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CICERO

On Moral Ends

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Preface

For helpful comments on the Introduction and notes I am very grateful to Desmond Clarke, Hilary Gaskin, Raphael Woolf, Daniel Russell and Alison Futrell. I am especially grateful to Alison Futrell, my colleague in Roman History, for help with a number of Roman issues, from the Voconian law to the excess, in this work, of members of the Licinius Crassus family called Marcus. I also owe thanks to all the students, graduate and undergraduate, to whom I have taught this work in my courses on ancient ethics, and who have helped me come to see the difficulties it presents for a modern reader. I am grateful for the work of scholars who have, in the last decades, produced new translations of important texts from the Hellenistic or post-Aristotelian period of ancient philosophy, and have helped in the process of making the theories of the Stoics, Epicureans and even eclectics like Antiochus part of the normal syllabus in ancient philosophy. I hope that this new translation and edition will make Cicero's text more accessible to a wide audience interested in ancient ethics.

It has been a pleasure to work with Raphael Woolf, who has produced a translation which is not only philosophically accurate but also stylish in Cicero's manner without expanding the English to twice the length of the Latin. In writing the Introduction and notes I have also been helped by older editions and translations, particularly the older edition of Madvig, and the translations and comments in the Budé and Loeb editions. I have aimed to introduce the work to readers who need some help with the Greco-Roman cultural background that Cicero takes for granted, and who also need, fully to appreciate the arguments, some orientation as to the philosophical background to the debates which Cicero develops. Since the audience for this book will be diverse – people interested in some or all of philosophy, ethics, history, the classical world and the history of ideas – the help I have provided will inevitably be too much for some and too little for others. I hope, however, that it will at least help many people to begin their own engagement with Cicero's debates. Cicero thinks through the arguments that he sets out in order to help the reader, and himself, find the right answer to the major issue in ethics: how we should live. It is an issue that still deserves our attention today.

JULIA ANNAS

Introduction

In June 45¹ Marcus Tullius Cicero composed *On Moral Ends*, a treatment in three dialogues, over five books, of fundamental issues of moral philosophy. The sixty-one year old Cicero, a Roman statesman with an eventful and distinguished career, had gone into political retirement during the ascendancy to supreme power of Julius Caesar after a turbulent period of civil war, in which Cicero had ended up on the losing side. His personal life had also fallen apart. In 46 he divorced Terentia, his wife of thirty years, and married his young ward Publilia. The marriage broke up less than a year later, partly because of Cicero's extreme sorrow at the death in childbirth of his much-loved daughter Tullia, together with her baby, in February 45. A productive writer, he decided to use his enforced and grief-stricken leisure to introduce educated Romans to major parts of the subject of philosophy in their own language, rather than leaving them to read the originals in Greek.² *On Moral Ends* is the most theoretical of the works on moral philosophy, accompanied by more specialized discussions in *On Duties* and *Tusculan Disputations* and the more 'applied' *Friendship*, *Old Age* and *Reputation*.

On Moral Ends is a substantial work of moral philosophy. There have been periods when it has been an influential part of the discourse of moral theory, and it has always been a valuable source for the three moral theories it discusses, those of Epicurus, the Stoics and Antiochus (the last a hybrid influenced by Aristotle). The modern reader, however, will probably find some aspects of the work puzzling, and an introduction to it is usefully framed round answering three questions which are likely to occur to us.

- (1) Why is a work on moral theory in dialogue form, specifically in three dialogues, in each of which a theory is first put forward and then attacked?
- (2) Why does a work on moral theory focus on our ends or goals (the title *De Finibus* is often translated 'final ends') rather than, say, right action or duty?

¹ All dates are BC unless otherwise noted.

² In the introduction to the second book of *On Divination*, one of these works of philosophy, he discusses the carrying-out of this plan.

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- (3) Why these theories? And, given that Cicero aims to cover the most important theories, where are Plato and Aristotle?

The sceptical method of ethics

Modern books do not typically introduce you to ethics by arguing for and then against theories. Cicero, however, aims to introduce his readers not just to the content of three ethical theories but to thinking about them philosophically, and for him this involves arguing for *and against* them. This is because he writes as an Academic Sceptic – a sceptic, that is, from Plato's Academy.

Plato pointedly refrains from presenting philosophical ideas in the form of treatises which give doctrines to be absorbed by the reader; he writes dialogues, in which ideas are discussed rather than presented on authority. The major figure in his dialogues, Socrates, sometimes puts forward positive claims of his own, and sometimes argues against the positions of others; when he does the latter, the arguments are always *ad hominem* – not in the modern sense of attacking the person rather than the position, but in the sense of using only premises accepted by the interlocutor, and showing him that his position has problems which are internal to it, and do not depend on accepting any of Socrates' own claims. Socrates' arguments against the positions of others reveal how far they are from having adequate rational support for their claims, and how ill-advised they are to hold them confidently. The positive ideas that Plato gives to Socrates and others³ are put forward as ideas which should themselves be subject to the same kind of probing; in the *Parmenides* this happens in the dialogue, while elsewhere this task is left to the reader to take up.

Plato's legacy has been a divided one, with some thinkers focussing on the positive ideas and systematizing them, taking the resulting doctrines to be 'Plato's philosophy', while others have taken up the project, identified with Socrates, of philosophy as the activity of searching for truth by questioning the positions of people who claim to have found it.

Plato's immediate successors, later grouped together as the 'Old Academy', were apparently as interested in developing their own ideas as in studying Plato's. His nephew Speusippus and his successor Xenocrates developed mathematized metaphysical systems; the figure of most importance for later moral philosophy was Polemon, about whose ideas we know little directly, but who was influential in holding that nature was in some way a basis for ethics – and meaning by that, *human* nature.

In 265 there was a radical change, mentioned by Cicero in book II, 2 (cf. book V, 10). The Academy was taken over by a new head, Arcesilaus, who brought in the idea that philosophizing in the spirit of Plato was doing what

³ In many dialogues Socrates becomes a recessive figure, and it is left to figures like the Visitor from Elea or an anonymous Athenian to lay out positive claims.

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Socrates is represented as doing, namely questioning others on their own grounds rather than putting forward positive ideas of your own. In his teaching methods Arcesilaus went back to Socrates, refusing to hold forth himself and always questioning others. The Sceptical⁴ (or 'New') Academy flourished; its targets were contemporary ones just as those of Socrates had been, and its best-known debates were with the Stoics, the most sophisticated philosophical school holding positive and systematic doctrines. Arcesilaus' most distinguished successor was Carneades (214–129/8), a powerful arguer who classified and systematized arguments and positions (*On Moral Ends* is indebted to his classification of moral theories and to many of his arguments). Like Socrates, the Sceptical Academics wrote nothing; one of Carneades' pupils, Cleitomachus, recorded 200 books of his arguments, but claimed to know nothing of the positions, if any, that Carneades committed himself to.

The last head of the Sceptical Academy, Philo of Larisa, moved from Athens to Rome about 88. Athens was undergoing violent political upheavals, and changed sides, committing itself to the anti-Roman side in the war involving King Mithridates of Pontus. In 86 the ruthless Roman general Lucius Cornelius Sulla punished this betrayal by sacking and plundering Athens, carrying off huge amounts of booty. Scholars generally agree that in this general state of ruin the philosophical schools, including those of Plato and Aristotle, came to an end as institutions. Their philosophy continued to be taught, but the successions of heads going back to the founders were broken.⁵ Cicero thinks of the Sceptical Academy as a philosophy one can learn and teach anywhere, not as an institution specific to Athens.

From an early age Cicero was interested in philosophy as well as the rhetorical skills necessary for success in Roman politics. Around 88 he went to lectures in Rome by the Epicurean Phaedrus as well as the Academic Sceptic Philo of Larisa. In 79 he spent time in Athens (depicted at the start of book v) attending lectures by Antiochus of Ascalon (to whom we shall return). He was taught by a Stoic, Diodotus, who lived in his household until he died in 60. Cicero's knowledge of philosophy is thorough, and based on having worked through the arguments, not on superficial acquaintance with the ideas.

From his encounter with Philo of Larisa onwards Cicero identified himself as an Academic Sceptic; that is, to him philosophy consists essentially in the activity of seeking truth by discussing and arguing against the positions of others, rather than by thinking up your own position to hold or adopting someone else's. In ethics, this involves familiarizing yourself with

⁴ 'Sceptical' here retains the idea of philosophy as investigating or inquiring (the meaning of the Greek verb *skeptesthai*) rather than a dogmatically negative denial of various positive claims, as the modern notion of scepticism implies.

⁵ J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (*Hypomnemata* 56), Göttingen 1978; J. Lynch, *Aristotle's School*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1972. In book v, where Romans are living in Athens and going to philosophy lectures, the Academy is deserted and Antiochus is teaching his new philosophy in a more recent building.

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the theories which are current, working through the arguments for them and testing them by seeing how well they stand up to critical examination. The result, according to the Sceptical Academics, is that it turns out that none of the theories available warrants commitment to it. All have rational advantages – good arguments for them and against opponents – but they also all have rational flaws – arguments against them and internal weaknesses. A person interested in really searching inquiry thus has to withhold assent to any of them. This does not leave her with nothing; continued examination of the arguments for and against the theories produces in a fair-minded person the unavoidable impression that some of the theories are preferable to others, even though none of the preferable theories warrants whole-hearted assent. Thus Cicero clearly thinks that Epicureanism is a far weaker ethical theory than either Stoic ethics or a more Aristotelian theory; but the fact that he does not take Epicurus seriously as an option does not make it possible for him to decide firmly for or against Stoic ethics, and indeed Cicero appears to have gone back and forth on the arguments for and against the Stoic view all his life.

We can now see why *On Moral Ends* has the form it does; serious engagement with ethical theories involves learning not just what the positions are, but the arguments for and against adopting them. Only when the reader gets involved in thinking through the pros and cons of a position is she thinking for herself about it, and this is the crucial aspect of Plato's tradition of doing philosophy, according to the Academic Sceptics. It is not surprising that this mode of approaching philosophical issues should appeal to Cicero, who was famous for his argumentative talents in the law-courts. Someone notable for his success in both prosecuting and defending will naturally be aware of the distance between arguing for a case (and thus summoning up all the reasons for it and against the opponent) and being personally committed to it. They will also be open to the idea that the adversarial method of arguing for and against a claim, while open to rhetorical abuse, is a good method for finding the truth.

There is a complication, or rather there are two. As Plato's Academy came to its end, there were two developments, of which the second was important to Cicero, while he seems unaware of the first.

After many years of arguing against the Stoics in their own terms, the Sceptical Academy seems to have settled into a position of taking a Stoic framework for granted as the location of most of their arguments. One dissident member, Aenesidemus, grew to resent this narrowing of their argumentative horizons, and broke away to refound a more radically sceptical school, which he named after Pyrrho, a philosopher who had earlier argued for a sceptical way of living, but who wrote nothing and left no philosophical school. We know a lot about this new Pyrrhonian version of scepticism, because we possess extensive writings by a later Pyrrhonian sceptic, Sextus Empiricus. It is puzzling, though, that Cicero shows no awareness of this breakaway from

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the Academy.⁶ When he refers to Pyrrho, it is only to the idea that he gives us no rational way of deciding everyday matters; Cicero regards this as an unserious position, and also as a basically ethical, rather than sceptical one. As a result, he does not associate philosophical scepticism with ideas which are familiar to us from later Pyrrhonism, such as that scepticism leads to tranquillity and is a way to happiness. For Cicero scepticism is simply the position of those who rigorously search for the truth.

Another dissident in the last days of the Academy was Antiochus of Ascalon, who made an equally radical move in the other direction, away from detached refusal to make a commitment. Antiochus reacted against a centuries-old tradition of adversarial argument and emphasis on differences between philosophical positions by looking instead for common ground and areas of agreement. Still seeing himself as being in the Platonic tradition, he claimed that Plato's true legacy was not endless inconclusive argument but rather certain prominent themes and ideas. Moreover, Antiochus claimed, these ideas were to be found not only in Plato's own work but in that of his immediate successors in the Academy, including Aristotle, and even, as we shall see, in that of the Stoics. Antiochus claimed to go back to what he called the 'Old Academy', rejecting the Sceptical, 'New' Academy as a development untrue to what is central to Plato, and thus as a false Platonic tradition. (This was a momentous move; from now on, anyone seeing himself or herself as being in Plato's tradition had to face the issue of whether the Academy had two traditions (sceptical and doctrinal) or only one, and, if one, which it was.)

In Antiochus' view, there was a single 'Old Academy' tradition, which we find explicated by Cicero in books IV (3–15) and V (9–14). Platonists and Aristotelians, he claims, agree on fundamentals and can be regarded as a single tradition. Moreover, this tradition includes one of the new schools of the Hellenistic period, the Stoics. Zeno of Citium had set up a new philosophical school around 300 in the Stoa Poikile or Painted Porch in Athens, a school which after some dispersal under Zeno's pupils had been re-established by the powerful and productive Chrysippus. In many ways the Stoics introduce radically new ideas, and initially their position was strongly marked off from those of Plato and Aristotle. They are physicalists with no use for the Platonic or Aristotelian notions of form; they have a strikingly new system of logic; and in ethics they maintain a number of uncompromising theses: nothing is good except virtue, virtue is sufficient for happiness, emotions are always faulty, there are no gradations between virtue and vice.

⁶ It is particularly puzzling because one of Aenesidemus' works was dedicated to Lucius Aelius Tubero 'from the Academy', an intimate friend of Cicero's. It has been denied that Aenesidemus was an Academic (which would solve this problem); see Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, 'Aenesidemus and the Academy', *Classical Quarterly* 42 (1992), 176–89; but this claim is effectively attacked by Jaap Mansfeld, 'Aenesidemus and the Academics', in L. Ayres (ed.), *The Passionate Intellect*, New Brunswick and London, 1995, Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities VII, 235–48.

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Antiochus, however, downplays the differences between his single Academy tradition and the upstart Stoics. All they are really doing, he claims, is to introduce new technical terms; the basic underlying ideas are the same. (This is an argument which is prominent in *On Moral Ends*.) On all important matters, Antiochus claims, the Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics stand together. They stand united against the Epicureans, who disagree with all of them on most major points.

Antiochus' claim seems to modern eyes hopelessly unhistorical. It seems obvious to us, for example, that Aristotle diverges from Plato quite strongly at some points, and that the Stoics, who are physicalists, have metaphysical and epistemological positions which cannot be reconciled with anything in Plato. Awkward questions can easily be raised, such as, 'Where in this combined tradition are Plato's forms?' We should remember, however, that Antiochus was not a historian; he was a philosopher trying to find high-level similarities and to downplay the differences on which so much inconclusive argument had been lavished.⁷ His emphases also reflect the interests of his day; the issue of Plato's forms, central to us, was uninteresting to contemporary debates. Further, for Antiochus, establishing the tradition of the 'Old Academy' was a matter of self-definition, not description of someone else's ideas, and so we should not judge him by historical standards. The result he aimed at is not an academic synthesis but a philosophy to live by.

From the passages in books iv and v we get some idea of Antiochus' hybrid theory as a whole; what matters for *On Moral Ends* was his attempt to put together a theory combining the advantages of Stoic and Aristotelian moral theory, while discarding their disadvantages. Modern histories of ethics have not been kind to Antiochus, either ignoring his theory or dismissing it, but the reader who persists with the arguments of books iv and v will get a better sense of what is at stake, in terms of both arguments and of motivation, in the ethical debate between Stoics and Aristotelians.

Cicero had studied with Antiochus at Athens in 79 (as is depicted in book v) and, although he casts himself as the theory's opponent in that book, was sympathetic to Antiochus' project, knew it thoroughly and was influenced by it. Some interpreters have seen in Antiochus a straightforward opponent to the influence of Philo and thus to Cicero's stance; after all, Antiochus and Philo represented conflicting views of Plato's philosophical tradition: Antiochus seeing it as doctrinal, Philo as sceptical. An Academic Sceptic, however, is committed to searching for the truth through inquiry and argument; nothing prevents him from seriously considering positive views, and we would expect him to be interested in promising new developments in philosophy. As long as he remains open-minded and detached from wholehearted commitment, there is no reason why he should not take on Antiochus' position, or any other, for

⁷ Cf. Jonathan Barnes, 'Antiochus of Ascalon', in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds.), *Philosophia Togata I*, Oxford 1989, 51–96.

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purposes of argument or developing that position.⁸ Indeed, it is perfectly consistent for him to claim that this is the most convincing position to hold, as long as he continues to be open-minded about alternatives.

There is no need, therefore, to conclude that Cicero's philosophical perspective underwent radical changes on the ground that the philosophical works composed at the end of his life are written from an overtly Academic point of view, whereas works he wrote earlier (54–51) are not. These early works, which unfortunately we possess only in part, are his *On the State* (*De Re Publica*) and *On Laws* (*De Legibus*). As we can tell from the titles, they have Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* as literary models, and if read in isolation would not indicate that the author was an Academic. This is not a problem, however, if we take it that Cicero found these positions to be the most convincing on the subject; an Academic goes with the most convincing option available so far.⁹ In these works he puts forward views about the state which he finds the most convincing. In the works written at the end of his life he has a different aim; he is introducing the reader to philosophical engagement with the major positions that philosophers debate. To do this he has to give a sense of the difficulties involved, and hence all three theories are presented as matters of debate, on which she has to make up her own mind, something which requires understanding and engaging with the arguments. Cicero does not pretend to be neutral himself, and he uses his rhetorical expertise to present the positions in appropriate ways. We see the same skills he deploys in his courtroom speeches, only put to a more worthwhile and intellectually serious end – for what could be more important to the reader than working out for herself which is the right way to live?

The most important function of the dialogue form is thus its epistemological one, the way it forces readers to think for themselves about the ideas being presented. There are other, more literary advantages. One is that the major speakers are characterized in ways that illuminate for the reader the ideas they present. Minor roles apart, there are four important characters in the work.

The spokesperson for Epicureanism is Lucius Manlius Torquatus, descendant of a famous and ancient noble family which, after a period of relative mediocrity, has become politically prominent again; Torquatus' father had been consul, the highest Roman elected office, in 65, and in 50, the dramatic

⁸ This open-mindedness cannot extend to Antiochus' theory of knowledge, however, which adopts the Stoic view that we can have at least some 'apprehensions' or instances where we can not be wrong; despite the fragmentary nature of Cicero's works on epistemology (the *Academica*) it is clear that he is opposed to Antiochus on this front.

⁹ John Glucker has argued that Cicero's attitude changes twice; see 'Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations', in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), *The Question of 'Eclecticism': Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, Berkeley 1988, 34–69. This is countered by Woldemar Görler in 'Silencing the Troublemaker: *De Legibus* I.39 and the Continuity of Cicero's Scepticism', in J. G. F. Powell (ed.), *Cicero the Philosopher*, Oxford 1995, 85–113; see also the Introduction by J. G. F. Powell in the same volume, 1–35. It is not a problem, then, that Cicero can, when putting forward a position or set of arguments, criticize the Sceptical Academy itself (as *De Legibus* I 39 and *On Moral Ends* II (43).

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date of the dialogue, Torquatus has been elected to the next-highest office of praetor and is looking forward to becoming consul himself. Cicero's readers know that this never happened; on the losing Pompeian side in the civil war, Torquatus was killed in 48 after military defeat.¹⁰ As Cicero presents it, Epicureanism is an inappropriate and ridiculous philosophy for a successful politician to hold. Torquatus is depicted as having got hold of a few simple ideas, presenting them in a crude, bludgeoning way and unable to argue for them or meet criticisms; he is constantly deferential to Epicurus, reverently quoting or paraphrasing the Master's words. Cicero intends these touches to be not only critical of Epicureanism but an indication that it does not fit a Roman political and military life.

Marcus Porcius Cato ('Cato the Younger'), on the other hand, is an appropriate figure to present Stoic ethics. Cato's great-grandfather, 'Cato the Censor', was a figure of legendary severity, and Cato himself famous for being stubborn and unyielding on principle, a trait frequently frustrating to Cicero in his public career. Cato was attracted to Stoicism, and his death transformed him into a Stoic martyr; after defeat at the battle of Thapsus in 46, Cato refused Caesar's pardon and committed suicide rather than compromise with the destruction of the old Roman constitutional order. Writing soon after Cato's death, Cicero portrays him respectfully, as someone who thoroughly understands Stoic theory; the reader is expected to know that he died in accordance with its principles. His precision and pedantry in constantly referring to original Greek terms, together with his lack of tact at the beginning and his point-by-point rather than flowing presentation, similarly reflect an unwillingness to compromise or popularize his presentation.

Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus defends Antiochus' theory in book v. Consul in 61, he had been born into the powerful Calpurnius Piso family, then adopted by Marcus Pupius. In his youth he was a promising orator, and also a friend of Cicero's. Later in life he gave up oratory (*Brutus* 236) and adopted political courses which brought him into conflict with Cicero. The positive portrayal of Piso, and his ample oratorical exposition of Antiochus' theory, hark back to happier and more co-operative days when he and Cicero studied together, and is also suited to Cicero's assessment of that theory as stronger on rhetorical appeal than on philosophical substance.

What of the fourth major figure? Although he is called Cicero, he is not to be straightforwardly identified with the author Marcus Tullius Cicero. 'Cicero' is the figure who shows us that the searcher for truth will take positions seriously, but always be open to the force of arguments against them. Here 'Cicero' serves the author's purpose in arguing against all the positive theories. In other works he can be found defending some of them. In his own

¹⁰ See J. F. Mitchell, 'The Torquati', *Historia* 15 (1966), 23–31. In 62 Torquatus was the prosecutor when Cicero successfully defended Publius Cornelius Sulla on a charge of public violence. At *Brutus* 265–6 Torquatus is respectfully remembered, along with Triarius, as a good friend of both Cicero and Brutus.

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dialogues Plato presents his teacher Socrates as doing both of these tasks. When Cicero, less modest than Plato, needs a Socrates figure he does not hesitate to cast himself in the role.

One final advantage of the dialogue form is that it allows Cicero, the author, to portray appealing settings which give the conversations contexts that would have significance for his readers. Here the settings of the first two dialogues, Roman country houses, are sketched only barely. The book v setting is more substantial; we are in Athens in 79, where Cicero and other Roman friends are going to philosophy lectures and, like modern tourists, visiting famous historical sites. Among these sites is the now-deserted Academy, where the philosophically inclined wax nostalgic. There is an obvious irony here; the Academy is evocatively empty because only a few years previously a Roman army had sacked Athens so thoroughly that all the philosophical schools had come to an end. Cicero probably means us to notice that Plato's Academy is now dead as a Greek institution, but lives on in the intellectual activity of Cicero and others like him, in the debates in this book and more generally in Cicero's attempt to get Romans to think philosophically in their own language.

Ethics and your final end

Why should moral theory be about our final or ultimate end, and what is this anyway?

Cicero writes in the mainstream of ancient ethical theory, which begins with Plato and Democritus, is formulated by Aristotle and provides the framework for ancient ethical theory thereafter. The assumption is that each of us has, implicitly, an ultimate or overarching end in terms of which we make sense of our everyday actions and our longer-term priorities. When I think of the actions I perform and the way my life is going, I can (and often do) think of this in a linear way – one thing after another. However, I can also think of the way that particular actions contribute to more general ends. I study, for example, in order to get a good job, practise in order to play tennis well, and so on. These more general ends, in turn, contribute to other ends specified at an increasingly general level. I play tennis, for example, in order to be healthy, get a good job in order to be self-supporting, and so on. Thinking about the way my actions contribute to my ends thus reveals what my most general goals and priorities are. It is an assumption of ancient ethical theory, first made explicit by Aristotle, that these more general ends – being healthy, having a career and so on – will also emerge in my thinking as contributing to my overall goal in life. Why should this be? I have, obviously, only one life, and thus the goals I have are bound to be ordered, whether explicitly or implicitly, towards the living of a single life to which they all contribute.

Thus my everyday actions and attitudes are, even before I reflect philosophically, implicitly oriented to my life as a whole, conceived as a unity. At some point most people make this thought explicit, and this serves as what I

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have called ‘the entry-point for ethical reflection’,¹¹ the start of reflections which get me to look at my life critically, ask whether my life currently embodies the right goals and priorities, and work out better ways of living. Ethical theory analyses, clarifies and refines my thoughts about my life as a whole and overall aims. Thus the person who embarks on ethical reflection will, in the ancient world, soon find himself confronted by a variety of theories offering different answers to the questions of how best to live and how properly to conceive of the overall, ultimate goal in living. By the time Cicero writes, there has been a long and sophisticated tradition of doing this.

Of course, then as now, there were irresponsible people who lived without ever reflecting on the overall shape of their lives; but in general the importance of doing this, and of exploring ethical theories as a result, was widely recognized. There was also one ethical school, that of the Cyrenaics, who rejected the idea that ethical thought should direct us to living a better life as a whole; they thought that we should aim at getting the most and most intense pleasure, meaning by that an experienced feeling. Thinking about your life as a whole will obviously dampen the pursuit of intense pleasant feelings. But the Cyrenaics were always seen as marginal, and the school was not influential, surviving in philosophical discussions as an example of an ethical theory that was obviously inadequate.¹²

In Plato (and possibly Democritus) we find the basic structure of ancient ethical thinking taken for granted, but not treated systematically. In some passages¹³ we find it taken as an assumption of everyone’s thought that we all seek a single final end in everything we do, that this must be ‘complete’ in including everything we need for the good life, and that this is what we all mean by seeking happiness, although people have radically different ideas as to what it takes to achieve happiness. Aristotle is the first to systematize and lay out these ideas: our final good, he says in the famous opening chapters of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is ‘complete’ and ‘self-sufficient’ in including everything and omitting nothing that we need for living well. Moreover, everyone agrees on the common-sense level that in trying to achieve our overall good we are seeking happiness, though this settles nothing, since people disagree as to what happiness consists of.

Happiness in ancient Greek is *eudaimonia*, and because it is the central concept in Greek ethical thought the latter is often called eudaimonist. From the way it is introduced it is clear that it is defined formally, by the overarching role it plays in ethical thinking, and should not be identified with narrower modern concepts of having a good time, or pleasure. Indeed, ethical theory

¹¹ In *The Morality of Happiness*, Oxford 1993.

¹² The Cyrenaic school was founded by Aristippus of Cyrene (in North Africa), an associate of Socrates. It is uncertain whether he or his grandson, Aristippus the Younger, was the one to formulate the school’s ideas. Some later Cyrenaics allowed that happiness, our final end, could play a role in our pursuit of pleasure, but clearly it is only an instrumental one: overall considerations may inhibit pursuit of pleasure, but only if greater pleasure will ensue eventually.

¹³ *Euthydemus* 278c–282a, *Symposium* 204c–205a, *Philebus* 20b–23a, 60a–61a.

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develops as a series of attempts to specify what happiness is. Plato, the first to think systematically in these terms, holds very radically that living virtuously is sufficient for a happy life, recognizing that this overturns the views of most people, who identify happiness with a life in which you have things that are conventionally considered goods – money, good looks, success. Immediately, therefore, we find a focus on the other central concept in ancient ethics, virtue.

Like ancient happiness, ancient virtue is somewhat different from the modern notion.¹⁴ Virtue is just the virtues, admirable traits of character like bravery and justice, united by the fact that they share good practical reasoning about what should be done. A virtue is a disposition, that is, a habit of acting which has been built up through practice, though it is never thought of as a mindless habit, since it is a disposition to deliberate and to make decisions. Virtue is built up by following role models (as Aristotle stresses) or rules and principles (as the Stoics stress) but the point of virtue is that the virtuous person learns to think for herself about ethical matters, so that all ancient theories depart radically from everyday thinking and are quite critical of it. (Aristotle is the least critical here.)

Virtue has two aspects, being both cognitive, a matter of deliberation and discernment, and also attitudinal, a matter of how you react to people and situations. The virtuous person will reason morally and discern what is the right thing to do (different schools laying weight on deliberation or insight). Modern theories of virtue tend to stay at this point, and discuss the different virtues, such as courage or wisdom, separately. Ancient theories, however, regard this as an unsatisfactory place to stop, since the virtues are then defined by the areas in which moral reasoning is applied, in a way which may depend upon social convention. Moreover, it is implausible that you could make correct judgements in only one area of your life, isolating considerations of bravery, say, from those of justice and issues of what is worth standing up for. Hence there is a tendency in all ancient schools to see the virtues as mutually dependent. Some emphasize this point to the extent of thinking of virtue just as being the achievement of excellent practical reasoning in all spheres. This implies that to the extent that we define virtues as different because of having different areas of application, we are merely tracing social convention, not marking off real distinctions in virtuous reasoning itself. The Stoics (following up indications in Plato) call virtue the skill or expertise of living; it is the disposition to make the right practical decisions, so that the virtuous person acts well in the way that the expert produces good results.

However, even schools which think of virtue as a skill also think of it as motivating; it is not like an expertise which you might choose to exercise or not, in a detached way. All the schools accept, in some version, Aristotle's

¹⁴ If there is such a thing as a unified modern conception of virtue; the late twentieth century has seen a resurgence of virtue both in everyday discourse and in ethical theory, but it is not generally accepted that virtue is internally structured, and cognitively articulated, in the way that ancient virtue is uniformly supposed to be.

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claim that there is a difference between the person he calls merely self-controlled, who reasons morally and does the right thing, but has to combat their inclinations to do so, and the virtuous person, who actually takes pleasure in being virtuous. Virtue is not merely a matter of having your practical reasoning in an excellent state; it is also a matter of having your emotional reactions and attitudes in conformity with your practical reasoning.

The comparison of virtue to a skill brings out the important point that it is never taken to be an inert disposition, but is rather to be thought of as a way of living. Similarly, happiness, our final goal, is not a state of the person that actions are to bring about; it is the happy *life*, a way of living. Ancient ethics is basically concerned with being a good person, but this is not cut off from concern with right action, since the virtuous person will be, precisely, the person who acts rightly. (A number of the arguments in book IV centre on this point.) Ancient ethical theories, however, do not aim to produce all-purpose answers to practical questions, answers available to anyone who reads the book. Rather, the point is to get the learner to understand the theory in such a way that they internalize it and are thus able to reason in accordance with it. What answers this will produce will, of course, depend on particular lives and their circumstances, something about which not much that is useful can be said on a general level. The theories Cicero presents take it that the most important thing in your life is to become a virtuous person and so to live and act in a morally worthy way; but you can only achieve this for yourself, by understanding the theory and using it to transform your life. No book can give you the answers in advance.

Aristotle denies Plato's claim that living virtuously is sufficient for happiness – that is, that the virtuous person has what matters for living the best life, even given the worst that life can throw at you. For Aristotle, common sense is correct in holding that to be happy you need some conventional goods; he regards it as ludicrous to hold that the virtuous person could be happy 'on the rack', in the depths of undeserved misfortune. This is the single most famous claim in Aristotle's ethical works, and the major debate in ancient ethics turned on the issue of whether he was right, as against Plato and the Stoics, who claimed that virtue, the way you live and deal with your circumstances, matters in a different way from those circumstances themselves, and has a radically different kind of value. In book III the Stoic arguments are put forward for thinking of virtue as valuable in a different kind of way from the material it is applied to, and for thinking that nothing but virtue can constitute the happy life. While it seems paradoxical at first, the idea is supported by surprisingly powerful arguments and worked out in a rigorous way.

Antiochus produced an ethical theory which restated Aristotle's ethics in the terms of contemporary debate, and so produced an updated version, recast in the form of a 'developmental' story made current by the Stoics.¹⁵ The argu-

¹⁵ See J. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness*, Oxford 1993, chs. 6, 12 and 20 for exposition and discussion of Antiochus' theory and another hybrid theory aiming to combine Stoic and Aristotelian positions, set out in Arius Didymus.

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ments in book IV attack Stoic ethical theory from Antiochus' renewed Aristotelian point of view, one that now needs arguments against the Stoic position. Aristotle claimed on the basis of common sense that virtue could not be sufficient for happiness. However, once the Stoics have established a powerful theory claiming that virtue is sufficient for happiness, an opponent can no longer fall back on common sense, but must attack the Stoics. Whatever the force of Antiochus' own anti-Stoic arguments, however, his own position is somewhat exposed. He wants to recognize the force both of Aristotle's position and that of the Stoics. But virtue can hardly be sufficient *and* not sufficient for happiness. Antiochus solves the problem by distinguishing the happy life, for which virtue is sufficient, from the 'happiest' or 'truly happy' life, a life where the virtuous person enjoys conventional goods. This is a position which can be developed attractively, as it is in book V, with all the resources of Cicero's oratory. But it falls, he thinks, to a simple but powerful argument, delivered by Cicero himself: on this view it is the happiest life, not the happy life, which is complete, and so the spirit of the Stoic theory has not been retained at all. The contrast here between expansive, enjoyable oratory and short but deadly argument is meant to resonate with the reader, since understanding ethics philosophically requires having satisfactory arguments. The issue of whether happiness requires conventional goods, or merely a virtuous way of dealing with whatever your situation is, is one where it is easier to criticize the opposition than to find decisive arguments on your own side.

Cicero begins, not with disputes over the importance of virtue in happiness, but with a theory which identifies happiness with pleasure. (The next section suggests why he does this.) Epicurus claims that the happy life is simply the life of greatest pleasure; the most modern-sounding of the theories, it is in ancient terms problematic in its conception of both happiness and virtue. How can happiness, the happy life which is our complete end, amount to no more than pleasure? Epicurus tries to explicate pleasure in ways that meet eudaimonist criteria, but the arguments of book II show that this is an uphill task. Further, would we be interested in virtue if what we are aiming for is pleasure? Epicurus tries to show us that we would. In both cases, however, Epicurus runs into problems; eudaimonism, unlike some modern forms of ethical theory, is not hospitable to the idea that our final end is pleasure, even a form of pleasure of which Epicurus tries to show that it can meet eudaimonist demands on happiness and virtue.

Why these theories?

What the modern reader is initially likely to find most puzzling is the absence from this philosophical scene of the two philosophers most prominent in modern discussions of ancient ethics, Plato and Aristotle. Antiochus claimed that the schools of Plato and Aristotle together formed a single tradition, and it is the ethical part of this position which provides arguments against the

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Stoics in book iv and is laid out in book v. But why prefer this later composite to the originals?

Cicero was well-read in both Plato and Aristotle, and greatly admired them.¹⁶ He quotes from and refers to Plato frequently, often for ideas which are not to be found in Antiochus' amalgam of Platonic and other positions, and he clearly read Plato's dialogues closely for himself. He translated the *Timaeus* and *Protagoras* into Latin, as well as using the *Republic* and *Laws* as literary (though not philosophical) models. He admires Plato's literary brilliance and regrets the sharp divide Plato makes between philosophy and rhetoric, pursuits which he himself does not find incompatible.¹⁷

However, Cicero does not read Plato as a systematic thinker like the Stoics, for example, and does not try to fit him into the ethical debates of his own time; he sees him as a great philosopher of the past whose view does not correspond to any modern position in ethical debate.¹⁸ The ethical discussions of Cicero's time assume that our ethical aims are limited to the fulfilment of our human nature; they are all naturalistic, in a common understanding of that term. Plato does not appear as a participant in these debates because his most striking claim is that the virtuous person should 'become like God', transcending human nature as much as he can.¹⁹ This idea does not fit into Hellenistic ethical debate at all, though it was to have a great future in later antiquity.

Cicero also admires Aristotle, but likewise does not see him as a figure of contemporary relevance in ethical debate. He is familiar with the work we call the *Nicomachean Ethics* (book v, 12) – though he thinks of it as written by, rather than dedicated to, Aristotle's son Nicomachus – but grants it no special authority by comparison with the work of Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus. For him the main point of Aristotle's ethical theory is that it denies the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, maintaining that conventional goods are a part of happiness. This point is most familiar to him from Antiochus' version of it, and Antiochus' position, moreover, has the advantage of coming equipped with arguments against the Stoics. It is understandable that Cicero would think that Antiochus' hybrid theory contained the strongest and most up-to-date

¹⁶ For instance, he called the two gymnasia at his favourite country house at Tusculum 'Academy' and 'Lyceum' after the gymnasia where Plato's and Aristotle's schools had started.

¹⁷ For the material see T. B. DeGraff, 'Plato in Cicero', *Classical Philology* 35 (1940), 143–53. See A. A. Long, 'Cicero's Plato and Aristotle', in J. G. F. Powell (ed.), *Cicero the Philosopher*, Oxford 1995, 37–61, for a discussion of Cicero's attitude to Plato's contrast between philosophy and rhetoric.

¹⁸ At *Tusculan Disputations* book 5, 34–6, he notes that Plato, as well as the Stoics, holds that virtue is sufficient for happiness, backing this up from two dialogues, the *Gorgias* 470e and the *Menexenus* 246d–248a (over-translating the latter passage to make a stronger claim than can strictly be found there). But he never sees Plato as having a systematic position in the debate on this topic which absorbs his interest in books III–V.

¹⁹ This is most memorably put in the 'digression' at *Theaetetus* 171d – 177c. See J. Annas, *Platonic Ethics Old and New*, Ithaca, N.Y. 1999, ch. 3, for the idea and its prominence in later, systematic Platonism.

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version of Aristotelian ethics. It is presented in developmental form and defends itself against a position of which Aristotle knew nothing. Hence, although he respects Aristotle's own ethical writings, Cicero does not put them to philosophical work.²⁰

We may regret that the ethical debates of Cicero's time marginalize Plato and Aristotle, but it is important to note that this happens for several reasons. These philosophers were by this time classics from the past, and other theories were more current; Aristotle's own works were superseded by more recent versions of his ideas which presented them in more currently usable form. Further, ethical debate always takes place within an intellectual framework, and the positions and arguments that Cicero finds important make sense within the framework with which he is familiar. Central here is a division of available ethical options which, while put to work in the criticisms of book II (33–43) and book IV (49–50), is not fully stated until the discussion in book V, 16–22 (which takes place on the very spot where it was thought up, Plato's Academy).²¹ This is Carneades' division of ethical theories – that is, theories that tell us how we should think of our final end.

Carneades begins from several assumptions; since Academic Sceptics argued only from premises shared with the opponents, these must have the status of assumptions taken for granted in ethical debate at the time. (Otherwise, Carneades would be importing into the debate substantial assumptions of his own, something which as an Academic Sceptic he cannot consistently do.) Firstly, what we are looking for is a way of achieving our overall goal which is a skill or expertise, something that can be taught and has intellectual content. From this it follows that the expertise we hope to learn must be directed at something other than itself, since no skill can coherently be directed only at itself. Secondly, ethics must appeal to some motivating factor already present in human nature. Carneades holds that in ethical debate we come down to three such motivating factors: pleasure, freedom from pain and natural goods of body and mind (beauty, intelligence and so on). Thirdly, an ethical theory must provide some criterion for choices, some actual help in our learning to do the right thing.

This already rules out quite a lot. The first assumption rules out theories that appeal to feelings rather than to reflection and reason to develop an ethical theory. In book II, 36–7 Cicero appeals to this to undermine the claims of Epicurus' theory, on the grounds that it appeals to the verdict of the senses

²⁰ Cicero was aware of the difference between Aristotle's popular works (now lost) and his 'note-books' (cf. book III, 7), probably Aristotle's lecture and research notes, from which our Aristotelian corpus has come; he knew Tyrannion, the scholar who worked on them. There are puzzles, however; he regards his own work *Topics* as a version of Aristotle's work of the same name, but this cannot be our *Topics*. See A. A. Long (note 17) and J. Barnes, 'Roman Aristotle' in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds.), *Philosophia Togata II*, Oxford 1997, 1–69.

²¹ It is briefly mentioned in book III, at 30–1, and also in *Lucullus* (the first version of the *Academica*) 130–2, and *Tusculan Disputations* book 5, 84–5. It is an argumentative framework which can be put to use in a variety of contexts.




Figure 1 Carneades' division of ethical theories by their ends. Ruled out as providing no practical guidance: Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus.

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rather than that of reason and thinking. An empiricist like Epicurus would have to respond that his theory can, in fact, account for the production in humans of a structured understanding that has the complexity of a skill or expertise. At any rate, the thought behind the first assumption is that all parties to ethical debate agree that an ethical theory cannot merely appeal to feelings or to isolated reactions, but must present itself as having the intellectual complexity of an expertise, something with structured intellectual content that can be conveyed.

The second assumption is that an ethical theory must appeal to and start from a factor which is antecedently motivating to human nature, and construct its final end from this. This assumption dominates Carneades' classification of theories, as we can see from Figure 1. Three motivating factors are posited: pleasure, freedom from pain and natural goods of body and mind (health, intelligence and so on). Theories are classified by reference to these motivating factors in two ways. One is that of whether they hold that our final end is to succeed in getting them, or merely to do our best to get them. Here we find that the classification is somewhat abstract, as some of the positions generated lack actual proponents. Aristippus, we are told, held that our end is to succeed in getting pleasure, and Hieronymus held that it is to succeed in getting freedom from pain, but nobody can be found to hold the theories that our final end is to *attempt* to get these things. With the natural goods it is the other way round. The Stoics, Carneades says, actually hold that our final end is to attempt to get these things, whether we succeed or not; but he cannot find anyone to defend the theory that our final end is actually to get them, and so he defends it himself for the sake of argument. (This option is sometimes referred to as 'Carneades' theory', but Cicero's readers would understand that the great sceptic defended no theory himself, so that any such theory would be defended only for purposes of argument.)

Theories are also classified according to whether they hold that our end should be limited to the original motivating factor, or should also include morality, in the form of virtue. Thus, while Aristippus is said to hold that our end is pleasure alone, the view that it is pleasure *and* virtue is ascribed to the otherwise completely unknown Callipho and Dinomachus. While Hieronymus is said to hold that freedom from pain alone is our final end, the obscure Diodorus is brought in to hold that it is freedom from pain *and* virtue. And, while the view that our final end is merely to get natural goods is defended only by Carneades for the sake of argument, the view that it is getting natural goods *and* virtue is ascribed to Aristotle and the 'Old Academy' tradition.

It is worth noting that this second assumption tacitly rules out theories which aspire to unworldly ends that transcend human nature, such as Plato's idea that virtue is 'becoming like God' and Aristotle's position in the work that we read as book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that our final end is to contemplate abstract truths. In the period we are concerned with, such theories were not part of the mainstream discussion of ethics.

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The third assumption rules out theories which give no general guidance about right action or hold that no general guidance can be given; Cicero accepts that this rules out the theories of Pyrrho the sceptic and the early Stoics Aristo and Erillus. Modern scholars accept that this is too swift a dismissal of Aristo and Erillus, and find the view taken of Pyrrho very puzzling.²² In general, however, it is not too difficult to see the point of a demand that an ethical theory should offer some guidance as to how to go about living in one way rather than another. These theories are represented as presenting their basic principles but then refusing any actual guidance as to how these might be applied in a person's life in order to produce moral improvement. Their rejection can be seen as one aspect of the widespread ancient assumption that an ethical theory must be a theory to live by, an object of reflection which must produce some difference in the person's life. The modern assumption that we can divorce the truth of an ethical theory from its practicability is deeply alien to ancient ethical debate. For the ancients, if an ethical theory can provide no guidance as to how we can incorporate it into our ethical reflection, then it is not a serious ethical theory. Cicero's repeated verdict on these theories is that nobody bothers with them.

It is worth noting that many of the positions in Carneades' diagram (see Figure 1) are unoccupied, held solely for the sake of argument or held by utterly obscure people of whom we know little or nothing. Moreover, we can see that the theories of Epicurus and the Stoics are located in ways that make them appear odd. Epicurus' theory appears as a clumsy attempt to combine two different approaches, while the Stoics are introduced as thinkers interested in trying to get, rather than actually getting, natural goods.²³ These approaches dominate the arguments against Epicurus in book II and the Stoics in book IV.

The importance of Carneades' division for the arguments of Cicero's work may lead the reader to ask herself various questions. Are these assumptions all equally acceptable? Is the second, in particular, reasonable? Does it rule out in advance theories which hold that our final end is one that we can grasp only after a process of moral development, and so is distinct from any pre-moral motivation? Should the theories of Epicurus and the Stoics be introduced in this framework? We should recall, however, that Carneades is a sceptic. He is

²² On Pyrrho see above, p. o and n. o. For Aristo see A.-M. Ioppolo, *Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico*, Bibliopolis, Naples, *Elenchos* Collana XIX. For Erillus, see Ioppolo, 'Lo stoicismo di Erillo', *Phronesis* 30 (1985), 58–78.

²³ The Stoic theory in fact occupies an awkward position, since the way it is introduced does not advert to the role of virtue in the theory, although elsewhere the division introduces the Stoics as holding that our sole aim in trying to achieve happiness is virtue. Carneades may be assuming that his readers know that the Stoic theory can be introduced either way. It is possible that the awkwardness is due to Antiochus, or Cicero, applying the division in a way different from that originally intended. For a discussion of the complications in Carneades' arguments, and their indebtedness to earlier classifications by the Stoic Chrysippus, see K. Algra, 'Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero: the Ethical *Divisiones* in Cicero's *Lucullus*', in B. Inwood and J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Assent and Argument*, Brill, Leiden 1997, 107–39.

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not trying to capture the theories' self-conception or to emphasize their strong points – that is for others; his task is to produce effective arguments against them. His classification is well adapted to the use of it made in book v, 22, namely to simplify and structure the discussion. Theories that locate our final good in pleasure can be argued out of court, as Epicurus is; the only philosophically serious debate is between the Stoics and Aristotelians, and it hinges on whether we need conventional goods, as well as virtue, to be happy. It is important to get Epicurus out of the way, but energy is then devoted to the real issue: the role in happiness of virtue and of conventional goods.

Carneades produced this 'division' as a way of organizing arguments against all positive theories. It is interesting that later Antiochus found it useful in disposing of all theories – except his own. He took over, as suitable for his purposes, a scheme which rejects first the theory that our final end is pleasure, then the theory that our final end is virtue – but then, instead of arguing against all the options as Carneades did, he added on arguments for his own theory as the preferable option. It is a good example of the way that he tried to salvage something positive from the rubble of centuries of argument. It also suited the idea, which he puts to great use, that the Stoics were not really innovators, but took over ideas from the Old Academy (particularly, in ethics, from Aristotle) and cast them in new forms.

Cicero was influenced by both traditions stemming from Plato – the sceptical tradition of Carneades and Antiochus' attempt to build positively from differing views. In book v, however, he shows that in ethics at least he is unconvinced by Antiochus' own theory. By producing a powerful argument against it he shows that for him no theory is left standing as the clearly preferable one. Attractive as is a synthesis like that of Antiochus, we are, in Cicero's view, back where we always were: trying to think through for ourselves the arguments on each side and come to our own understanding of which is the best way to live. The Stoic and Aristotelian views are both powerful and attractive, but there are important objections to both of them, and we are not in a position to commit ourselves, with a good intellectual conscience, to either of them. We are left going through the arguments, still trying to find convincing ones. This message, rather than any positive doctrine, is what Cicero hopes to leave with his readers, and, whatever our historical interest in the theories he presents, it is a message that is still, and will always be, timely in ethical philosophy.

Chronology

Principal dates

BC	Life of Cicero	Theoretical works
106	Birth of Cicero, 3 January	
91–88	Serves under Pompey’s father in Social War	
	Studying law with Q. Mucius Scaevola (Augur)	
88	Hears Philo of Larissa in Rome	
	Studying oratory	
87	Studying law with Q. Mucius Scaevola (Pontifex)	
86		<i>De Inventione</i> (<i>On Rhetorical Invention</i>) (written after 91)
80	Defends Sextus Roscius, his first public case	
79–8	Travels and studies in Greece and Asia: hears Antiochus of Ascalon, Posidonius, Zeno and Phaedrus (Epicureans)	
75–4	Quaestor at Lilybaeum in Sicily	
70	Prosecutes Verres for extortion in Sicily	
69	Aedile: gives games	
66	Praetor. Speaks for Pompey’s command	
65	Birth of his son Marcus. His brother Quintus is aedile	
63	Consul with C. Antonius. Executes conspirators without trial	

Chronology

BC	Life of Cicero	Theoretical works
62	Quintus Cicero praetor	
61	Testifies against P. Clodius on sacrilege charge Quintus Cicero governs Asia (61–58)	
58	Measures of P. Clodius send Cicero into exile in March	
57	Quintus Cicero serves under Pompey (57–6) Recalled from exile; returns to Rome in September	
56	Cicero warned and ceases to oppose them	<i>De Oratore (On Oratory)</i>
54	Quintus Cicero serves under Caesar in Gaul (54–52)	<i>De Re Publica (On the State)</i> begun
53	Elected augur in place of M. Crassus	
51	Goes to govern Cilicia, arriving 31 July. Quintus serves under him.	<i>De Re Publica (On the State)</i> published. <i>De Legibus (On Laws)</i> begun
50	Leaves Cilicia (30 July) and reaches Italy (24 November)	
49	Cicero continues peace efforts, though assigned a command by Pompey In June leaves Italy to join Pompey	
48	Cicero returns to Italy and waits for Caesar’s pardon at Brundisium	
47	In July pardoned by Caesar along with Quintus and his nephew Quintus jr.	
46	Divorces Terentia Delivers <i>Pro Marcello</i> , thanking Caesar for his clemency, in the Senate Marries Publilia	*Eulogy of Cato <i>Brutus (Brutus)</i> <i>Paradoxa Stoicorum (Stoic Paradoxes)</i> <i>Orator (The Orator)</i>
45	In January Tullia gives birth to a son but dies in February In April young Marcus begins his studies in Athens	*Consolation to himself * <i>Hortensius</i> : Exhortation to Philosophy <i>Academica (Academic Scepticism)</i>

Chronology

BC	Life of Cicero	Theoretical works
45 (<i>cont.</i>)		<i>De Finibus (On Moral Ends)</i> <i>Tusculan Disputations</i> and <i>De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of Gods)</i> begun
44		<i>Cato Maior de senectute</i> (<i>Cato the Elder: On Old Age</i>)
	In April–June visiting his country villas in Italy	<i>De Divinatione (On Divination)</i> finished
	On 17 July leaves for Greece but quickly returns	<i>De Fato (On Fate)</i> * <i>De Gloria (On Reputations)</i>
	On 31 August returns to Rome	<i>Topica (Kinds of Argument)</i>
	On 2 September delivers First Philippic Oration against Antony	<i>Laelius de amicitia (Laelius on Friendship)</i>
	In October–December visiting his villas in Italy; writing Second Philippic	<i>De Officiis (On Duties)</i>
43	Delivers Fifth–Fourteenth Philippic On 9 December Cicero killed	

Notes:
* = lost
Some minor undateable works have been omitted.
N.B. Some of the dates are approximate.
Source: From Cicero *On Duties*, ed. M. T. Griffiths and E. M. Atkins, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge, 1991.

	Pythagoreans		Other 'Presocratics'		Pyrrhonists	Platonists	Aristotelians	Stoics	Epicureans	Cynaics	Other (school unknown)
	Pythagoras	Heraclitus									
500 BC		Gorgias				Socrates		Socrates		Socrates	
		Democritus				Plato	Aristotle			Aristippus	
400 BC	Archytas					Speusippus	Theophrastus				
	Arion					Xenocrates	Dicearchus				
	Echecrates					Polemo	Aristoxenus	Zeno of Citium		Aristippus the Younger	
	Timaues							Aristo of Chios	Epicurus		
300 BC					Pyrrho	Arcesilaus	Strato	Erillus	Metrodorus Hermarchus		
							Demetrius of Phaleron	Cleanthes	Polyaenus Themista		
							Lycro Hieronymus	Dionysius of Heraclea	Charmides		Calippo
											Dinomachus
200 BC							Aristo of Ceos	Chrysippus			
								Diogenes of Babylon			
							Critolaus	Antipater			
						Carneades	Diodorus				
								Panaetius			
								Mnesarchus			
100 BC								Posidonius			
						(Philo of Larisa)			Phaedrus		
							Antiochus		Zeno of Sidon		
					(Aenesidemus)		Aristus		Siro		
									Philodemus		
							Staseas				

Figure 2 Cicero's philosophical background (all names are mentioned in On Moral Ends except for those in brackets).

Further reading

The text used is *M. Tulli Ciceronis De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum Libri Quinque*, ed. L. D. Reynolds, Oxford 1998 (Oxford Classical Texts). Also consulted are the text, translation and notes in *Cicéron: des termes extrêmes des biens et des maux*, ed. J. Martha, 2 vols., Paris 1967 (Budé edition) and the text and notes in *Cicero: De Finibus bonorum et malorum libri V*, ed. N. Madvig, Copenhagen 1876, reprinted Olms, Hildesheim, 1965. There is a text and translation in *Cicero, De Finibus*, trans. by H. Rackham, Cambridge, Mass. 1931, reprinted 1971 (Loeb library). *Cicero On Stoic Good and Evil*, by M. R. Wright, is a text with translation and notes of book III with the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (Aris and Phillips, Warminster, 1991).

For Cicero's life see A. E. Douglas, *Cicero, Greece and Rome*, New Surveys in the Classics, Oxford 1968; D. L. Stockton, *Cicero: a Political Biography*, Oxford 1971; and E. D. Rawson, *Cicero, A Portrait*, London 1975, reprinted Bristol 1983. Cicero's other philosophical works are all available in the Loeb library series, with Latin and facing English. There is a recent translation of *On Duties*, with introduction and notes, by E. M. Atkins and M. Griffin, Cambridge 1991 (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought).

For Cicero's philosophical background see two books edited by Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes: *Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society* Oxford 1989 and *Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome*, Oxford, 1997. There is an excellent selection of essays in J. G. F. Powell, *Cicero the Philosopher*, Oxford 1995. See also Günther Patzig, 'Cicero as Philosopher, am Beispiel der Schrift "De Finibus"', 251–72 in Patzig, *Gesammelte Schriften* III, Wallstein, Göttingen, 1996. For Cicero's Academic background see *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books* (Proceedings of the 7th Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, 21–5 August 1995), Brill, Leiden/New York/Köln, 1997. See also Carlos Lévy, *Cicero Academicus: Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la Philosophie Ciceronienne*. Collection de l'école française de Rome 162. Rome, Ecole française de Rome 1992.

The main sources for Epicurean and Stoic ethics are to be found in B. Inwood and L. Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, second edition, Hackett,