippe Schmitter, Samer Shehata, Amy Shuster, Richard Snyder, Jeannie Sowers, Josh Stacher, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Andrew Tabler, Julie Taylor, Josh Tucker, Lucan Way, and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. Matt Johnson and Laura Sylvester ably assisted me during the final stage of research and revisions. Two anonymous reviewers at Cambridge University Press provided insightful comments on the manuscript. I am especially grateful to Arang Keshavarzian and Erik Kuhonta, colleagues from Princeton, whose early observations helped me discern the ways institutions shaped behavior.

Institutions are not only the core of this book’s thesis, they were the prerequisite for its production. In addition to the individuals named here, several organizations enabled the public presentation and execution of my research. My deep thanks go to the Comparative Politics Research Seminar at Princeton University, the Woodrow Wilson Scholars Program, the Society for Comparative Research, the European University Institute, the American Political Science Association, the Middle East Studies Association, and the Institute for Qualitative Research Methods, whose inaugural training camp had a formative impact on my research design. Financial support was provided by Princeton University, Princeton’s Center for the Study of Religion, the MacArthur Foundation, the American Research Center in Egypt, the American Institute of Iranian Studies, the Association of Princeton Graduate Alumni, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the Fulbright Foundation. In addition, the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University generously supported a year of research and rewriting. A stellar production team at Cambridge University Press has allowed me to consolidate the work begun under these institutions and realize the confidence
Acknowledgments

earlier colleagues placed in the project. I feel incredibly fortunate to have experienced Lew Bateman’s deft editorial direction and the craftsmanship of copy editors Ruth Homrighaus and Laura Lawrie.

While completing research abroad, I incurred countless debts to individuals and institutions, who selflessly shared their knowledge and time. Among the many who facilitated my work are Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development, Mustafa Kemal Al-Sayid and the Center for the Study of Developing Countries at Cairo University, Pedram Saeed and the Parliamentary Research Center in Tehran, and Fazil Irwan at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia. Special credit goes to Joel Rocamora and his gracious staff at the Institute for Popular Democracy in Manila, whose generosity and attention enabled a whirlwind tour interviewing the Philippine political elite.

I send heartfelt thanks to Larry David, Darren Star, and Joss Whedon, whose projects pleasantly distracted me from my own.

I am grateful to Joan Asseff for her cheer and encouragement as I completed this book during the past year.

Finally, my deepest love and gratitude go to my parents, Mac and Becky Brownlee. Beyond innumerable amounts of moral and logistical support, they were my closest advisors as I chose this subject and took it forward. I dedicate this book to them.