Contents

List of figures vii
List of tables viii
Notes on contributors x
Preface xv

Part I: Introduction 1
1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory
DARREN G. HAWKINS, DAVID A. LAKE, DANIEL L. NIELSON, AND MICHAEL J. TIERNEY 3

Part II: Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits 39
2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid
MONA M. LYNE, DANIEL L. NIELSON, AND MICHAEL J. TIERNEY 41
3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy
J. LAWRENCE BROZ AND MICHAEL BREWSTER HAWES 77
4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems
HELEN V. MILNER 107
5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality
LISA L. MARTIN 140
Contents

6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union
   MARK A. POLLACK 165

Part III: Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability 197

7 How agents matter
   DARREN G. HAWKINS AND WADE JACOBY 199

8 Screening power: international organizations as informative agents
   ALEXANDER THOMPSON 229

9 Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO
   ANDREW P. CORTELL AND SUSAN PETERSON 255

10 Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity
    ERICA R. GOULD 281

11 Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power
    KAREN J. ALTER 312

Part IV: Directions for future research 339

12 The logic of delegation to international organizations
    DAVID A. LAKE AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS 341

References 369
Index 394