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1. Toleration in Enlightenment Europe

Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter

Prehistory

The invention of printing, the Protestant Reformation and the reactions of princes and popes brought furious struggles, theological and political, over conscience and coercion, faith and freedom. Throughout the Reformation and Counter-Reformation eras, Europe remained uncompromisingly a ‘persecuting society’, even if arguments for toleration, both on principle and as a politique necessity, were also advanced.1

The publicists of the Enlightenment further developed such pleas for toleration, and in the process their basis and character was transformed, with the original religious rationales becoming incorporated within a wider philosophy of freedom conceived as a fundamental human attribute and precondition for civilized society. Liberté would head the Rights of Man of 1789, just as religious freedom – guaranteed by the absence of an established church – was one of the shibboleths of the Constitution of the United States, whose third president, Thomas Jefferson, boldly proclaimed the ‘illimitable freedom of the human mind’. Toleration was thus to acquire a secular cast as, in liberal ideologies, freedom of thought and speech became definitive of human rights, alongside other cherished freedoms like habeas corpus.2

In reality, however, the eighteenth century saw toleration nowhere unequivocally and comprehensively embraced in either theory or practice; and where it gained ground, it was partial, fragile, contested and even subject to reversal. No clear and distinct metaphysics underpinned toleration claims, nor was there a single, classic, foundational text, commanding universal assent. It will be the aim of this book, therefore, to address the ambiguities, limits and fluctuations no less than the extension of toleration in the Enlightenment.

One point, moreover, must first be stressed. Religion did not merely retain a powerful presence throughout eighteenth-century Europe, it was central to the Enlightenment project itself. Some historians have claimed that the philosophes crusaded for ‘atheism’ or ‘modern paganism’3 and atheists there were indeed. François-Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694–1778), the most notorious critic of Christianity, made his ultimate rallying-cry écrasez
l’infâme – ‘crush the infamous’ – and he attacked not only Catholicism but also the shallow natural religion and Optimism of the rationalists. His own liberal views were set out in his *Traité de la tolérance* (1763). Most activists, however, wished to see religion not abolished but reformed, with ‘bigotry’ and ‘superstition’ yielding to a God of reason and Nature, compatible with science, morality and civic duties. Immanuel Kant claimed the Enlightenment meant *sapere aude*, having the courage to think for oneself in all things, including matters of religion. The fact that the French Revolution enthroned its Goddess of Reason in Notre Dame shows how religion continued to provide the vestments in which enlightened values were ceremonially clad. ‘The coherence, as well as the confidence of the Enlightenment’, Norman Hampson has maintained, ‘rested on religious foundations’.

Nor must it be forgotten that while the cause of toleration was fundamental to freethinkers and Deists, it might weigh no less heavily with sincere Christians. The English polymath Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), for instance, combined materialist philosophy with a distinctive model of Protestant Dissent. His *Lectures on History* (1788) vindicated the superiority of modern times over the ancient in faith, science, government, manners and happiness, discerning therein the hand of God. In his providentialist scenario, the future progress of religion and rationality required total toleration and the separation of Church and State would be its guarantee.

But if many of them were pious and even Christian, Aufklärer across Europe were disgusted by worldly and extravagant church establishments, by ‘priestcraft’, and by preposterous pontifications: ‘I knew a real theologian once’, wrote Voltaire:

> He knew the Brahmins, the Chaldeans... the Syrians, the Egyptians, as well as he knew the Jews; he was familiar with the various readings of the Bible... The more he grew truly learned, the more he distrusted everything he knew. As long as he lived, he was forbearing; and at his death, he confessed he had squandered his life uselessly.

Divisions within Christianity, and the bloody wars of truth they sparked, brought disillusionment. The endless squabbling among the children of God was contrasted with the harmony supposedly brought by the ‘new philosophy’, notably the Newtonian science which was revealing the fundamental laws of Nature. There were, Voltaire quipped, no sects in geometry.

**Thinking Tolerance**

The early modern centuries advanced many arguments for toleration. Every advocate denounced tyranny, the persecution of the faithful and the suppression of truth. The Inquisition, the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* (initiated in 1559), judicial torture and the Augustinian maxim ‘compellare intrare’ all
drew vehement denunciations. The irenic Erasmus, along with fellow Christian humanists, had reminded the faithful that the Gospel message was peace; Christ had preached love, and war-mongering popes like Julius II were like Antichrist. Sceptical towards witch persecution, Michel Montaigne famously deemed that ‘it is putting a very high price on one’s conjectures to have a man roasted alive because of them’.

On a huge hill, cragg’d and steep, Truth stands
And hee that will reach her, about must and about must goe,

declared John Donne, likewise intimating that no candid Christian should presume to possess a monopoly on that commodity.8

For all that, Catholics and Protestants alike continued to maintain that the True Church was duty-bound to extirpate evil and error, if necessary with fire and faggots. Thomas More declared the ‘carbuncle’ of heresy had to be surgically excised lest it infect the rest of the corpus Christi. Was it not preposterous to tolerate the disciples of the Devil or of Machiavelli? Witches, unbelievers, atheists and apostates were rebels against the Lord who must be converted, punished or annihilated. Only a few brave and persecuted groups, like the Anabaptists or Socinians, proclaimed toleration as an ideal – toleration, it has been remarked, was long a loser’s creed.

Building upon what had come before, Enlightenment champions were to recast the emergent claims to toleration. New individualistic models postulated an original autonomy for natural man anterior to Church and State. If, as John Locke and many others were to insist, man was born free under universal law in a state of Nature, how could the prince come by any legitimate authority to constrain the mind? Faith was not to be forced: ‘For what obeys reason is free, and Reason He made right’, sang John Milton, developing a tolerationism hinging on a pious image of reason as a divine light, which complemented the anti-censorship arguments developed in Areopagitica.9

If freedom and toleration were thus essential to the pursuit of inquiry, both religious and secular, doubts were at the same time being voiced in the early Enlightenment about the authenticity of any transcendental tablets of Truth to which the Godly had privileged access. The seeds of such scepticism might be found in Renaissance Pyrrhonism – Montaigne’s ‘que scais je?’; in the temper of Christian fideists; in the Cartesian call to systematic doubt; and in the adiaphoristic teachings of Anglicans and Dutch Remonstrants, who pared down to the core the truths essential for subscription and accepted a penumbra of ‘things indifferent’ about which forbearing Christians could agree to disagree.

Enlightened minds ventured further. Philosophy, philology and textual scholarship were persuading critics like Pierre Bayle that human erudition
was irremediably imperfect, be it in respect of the migrations of the descend-
ants of Noah, the occurrence of miracles or the theology of salvation. The
corruption of sources, the depredations of time and the quarrels of authors
meant that teachings would never cease to be in dispute. In the late seven-
teenth-century ‘crisis of European consciousness’, the ‘Ancients versus Mod-
ers’ querella challenged old certainties. William Temple’s Essay upon the
Ancient and Modern Learning (1690) maintained the superiority of Greek
philosophy and science; William Wotton’s Reflections upon Ancient and
Modern Learning (1694) countered that, in the sciences at least, the ‘Mod-
ers’ had surpassed the ‘Ancients’. This battle of the books was especially
corrosive because its arguments were manifestly extendable to the sacred
writings themselves. What then of Scripture truth? Was it self-evident for all
to see? Was it literal or figurative? Did it have to be elucidated by the erudite?
And, if so, who were the authorized interpreters?10

This scepticism accompanied a new problematization of the well-known
fact that the human scene was a world of difference. Travellers and armchair
anthropologists alike found themselves confronted by a kaleidoscope of
beliefs and customs amongst the peoples of mankind. Might such differences
in manners and morals best be understood not – as traditionally – in terms
of truth and error but as marks of mere heterogeneity? Indeed, might such
human variability be natural or even desirable? The histories of nations
showed that one prime site of divergence was religion. The globe presented
a cabinet of diverse faiths – Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, Christian-
ity, with all their sects and schisms, to say nothing of polytheistic cults.
Confrontations with such radical heterogeneity fostered the deistic conviction
that there must be many ways to God, discoverable through Nature, each
acceptable to the Supreme Being, and hence deserving of tolerance.11 In his
L’Esprit des lois, that magisterial account of human diversity and the laws
governing it, Montesquieu implied that the true philosopher would be indif-
ferent to difference.

In short, philosophical doubt swept through the world of letters in the early
Enlightenment. Diversity did not, it goes without saying, unequivocally
clinch the case for toleration. For Hobbes, after all, no less than the Pope,
the enforcement of uniformity was necessary to obviate anarchy. But the
philosophy of tolerance could be supported by pragmatism. Voltaire thus
suggested the utility of diversity:

Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place more venerable than many
courts of justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of man-
kind. There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together as tho’ they
all profess’d the same religion, and give the name of Infidel to none but bankrupts.
There the Presbyterian confides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the
Quaker’s word. And all are satisfied.12
The ties of trade, in other words, rendered religious heterodoxy unthreatening in a nation in which ‘every man goes to heaven by which path he likes’. Voltaire’s was only one of many voices which made the economic case for toleration: pluralism promoted prosperity. Conversely, had not intolerance proved calamitous and counterproductive? Far from stamping it out, persecution had bred heresy; the Inquisition had created martyrs, its flames had lit freedom’s torch. Wars of religion had discredited the faith.

With the Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War in 1648, and the Restoration bringing down the curtain on twenty years of mayhem in Britain, the mood of Europe’s ruling orders swung decisively against those who had boldly shed blood in the name of infallibility, divine right, prophetic revelation or the Bible. As the dictates of popes and presbyters grew challenged by arguments historical, philosophical and moral, it could now even be claimed that religious dogmatism did not only create civil disorder but was even symptomatic of mental disorder: the soi-disant saints were literally out of their minds. Physicians pointed to affinities between sectaries and lunatics – speaking in tongues, seizures, visions and violence. In individuals such aberrations had long been blamed on demonic possession; now it was the turn of entire religious sects to be ‘demonized’ on medico-philosophical authority, with scientific rationality thus playing a regulatory no less than a liberating role. And all the while satirists were making laughing-stocks of Puritans and other zealots:

Such as do build their faith upon  
The holy text of pike and gun  
Decide all controversies by  
Infallible artillery . . .  
As if religion were intended  
For nothing else but to be mended.

Critiques of Catholic superstition and Puritan enthusiasm (or self-divinization) thus had many sources and took many forms. The smouldering anti-clericalism fuelling them even occasionally became enshrined in official policy, witness the eventual expulsion of the Jesuits from all Catholic countries – hardly in itself a triumph of toleration!

The philosophical basis of toleration

In a political situation in which freedoms were endangered by the ambitions of the Sun King, Enlightenment philosophies of toleration were elucidated which construed man as a thinking being whose rationality demanded freedom of thought and expression. John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) developed an empiricist model of the mind as a tabula rasa on which the raw data of experience were registered. Book IV spelt
out the epistemology of religion. Discussing the existence of God, Locke rejected the Cartesian assumption that man is born with an innate idea of the Deity. God is rather a complex idea built up in the mind by taking ideas already acquired – e.g. ‘existence and duration, knowledge and power, pleasure and happiness’ – and projecting them to infinity. Simple ideas are built up from the senses, and the mind organizes and ‘enlarges’ them until it arrives at the highest complex idea of all, that of God. Such notions were further developed in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695), where Locke explained that faith for its part is, properly, trust in the powers of reason. Revelation contains verities which do not come from reason but which must be subjected to its bar, since it is a divine gift and therefore our final arbiter.

Locke’s thinking on toleration chimed with his epistemology. A substantial but unpublished essay on toleration, dating from 1667, contains the essential principles later to be expressed in the *Letters on Toleration* published during the reign of William III. In his 1667 essay, Locke held that the ‘trust, power and authority’ of the civil ruler was vested in him solely for the purpose of securing ‘the good, preservation and peace of men in that society’. That is, the sphere of the state extended solely to external matters and not to faith, which is internal, a matter of conscience.

To elucidate the limits of those civil powers, Locke divided opinions and actions into three kinds. First, there were speculative views and forms of divine worship which did not concern the polity at all. Second, there were those opinions and actions which were neither good nor bad in themselves, but which impinged upon others and thus were public concerns. Third, there were actions which were good or bad in themselves – namely, virtues and vices.

Beliefs and behaviours of the first kind had ‘an absolute and universal right to toleration’. This derived from the fact that they did not affect society, being either wholly private or concerning God alone. Opinions of the second sort – for instance conceptions about divorce – ‘have a title also to toleration, but only so far as they do not tend to the disturbance of the State or do not cause greater inconvenience than advantage to the community’. But, Locke added, while the magistrate could prohibit *publishing* such opinions if they might disturb the public good, no man ought to be forced to renounce his opinion, or assent to a contrary opinion, for such coercion would only breed hypocrisy.

As for the third class – actions good or bad in themselves – Locke maintained that civil rulers had ‘nothing to do with the good of men’s soul or their concernments in another life’. God would reward virtue and punish vice, and the magistrate’s job was simply to keep the peace. Applying such principles to the political situation of the 1660s, Locke held that Catholics could not be tolerated, because their opinions were ‘absolutely destructive of all
governments except the Pope’s’. Neither should toleration include atheists, since any oaths of loyalty and allegiance which they took would carry no conviction.

Exiled in the Dutch Republic in the 1680s, Locke wrote a Letter on Toleration which was published in Latin in 1689. Echoing the 1667 arguments, this denied that Christianity could be promoted or defended by force. Christ was the Prince of Peace; He had used not coercion but persuasion; persecution could not save men’s souls. Persecution was anti-Christian, since love of fellow men is the essence of Christianity.

Civil government must be distinguished from the Church. The business of civil government was to secure men’s lives, liberty, health and possessions, whereas the salvation of souls was the concern of religion. Hence churches should be voluntary societies and the ecclesiastical authority ought to have no physical sanction other than excommunication.

Locke’s tolerationism was contested by High Churchmen, while his latitudinarian attempt to defend Christian belief by reason drew criticism from traditionalists. Bishop Stillingfleet, for example, expressed his fear as to the erosion of belief which was bound to follow from the denial of innate ideas. ‘An universal toleration is that Trojan Horse’, he proclaimed, ‘which brings in our enemies without being seen’. At the same time, Locke’s opinions were being driven down more radical roads by embarrassing deistical and freethinking allies, notably John Toland (1670–1722). Reputedly the son of an Irish Catholic priest, Toland had run away to England as a young man, becoming a Protestant of a sort. A brilliant scholar, he was known in Oxford as ‘a man of fine parts, great learning, and little religion’. In 1696, he published his Christianity not Mysterious: Or a Treatise Shewing that there is Nothing in the Gospel Contrary to Reason, Nor above it: And that no Christian Doctrine can be Properly call’d a Mystery. Religion, he claimed, requires no mysterious explanation, and the Christian gospel stands by the use of reason independent of divine revelation. He expressed his belief in a Supreme Being, verified, as Justin Champion shows in the chapter entitled ‘Toleration and Citizenship in Enlightenment England’ (see pp. 133–56, this volume), on broadly rationalist principles. The religion of which Toland had little was conventional Christianity; and while he roundly denounced clergy of all denominations, his true bêtes noires were the Puritans with their scriptural dogmatism.

Though just a year separated Toland’s book from Locke’s The Reasonableness of Christianity, the intellectual gulf was vast. Locke aimed to make Christianity acceptable to all reasonable men; Toland taught that the mysterious and miraculous elements of Christianity must be trashed. His book caused an uproar, being condemned by the Irish parliament, attacked by divines and burned by the public hangman.
Only the most anglocentric historian would maintain that toleration and rational religion blossomed on English soil alone. The French Calvinist, Pierre Bayle, exiled in the Netherlands, was hugely influential. His first major work was a critique of Catholic intolerance, published in 1682 as *Letter on the Comet*, and republished the next year as *Diverse Thoughts on the Comet*. In *New Letters from the Author of the General Critique* (1685), he expanded on ideas about the rights of conscience mentioned in that earlier work, showing – contrast Locke! – that a society of atheists could live by honour and civility, and even surpass idolatrous and superstitious nations in orderliness.

Bayle then reacted to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes with his outraged *Philosophical Commentary on the Words, ‘Compel Them to Come In’*, published in 1686. To compel men to profess religion in which they did not believe was immoral; it was also irrational, because it discouraged the discovery of truth. No one, he maintained, had a right to claim such complete possession of truth as not to need to engage in rational argument with others.\(^{17}\)

According to Jonathan Israel’s ‘Spinoza, Locke and the Enlightenment battle for Toleration’ (see pp. 102–13, this volume), whilst discussion of toleration has tended to focus on Bayle, Locke and the English freethinkers, it was actually the Dutch Jew, Benedict Spinoza, who launched the most radical, and historically most momentous, justification. For such contemporaries, toleration remained essentially a matter of freedom of religion. Spinoza’s slogan, *libertas philosophandi*, by contrast embodied a barely concealed revolutionary implication: the absolute freedom to philosophize, entailing the right to reject all revealed religion and to base human values, along with social and political principles, not on faith or priestly authority, but on rational philosophy.

The battle for religious toleration was crucial, since the flames of ecclesiastical persecution had been so fierce. But for Enlightenment thinkers more was to be at stake. Censorship in any shape or form denied man’s dignity as a rational being. Social progress depended upon reason being free to apply itself wheresoever – to the natural sciences, to legislation, morality and politics. In a Europe still disgracefully backward, advance would be impossible without the ferment of knowledge and modernization of attitudes which the free exercise of reason alone would stimulate. How absurd that regimes were still burning books and clapping authors in irons! Why such dread of knowledge? The *philosophes* endlessly rehearsed Galileo’s fate as an object lesson in the arrest of progress by religious bigotry. Where inquiry was free, as in England, science leapt ahead – witness Newton. Prometheus became the hero of those championing dauntless defiance of authority – other myths, from Dr Faust to Dr Frankenstein, were, of course, waiting in the wings as reminders of the nemesis looming for humans behaving like gods.\(^{18}\)
Toleration and its tensions

The *philosophes* loved portraying themselves as paladins of freedom, combating censorship and intolerance, and as the tutors of enlightened rulers, notably Frederick the Great. Himself an unbeliever, Frederick perceived the value to Prussia of encouraging immigrants of all faiths, Jews included. ‘All must be tolerated’, he proclaimed in a celebrated letter of 1740, ‘here everyone must be allowed to choose his own road to salvation’. In reality the situation was far more complicated than these idealizations suggest.

There was, for one thing, no agreement even within the republic of letters as to precisely what toleration entailed and what its limits should be. Was it a means or an end? Must the intolerant be tolerated? Was curbing bigots itself an act of bigotry? Above all, realists like Locke divined that toleration had to be guaranteed by a civil power, which evidently would not tolerate deadly enemies like Papists. Voltaire notoriously would not allow atheism to be talked of in front of the servants.

As Quentin Skinner has recently intimated, building upon earlier discussions by Isaiah Berlin, the eighteenth century might be viewed as a watershed in philosophies of liberty. An earlier tradition of ‘liberty before liberalism’ – it has variously been called Machiavellian, neo-Harringtonian, civic humanist or republican, and is now styled by Skinner ‘neo-Roman’ – envisaged liberty in terms of citizen participation in a free and virtuous commonwealth. Nineteenth-century liberalism by contrast, as typified by John Stuart Mill, espoused what Berlin has dubbed ‘negative liberty’, that is a state of legal protection from external hindrances (‘freedom from’). Enlightenment thinkers rang the changes upon these respectively ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ ideas of liberty. In the context of the present discussion, the point is that both of these tenets, and all positions intermediate, tended to assimilate the case for religious toleration within a wider temporal politics of (positive or negative) liberty.

This is not to imply that the status of freedom itself was beyond controversy. That great fly in the ointment, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, insisted that the health of a republic might necessitate ‘forcing people to be free’ – why tolerate the selfishness and depravity which would cause a polity to corrupt and collapse? In that light it made perfect sense for the Genevan to condemn the setting up of a theatre in his native city, since such licentiousness would sap virtue. Quite apart from Rousseau, powerful primitivist currents hankered after the sincerity and simplicity associated with moral solidarity. Holding cohesion essential to political vitality, some *philosophes* advocated a civil religion to counter sordid, sinister, selfish factionalism. For Rousseau, those refusing to accept the civil religion would be banished. In such circumstances, tolerance might be represented as the atrophy of collective moral will.
The dilemma of how personal and public freedoms could be balanced also loomed large, albeit within a different moral framework, in Immanuel Kant’s analysis of the relations between rationality, freedom and the public sphere. It was, Kant insisted, man’s duty to break free of his self-imposed chains and dare to think. But his *Was ist Aufklärung?* (1784) also maintained the individual’s paramount duty of public obedience to his prince; subjects had a duty to restrain expression of individual judgments in the interests of upholding the ruler’s will and thus forestalling chaos. As Kant’s dilemma and other examples make clear, in the Enlightenment the bottom line in questions of toleration ultimately lay in decisions of state, even *raison d’état*. Thus the journalist and moralist Daniel Defoe allowed Robinson Crusoe to argue the case for toleration from the perspective of enlightened Absolutism in his best-selling novel of the same name, published in 1719. Here Crusoe stated:

My island was now peopled, and I thought myself rich in subjects; and it was a merry reflection, which I frequently made, how like a king I looked. First of all, the whole country was my own mere property, so that I had an undoubted right to dominion. Second my people were perfectly subjected; I was absolutely Lord and Law-giver; they all owed their Lives to me, and were ready to lay down their Lives, if there had been occasion for it, for me. It was remarkable too, we had but three Subjects, and they were of different Religions; my man Friday was a Protestant, his father was a Pagan and a Cannibal, and the Spaniard was a Papist; however, I allowed Liberty of Conscience throughout my Dominions.

For the poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the argument for toleration, however, was a negative one, namely the proven historical failure of persecution. As he put it:

The only true argument, as it seems to be, apart from Christianity, for a discriminating toleration is, that *it is of no use* to attempt to stop heresy or schism by persecution, unless perhaps, it be conducted upon the plan of direct warfare and massacre. You *cannot* preserve men in the faith by such means, though you may stifle for a while any open appearance of dissent. The experiment has now been tried and it has failed; and that is by a great deal the best argument for the magistrate against a repetition of it.

So much for the theories, but how did eighteenth-century rulers handle the practical issue of toleration?

**Toleration and the State**

The histories of states reveal very different political stances toward toleration, and different degrees of its *de facto* or official practice. At least in terms of the subjects’ ability to think and worship as they wished, it was the Dutch
Republic and England which were most advanced. Yet as two essays in this book insist, there were significant limits to the toleration granted even in those nations.

From the early seventeenth century, the United Provinces enjoyed informal toleration. But in ‘Toleration and Enlightenment in the Dutch Republic’ (see pp. 114–32, this volume), Ernestine van der Wall shows that the Dutch Republic was none the less later to be shaken by a series of toleration controversies, revolving around the basic question: how far should one go? Their vehemence is explained by the specific religio–political role of the Dutch Reformed Church – while not ‘established’, it nevertheless enjoyed privileged status – and this had far-reaching consequences both religiously and temporally, since non-Reformed citizens were often treated as second-rate citizens. From 1750 onwards, the non-Reformed denominations campaigned for a greater measure of toleration, or even for equal rights. Such goals were resisted as a toleration too far, but were later to be realized in 1796 when, in the new Batavian Republic, Church was officially separated from State, signalling the end of the Reformed Church as a dominant body.

In the 1760s and 1770s the ‘limits of toleration’ question was voiced in the Netherlands in the context of speculations about the salvation of virtuous pagans. This so-called ‘Socratic War’, in which attitudes towards non-Christian religions played an important role, brought into sharp focus the conceptual and practical problems of toleration in eighteenth-century Dutch society.

Parallels may be drawn with Erastian England, where the Church of England remained established but the Act of Toleration (1689) granted freedom of worship for Nonconformists and most other religious minorities (excepting Unitarians) at the price of the continuation of certain civil disabilities – a political compromise (a mere exemption, not a right) for the time being acceptable to Protestant Dissenters but, in later decades, increasingly insupportable to a vocal minority. In ‘Toleration and Citizenship in Enlightenment England’ (see pp. 133–56, this volume), Justin Champion highlights the intellectual and political conflicts which arose over the toleration of Judaism in the first half of the eighteenth century: as in the United Provinces, how far were tolerationist imperatives to be extended to non-Christians? Ranging up to the political controversy surrounding the proposed Bill for the Naturalization of the Jews in 1753, Champion analyzes the relationships between Enlightenment ideas about faith, citizenship and toleration.

It was the Deists who made capital out of the debate, above all John Toland. His Reasons for Naturalising the Jews (1714) has been celebrated by historians as a liberal and even philo–semitic work, representing an unambiguous defence of rights to toleration – it was, after all, Toland who coined the phrase ‘the emancipation of the Jews’. By setting this work in the broader
context of Toland’s other accounts of Judaism, notably his materialist history of the Mosaic polity, Champion brings out the non-confessional premises of Toland’s arguments. In the process, comparing Toland’s views with clandestine works such as the *Traité des trois imposteurs* (1719), he also highlights points of difference between English polemics and ‘High Enlightenment’ theorists. Far from being mere abstract theories, English toleration arguments were rooted in a practical political agenda aimed at reconfiguring the relationship between the political and the religious. In eighteenth-century discourse, Champion concludes, a coherent theory of toleration could be constructed only from non-confessional parameters: for all religions to be tolerated, they had to all be considered equally false.

If the Dutch and the English enjoyed a substantial, but far from complete, toleration, certain other regimes set their face squarely against it – at least officially. In his ‘Inquisition, Tolerance and Liberty in Eighteenth-Century Spain’ (see pp. 250–58, this volume), Henry Kamen wryly notes that the Iberian world has not figured large in discussions of toleration, and Spain has usually been pictured as the archetypically persecuting society, obediently served by the Inquisition. Enforced orthodoxy and cultural unity – as evidenced by the expulsions of the Jews (1492, 1497) and Muslims (1609) – created a monolithic society in the expectation that ‘unity makes peace’: there was therefore no ‘problem’ of social tolerance that might call either for fresh thinking or new legislation. In other words, in the wake of the expulsions, toleration was not a living issue. If shedding some of its notoriety, the Inquisition continued during the eighteenth century to play its accustomed role in upholding censorship.

But even the Spanish story, apparently so clear-cut, proves more complex. Kamen shows that debate continued to simmer as to the fate of cultural minorities, including those earlier expelled, and with respect to discrimination against minorities on such matters as blood-purity. He further examines the philosophical and political attitudes held by progressive members of the elite who challenged dogmatism in science and faith, and had minds open to the possibility of religious pluralism. He also raises the issue of receptivity to Enlightenment outlooks amongst those who travelled abroad, notably their absorption of French and English rationalism.

If Spain is often ignored, Nicholas Davidson’s ‘Toleration in Enlightenment Italy’ (see pp. 230–49, this volume) similarly reminds us that, despite the prodigious labours of Franco Venturi and other Italian historians, all too many anglophone scholars remain unfamiliar with the dynamics of the Italian Enlightenment. Sketching in bold strokes developments in different centres, he examines the institutional framework upholding religious intolerance, including the operation of the Index and the Inquisition. He then explores the case for toleration as advanced by Enlightenment propagandists including
Pietro Giannone, Alberto Radicati, Cesare Beccaria and Gaetano Filangieri, before comparing similar views amongst Jansenists and Catholic reformers, including Pope Benedict XIV and Pietro Tamburini. We need to learn more, counsels Davidson, about the relationship between Enlightenment authors and discussions on toleration within the Italian Catholic Church: were changes in the institutional framework of religious intolerance a response, or a prelude, to those intellectual debates?

In Enlightenment France the toleration question was dominated by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, that high-point of the politico-religious ambitions of Louis XIV. Marking the end of a century of politico-bi-confessionalism, the post-1685 expulsions of the Huguenots signalled a new era of religious persecution in the name of un roi, une foi, une loi. In 1691 Bishop Bossuet was thus proud to boast that Catholicism was the least tolerant of all faiths. In her ‘Citizenship and Religious Toleration in France, 1685–1787 (see pp. 157–74, this volume), Marisa Linton relates the theoretical positions adopted in the French toleration debate to the changing political predicament of religious minorities and official attitudes towards them. One reason why the Bourbon monarchy upheld a confessional state lay in the fear that those whose religious affiliations lay elsewhere would also be disloyal to the Throne. Assessing the position of Protestants who stayed in France after 1685, she notes that, while revocation marked a reversal of an earlier, more tolerant, politics, there remained a certain measure of de facto toleration of Protestant minorities in local communities.

Linton also teases out some of the complexities of French Enlightenment attitudes towards toleration – its equivocations and limits. Turning to the theoretical position on toleration adopted by Montesquieu, Voltaire and other philosophes, she emphasizes that a key justification was derived from the natural law concept of freedom of conscience.

Casting her eye more widely, Linton then enquires into the relationships between ideologies and politics, in particular considering how the equivocal theoretical position of Jansenists within the French state after the Bull Unigenitus skewed the terms of the debate and encouraged pro-tolerationist arguments on the basis of citizenship. Could religious minorities be virtuous citizens and play a supportive role in public life, thereby permitting matters of religious affiliation to be left to private conscience? Such questions were played out in the Paris parlement in the billets de confession issue in the 1750s and the 1780s debate on the toleration of Protestants. Although the number of actual Jansenists in the parlement was small, they were highly influential and played a vital role in developing political consciousness; and disputes over religion were to prove a major source of tension between monarchy and parlement. Jansenists increasingly used arguments based on citizenship and patriotism to justify their participation in the State, and the
citizenship card was also played by other religious minorities; the campaign
to vindicate the memory of Jean Calas, for example, derived moral force
from the claim that he, like his fellow-Calvinists, was a good family man
and a loyal citizen.27

Linton thus draws attention to the growing currency of the idea that citizen-
ship implied the right to religious toleration. Eventually the monarchy itself
acquiesced in this change in public opinion, and some civic rights were form-
ally conceded to Protestants in 1787 – and the Revolutionaries were, of
course, to take the logic of this position much further.

Every kingdom has its own distinctive toleration tale. In some, the forces
of Enlightenment came to prevail, albeit partially and sometimes temporarily.
Habsburg Austria offers a case in point. In ‘Enlightenment in the Habsburg
Monarchy: History of a Belated and Short-lived Phenomenon’ (see pp. 196–
211, this volume), Karl Vocelka notes that Austrian historiography has tradi-
tionally defined the reigns of Maria Theresa, Joseph II and Leopold II as the
period (1740–92) of ‘enlightened absolutism’. Although they already enjoyed
a certain influence at the dawn of the eighteenth century through Prince
Eugene de Savoy and the Emperor Joseph I, enlightened ideas remained
restricted to the elite. The religious struggles of the seventeenth century had
undermined the influence of Protestantism and established Catholicism as the
state religion in Austria and Bohemia, and the traditional Protestant stress on
education and literacy was replaced by a Counter-Reformation focus on fine
arts and music. This, together with a stagnant economy, meant that the cul-
tural climate was not congenial to Enlightenment ideas, which in any case
lacked a broad social base.

Maria Theresa remained baroque in her attitudes in most respects. While
she prided herself upon conducting ‘enlightened’ policies against peasant
superstition, particularly in her non-Austrian territories,28 and initiated
reforms in administration, law and education, religious toleration as such was
anathema to her. Working towards the creation of a uniformly Catholic state,
she deported many thousands of her Bohemian Protestant subjects.

Joseph II (who ruled for only ten years, although he also had some influence
on the politics of his mother) and Leopold II (who ruled for just two
years) did, however, put enlightened ideas into action. Joseph brought in a
Patent of Toleration – for Protestants, Greek-Orthodox and Jews – and a
number of reforms regarding the Catholic Church, such as a reduction of
ceremonies, pilgrimages and brotherhoods, the dissolution of monasteries,
etc. Quite unlike his mother, Joseph believed toleration would actually bolster
the political strength of the state. ‘With freedom of religion’, he wrote to her
in June 1777, ‘one religion will remain, that of guiding all citizens alike to
the welfare of the state. Without this approach we shall not save any greater
number of souls, and we shall lose a great many more useful and essential
people’. Toleration thus was politically expedient. The outbreak of the French Revolution led, however, to a return to reaction under Francis I, who succeeded Leopold II in 1792. Reforms ceased, Revolutionary sympathizers were persecuted, and the brief period of Enlightenment in the Habsburg Monarchy ended abruptly.

While Austria seemed to be moving towards toleration, other nations were veering in the opposite direction, if for complex reasons. In ‘Toleration in Eastern Europe: the Dissident Question in Eighteenth-century Poland–Lithuania’ (see pp. 212–29, this volume), Michael Müller focuses on religious conflict in the period before the partitions, examining the reasons for the erosion of toleration in Eastern Europe and the emergence of a new ‘neo-confessionalism’.

In Poland and elsewhere in the East, the Enlightenment was not necessarily instrumental in consolidating already existing, or producing new models of, multi-confessional coexistence. The ideal of religious unity played an important role in processes of proto-national integration or, as in Catherine the Great’s Russia, in the shaping of an identity of late-absolutist statehood. Eighteenth-century politics tended to instrumentalize religious issues in the context of great power relations – in other words, religion became nationalized. The fate of toleration, Müller emphasizes, lay in tensions between secularization and re-confessionalization.

Other political entities embodied toleration of a sort, but independently of avowed enlightenment ideologies – realities counting more than rhetoric. In his ‘A Tolerant Society? Religious Toleration and the Holy Roman Empire, 1648–1806’ (see pp. 175–95, this volume), Joachim Whaley observes that the Peace of Westphalia had brought to a conclusion over a century of often violent confessional struggle dividing the Holy Roman Empire. Primarily a religious peace, it set the judicial framework for relations between the three main Christian denominations, and hence for religious coexistence generally, in the German lands for the next 150 years.

Whaley addresses the Imperial problem at several levels. In terms of politics, the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia were designed to neutralize religion as an issue liable to unsettle the relations between the members of the Empire. At the same time, however, by specifying in great detail the rights of various Christian confessions in designated territories, the Treaty created a check to change, since its opponents could always appeal to the sanctity of the Empire’s fundamental law.

Nevertheless, many factors bred demands for change. Jurists such as Thomasius, looking back to precedents from pagan Rome, promoted the view that rulers and regents had no authority in religious matters, and such jurisprudential arguments were given greater force during the eighteenth century by the influence first of English and later of French writings on toleration. In
some localities purely pragmatic considerations – both political and, above all, economic – prompted legislation granting rights to religious minorities including radical sects, Mennonites and Jews, none of whom had been mentioned in the Peace of Westphalia.

Whaley examines the interplay between ideals and necessities in stimulating legislation first in the Protestant territories and later in many of the Catholic principalities. This legislation commonly involved granting licences to specific groups for specific purposes. After the 1770s this piecemeal approach was itself condemned as inadequate by enlightened critics who regarded licences as simply another, if disguised, form of intolerance. Contemporaries such as Goethe and Schiller protested that they were living in an intolerant age. In Goethe’s judgement, to tolerate was itself to insult, rather as Tom Paine contended that the very notion of toleration was inherently intolerant, since it implied its granting as an act of grace and favour, whereas in truth freedom of thought and conscience was a basic right.

Such criticisms did little, however, to bring about more general change. That was the product of the reform period after 1800, in which the Holy Roman Empire and its restrictive legislation were destroyed. A reduced number of larger German states emerged, with confessionally more mixed populations: for the first time the principle of legal equality between individuals of different denominations became a functional prerequisite of the new polities.

Despite some examples of de facto toleration of a limited number of immigrant Reformed communities in the Lutheran states of Scandinavia from the late sixteenth through the early seventeenth centuries, neither Denmark nor Sweden proved particularly receptive to Enlightenment toleration. French Enlightenment ideas were advanced in Denmark and neighbouring Sweden by the influential philosopher and playwright, Ludvig Holberg (1684–1754), who was particularly influenced by the writings of Montaigne. Like his French mentors Holberg was hostile to the established clergy and learned theology. Despite his adherence to a modern Deism he never became an advocate of religious toleration. According to Holberg, articles of faith which went against common sense had to be rejected. Thus Catholicism with its emphasis on transubstantiation had to be discarded as dangerous superstition, while Calvinism with its emphasis on predestination undermined God’s justice and mercy. Raison d’état, argued Holberg, could not allow such denominations or atheists to be publicly tolerated. However, the fact that Holberg was convinced that everyone had a duty to examine their faith and accepted religious dogma critically, meant that while he could not support freedom of worship he came down strongly in support of freedom of conscience and speech. Even if, by the mid-eighteenth century, Holberg and French Enlightenment authors such as Voltaire and Montesquieu had a con-
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considerable readership in Denmark, as well as in Sweden, where the writings of Locke and Hume seem to have been particularly popular, their views never appear to have reached beyond the urban upper classes and the educated gentry, and they had little if any immediate practical effect. If anything, in the short term Enlightenment ideas, together with the pressures from Pietist circles, led to greater intolerance spurred on by the increasingly beleaguered Lutheran state churches of Scandinavia.32

In 1770 when the Court physician Johann Friedrich Struensee became chief minister in Denmark it seemed to many contemporaries that the Enlightenment had finally arrived in the North. They were confirmed in their beliefs when in September 1770 Struensee’s government removed all censorship. Even if some restrictions were re-introduced the following year, this freedom of the press gave rise to a host of pamphlets of a highly heterodox nature, many of which were particularly hostile to the established Lutheran clergy who were portrayed as fat and greedy priests. Struensee also proceeded to demolish many of the moral laws, cancelling the fines which had hitherto been imposed on people found involved in extra-marital sex, while instructing the Lutheran Church to offer similar baptismal treatment to illegitimate as well as legitimate children. Such moral relativism, however, caused considerable hostility among the conservative and orthodox establishment who needed little justification to take action against a man whom they did their utmost to portray as a dangerous atheist. Struensee’s fall in January 1772 and subsequent execution meant that his Enlightenment project was short-lived and of little consequence.33

Towards the end of the eighteenth century there was a growing support for toleration in Denmark and Sweden even among Lutheran theologians, many of whom supported some form of toleration. Locke’s *Letters on Toleration* was translated into Swedish in 1793, while Sweden received its toleration act (*Religionsfrihetslag*) in 1781. It had, however, clear limitations, for example only extending the right to stand for parliament to those of the Reformed faith. Schooling still remained the prerogative of the Lutheran Church in Sweden, while Catholic proselytism was explicitly forbidden. Jews were excluded and regulated by the so-called *Judenreglement* issued the following year. Despite such changes and initiatives toleration was never fully and sincerely embraced by the ecclesiastical and political leadership in Scandinavia during the Enlightenment period.34

Conclusions

What generalizations do these different national experiences prompt? We must, for one thing, always be careful not to confuse rubrics and realities. As Robert Darnton has shown, though *ancien régime* France officially main-
tained a system of strict censorship, it was an open secret that censorship was at best uneven, and Malesherbes, one of the Directeurs de la Librairie – that is, chief censor – was not a little sympathetic towards the philosophes. Clandestine manuscripts circulated widely, and banned books were constantly smuggled into the country from the United Provinces and the Swiss cantons.\textsuperscript{35} Nicholas Davidson likewise shows that in various Italian states censorship, though officially rigorous, was in actuality lax, corrupt or erratic. No regime had the power, even if it possessed the will, to enforce absolute unity of worship or prohibitions on print.

In his wide-ranging ’Multiculturalism and Ethnic Cleansing in the Enlightenment’ (see pp. 69–85, this volume), Robert Wokler observes how, during the past 200 years, critics of the ‘Enlightenment Project’ have decried its philosophy for its shallow rationalism, its uniformitarian conceptions of human nature and the alleged sinister application of its political doctrines by totalitarian regimes.\textsuperscript{36} Addressing the charge that leading Enlightenment thinkers were as intolerant of religious and social diversity as the orthodoxies they denounced, Wokler appraises the commitment to multiculturalism in the philosophical anthropologies of such protagonists as Voltaire, Hume, Diderot, Kant and Condorcet. Above all he identifies a principle of toleration at the heart of the Enlightenment, which he views as an intellectual movement which did not prefigure but rather attempted to forestall the grandiose schemes of ethnic cleansing which have been so prevalent throughout the twentieth century.

A somewhat dissimilar assessment is offered by Sylvana Tomaselli. Her ‘Intolerance, the Virtue of Princes and Radicals’ (see pp. 86–101, this volume) holds that scrutiny of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writings reveals that toleration was not particularly prized as a virtue. Toleration was not even routinely portrayed by its advocates as a good in itself – mostly it was considered as a means to an end. For Montesquieu, it was a necessary route to prosperity and peace, rather than a neglected virtue.

To understand why this was so, we need, Tomaselli contends, to examine further the texts and contexts in which toleration was discussed. The two most important political theorists around 1700, Bossuet and Fénelon, provide an appropriate starting-point for her elucidation of the moral status of toleration for eighteenth-century minds.

Overall, according to Martin Fitzpatrick’s survey, ‘Toleration and the Enlightenment Movement’ (see pp. 23–68, this volume), there are many ways of exploring the themes of freedom and repression in the Enlightenment. Fitzpatrick discounts the triumphalist whiggism which would trace an inevitable rise of toleration through the Enlightenment and beyond, but he equally challenges the pessimistic view that the Enlightenment, in its attacks on the ancien régime confessional state, cleared the way for the imposition of new
and more stringent mind and behavioural controls. The truth lies, he suggests, somewhere between both positions.

That is why, Fitzpatrick contends, it is necessary to probe ambivalences in the thinking of the *philosophes*, and in so doing he raises major questions. What sort of prejudices did they attack, and which were they content to leave in place? What was the relationship between their editorializing and their actions? What prejudices did they themselves retain? Finally, by the vigour of their attack on intolerance, did they not create a new sort of intolerance, one favourable to enlightened uniformity? Did Voltaire, for instance, envisage a new ‘Church’? Did reason dictate a new dogmatism? Was new *philosophe* but old priest writ large?

Through posing such questions, Fitzpatrick moves on to the relationship between campaigns for religious toleration, understood in the restricted terms of freedom of worship, and the trend to demand toleration as a ‘right’. Did such changes in discourse mean a real shift in programme, moving ultimately away from a concern with toleration towards a pluralistic society, and the implied acceptance of moral and religious relativism? Did religious claims finally become swallowed up in the specifications of the modern state?

This book does not suggest that the Enlightenment was some predestined stage in the triumph of toleration: far from it. But, as John Gray has recently stressed, it was the thinkers of the Enlightenment who most clearly voiced those arguments for toleration, in all their strengths and weaknesses, which continue to envelop us in our present multicultural and multireligious societies. Here, as in so many other ways, we are the children of the Enlightenment.37

Notes


7 F.M.A. de Voltaire, *Philosophical Dictionary*, 1764, article ‘Theologian’.


Sir William Temple’s *Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands* (1673) had earlier developed similar arguments. Temple stated that ‘the great and general end of all religion, next to men’s happiness hereafter, is their happiness here’. Since ‘the way to our future happiness has been perpetually disputed throughout the world, and must be left at last to the impressions made upon every man’s belief and conscience’, our ‘happiness here’ is alone of public concern. The rulers of the United Provinces had grasped that. There men live together like citizens of the world, associated by the common ties of humanity and by the bonds of peace, under the impartial protection of indifferent laws, with equal encouragement of all art and industry and equal freedom of speculation and enquiry, [wherein] will appear to consist chiefly of the vast growth of their trade and riches, and consequently the strength and greatness of their state.


13 M. Heyd, ‘Be Sober and Reasonable’: the Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seven-
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18 R. Shattuck, Forbidden Knowledge, passim.


21 For the claim that Enlightenment opinion created despotisms of its own, see J.L. Talmon, The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy, Boston, 1952.


28 G. Klaniczay, The Uses of Supernatural Power: The Transformation of Popular


32 S. Lindroth, Svensk Lärdomshistoria. Frihetstiden, Stockholm, 1978: 497–557 and O. Feldbæk, ‘Tro, viden og holdninger 1730–1814’, in A.E. Christensen et al. (eds), Danmarks Historie, IV, Copenhagen, 1982: 228–52. Volumes dealing specifically with the Enlightenment in Denmark/Norway and Sweden/Finland have yet to be written, even if some useful information can be obtained from S. Holm, Filosofien i Norden før 1900, Copenhagen, 1967.

33 See S. Cedergreen Bech, Struensee og hans tid, Copenhagen, 1972; and L. Koch, Oplysningstiden i den Danske Kirke 1700–1800, Copenhagen, 1914.

34 See N. Hope, German and Scandinavian Protestantism 1700 to 1918, Oxford, 1995: 300–6.

