In her controversial report from Jerusalem on the 1961 trial of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, the German-Jewish political philosopher Hannah Arendt struggled to define the significance of the Nazi regime’s attempt to exterminate the Jews. She was certain of the defendant’s guilt and the appropriateness of the death sentence imposed on him. Against widespread international criticism of Israel’s kidnapping of Eichmann in Argentina to bring him to justice, she defended the right of the Israeli court to try him. Nevertheless, Arendt resisted the court’s claim that the “final solution” amounted to the culmination of centuries of antisemitism. Instead she believed that the Judeocide was a “new crime, the crime against humanity – in the sense of a crime ‘against the human status,’ or against the very nature of mankind.” Genocide, she continued, “is an attack upon human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the ‘human status’ without which the very words ‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’ would be devoid of meaning.” As “a crime against humanity,” the Nazi effort to make the Jews “disappear from the face of the earth” was indeed “perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people.” Yet, “Only the choice of victims,” she said, and “not the nature of the crime, could be derived from the long history of Jew-hatred and anti-Semitism.”

This insight from the Eichmann trial has drawn less attention over the years than Arendt’s depiction of Eichmann as a bland careerist and her biting criticism of Jewish leaders in occupied Europe, who in her

view, contributed to their own destruction. Historians of Germany have rediscovered Arendt of late, but they have focused on her sprawling and problematic work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, to apply her insights regarding the contributions of European imperialism to the emergence of totalitarian regimes in Europe after World War I and the Nazi genocide against the Jews during World War II. The determination to apply imperialism and empire as categories of analysis to generate fresh insights into the historical development of Germany, which Arendt’s work has spawned, has produced a lively debate between two competing perspectives. The first focuses on the long-term impact of Imperial Germany’s maritime colonialism before the Great War, and explores the possible continuities between Imperial German colonial practices and the Third Reich. A second and more recently articulated position that challenges the first recognizes that “Germany,” be it the Holy Roman Empire until its dissolution in 1806, or the Second Empire after 1871, was a continental empire well before it ever ventured overseas. That legacy and the longstanding German fascination with and dread of the “east,” Russia especially, carried important consequences, notwithstanding the nationalist imaginings of German colonies overseas that extended at least as far back as the Revolution of 1848.

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Introduction

Yet such starkly posed alternatives limit the ways in which “empire” as a category of analysis applies to Germany, and not only because Germany’s two-dimensional imperial ambitions, continental and maritime, warrant further assessment as to how each stood in relation to the other. Rather, comparative studies that explore the links between empire, colonialism, and genocide are offering new ways to historicize the Nazi regime’s obsession with the biological endangerment of the German Volk and its mutually reinforcing remedies, the acquisition of “living space” (Lebensraum) at the expense of the Slavs and the extermination of the Jews. Using the fifteenth-century “reconquests” (reconquistas) of Christian Spain against the Moors and the Muskovite princes against the Mongols as examples, A. Dirk Moses argues that, “the founding of empires can be linked to the experience of a society’s having been colonized and subjected to imperial conquest and rule,” often leading to the expulsion or destruction of the one-time colonizer. Moses suggests that this insight could prove especially relevant to National Socialism, a German “national liberation movement,” for which the acquisition of a vast empire would exterminate millions, and especially the Jews, who were perceived as the pernicious agents of foreign colonization and contamination. Yet Moses’ argument also applies to the combination of brashness and pessimism that characterized the imperialism of the Second German Empire. If far less extreme than the Third Reich, pre–World War I aspirations to an even larger empire than the post-1871 entity joined two goals, creating internal cohesion and marginalizing domestic “enemies,” and the achievement of global power. Major ruptures and discontinuities indeed punctuated the history of the “first” German unification from...
1871 to 1945. Nevertheless, the insecurities of Imperial Germany, which were interwoven in the triumphs that followed unification, established a pattern that would intensify through war, defeat, and economic crisis.

This book, a synthesis that draws primarily upon the findings of recent scholarship, argues that Germany offers an example of a less-appreciated “tension of empire,” the aspiration to imperialist expansion and the simultaneous fear of dissolution at the hands of its imperialist rivals. That tension arose from the memory of the late medieval decline of German settlements in the Slavic lands of Eastern Europe, the religious conflict of the Reformation and the Thirty Years War, the decentralization and eventual break-up of the Holy Roman Empire under Napoleon, the triumphant but “incomplete” unification of 1871, which left large communities of ethnic Germans beyond the boundaries of the Second Empire, and finally, Imperial Germany’s defeat and “subjugation” at the end of World War I. If the boundaries between European colonizers and the indigenous peoples they colonized were fluid and subject to contestation, as Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler famously observed over ten years ago,7 the boundaries between becoming or being an empire and being bested by imperialist rivals could be equally impermanent and unstable. Through German eyes, beginning with the educated middle classes that propelled the drive to German unification in the nineteenth century, the prospect of sudden and devastating reversal lay barely hidden beneath the promise of a globally powerful Germany. The volatile combination of ambition and dread, which was embedded in a religious and millenarian vision of national death and resurrection,8 informed the determination to challenge European imperialist rivals and ultimately the United States. At the same time, the perceived “failure” to eliminate social, religious, and ethnic divisions at home led increasingly to the demonization of domestic “enemies,” who appeared to be the agents of foreign foes. That tendency, already evident during the Second Empire, grew more pronounced under the Weimar Republic, which many Germans saw as the noxious offspring of the Entente’s depredations. In their view an unholy alliance of liberals, “Marxists” and especially Jews

presided over the post–World War I Weimar “system,” doing the bidding of Germany’s foreign “colonizers.”

Although the desire to recover and extend Germany’s prewar maritime empire persisted among former colonial administrators and public intellectuals after the Great War, Germany’s defeat, the collapse of the Hohenzollern monarchy, and what was perceived as a punitive postwar peace settlement meant that the acquisition of a continental “living space” became central to a German resurgence. Catapulted into power as the expression of populist and elite discontent unleashed by the Depression, the National Socialists would combine the projects of empire and genocide. Although markedly different from the vision of a restored and modernized Holy Roman Empire that infused the nationalism of Catholics before World War I, the Nazi “Greater German Reich” would, unlike the Bismarckian and predominantly Protestant “lesser Germany,” be invulnerable to foreign conquest and dismemberment. As a corrective to the failure of the Second Empire to realize its imperialist ambitions before and during the Great War, an expanded German Lebensraum would provide the resources to compete with, and triumph over, the Nazi regime’s imperialist rivals. It would forge a harmonious and racially purified empire that by subordinating, expelling, or killing its enemies would ensure the domination of the German master race, a final triumphant resurrection over a past of unfulfilled aspirations. Because Jews mythically personified Germany’s foreign and domestic enemies, they embodied the fragile boundaries between the dream of expanding and maintaining an empire and losing it through military defeat and racial pollution. As Isabel Hull has argued recently, German military doctrine had long presupposed that victory in war required the complete destruction of the enemy. The Third Reich would distinguish itself by eliminating the enemy behind the enemy.

Despite the long imperial history of Germany, Nazi Empire limits its chronological focus to the “first” German unification (the second being in 1990), the period between the founding of the Second Empire to the demise of the Third Reich. During the 1960s and 1970s, choosing this particular chronological frame would have been unexceptional in light of the controversy that the historian Fritz Fischer unleashed with his Germany’s War Aims in the First World War, published in 1961.  

10 Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914–1918 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961). Fischer went further in his War of Illusions: German Policies
By identifying continuities in the imperialistic war plans of the Second Empire and Third Reich, Fischer influenced a generation of scholars to investigate Germany’s “deviation” (Sonderweg, or “special path”) from the liberal democratic west as the source of its descent into fascism. Dominated by an agrarian and industrial elite, the Second Empire pursued imperialism and ultimately war to shore up its power against the rise of the German labor movement. Although weakened by revolution and military defeat in 1918, the elite recovered enough to put the Nazis in power in 1933, again to secure its social and political domination. This book does not restore the “special path” argument, which historians since the 1980s have progressively dismantled. Yet with due allowance for the discontinuities between the founding of the Second Empire and the end of the Third Reich, a common thread emerges. Imperial Germany and its two successors staged the drama of German imperialist aspiration, the eschatology of ethnic homogeneity over diversity, imperial enlargement over stasis, and Lebensraum as the route to biological survival.

As the European order changed during the nineteenth century from a conglomeration of dynastic empires to a composition of hybrids, that is, empires that strove to become internally cohesive nation states, Imperial Germany was potentially the most destabilizing because it anticipated further enlargement even as it partially fulfilled German nationalist aspirations of long standing. Although the “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck temporarily contained expansionist ambitions in favor of internal consolidation and stabilizing the concert of great powers, Imperial Germany’s military might and rapid economic growth increased the pressure to compete for preeminence with other “world empires.” That pressure grew all the more intense because of Bismarck’s seeming inability to contain domestic “enemies,” especially ethnic minorities and the emerging German left. Yet Germany’s acquisition of protectorates overseas and its efforts to establish informal empire on the continent, resulted in its near total diplomatic isolation. That predicament, coupled by the anxieties generated by the transnational migration of Slavs and Jews, gave rise to a radical nationalist fear of annihilation that encouraged the disastrous
brinkmanship at the commanding heights of the Reich government in the summer of 1914. “Preventive war” was to be the antidote to international “encirclement,” and as an important by-product, internal division. If the Second Empire represented the potential of German nation and empire building, its defeat, the loss of its overseas empire, and its partial dismemberment after World War I reawakened earlier experiences of division and victimization by the European great powers, made more intense by economic crisis and deep domestic political divisions. To be sure, the Weimar republic was by no means destined to fail or was the viscerally antirepublican, anti-Marxist, and antisemitic radical right, from which the Nazi movement would emerge, destined to succeed. During the tumultuous first four years of the republic’s life, the threat of foreign intervention and the Entente’s desire to stabilize the German economy undermined radical nationalist and imperialist putschism. Furthermore, during Weimar’s “middle years” between 1924 and 1929, a rough economic stabilization and a tenuously restored European state system that was partially willing to entertain German revisionist claims against the postwar peace settlement, allowed the republic to establish a degree of legitimacy. Yet, in addition to destroying the global economic and political order, the Great Depression propelled a new movement to power, the National Socialists, who defined their imperialism not only against the “bourgeois” revisionism of the republic, but also against what they deemed as the absurdity of Wilhelmine imperialism, its prioritizing of commercial over racial ends. Although economic objectives, the acquisition of raw materials and labor, were deeply embedded in the Nazi Lebensraum project, they were the means to more important goals, settlement, ethnic cleansing, and the racial revitalization of the Volk as to key to its German invulnerability.

Genocide, often the outcome of colonial conquest, has been a disturbingly common historical and contemporary problem.¹³ The Nazi variant, the regime’s solution to the “incomplete” unification of 1871, the defeat and collapse of 1918, and the crisis of the European state system between the wars, was the most extreme manifestation of a long-standing European problem, the tension between the maintenance of empire with all of its diversity and the struggle for ethnic and ideological

homogeneity. Without the Nazis’ obsession with the mythical power of the Jewish “enemy” and the long history of antisemitism, of course, the Holocaust would not have happened. Yet the distinctive characteristic of the Holocaust that total war reinforced, its remarkable consistency, in which Hitler’s charismatic authority unleashed the ideologically murderous zeal and personal ambition of thousands of the Reich’s epigones in the field, transformed the homogenizing capacities of the European nation states into what Arendt termed the “attack on human diversity as such.” By ensuring the triumph of an empire that was to last a millennium, the Nazi “living space,” cleansed of “undesirables” and “subhumans,” would end the tension between dominion and annihilation.
From Imperial Consolidation to Global Ambitions

Imperial Germany, 1871–1914

The unification of Germany, which followed Prussia’s victories over Denmark in 1864, the Austrian Empire in 1866, and France in 1871, produced a new territorial state with formidable military power, economic potential, and expansionist ambitions. Having triumphed three times in succession over enemy armies, the German “Second Empire” promised to become, for many of its citizens, the more effective successor to the first, the Holy Roman Empire, and thus the heir to Rome itself. Following the dreams of the revolutionaries of 1848, many imagined that the new Germany was but the first stage in the achievement of a dominion that would extend beyond its present borders to include ethnic Germans scattered throughout Europe, a realm that would reach as far as Constantinople and the Black Sea. Imperial Germany came nowhere close to achieving that goal during its forty-seven-year lifespan. Yet by the beginning of the twentieth century, its export industries, which included electrical engineering, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, metals, finished goods, and machine-tool production, had transformed it into Europe’s most dynamic economy. Germany’s rapid economic growth over a short period, second only to that of the United States after the


Civil War, testified to its emergence as one of three new global players, along with America and Japan, that would rival the dominant European empires, Great Britain and France. The multiplication of industrialized and industrializing empires hastened global commercialization and the frenetic scramble for colonies in previously inaccessible parts of the globe that characterized the last third of the nineteenth century. At a time when global imperialist competition weakened the concert of European great powers that stabilized the continent after the defeat of Napoleon more than a half century earlier, the ambitions that Germany’s military prowess and economic power spawned, reflected in its determination to “catch up” with and surpass Europe’s leaders, meant that Germany would play a pivotal role in that competition.

In the 1860s, the prime minister of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, opportunistically promoted unification to expand Prussian power, dissolve the German Confederation (the loose association of German states constructed after the defeat of Napoleon led jointly by Prussia and the Austrian Empire), and co-opt liberal nationalists, who sought a united Germany with constitutional limitations on monarchical power. Despite bitter battles between Prussian liberals and Bismarck over the accountability of the government and its military to parliament, the expectation of the commercial, legal, and cultural benefits of unification, for which Prussian economic power was indispensable, divided the liberal movement and worked to Bismarck’s advantage. The Prussian army’s impressive performance contributed to unification on Bismarck’s terms, as did the fear of many liberals in Prussia and in other German states that a “ring” of enemies, especially France and Russia, would continue to profit from a politically fragmented Central Europe. Only unification under Prussian leadership would allow Germany to compete with other empires.3 The ethnic tensions arising from Prussia’s past as a colonizer, precipitated by the large number of Poles in its eastern territories of Silesia, West Prussia, and Posen, which Frederick the Great annexed during the eighteenth century, proved equally relevant to liberal sentiment. The demands of liberal revolutionaries in 1848 for a German national state provoked Polish rebellions in Prussia’s eastern provinces, which had remained outside of the German Confederation. The Polish uprising in 1863 against the Russian Empire caused Prussian liberals especially to believe that too much democracy would bolster the political influence of

3 Harald Biermann, Ideologie statt Realpolitik”; Kleindeutsche Liberale und auswärtige Politik vor der Reichsgründung (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2006), 239–53.