1 Multiple modernities as limits to secular Europeanization?

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The casual reader of current news cannot help but notice the prominence of religious issues in contemporary European politics. In the 1990s hundreds of thousands of refugees from Croatia (Catholic), Serbia (Orthodox), and Bosnia (Muslim) were a painful reminder to all of Europe’s religious heterogeneity. Declaration No. 11, appended to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, innocuously proclaimed that the European Union (EU) respects and in no way prejudices national laws governing the status of Churches and religious associations as well as of philosophical and non-confessional organizations. Since then religious issues have become increasingly politicized (Soper and Fetzer, 2002).

In France a bitter debate has raged over the use of headscarves in schools. In Germany a similar political debate is occurring, at a less feverish pitch, with a more prominent role accorded to the Supreme Court. In Spain the Aznar government passed a law strengthening the position of the Catholic Church in public education, despite the public outrage of the opposition (Fuchs, 2003). Anti-Semitism is on the rise among Europe’s Muslim population, especially since the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000. The public release of an EU-sponsored report on this subject became a matter of political controversy in the fall of 2003. In Kosovo that threat lingers. And the opening of negotiations between the EU and Turkey about eventual membership leaves religion on Europe’s diplomatic agenda, and with it the issue of the compatibility between political Islam and secular Europe.

Europe, arguably the most secular part of the world, is increasingly forced to grapple with religious issues like these. Focusing exclusively on the Europeanization of secular politics – of who gets what, when, and how – misses two central aspects of European politics. First, as I shall argue in this chapter, European identity has remained largely untouched by legal and cultural processes of Europeanization, leaving the core of the emerging European polity hollow. Second, as Europe enlarges, transnational religious communities, defined here as entities spanning state borders, run up against the secular European polity. Because it has a strong influence in
many of the states that are joining, or seeking to join, the EU as fully-fledged members, religious politics in the West European core of united Europe is becoming more important. I view the variety of these political encounters and outcomes as manifestations of multiple modernities.

The core of secular Western Europe has preserved Christianity largely as glimmering embers that are no longer able to generate, on their own, much heat. European enlargement, however, is infusing renewed religious vitality into Europe’s political and social life, thus chipping away at its exceptional secularism. This development is noteworthy for three reasons. First, religious vitality has the potential to revive political recognition of the Christian and specifically Catholic foundations of European integration. Second, renewed attention to religious differences could ignite political reactions that in the foreseeable future may well impede Europeanization. Third, the growing salience of religion is likely to demand new terms of coexistence with secularism. Legal and cultural Europeanization have left problematic and undefined the core of the European project. In the future religion may help fill that core by offering a focal point for political debate, engagement, and conflict.

A few decades back, the conventional European wisdom held that farmers were destined to disappear from the political stage. Yet half a century later, the Common Agricultural Policy remains a central and economically costly pillar of the European Union. The analogous view about religion is widespread in what many Europeans, in the West more than in the East, understand to be a secularizing or fully secular polity. This book is based on a different political intuition. European enlargement will feed rather than undermine the importance of religion in the EU. To a long shelf of books devoted to the enlargement of the core of a secular, capitalist, and democratic Europe, this volume adds an analysis of how transnational religious communities in the European periphery are reintroducing religion into the center of Europe. The book’s analysis focuses on the role of Catholicism in contemporary European politics, with specific reference to Poland, the largest country that joined the EU on May 1, 2004; on the fusion of Orthodox Christianity with nationalism and the modern state in East and Southeast Europe, with specific reference to Serbia and the fateful position it occupies in the Balkans; and on the role of Islam and a large and rapidly growing Muslim diaspora, with specific reference to the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the EU.

A long and tortuous debate on the preamble to the European draft constitution that José Casanova reviews in chapter 3 revealed just how difficult it is to strike a politically tenable balance between religion and secularization in contemporary European politics. The preamble defines Europe as a civilization whose people “have gradually developed the
values underlying humanism: equality of persons, freedom, respect for reason.” Religion appears obliquely only once, when the preamble speaks of the “cultural, religious, and humanistic inheritance of Europe” – a late addition to the final draft after the deletion of a specific reference to explicitly religious and secular symbols of identity, Christianity, Greco-Roman civilization, and the Enlightenment. Brokering a compromise between Ireland, Spain, Italy, Poland, and Christian Democrats from other countries on the one hand and France, Belgium, some of the Scandinavian countries, and socialists and liberals from other countries on the other, according to Leszek Jesień, a Polish expert, “put a certain fog on the issues” (Bernstein, 2003) that left the preamble (in the view of one British diplomat) “pompous and pretentious, but at first view not actively dangerous” (Economist, 2003).

The omission of an explicit reference to Christianity was harshly criticized in the summer of 2003 by both Pope John Paul II and the leader of the Greek Orthodox Church, Archbishop Christodoulos. The Pope addressed the future of Europe in “Ecclesia in Europa,” a lengthy postscript to a 1999 Synod that he had hoped would be the beginning of a moral and civilizational renewal of Europe brought about by the Catholic Church. That renewal is, in the Pope’s view, rooted in the recovery of a profoundly multicultural historical memory and in the imagination of Europe as a place open to entirely new possibilities. But the Pope at the helm of a traditionally pro-European Catholic Church, has sailed into rough waters. In the fall of 2004, the European Parliament opposed the nomination of Rocco Buttiglione, a conservative Italian politician, practicing Catholic, and friend and biographer of the Pope, as European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs. Buttiglione’s conservative views on gay marriage, single mothers, and working women sparked outrage among secular parliamentarians. And so secular and religious views of European values came into conflict once more.

These illustrations point to what Grace Davie (2001: 467–68, 1994a) refers to as an odd irony about the self-perceptions of Europeans:

At one and the same time, they perceive themselves as increasingly secular and draw the boundaries of their continent – known sometimes as “fortress Europe” – along Christian lines. Whether consciously or not, the effective barriers to entry coincide with a geographical definition of Christendom. Nations dominated by Western (Catholic) Christianity will, in my view, find it easier than their Orthodox equivalents to enter the European Union; Muslim states will find it harder still (if not impossible), despite the existence of significant Muslim communities within most, if not all, West European nations.

Why? Are the reasons to be found in the inherent characteristics of Christianity, Orthodoxy and Islam, or in important historical processes,
such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, nineteenth-century industrialization, and prolonged periods of state-building, the growth of nationalism, and democratization – all of which have differentiated Southeastern from Western Europe? When Greece joined Europe in 1981, its Orthodoxy was trumped by the country’s widely acknowledged role as Europe’s foundational civilization. Yet the legacy of 500 years of Ottoman rule left Greece ill-prepared for functioning in the EU. Indeed, if we imagine a Europe populated solely by states like Greece, it would probably not be able to form a union (Katzenstein, 1997a). Greece’s falsification of its economic statistics before joining the European Monetary Union illustrates the problem. Yet compared to the Serbian Orthodox Church, as Vjekoslav Perica argues in chapter 7, Greece is more skilled in its diplomacy and more open to European developments. In Europe’s historical evolution, religion is deeply entangled with other factors. Compared to them, however, the salience of religion, what some call its constitutive effects, lies in the intensity that perceived religious and value conflicts generate in Europe, as they do elsewhere.

**Multiple modernities in the era of Europeanization**

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the secular European project of extending and securing peace among democratic welfare states is helping to revitalize religion as a political force (Greeley, 2003). Inside Europe, Grace Davie (2000) argues, a variety of mutating collective memories provide a never-ending reconstruction of religious traditions: in the Church and through churchgoers, in education, the media, and law, in alternative formulations provided by new religions, and in the arts. Less subtle and equally important, the number of Muslims living in Europe has increased in less than a generation from about 1 million to more than 15 million. Their social integration into European societies is a complex political task. In addition, the southern and eastern enlargement of the European Union has brought Catholicism and the Orthodox Church into closer contact with the European project and incited lively debate about the likely impact of the EU on “traditional Christian values.” How should we think about these political processes?

Multiple modernities disappoint those searching for one dominant narrative, such as the growth of secularism or the inescapability of civilizational clashes. They are expressed in a variety of cultural programs that reinvent themselves continuously in history. These programs adapt themselves to (and also modify) large-scale historical processes such as modernization, secularization, industrialization, and democratization. Variable constellations of political context are brought together by
transnational contacts between global–local and international–regional sites of politics. In sum, multiple modernities and variable contexts shape and transfigure an enlarging Europe as it encounters transnational religious communities.

Shmuel Eisenstadt (1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2002; see also Berger and Huntington, 2002) has interrogated “multiple modernities” as a central topic in macro-history. This body of research examines long time periods and puts religion in a central place. Modern societies are not converging around common patterns. Rather, “the idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world . . . is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs” (Eisenstadt, 2002: 2). This makes unavoidable the antinomies of modernity. Modernizing non-Western societies and modern, Western societies thus display different patterns of modernity. The cultural core of West European modernity offers a specific “bundle of moral-cognitive imperatives under the premises of the rationalization of the world” (Spohn, 2001: 501) and a secularizing reconstruction of religious traditions that radiates outward to other parts of Europe as well as North and South America through imposition, emulation, and incorporation.

Because Western modernity is adopted selectively and transformed in widely differing political and cultural contexts, it does not create a common global standard. Indeed, Western modernity is sufficiently broad to allow for tensions, even contradictions, between orthodox and heterodox orientations and identities, and unavoidable conflicts between geographic and socio-economic centers and peripheries. That difference is very evident across the Atlantic, as José Casanova argues in chapter 3, thus giving the current rift over the Iraq war a deeper significance than sharp political disagreements over the doctrine of preventive war and unilateral action outside of the UN framework. Difference also marks Germany and Japan, and not only as distinct models of capitalism. The difference created by Germany’s exposure to Christianity as one of the world’s great religions – in sharp contrast to Japan’s tradition of religious syncretism – confirms the political plasticity and institutional plurality of modernity (Eisenstadt, 1986, 1996, 1998). Here Eisenstadt parts company with others, such as Ernst Haas (1997, 2000), who claim Japan as an example of secularization. Eisenstadt stresses instead Japan’s syncretism. Considering Casanova’s argument in chapter 3, this disagreement is instructive. Does the belief in secularism become compelling largely as a self-fulfilling prophecy – because of its foundational commitment to open-ended learning that by definition only it, not syncretism, can embody? Work on multiple modernities is rooted in Max Weber’s
writings on world religions. Secularist thought instead draws heavily on Weber’s analysis of bureaucratic rationality. Writings in the secular tradition cling with determination to the idea that in the long term the self-reflexivity, open-endedness, and procedural thinness of secularism give it a decisive edge over all other forms of modernity. Multiple modernities make us look for and accept political antinomies that are perpetually recreated and that make even traditional fundamentalism modern.

Focusing on transnational communities also emphasizes a multiplicity of political balances that can be struck between secular and religious politics (Rudolph, 1997a, 2003). A transnational perspective undercuts the assumption of unitary, internally coherent religious or civilizational entities with an unquestioned identity. There are two general ways of articulating such a transnational perspective. One focuses on the connections between global and local factors in an increasingly deterritorialized world, the other on the links between national and regional factors in a world that continues to give the principle of territoriality its due (Katzenstein, 2005). A group of scholars who published under the name of the Group of Lisbon (1995: 15) insist that the two perspectives “refer to different processes and phenomena.” Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996: 185 and also 8–13) concur, as they see a vast difference “between a strictly global and a highly internationalized economy.” Globalization transcends space and compresses time and in so doing it has novel transformative effects on world politics. Internationalization refers to territorially based exchanges across borders and acknowledges basic continuities in the evolution of the international system. Globalization highlights the emergence of new actors and novel relations in the world system, internationalization the continued relevance of existing actors and the intensifications of existing ones. “Internationality,” argues Jan Aart Scholte (2000: 49), “is embedded in territorial space; globality transcends that geography.”

An analysis of various transnational religious communities in Europe benefits greatly from both perspectives. The growth of a European polity and transnational religious communities are both shaped by global and international processes. As this book illustrates, the transnational politics of Catholicism, with its elaborate and well-defined international structures, differs greatly from that of the Orthodox Church, firmly rooted in the nation-state, and the global–local connections that define Islam’s institutional structure and outlook. Focusing on Catholicism and Poland, Orthodoxy and Serbia, and Islam and Turkey illustrates the complex interplay between globalization and internationalization.

The plausibility of focusing on multiple modernities is supported by central conclusions of a large number of sociologists of religion (for example, Esposito and Watson, 2000; Marty and Appleby, 1997; Race
and Williamson, 1995; Beyer, 1994; Casanova, 1994; Johnston and Sampson, 1994; Robertson and Garrett, 1991) and a few political scientists who have written on the role of religion in world politics (for example, Thomas, 2000, 2005; Norris and Inglehart, 2005; Almond, Appleby and Sivan, 2003; Carlson and Owens, 2003; Hurd, 2004; Petito and Hatzopoulos, 2003; Byrnes, 2001; Dark, 2000; *Millennium*, 2000; Kurth, 1998; Haynes, 1998; *Orbis*, 1998; Rudolph and Piscatori, 1997; Janis, 1991; Berger, 1982). In the analysis of Europe and its international relations the rediscovery of religion is overdue. Specifically, scholars of Europe’s emerging polity have so far neglected this topic in their voluminous writings. This oversight is true, specifically, for analyses grounded self-consciously in secular liberal and cultural realist perspectives. Instead of multiplicity these perspectives stress uniformity of outcomes: a progressive and cooperative secular politics for liberals, a divided and conflictual one for realists.

A secular liberalism is deeply ingrained in the self-understanding of most Europeans and in the interpretations of most scholars of European politics. Not long ago it was an article of faith, so to speak, among most scholars of religion and of Europe that secularization was the dominant trend in modernization. Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) went so far as to pronounce ‘the end of history’ after liberalism’s final and decisive victory over the challenges posed by fascism in the first half of the twentieth century and communism in the second. Henceforth there would be no more ideological opposition to the rationalist secularism that Fukuyama had seen triumph in the Cold War.

As the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union occurred with the help of a devout Polish Pope and fervent Islamicist *mujahdeen*, Fukuyama’s conclusion is less than fully convincing. It does not sit well at least with one of the pre-eminent sociologists of religion of this generation. In the words of Peter Berger (1997: 974, quoted in Stark, 1999: 16):

What I and most other sociologists of religion wrote in the 1960s about secularization was a mistake. Our underlying argument was that secularization and modernity go hand in hand. With more modernization comes more secularization. It wasn’t a crazy theory. There was some evidence for it. But I think it’s basically wrong. Most of the world today is certainly not secular. It’s very religious.

And so, in its own way, is Europe. Berger (1999: 10) describes the European way with religion in the following terms: a “strong survival of religion, most of it generally Christian in nature, despite the widespread alienation from organized Churches. A shift in the institutional location
of religion, then, rather than secularization, would be a more accurate description of the European situation.”

José Casanova makes the same basic point in chapter 3 but with an interesting twist. The secularization of Europe is not a harbinger of broader developments in world politics. It is instead exceptional and distinctive of Europe, a self-fulfilling prophecy that takes something for granted that is not necessarily so. Large segments of the European population have accepted a teleological theory in which religions atrophy. In Casanova’s view, the secularization of Western Europe is the result of the triumph of a specific knowledge regime rather than a deeper aspect of the process of modernization.

Cultural realism (A. Johnston, 1995; Nau, 2002; see also Niebuhr, 1940; D. Johnston, 2003) offers an alternative perspective that is more open to the influence of religion in world politics. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 1996) political intuition differed sharply from Fukuyama’s. Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” draws a pessimistic picture. The historical turn of 1989–91 removed one ideological conflict, but it revealed the existence of another. For Huntington, civilizations have become the relevant cultural context for states and non-state actors alike. Huntington insists that this is true in particular of “faultline” states that lie between civilizations, such as Serbia. Civilizational clashes are for Huntington the defining characteristic of a new era of international politics.

Because their building blocks are variable constellations of religion, culture, language, values, traditions, and memories, civilizations are not easily defined with any degree of precision. Today religion, specifically the rise of Islamist political and religious fundamentalism in the Middle East, gives the civilizational argument much of its political prominence. Huntington’s primary argument holds that underneath civilizational fluidity, a profound split exists between the “West” and the “rest.” A secondary argument is less clearly identified with Huntington’s main thesis. It holds that under the wide umbrella of civilization, identities are contested and can be reconstructed quite easily through a politics that by definition is forever in flux. For example, Huntington argues that Kemalist reformism can be explained within the context of Islam, as can significant reform efforts in Mexico and Russia (Huntington, 1993: 24, 42–44, 48).

Bassam Tibi deploys in chapter 8 both versions of the civilizational argument, although he stresses the first more than the second. In Tibi’s view the radical nature of Islam in Germany is in part due to politics, specifically the monopolistic politics of representation that the German
state imposes on its non-Christian immigrant communities (Fetzer and Soper, 2005: 98–129). And the radical nature of some Islamicist groups is due also to the radical doctrine and practices that are imported to Germany from Turkey through a variety of transnational ties. Islam is not simply a religion like contemporary Christianity, a matter of individual belief more or less firmly held. It is also a matter of intense practice and revered rituals, without which Islam would cease to exist. Political practice has created deep faultlines between the German state and important strands of Islamicist communities in Germany. Yet different German policies and different Islamic practices could alter, even erase, such faultlines.

Hakan Yavuz offers a different interpretation in chapter 9. He stresses the second argument much more heavily than the first. He emphasizes the political malleability and changeability of various Turkish identities within one Islamic civilization that, as it interacts with Europe, is creating competing versions of Islam. These versions find different ways of accommodating themselves to an expanding Europe. Yavuz’s general point extends well beyond Turkey, as Islam’s resurgence illustrates. “Islam” is a construct that now assigns to Iran a pivotal role in the Middle East. When the ideology of “Pan-Arabism” reigned supreme only a generation ago, as a non-Arab country, Iran was excluded from the Middle East. Since then anti-imperialism has given way to anti-Westernism. Twentieth-century Islam thus is not an unchanging and homogeneous actor or oppositional civilization (Trautner, 1999; Wedeen, 2003). Unsurprisingly, in contemporary Islam significant political differences exist between Saudi Arabian and Iranian visions of traditionalism and radicalism, just as within Saudi Arabia and Iran deep fissures also exist over the social and cultural purpose of Islam.

Secular liberalism and cultural realism have the virtue of simplicity. Both, however, suffer from limitations that invite us to move beyond them in our analysis of the interactions between Europeanization and transnational religious communities. Contra secular liberalism, there exists no teleology in history, secular or otherwise. And contra cultural realism, diversity and difference rather than unity and homogeneity are the markers of civilizational entities and the collective identities they foster. This is not to argue that concepts central to liberal and realist perspectives, such as efficiency and power, are irrelevant for the analysis of religion in world politics. They are most useful in combination with other concepts that better capture the ideas motivating religious politics.

By themselves liberal and realist perspectives do not yield a compelling answer to the mocking question that realists have traditionally posed to students of religion: “How many divisions has the Pope?” After the end of
the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire, students of international relations are likely to give a very different answer from the one proffered in the 1930s and 1940s and during the Cold War. Together with the Polish trade union movement, Pope John Paul II had a lot to do with the collapse and dismemberment of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. And so did fervently Islamicist mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan. Furthermore, efficiency as the master variable of a variety of liberal theories of international relations has great difficulties in engaging substantively the identities, motivations, and strategies of religious actors whose calculations typically cannot be reduced to simple instrumental reasoning (S. Thomas, 2000, 2005).

Grafted on to sociological approaches, liberal and realist analyses of religion in European and world politics yield more accurate analyses and deeper insights. As one manifestation of the sociological turn in international relations theory, constructivism insists that through interaction people construct the social and political world within the context of a material world they also inhabit. Agent, structure and language coexist and co-evolve without one enjoying ontological primacy over the other. In this view there is no reason to privilege actors, such as the unitary state, or levels of analysis, such as the international system, that have been central to most strands of realist and liberal international relations scholarship. This book’s emphasis on the relations between state and non-state actors and their various transnational relations thus stretches beyond the core of realist and liberal analysis of international relations.

World politics reflects multiple historical experiences and social contexts rather than one outcome – be it secular cooperation or civilizational clash. Religious thought and practice, for example, reflect diverse experiences and contexts. That is one reason why Yasusuke Murakami (1996: 389) comes close to equating secular and religious thought. The future, Murakami argues, will be marked not by homogenization but by diversity. The question of international understanding will not require a “communization” of cultures around standards set by modern science and the West. Instead it requires a growing “commensurability” of cultures based on the power of individual imagination and empathy as the basis for a rule- rather than a justice-based interpretive framework and approach to life. The difference between the revolutionary, transcendental reflections of historical religions (including contemporary science) in the West and the conservative, historiological, hermeneutic reflections in the East distinguishes between civilizations imbued with a sense of progress ending in the divine and the attainability of ultimate truth on the one hand and civilizations that remain in the world of the profane and sustain limitless reinterpretations on the other. “Thus religion [and