### POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

Judicial review by constitutional courts is often presented as a necessary supplement to democracy. This book questions its effectiveness and legitimacy. Drawing on the republican tradition, Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms of open elections between competing parties and decision-making by majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers treat the ruled with equal concern and respect. Rights-based judicial review undermines the constitutionality of democracy. Its counter-majoritarian bias promotes privileged against unprivileged minorities, while its legalism and focus on individual cases distort public debate. Rather than constraining democracy with written constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be paid to improving democractic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny.

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# POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY

RICHARD BELLAMY



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In Memory of my Father

#### CONTENTS

	Preface and acknowledgements page viii
	Introduction: legal and political constitutionalism 1
	PART I Legal constitutionalism 13
1	Constitutional rights and the limits of judicial review 15
2	The rule of law and the rule of persons 52
3	Constitutionalism and democracy 90
	PART II Political constitutionalism 143
4	The norms of political constitutionalism: non-domination and political equality 145
5	The forms of political constitutionalism: public reason and the balance of power 176
6	Bringing together norms and forms: the democratic constitution 209
	Conclusion 260
	Index 264

#### PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A written, justiciable constitution, incorporating a bill of rights, is widely accepted as a necessary safeguard against the abuse of power by democratic governments. This book challenges that common view and the often unexamined and erroneous assumptions about the workings of democracy on which it rests. Far from guarding against a largely mythical tyranny of the majority, the checks imposed by judicial review on majoritarian decision-making risk undermining political equality, distorting the agenda away from the public interest, and entrenching the privileges of dominant minorities and the domination of unprivileged ones. As such, legal constitutionalism can produce rather than constrain arbitrary rule, detract from the rights protection of weak minorities, and damage the rule of law in both the formal and the substantive senses of treating all as equals. By contrast, the workings of actually existing democracies promote the constitutional goods of rights and the rule of law. Party competition and majority rule on the basis of one person one vote uphold political equality and institutionalise mechanisms of political balance and accountability that provide incentives for politicians to attend to the judgements and interests of those they govern and to recruit a wide range of minorities into any ruling coalition. From the republican perspective adopted here, the procedures and mechanisms of established democracies offer adequate, if not perfect and certainly improvable, safeguards against domination and arbitrary rule. Most kinds of legal constitutionalism subvert these democratic protections, creating sources of arbitrariness and dominance of their own in the process. In sum, democracy provides a form of political constitutionalism that is superior both normatively and empirically to the legal constitutional devices that are regularly proposed as necessary constraints upon it.

In developing this thesis, I have incurred numerous debts. While controversial within the legal and political theory communities that I habitually frequent, it is far less so among political scientists. I owe much to the Government Department at Essex, where this project was originally

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ix

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