CHAPTER I

Historical background and introduction

At its height in the ninth century AD, the ‘Abbāsid caliphate covered an extensive realm that stretched across the African and Asian continents, from the western reaches of Carthage on the Mediterranean to the Indus River Valley in the east, spanning prime regions over which the Greeks, Romans, Persians, and Turks had gone to war during the previous thousand years. This empire had come into existence as a result of conquests that began under the early Islamic caliphate centered in Medina and its successor dynasty of the Umayyads (AD 661–750). But it was with the ‘Abbāsids that the process of social and cultural symbiosis and economic integration began to take root in this new state, giving shape to a new society characterized by the cohesive powers of a common language and currency and a unifying religio-political center.

The ‘Abbāsids, partly due to their rise as a religious millennial movement, were more conscious of their universal pretensions to power than their predecessors had been. The new caliphs, kinsmen to the Prophet through the line of his uncle al-‘Abbās, held messianic titles that pointed to their spiritual gifts as imāms and underlined their distinct historical role in guiding the mission of government. Titles such as al-Manṣūr, al-Mahdī, al-Hādī, and al-Rashīd were variant expressions of their claims to a divine right to rule, as well as to their charismatic power, and this message was given poetic expression in the shape and definition that the ‘Abbāsids gave to their new capital. Baghdad, better known as “the City of Peace” (madīnat al-salām) in the official parlance of the day, was built to be the ideal city of the new state. At the time of its origin in 762, it was built in a round shape with four gates, pointing midway between the cardinal directions, in a layout intended to reconcile cosmological conceptions of the disc of the heavens with the vision of the four quarters of the known world. The Round City encircling the palace of the caliph mirrored the rotation of the constellations about the fate of the world, making Baghdad a new symbolic center in political and religious terms.1

Reinterpreting Islamic historiography

As great an impact as this empire had on the fortunes of peoples and regions it ruled, however, we know few details about how it was administered and defended, what shaped the policies and motives of its caliphs, and how its subjects viewed their rulers. Medieval Arabic chronicles and literary sources provide us today with abundant anecdotal and narrative material about the lives of the caliphs, and historians have used these sources repeatedly to construct biographies of the caliphs. However, the intertwining lines of fiction and fact in these works have never been clearly separated. What did the narratives about the caliphs signify in their times? How did anecdotes convey various levels of thematic meaning? To what extent were literary tropes appreciated and detected by the medieval audience? These are some of the questions that the study of medieval Islamic historiography will gradually have to answer. This study represents an attempt in that direction. It explores the elusive nature of medieval Islamic narratives, and tries through a new reading of the sources to reposition our view of the classical intention behind the literary accounts, moving that intention from one providing direct chronology to one offering historical commentary and seeking the active engagement of readers and narrators, listeners and dramatizers. To set the stage, we shall examine here the historical background of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate, and survey those significant moments in its history that would color the memory of later historical narrative and contribute to the crafting of a particular spectrum of themes. We will then sketch in broad terms the method and approach of the present critique.

Historical overview

The ‘Abbāsid dynasty has traditionally been seen as arising immediately following the fall of the Umayyad caliphate in Damascus in the year 750. The Umayyad caliphate fell in the face of a popular revolution that swept its way from Khurāsān, the frontier province on the north-eastern border of the Islamic empire. Yet in reality it took the ‘Abbāsid family until at least the year 762 to consolidate its hold on power and push out other contenders to the throne. In the years that led up to the revolution the ‘Abbāsids had been one among several branches of the Prophet’s family in whose name the revolt was made that had seemed likely candidates for the new caliphate. Throughout the years of organizing the revolution the leadership issue remained open, partly because participants in the movement were united behind a slogan that ambiguously called for the succession of “one agreed upon [or worthy] of the house of Mūḥammad” (‘al-ridā min āl-Muḥammad”).

Socially this was a complex revolutionary movement, for it brought together diverse segments of Khurāsānī opposition, each harboring various

reasons for challenging the Umayyads. The rebels were, however, united on at least two important points, which lent them unity until the moment of victory. The first was their deep sympathy for the plight of the Hashemite family, long persecuted at the hands of the Umayyads, and an attendant desire to vindicate the memory of the family’s fallen leaders; the second was their vision that this mobilization from Khurāsān was going to be a messianic movement that would usher in a new, righteous age, heralding both a political and a religious rebirth for the faith. Once chosen, the new Hashemite caliph was to preside over a millennial age that would bring about justice and prosperity.

Various signs leading up to the revolution lent confidence that an age of religious redemption was destined to concur with that political change: the fact that the first call for this movement had taken place at the turn of the first Islamic century, a moment bearing significant cyclical connotation; and that members of the Hashemite family, thought of as holding the key to an esoteric religious knowledge, handed down in the Prophetic family, had been observing cosmic signs and finally determined that the hour had arrived for making the call (or da‘wa) for the revolution. These occurrences gave a unique dimension to the religious expectations of various followers. Further adding to these beliefs was a set of other portents that enhanced the followers’ commitment to their new cause. In the way the Hashemite family set about organizing the new religious-political mission, there seemed to be signs reminiscent of the early days of the Islamic faith. The Hashemites—from their distant bases in the western provinces, Kūfā, Medina, and Mecca, and the ‘Abbasids, from al-Humayma—had entrusted the responsibility for propagating the mission to a delegation of seventy Khurāsānī deputies and propagandists. This evoked memories of the time when the Prophet received the loyalty of seventy followers in Medina, who came to form the kernel community of the new religion that eventually conquered Mecca. Just as the Prophet had once turned outside Mecca for supporters, his Hashemite descendants were now seen turning outside Arabia for new supporters. And the Qur’ānic verse that spoke of the Prophet’s preaching to Umm al-Qurā (“mother of cities”),3 once understood as referring to Mecca, was understood in the climate of the new times as a reference to the town of Marw, capital of the province of Khurāsān.4 Marw had become the organizing ground of the new imāms, and the Khurāsānīs were now viewed as the new Ansār.5 Geographical significance played a role as well. The fact that the new da‘wa (“the call”) was initiated in Khurāsān, a region whose name meant “the land of the rising sun” and which was historically known as the area from which political movements were

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launched to revive the Iranian kingdom, now gave the enterprise an added symbolism. This encouraged the vision that the hour had finally arrived for a new dawn in Islamic history.6

The ‘Abbāsids claim for the imāmate on the grounds of kinship to the Prophet, however, was never secure. The ‘Alids, direct descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭima and her husband ‘Alī (the Prophet’s cousin), were their constant rivals. The ‘Alids had even been the focus of opposition movements, during the first schism that brought the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu‘āwiya, in conflict with the fourth caliph, ‘Alī. The conflict between Mu‘āwiya’s descendants in Damascus and ‘Alī’s sympathizers in Kūfah and Hijāz continued for decades afterwards, producing the famous tragedy of Ḥusayn in 661 at Kerbala and later the fall of his grandson, Zayd b. ‘Alī, at Kūfah in 740, and the fall of his son Yahyā in Marw in 743. These were not events easily forgotten, and they continued to resonate with bitter memories across the provinces and were of primary importance in turning the Hashemite family into a magnet for various social and political oppositions ranged across the east.

Therefore the ‘Alid family could, when it so desired, also call on a wide following of Arab and Iranian sympathizers. In 762, when the ‘Abbāsids caliph al-Manṣūr, believing the dust had settled and all was secure, set about sketching the perimeter of Baghdad, the ‘Alids raised the most massive revolt they had ever organized. Muḥammad al-Nafṣ al-Zakīyya (“the Pure Soul”), a descendant of al-Hasan who had long evaded accepting the ‘Abbāsid claim to power after the Umayyad fall, now came out in the open, rallied popular support in Medina, and claimed the caliphal title for himself. In a series of letters to al-Manṣūr, al-Nafṣ al-Zakīyya accused al-Manṣūr of having reneged on a bay‘a, an oath of allegiance, that he, along with the leadership of the movement, had once given to the ‘Alids during the underground phase of the revolution, and demanded al-Manṣūr’s allegiance. Muḥammad al-Nafṣ al-Zakīyya, whose name, Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh, reminded many of the Prophet’s name and led some to claim that he physically resembled the Prophet, was still a child when the Hashemite patriarchs met in secret just outside Medina a few years after 719 (AH 100) to decide on their strategy, and reportedly swore allegiance to al-Nafṣ al-Zakīyya. Firm evidence that can corroborate the ‘Alid claim on this bay‘a is lacking, but the ‘Abbāsid arguments claiming an early right to the succession are no less a matter of debate.

This said, one is inclined to suspect that the ‘Abbāsids may indeed have double-crossed the ‘Alids. To appreciate the potential for confusion on this issue, one need only imagine the loose structure that characterized the forma-

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6 As the ‘Abbāsid Dāwūd b. ‘Ali put it in his inaugural speech for the caliph al-Saffah, “Now authority has finally been put in order (āda al-amru ila‘isābihi). Now the sun has again risen from the East . . . and now the legitimate rights have been returned to where they should belong.” Ahmad b Yahyā Balādhurī, Anaṣīb al-Ashraf, vol. III, Banū al-‘Abbās, ed. A. A. al-Dūrī (Wiesbaden, 1978), 140; Ahmad b. Abī Ya‘qūb al-Ya‘qūbī, Taʾrīkh (Beirut, 1960), II, 350.
tive years of the revolution. Spread out between Khurāsān, Irāq, and Arabia, the details of the propaganda were subject to miscommunication, as news was relayed in a secretive environment among various parties: from the Hashemite imām to his chief propagandist in Khurāsān, on to a team of deputies who preached vague interpretations of the messianic daʿwa, and finally to a public that blurred the differences between ‘Alid, ‘Abbāsid, and other family branches under the name of the eponymous ancestor of the Prophet’s family, Hāshim.7

How the ‘Abbāsids came to channel the loyalty of the Khurāsānīs to their branch is a complex topic whose details lie outside the purview of the present study. Suffice it to say that the ‘Abbāsids, with their strategic skill and cohesive relations with the Khurāsānīs in the early days of their rule, proved able to circumvent ‘Alid political threats. Still, the revolt of Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakīyya marked a turning point by showing a continuing contest over the goals and original intentions of the revolution. In Medina, it also showed the emergence of new levels of affinity between the leading descendants of the city’s traditional elite (members of the families of the early companions of the Prophet, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, and al-Zubayr) and the ‘Alid rebel,8 as well as the affinity between religious traditionalists, such as the scholar Mālik b. ʿAnas, and this particular ‘Alid movement.9 In Baṣra, al-Nafs al-Zakīyya’s brother, Ibrāhīm, who raised another revolt almost simultaneously against the ‘Abbāsids, was to rally an even greater following and find similar support among jurists such as Abū Ḥanīfa.10 Whether these new alliances in Medina and Baṣra were indicative of broader regional and new social affinities is not clear from the sources. Yet despite these alliances the ‘Abbāsids were able to prevail, albeit with difficulty. The new regime, it had become clear, was able to marshal military and economic resources in this critical contest with the ‘Alids, and the Khurāsānīs were, for the moment, largely backing the ‘Abbāsid cause in a way that tilted the balance.

These tensions between the ‘Alids and the ‘Abbāsids formed one of many challenges that plagued the rise of the ‘Abbāsids. Others included an internal debate within the ‘Abbāsid family over questions of succession, as the caliph al-Manṣūr pressured his cousin, ʿĪsā b. Mūsā, to give up his claims for succession in favor of al-Manṣūr’s son, al-Mahdī, on whom the caliph placed great hopes of consolidating the line of succession and stabilizing ‘Abbāsid rule. Another even more menacing issue was the resurgence of some Iranian eschatological currents, which started to surface following the arrest and downfall of the famous commander Abū Muslim. Abū Muslim, a Khurāsānī commander in charge of the ‘Abbāsid military apparatus in Khurāsān early in the

Abbasid era, had played a key role in mobilizing Iranian support in the years leading up to the revolution. His identity and roots are shrouded with a terrific aura of myth and legend, but much of this is indicative of the enormous impact he had on the success of the revolution. Although to the Arab supporters of the revolution he represented an efficient military commander, in the east Abū Muslim seems to have been himself a center of religious and political gravity among Khurāsānis, who saw in him a regional political champion and even a prophetic reincarnation of earlier messianic figures. All this was a source of anxiety for the absolutist caliph al-Mansūr, who feared that the commander might either break away or support another pretender to the throne, whether an ‘Alid or an ‘Abbāsid. Abū Muslim was thus removed from the scene through a careful plot that lured that commander from the east to Baghdad. In the period that immediately followed, the fall of Abū Muslim passed without repercussions. However, in Khurāsān several years afterward, a new wave of rebels, known as the Abū Muslimiyā, emerged, harboring a great reverence for the memory of Abū Muslim and challenging the caliphate. Combining a yearning for messianic renewal with social and cultural visions of change that centered on Iran, the rebels seemed to threaten both the caliphate and Islam itself. The lost Iranian commander, these movements asserted, had gone into occultation and would later reemerge in a messianic movement. Others believed that Abū Muslim’s soul had transmigrated to another messianic figure, who was going to lead another Khurāsānī rising against the ‘Abbāsids in due course.11 There is no definitive religious label for the ideologies of these movements, except to say that they were a reflection of syncretistic traditions that blended ideas from Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and Islam, and were still fermenting in the unstable social and political climate of the post-revolutionary era.12

In many ways, these political challenges to ‘Abbāsid rule were conflicts not just over the definition of legitimization, but over the ability of a central authority located in one city, Baghdad, to exercise control over the social, economic, and religious life of the provinces. Questions about how the provinces were to be internally ruled, where the tax revenues would go, and whether the caliph could extend a single set of laws to all the provinces, kept flaring up in new ways and expressions. In this regard, the challenge to the ‘Abbāsid was no different from those facing other dynasties to establish central rule, whether before or after them, in the Near East. Despite the challenges, the ‘Abbāsids proved to be resilient survivors. As a family they succeeded in developing solidarity and commitment to defending their collective interest against their opponents, such as the ‘Alids. Various family members accepted the succession line drawn by al-Mansūr down to his son, al-Mahdī, and to the latter’s

sons, al-Hādī and al-Rashīd. In turn, the caliphs always trusted members of their family to assume the most sensitive political and gubernatorial responsibilities. Ruling positions in provinces such as Egypt, Syria, Ḥiǧāz, Baṣra, Kūfah, and Jaʿzīra were routinely assigned to members of the family, and their privileges also included occupying the ceremonial office of leading the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca. This new pattern of administration showed a marked departure from the Umayyads, who had relied mostly on tribal allies and protégés to assume a variety of posts.

Beyond their internal affairs, the ‘Abbāsids concentrated their efforts on building a cohesive monarchical institution based on a structured hierarchy of political and military clientage rooted in the memory of the revolution. The revolution not only marked the beginning of a political era, but also defined a moral and historical link among the empire’s political elite. Descendants of those who had participated in the revolution now formed a socio-political class referred to as either Abnāʾ al-Dawla, Abnāʾ al-Daʿwa, or al-Abnāʾ (the sons). Their loyalty to the regime was based not merely on economic privilege or expectations of military advantage, but on a shared relation to a key historical moment, and from that to a direct affinity to the state. This was a new experiment in Islamic political history whose roots cannot be traced to any similar model from the Byzantines or Sasanians. But although it seems to have fostered strong bonds of military loyalty, it may have had the disadvantage in the long run of drawing sharp lines between itself and other military and administrative classes and groups (particularly in the provinces) that sought to assimilate in the political rubric of the dynasty, but could not because they lacked this historical linkage with the revolution.

These problems of social assimilation, provincial control, and millennial effervescence were felt most severely by the ‘Abbāsids in Khurāsān, where political expressions took a range of forms and came in varying intensity. However, the roots of Khurāsān’s religio-political challenge and complexity stretch farther back than the ‘Abbāsids, into Sasanid times, and have a lot to do with the frontier nature of this region, straddling the borders of several empires and a range of autonomous principalities around the Oxus River Valley (Transoxiana). Locked in a diverse geo-political zone, Khurāsān faced the influence of its neighbors on social, economic, and religious levels. Alliances between Khurāsānīs and the Central Asian principalities were therefore not uncommon, and could at any time accelerate into a conflict among greater powers. In 751, when the region of Ferghāna went to war with the province of al-Shāsh (Tashkent), Ferghāna turned to China for help, while the ruler of al-Shāsh turned to the ‘Abbāsid governor of Khurāsān. The incident escalated into a military confrontation between the Abbāsids and the Chinese along the Taraz River. This was the episode usually remembered as the occasion on which the Arabs obtained the secret of papermaking from Chinese prisoners and transmitted it to the west. The battle that took place had gone in favor of the ‘Abbāsids, which put an end to Chinese influence in
the area, but in later years, particularly in the reigns of al-Amūn and al-
Ma’mūn, new actors, such as Tibet, were to appear on the scene again.

Buddhism may also have played a major role in bringing about this cul-
tural affinity between Khurāsān and Transoxiana. Buddhism, a religion that went through phases of wide support in Sasanid Persia and the Fertile Crescent from the third century AD, had strongly colored the ethical world-
view of Manichaeism. Furthermore, we know that a number of Buddhist religious centers had flourished in Khurāsān, the most important of which was the Nawbahār (“New Temple”) near the town of Balkh, which evidently served as a pilgrimage center for political leaders, who came from far and wide to pay homage to it. The Barmakid family, which took a role in the dissemi-
nation of the Hashemite da’wa in Khurāsān during the revolution and later occupied center stage as vizirs and bureaucrats in the court of the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, were originally the chief priests of the Nawbahār of Balkh, and were connected through marriage ties with neighboring princes in Transoxiana. The religious, social, and political prestige that the Barmakids commanded, therefore, were a key reason why the ‘Abbāsids turned to them for support. And this cooperation was cemented when the caliph al-Mahdī and his vizir Yahyā al-Barmakī each had his son nursed by his opposite number’s wife. As a result Hārūn al-Rashīd and Ja’far al-Barmakī became milk brothers, a bond that a-
ffi rmed a Perso-Arab partnership in power.

The east continued to command the greatest share of ‘Abbāsīd attention, and the caliphs attempted various experiments for establishing e-
ffi fective administration over Khurāsān, including a strict phase under the Abnā’ com-
mander, ‘Alī b. ‘Īsā b. Māhān, and a lenient phase under the stewardship of al-Faḍl b. Yahyā al-Barmakī, both during the reign of al-Rashīd. Our evidence is sparse about the details of various ‘Abbāsīd administrations in Khurāsān, but toward the end of his life, al-Rashīd appointed his son al-
Ma’mūn as governor of Khurāsān. The caliph’s idea was a new method in ‘Abbāsīd government, and the rationale behind it lay in al-Ma’mūn’s ties to maternal kin in the east. Al-Ma’mūn was the son of a Persian concubine, and the caliph hoped this could appeal in due course to Persian cultural and polit-
ical sensitivities while al-Ma’mūn could bridge Khurāsān’s administration under the direct control of Baghdad. There was little time to judge the efficacy of this new experiment, since the caliph al-Rashīd soon died, in 809, while on a campaign in Khurāsān. He left behind al-Ma’mūn in Marw, and another son, al-Amūn, who now acceded to the caliphate in Baghdad.

The events that soon followed the death of al-Rashīd were to be of critical

importance in ‘Abbāsid history, as a conflict ensued between the brothers al-
Amīn and al-Ma‘mūn. As relations deteriorated and the crisis over succession
escalated into a civil war, al-Amīn found support among the Abnā’, while al-
Ma‘mūn was aided by a new group of Khurāsānī supporters led by the
Sahlids, former protégés of the Barmakids, and the Tāhirids, a leading family
in the area of Būshanj and Herāt. The overarching dispute over the throne
also parted sympathies down the provinces, as various towns declared their
loyalty to one of the brothers, thereby leading to a conflict within the prov-
inces too. Al-Amīn’s forces gradually lost ground to al-Ma‘mūn’s armies and,
in 813, Tāhir b. al-Ḥusayn, al-Ma‘mūn’s commander, advanced on Baghdad.
After a siege that lasted nearly a year, his troops took the city by force. In the
midst of the chaos and turmoil that followed, al-Amīn was taken prisoner
and, probably at Tāhir’s command, was secretly put to death, an event that
would have lingering political ramifications. Al-Ma‘mūn, meanwhile, was
declared caliph in Marw and continued to reside in Khurāsān, giving no indi-
cation of a desire to return to Baghdad. It was only years later, in 819, when
he found conditions of protracted political chaos and instability still brewing
in Irāq, that he returned with his entourage, reestablished the old capital as his
center, and set about reorganizing the foundations of the state and reuniting
its fragmented authority in the provinces. Al-Ma‘mūn proved to be a far more
systematic planner of policies in Baghdad than he was in Khurāsān. He care-
fully pursued a policy of recentralization, revived ‘Abbāsid defenses on the
Byzantine frontier, and reorganized the military in a way that diversified the
state army to include more Persian troops, and later included the beginning of
a Turkish-slave military system. But by far the policy that has been most asso-
ciated with his name is known as the mihna, or religious trial/inquisition, when
he tried to impose the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur‘ān espoused by
the Mu’tazila school of speculative theology on the traditional circle of hadīth
scholars.

Al-Ma‘mūn died in 833, in the midst of a Byzantine campaign. His succes-
sor, al-Mu‘taṣim, continued many of his policies. He kept up state support for
the mihna, maintained a substantial role for the Persian political elite (such as
the Tāhirids in the east), and further expanded the Turkish-slave military
system. He also founded the city of Sāmarrā’ which, as his new capital, was
intended to accommodate the burgeoning Turkish army, but which may also
have been meant to distance the caliphal court from the traditionalist opposi-
tion of Baghdad as the new regime pursued a controversial religious policy.
Baghdad had been a city of the Abnā’ and maintained residues of political
hostility to the successors of al-Amīn.

In Sāmarrā’, al-Mu‘taṣim (833–842) maintained a strong grip on his new
military elite, as did his son and short-lived successor, al-Wāthiq (842–47). But
soon after, the authority of the caliphate began to give way to an assertive
and factional military. The Turkish-slave military system had been founded
to serve the function of directly guarding the caliph’s political interest. In
particular, al-Ma’mūn had drawn on their support, after the erosion of Arab tribal military support in the western provinces during the civil war, to recenteralize the provinces and cope with new threats cropping up on the empire's borders, such as the syncretistic Mazdakite revolt of Bābak al-Khurramīn in Azerbaijan and the Byzantines in Asia Minor. Having served its original purposes, the Turkish military now became an idle army, with a layer of officer-aristocracy that lived off its vast estates in Śāmarra and Mesopotamia and turned to manipulating the caliphs and state policy. The succession of al-Mutawakkil, the inexperienced son of al-Mu'tasım, indicated a suspicious shift from al-Wâthiq's succession line that was brought about purely by court intrigue. It was a sign of things to come.

Al-Mutawakkil tried various methods to alleviate the caliphate’s political weakness, the most notable of which was to end the miḥna program and realign state affinity with the traditionalist orthodox scholars; at one point he even contemplated shifting the capital to Damascus to escape the local military strongmen. Although a major achievement, the caliph's new religious policy failed to gain the caliphate the popular political support al-Mutawakkil had hoped for. Over the course of the miḥna, the traditionalist scholars had gradually developed a degree of social solidarity. As they found themselves threatened by the state and by other religious ideas, they set themselves apart from the caliphate, forming a new focal point of religious legitimization. The caliphate, having lost the meaning of its original political legitimization – which dated to the revolutionary era – through years of civil war and stormy arguments over the miḥna, could claim only a vague and shadowy credibility with the public. And it had become deeply vulnerable to military manipulation in Śāmarra. The massive amounts the caliphs expended on building the city, the plans for which apparently continued to multiply because of a colossal mistake made in the original urban planning, along with the need to keep the salaried troops content, eventually broke the caliphate’s finances, leaving al-Mutawakkil and successive caliphs vulnerable.

Al-Mutawakkil’s assassination in 861 by a military clique of palace conspirators paved the way for a stream of weak caliphs, mostly his children, who tried various alliances with military strongmen to extend some semblance of new political authority. In the end their efforts proved futile. Scarcely would a caliph, such as al-Muṣṭa’in or al-Mu’tazz, succeed in eliminating the dominance of one commander when a new pattern of alliance among other commanders would force him to give in to their influence. The tragedies of these caliphs have been commemorated in a singularly detailed fashion in the accounts of Tabarī. Intensely vivid and focused on intrigues within the palace, the story harbors a breath of suspense that is all its own, as we see one caliph’s (al-Muḥtadi’s) last attempt to escape the palace and rally public support, then