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Reason

1. What Is Kantian Ethics?

Some recent moral philosophers draw a distinction between "Kant's ethics" and "Kantian ethics." Kant's ethics is contained in Kant's own writings: the *Groundwork*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the *Metaphysics of Morals*, and the others. It is the theory Kant himself put forward, the fundamental principle of morality as he formulated it, the system of duties as he presented it, even the moral conclusions he thought followed from them. To write about "Kant's ethics" is to interpret that theory, to show how its parts are supposed to fit together, to relate it to Kant's philosophy as a whole. "Kantian ethics," on the other hand, is an ethical theory formulated in the basic spirit of Kant, drawing on and acknowledging a debt to what the author of the theory takes to be his insights in moral philosophy. Kantian ethics is not merely, or even mainly, an interpretation of what Kant said. It is put forward instead as a theoretical option in thinking about ethical questions and philosophical questions about ethics. It is answerable not to textual accuracy or exegetical standards of Kant interpretation but to the right standards for thinking philosophically about ethical theory and ethical issues.

It should be clearly understood, however, what these standards are – and what they are not. Some philosophers seem to think that each proposition in a theory must be argued for entirely on its own, using arguments that are supposed to persuade anyone at all, even someone with no sympathy whatever for the project in which the theory is engaged. That is a standard that no significant philosophical theory could ever meet. In fact, the best defense of any philosophical conception is always a more or less systematic exposition of it. It is reasonable to ask for arguments on behalf of individual claims, especially fundamental ones, but these too are to be understood in the context of the theory as a whole. A philosophical theory is best defended by letting us see clearly how it conceives its task, how it performs it, and how the resulting conception of the subject matter addresses the questions
reasonable people have about that subject matter. No philosophical theory is going to persuade everyone. What we should look for in a philosophical theory is one that, when presented in this comprehensive way, not only looks appealing, but its rejection also can be seen to incur significant intellectual costs that we should be reluctant to pay.

This means that “Kantian ethics” as I mean the term may sometimes look something like a sympathetic interpretation of Kant’s writings, even if its aim is quite different. Kantian ethics, however, certainly may depart freely from what Kant wrote and thought. It may criticize and modify the theory Kant put forward as well as sympathetically interpret or defend it. The present book is intended as an exercise in Kantian ethics in this sense. But it will also have a lot to say about Kant’s ethics. This is because I do not think the most defensible version of Kantian ethics needs to depart as far from what Kant thought and wrote as most recent practitioners of Kantian ethics do. What is needed instead, in many cases, is only a better understanding of Kant’s own thoughts.

One way of understanding the term ‘Kantian ethics,’ however, involves the at least tacit assumption that we already know what ethics is (from currently fashionable ideas about the aims and methods of ethical theory). “Kantian ethics” is simply a matter of seeing what Kant has to contribute to this project. In my view, however, the main benefit of studying an important figure in the history of philosophy, such as Kant, is that doing so helps us learn that the current philosophical fashions are not the only way to think about things. Philosophers (like other people) have a deplorable tendency to think in terms of entrenched prejudices. On many points, I will criticize standard interpretations of Kant for having interpreted Kant in terms of fashionable assumptions about ethical theory that have frequently been imposed on his writings – sometimes with charitable intent, but often with profoundly distorting effect. In Chapter 3, I argue that Kant’s conception of ethical theory – its aims, methods, and conception of ethical reasoning – differs significantly from prevailing conceptions.

A much better reason for developing Kantian ethics in ways that diverge from Kant himself is indicated by the wry title of Marcia Baron’s book Kantian Ethics (Almost) Without Apology. Those who find Kantian ideas in ethics appealing also sometimes feel that there is something about this for which they need to apologize. No doubt some of Kant’s opinions on particular ethical topics are – or at least seem at first glance to be – so out of touch with enlightened opinion today as to seem either ridiculous or repugnant. But I suspect that those who think we need to apologize for Kantianism in ethics are using these opinions only to confirm a certain traditional image of Kantian moral philosophy. Kant is seen exclusively as a representative of moralistic strictness and sternness, downright hostile to human happiness, mercilessly unsympathetic to human weakness, allowing no place in the moral life for natural human feelings and desires. People may sometimes
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see an element of truth in this aspect of morality, but they view the Kantian version of this truth as wildly exaggerated, one-sided to the point of inhumanity. This image of Kant is colorfully presented by Simon Blackburn:

For Kant, so the contrast goes, there is indeed the Humean crew. But standing above them, in the quarter-deck, there is another voice – a voice with ultimate authority and ultimate power. This is the Captain, the will, yourself as an embodiment of pure practical reason, detached from all desires. The Captain himself is free. But he always stands ready to stop things going wrong with the crew’s handling of the boat. Sometimes, it seems, the happiest ship will have no crew at all, but only a Captain … Thus the Kantian Captain. He is a peculiar figure, a dream – or nightmare – of pure, authentic self-control. He certainly appeals to our wish to be, ourselves, entirely the masters of our own lives, immune in all important respects from the gifts or burdens of our internal animal natures, or of our temperaments as they are formed by contingent nature, socialization, and external surrounds. Context-free, non-natural, and a complete stickler for duty, perhaps the Kantian self is nothing but the sublimation of a patriarchal, authoritarian fantasy.⁴

Even more flamboyant is the following remark by Richard Taylor:

I have known many admirers of Kant, and include myself with them; but if I were ever to find, as I luckily never have, a man who assured me that he really believed Kant’s metaphysical morals, and that he modeled his own conduct and his relations with others after those principles, then my incredulity and distrust of him as a human being could not be greater than if he told me he regularly drowned children just to see them squirm.⁵

The starting point for a less fantastic image of Kantian ethics was well stated by John Rawls. He regarded Kantian ethics “not as a morality of austere command but an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem” (Rawls TJ, p. 256). Kant was a philosopher of the Enlightenment – perhaps the greatest of all Enlightenment philosophers. For Kant, the principle of Enlightenment is: “Think for yourself” (WA 8:35, O 8:146). This means: Take the responsibility for your own actions and convictions. Do not put yourself under the tutelage or authority of others or let them do your thinking for you, however much, in thinking for yourself, you may need to listen to their arguments or treat their expertise as good evidence in the formation of your own judgments. This principle is based on respect for yourself as a rational being, arising from the recognition of rational nature in your own person as an end in itself (G 4:429). The same principle, however, requires you to respect rational nature in the person of every other human being. Each human being, as rationally self-governing according to universally valid standards, has dignity or absolute worth (G 4:431–6). Because the worth of every human being is absolute, the worth of all persons is fundamentally equal.

Kant’s moral outlook, in its fundamentals, is a characteristically Enlightenment outlook. In its time the Enlightenment was an important part of an
emerging intellectual movement, a way of thinking that still exists today. In
the eighteenth century this outlook was strongly opposed by antirationalistic
and traditionalist ways of thinking, and it is still under attack in our time both
from antirationalists and conservatives. To see Kantian ethics only through
the lens of malicious or condescending caricatures is therefore not only to
misread an influential historical philosopher but also to blind yourself to
a lot of the ongoing cultural life of modernity. If you are on the Enlight-
enment side of the ongoing struggle, then to confuse Kantian ethics with
your own nightmares about moral authoritarianism is to mistake one of your
closest friends for one of your worst enemies.

2. Human Nature

To Rawls’s felicitous formulation I want to add something else almost as
important. Kant’s moral outlook is also fundamentally determined by a
subtle, shrewd, historically self-conscious (and characteristically Enlighten-
ment) conception of human nature and human psychology that most treat-
ments of Kantian ethics (even sympathetic ones) have largely overlooked.
This side of Kant owes a great deal to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and it belongs
to a radical tradition in the social criticism of modernity whose later rep-
resentatives include Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Karl Marx. The Kantian
mistrust of our empirical desires reflects a Rousseauian picture of the way
our natural desires have been influenced by the loss of innocence – the
restless competitiveness – characteristic of human beings in the social con-
dition, especially as found in the social inequalities of what Rousseau and
Kant called the “civilized” stage of human society but was later renamed
“modern bourgeois society” or “capitalism.” Again, to miss this continuity
is not only to misread Kant; it is badly to misread the history, and even the
living reality, of the social order that is all around us.

Kant’s famous mistrust of our empirical “inclinations” is mistrust of
“nature” only insofar as our nature has been shaped by society. Kant asserts (as
explicitly as it would be possible for him to do) that there is nothing at all in
our “animality” – our animal instincts for survival, reproduction, and soci-
bility – that could be called “evil” or held responsible for it. Our inclinations,
considered in themselves, as expressions of our bodily or animal nature are
entirely good and “display themselves openly” for what they are. Kant holds
that they become evil only insofar as vices have been “grafted onto them” by
“an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and is hence all the more
dangerous” (R 6:26–7, 57). This enemy is competitiveness, social inequality,
the passion for domination over others.

Rousseau called it amour propre (Rousseau D, pp. 36, 53–4, 90; Rousseau
E, pp. 172–6). Kant has various names for it. Alluding to Montaigne, he
calls it “unsociable sociability” (I 8:20), but at other times “self-conceit” (KpV
5:75), or, finally, the “radical propensity to evil” (R 6:28–32). For Kant, as
for Rousseau, this propensity develops along with our reason, hence only in
the social condition (R 6:27).

It is not the instigation of nature that arouses what should properly be called the
passions, which wreak such great devastation in his originally good [animal] predis-
position. His needs are but limited and his state of mind in providing for them is
moderate and tranquil. He is poor (or considers himself so) only to the extent that
he is anxious that other human beings will consider him poor and will despise him
for it. Envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated
with these, assail his nature, which on its own is undemanding, as soon as he is among
human beings. Nor is it necessary to assume that these are sunk into evil and are
examples that lead him astray: it suffices that they are there, that they surround him,
and that they are human beings, and they will mutually corrupt each other’s moral
disposition and make one another evil. (R 6:93–4)

Against those theories that want to ground ethics on natural feelings,
inclinations, or passions (such as sympathy), Kant has two main objections.
One is that feelings and inclinations do not suffice to ground clear and
determinate principles for action. But the deeper objection is that in human
beings, no feelings, empirical desires, or passions are merely “natural” – that
is, good or innocent. All are at the same time social (and socially corrupted),
so that the most we can expect from them is a correspondence to what
is morally good that is contingent and at best precarious. Ethical theories
grounded on them therefore might give the right results for a different
species of rational creatures, a species that was asocial or whose sociability
was not, like ours, infected with self-conceited ambition and a passionate
need to dominate our fellows. When applied to us, such theories are either
too naïve or too complacent, especially in the context of our more developed
or “civilized” societies.

In other words, Kantian ethics is fundamentally committed to a radical
critique of human social life, especially of social life in its “civilized” form.
This critical tendency is not a mere ancillary feature or contingent concomi-
tant of Kantian ethics. It conditions the fundamental conception of Kantian
ethical theory. For it is Kant’s view that our only resource in combating the
radical evil of our social condition is the faculty of reason, whose develop-
ment accompanies that of our propensity to evil, and which alone enables
us to recognize evil for what it is. This is why moral principles for Kant must
be a priori rather than empirical in origin, and why we cannot trust our nat-
ural feelings, inclinations, or passions to provide us with moral distinctions,
judgments, and motives.

Our use of reason itself, of course, is subject to the very same subversion as
natural feelings and desires. Ordinary moral thinking, Kant says, is therefore
vulnerable to a “dialectic” in which we tend to quibble with the demands
of morality or adjust them to our wishes (G 4:405). Wouldn’t it be nice
if we had some other faculty, or some infallible (divine) source of moral
wisdom that is not subject to such corruption? But even supposing we did have such a source, our use of it would still be conditioned by our own interpretation, which would necessarily be our own thinking, hence subject to the same fallibility and corruption. Some circumvent this inconvenience either by saying that they are taking the word of this source “literally,” or else by attributing their interpretation to the same infallible sources. It is almost charming how naively they thereby assert what is now obviously only their own infallibility. Such blasphemous arrogance would be only comical if its real-world consequences were less monstrous.

Thus in the end there is no escaping the fact that human reason – feeble, fallible, imperfect, corrupted reason – is always our last resort, even our only ultimate resource, for criticizing everything, including our own misunderstandings and abuses of reason itself. Kant’s “critique of reason” thus takes “reason” in both the objective and subjective genitive – it is a critique carried out by reason upon reason. We rely on reason to criticize feelings, desires, inspirations, revelations, and even reason itself, not because it is infallible but rather because it is only through reason that we have the capacity to criticize or correct anything at all.

Kant’s ethical theory holds that every human being has equal dignity as an end in itself, but his theory of human nature and history is based on the idea that civilized human beings tend to assert their self-worth antagonistically in relation to others, seeking superiority over them. Kant is sensitive to this tendency at work in all our desires, and also to the way it leads us to deceive ourselves about our own motives, our merits, and about what morality demands of us. He therefore thinks we need to guard against our corrupt tendency to quibble with the strictness of the moral law and make exceptions to moral rules in our own favor. This is even the reason why Kant thinks we need moral philosophy in addition to moral common sense or “common rational moral cognition” (G 4:405).

Kant thinks that the chief benefit of our social condition, in combating the evils that come along with it, is the development of reason – which he understands as the capacity to regulate our conduct by universal principles of respect and concern that we are capable of sharing with other rational beings. Reason is a capacity for self-government (which Kant emphasizes that human beings exercise with only very limited success) based on mutual respect and free communication, yielding a system of principles people can all share, and aiming at what he calls a “realm of ends,” a system of human ends that can be rationally shared between all people because the dignity and welfare of all rational beings are equally included in it.

3. Gender and Race

Through the intellectual and cultural movement the eighteenth century called “Enlightenment,” modernity is still struggling to free itself from the
chains and the pollution of traditional ideas and traditional ways of life and find a path toward a more rational and decent human future. In the writings of eighteenth-century representatives of this movement, we sometimes find a torch we may still use to light our way. At other times, however, we see them fettered by the very traditions – cultural or religious – from which, in their best thoughts, they were still trying to free themselves. Kant may be the greatest philosopher of the Enlightenment, but in this way he is also typical of it.

Kant’s view of women. There are some special worries in this respect about Kant’s views on race and gender. Although Kant’s ethics is based on radically egalitarian principles, Kant accepted quite complacently the social and political subordination of women that prevailed in his time, and in some of his writings on anthropology he expressed views that can be described only as racist. The enterprise of interpretation, moreover, is sufficiently holistic in character that we cannot automatically dismiss the thought that these views might possibly require us to qualify in disturbing ways the seemingly egalitarian principles on which Kantian ethics appears to rest. It has been maintained, for example, that when Kant speaks of the dignity or absolute worth of humanity or rational nature, the referent of these terms must be understood as restricted only to white males.5

Such an extreme conclusion as that, however, is rendered indefensible by Kant’s explicit statements including women and human beings of any and all races as rational beings and hence as falling within the scope of principles of right. For example, Kant’s entire theory of marriage right, however repugnant parts of it may be, is motivated mainly by the need to protect the rights and human dignity of women. It is nevertheless true that he regarded women as weaker than men not only physically but also intellectually and thought it appropriate that they should be in a permanent condition of civil guardianship (Vormundschaft), represented in the public sphere by their fathers or husbands (VA 7:209).

Kant is a subject of lively controversy among feminist philosophers, some of whom see his entire moral philosophy as nothing but an ideology of patriarchy and male supremacy, while others regard Kantian ethics as the original articulation of principles of morality and right that are indispensable to women’s liberation and equality of the sexes.6 Some of these issues will be addressed later, in Chapter 13. It is also relevant to point out that the criticisms of the former group of feminists often tend to follow a pattern of Kant interpretation and criticism that is by no means characteristically feminist but familiar from Romantic, Hegelian, virtue ethics, and other older traditions.7 This is precisely the misreading of Kantian ethics I have criticized above and will continue to criticize, especially in Chapters 2 and 8.

Kant on the inferiority of nonwhite races. During the 1770s and 1780s, Kant became increasingly interested in the empirical study of human nature, and one side of this was the development of a theory of race. He held that
the human species was biologically one, but that differing geographical conditions, leading to different modes of life, resulted in the differentiation of the species into four different races: white, yellow Indian (Asian), black (African), and copper-red Indian (American).

Kant never says in so many words that the white race is superior to the others, but he obviously regards the greatest achievements of the “yellow” race as belonging to the past, the “black” race as capable of discipline and industry but not of further cultural development, and he thinks of American Indians as occupying the lowest level of all: They have been stunted, in his view, by the fact that their ancestors developed in a very different climate and later migrated to one unsuited to them. He even conjectures that American Indians may be in the process of dying out – though he regarded the active extermination of them by whites as “gruesome” (VA 25: 840). In print, Kant presented these views in Of the Different Races of Human Beings (1775) and Determination of the Concept of Race (1785). In an essay with the seemingly innocuous title On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788) Kant then defended the more pernicious aspects of his theory of race, as part of a controversy with Georg Forster, a much more farsighted thinker on this topic, who had lived among non-Europeans and challenged the racist preconceptions then prevailing among Europeans.8

Kant argues that certain races have developed under geographical conditions that make them incapable of adaptation to other climates or ways of life. This in effect pretty clearly underwrites a kind of racial hierarchy, in which only the white race has developed under conditions suitable for making contributions to the future progress of the human species. Nonwhite races, especially the Negro, are presented as fit only for manual labor directed by Europeans (TPP 8:173–5). Though Kant never directly defends the institution of black slavery, in a footnote he quotes with approval the observations of a German opponent of its abolition, who claims that freed slaves generally lose the laboring skills they formerly possessed (TPP 8:174n). Some have argued that Kant’s theory of race played an influential role in the development of dominant racist theories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.9 Though I do not pretend to know the details of the intellectual history involved, this seems to me quite plausible.

One natural response to this situation is to claim that although Kant regarded nonwhite races as inferior to whites, he also held on basic philosophical grounds an egalitarian position about all human beings regardless of gender or race, and it is this latter position that matters to Kantian ethics.10 This has been the main response, in fact, by the leading writers on Kantian ethics who have addressed this issue.11

The controversy often seems to be between those who take philosophical principles seriously and those who are skeptical about the whole project of systematic philosophy, and especially the serious study of its history for the philosophical insights that may be obtained both from its achievements and
from critical reflections on it. For the attacks on political grounds are never aimed at achieving philosophical insights of any kind. (Often enough, it remains wholly obscure what philosophical conclusions, if any, the attackers intend us to draw from their sensational exposés.) And Kant is far from being the only philosopher who can be attacked in this way: Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Mill . . . virtually every significant figure in the history of philosophy is vulnerable to attack in this manner. The critics apparently think we can learn something worthwhile from reading a past philosopher only when we examine, as artifacts of intellectual history, his (often flawed) judgments about particular social issues and situations, interpreting his philosophical claims only as a set of disingenuous ideological rationalizations for these judgments.

I suspect part of the motivation for these attacks is based on a mistaken analogy between the right way to view historical philosophers and the right way to view present-day political figures. When we hear a politician stating grand ethical principles, within which his actions and stands on particular issues stand in blatant contradiction, the natural conclusion to draw is that his moral pronouncements are hypocritical and should not be taken seriously. Thus it may be tempting to look similarly at the analogous phenomenon in the case of important figures in the history of philosophy. We show our own enlightened outlook and critical distance from these dead white men not by being taken in by their high-sounding philosophical pronouncements but by revealing with merciless accuracy the naked historical facts about their dreadful political opinions.

This seems to me a fundamentally wrong way to look at the matter. For one thing, great figures in the history of philosophy are often great precisely because their insights into highly abstract matters of principle far outrun the capacity of their own time – and often enough, also their own capacity – to understand fully what these insights mean in practice. To see this gap – either in the case of the philosopher or in the case of the entire age – as a case of simple hypocrisy is to misunderstand badly the relation of important philosophical principles to the historical conditions of their genesis. To a more judicious way of looking at things, it might even be expected that the greatest philosophical insights will be those that furthest outrun the philosopher’s own ability to absorb and apply them. Kant’s assertion of the equal dignity of rational nature in all persons is a striking example of this, when we come to some of his opinions about the family, political, and economic relations, and the concept of race.

The other main disanalogy between the historical philosopher and the hypocritical politician is that when we study texts in the history of philosophy in order to learn from them, we should care only marginally, if at all, about the moral character of the philosopher. Politicians are people who wield power over us, and it is important that we be able to have personal trust in their sincere adherence to the principles they advocate. This is not true of
long-dead philosophers whose texts we study, or at least it should not be. What we learn from them should rest not on the author’s moral authority but on the content of the doctrines and the strength of the arguments for them. Whether Kant’s personal adherence to the moral principles he articulated was sincere or hypocritical might be of interest to biographers, but it should be of little or no interest to philosophers today who are attempting to construct a Kantian ethical theory.  

Did Kant change his views on race in the 1790s? However we decide this question, new light has recently been shed on the issue by Pauline Kleingeld. She argues, quite plausibly, that Kant’s views on the topic of race underwent a dramatic change around 1792–3, probably as a consequence of his increasing interest in questions of right and justice. He never openly repudiated his racial theory of the 1770s and 1780s, but the observations about race present in his lectures on anthropology throughout the 1780s are conspicuously absent from *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Standpoint* (1798). There the entire topic of race is dealt with in two brief paragraphs: The first praises a book by C. G. Girtanner that proposed to expound Kantian views on natural history but whose treatment of race was devoted mainly to the argument that racial differences are entirely matters of anatomy and physiology and provide no “moral characterization.” The second defends the claim that “the fusion of races” promotes vitality and fertility among the offspring, while proximity of kinship has the opposite tendency (VA 7:320–1).

In his writings on right in the 1790s, Kant adds to the traditional headings of “right of the state” and “right of nations” a new heading: “cosmopolitan right,” which includes principles that are supposed to govern the commerce between people of different nations (EF 8:357–60, MS 6:352–4). Under this heading, Kant mounts a remorseless attack on the injustices perpetrated by Europeans in their dealings with other peoples. Kant’s position probably comes to fullest expression in the following remarks from *Perpetual Peace*.

If one compares with [this right of hospitality] the inhospitable behavior of civilized, especially commercial, states in our part of the world, the injustice they show in *visiting* foreign lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to *conquering* them) goes to horrifying lengths. When America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered, they were, to them, countries belonging to no one, since they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In the East Indies (Hindustan), they brought in foreign soldiers under the pretext of merely proposing to set up trading posts, but with them oppression of the inhabitants, incitement of the various Indian states to widespread wars, famine, rebellions, treachery, and the whole litany of troubles that oppress the human race.

China and Japan (*Nippon*), which had given such guests a try, have therefore wisely [placed restrictions on them], the former allowing them access but not entry, the latter even allowing access to only a single European people, the Dutch, but excluding them, like prisoners, from community with the natives. The worst of this (or