Democracy's Edges

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An enduring embarrassment of democratic theory is that it seems impotent when faced with questions about its own scope. By its terms democracy seems to take the existence of units within which it operates for granted. It depends on a decision rule, usually some variant of majority rule, but the rule's operation assumes that the question "majority of whom?" has already been settled. If this is not done democratically, however, in what sense are the results that flow from democratic decision rules genuinely democratic? A chicken-and-egg problem thus lurks at democracy's core. Questions relating to boundaries and membership seem in an important sense prior to democratic decision-making, yet paradoxically they cry out for democratic resolution.

One need not consider such extreme cases as Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, or the West Bank for evidence supporting this contention, though they surely do. Arguments about the legal status of Turkish "guestworkers" in Germany, removing full British citizenship from members of the Commonwealth, or denying public education to the children of illegal immigrants in California are all challenging to think about as matters of *democratic* politics partly because they render problematical assumptions about who constitutes the appropriate demos for majoritarian decision. Indeed, virtually every aspect of a country's policies dealing with immigrants or minorities can be shown to involve this paradox in some way. Democratic theorists often acknowledge the existence of the difficulty, but surprisingly little headway has been made in dealing with it to date.[1]

If the controversial character of political boundaries were to diminish over time, perhaps the chicken-and-egg problem would abate as well.

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[1] As Dahl (1989: 3) puts it: "Advocates of democracy – including political philosophers – characteristically presuppose that 'a people' already exists. Its existence is assumed as fact, a creation of history. Yet the facticity of the fact is questionable. It is often questioned – as it was in the United States in 1861, when the issue was settled not by consent or consensus but by violence."

But events show few signs of being so generous to democratic theory's troubles. The past decade has seen a resurgence of identity politics in many parts of the world, ranging from the remnants of the Soviet empire through much of Africa – not to mention in long-established democracies such as Australia and Canada. In dozens of countries around the world, insurgent groups question the legitimacy of existing boundaries, demanding that they be redrawn so as better to reflect their aspirations. Sometimes these demands are limited to requests for bounded domains of sovereignty over certain matters within national boundaries, as with the Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament approved by referendum in 1997. Indeed many run-of-the-mill disputes about the distribution of authority within federal and confederal systems fall into this category. Often, however, the demand has involved insistence on full secession and the creation of new national states, as with the creation of the United States of America, Pakistan, or the Slovak republic. One only has to think of the demands for an independent Quebec, a Palestinian state, an Afrikaner Volkstaat, reunion of Russia with Belarus, an independent Chechnya, or a Kurdish republic – to name a few obvious cases – to be reminded that today's world is replete with would-be secessionists and unifiers who reject the democratic legitimacy of existing boundaries and seek to redraw them.

Even when boundaries are not in dispute, the international realities of power can render democracy's edges elusive. Transnational forces in today's world can have a greater bearing on national policies than the decisions of elected governments. National political choices are often trumped by the actions of such institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, or the European Union. Such institutions often have political agendas of their own, ranging from privatizing and deregulating the global economy to imposing labor law and regulatory regimes on countries to which their governments may stand opposed. Some of these international institutions are subject to attenuated forms of popular control, but it is unclear that this rises to a level that accords them much democratic legitimacy.

Moreover, democracy's edges are often blunted by transnational forces that defy even indirect popular control. The decisions of currency speculators, multinational investors, and global mutual fund managers can render domestic governments at best reactive and at worst helpless before dynamics set in motion by private players on the international stage. Britain's 1991 sterling crisis, which forced withdrawal from the European exchange rate mechanism, was a dramatic illustration. But in a host of more mundane and less visible ways, democratic governments the world over find increasingly that their taxation, welfare,

employment, borrowing, and public expenditure policies are constrained by what they are bound to anticipate from fickle international investors. A poignant instantiation of this trend is the 1990s fashion for creating independent banks that "signal" stability to capital markets – a euphemism for ceding democratic control of monetary policy to technocrats whose behavior can better be predicted by investors just because they are insulated from mechanisms of democratic accountability.

The contributors to the present volume all speak to dimensions of this reality. Some deal with the conventional boundary problem, advancing possible solutions to the chicken-and-egg paradox it engenders. Some are concerned with recasting the relations between democracy's decision rules and its edges, to diminish the paradox's significance or make it disappear. Some focus on transnational institutions, asking whether and how they might be subjected to more meaningful popular control or otherwise rendered legitimate within the ambit of democratic principles. Some take up secessionist aspirations, and the role of transnational institutions in undermining, or fostering, national democracy. Some consider the capacity of democratic institutions, whether domestic or international, to manage the environmental dangers that exhibit little – and decreasing – interest in national boundaries. And some suggest that the search for democracy's edges should lead us to reconsider the meaning of democracy itself, drawing on developments in fields as distant from the contemporary practice of political theory as the foundations of cognitive science. All are concerned to further our understanding of a perennial but neglected dimension of democratic theory that has been thrown into sharp relief by the evolving power fluidities of the late twentieth century.

I. Outer edges

In chapter 2, Robert Dahl makes the case that democracy's outer edges are likely to remain coterminous with those of the national state. Understanding democracy to require, at a minimum, a measure of popular control over decision-making, he argues that there is an inverse relationship between efficacious popular control and consequential decision-making. Whereas small groups can offer extensive popular control of their decisions to their members, such groups will often be ineffectual in determining outcomes in the world. By contrast, large entities may be consequential in the world, but are difficult to control democratically. Nation states are sufficiently large that meaningful democratic control of them is exceedingly difficult, but Dahl argues that it is at least possible in some areas. He thinks it instructive, when thinking about democracy

in international organizations, to note that foreign policy is one of the most difficult areas in which to achieve democratic control at the national level. What is at stake in foreign policy decisions is often by its nature inaccessible, and far removed from voters' everyday experience. The result is that popular control is limited to a kind of reactive activism. When foreign policies such as the United States' pursuit of war in Vietnam begin to have a widespread impact on people's daily lives they may rise up and oppose them; the rest of the time the policies will be left in the hands of elites.

International organizations such as the United Nations are substantially immune from even the limited popular control that is characteristic of foreign policy in national democracies. As a result, Dahl contends that we should not regard them as democratic at all. Better we should see international organizations for what they are: bureaucratic bargaining systems. This does not mean, for Dahl, that international organizations are undesirable. They may serve valuable purposes, perhaps indispensable ones. Indeed, some international organizations such as the UN may promote national democracy in parts of the world where it is presently lacking. Even in these cases, however, the international institutions themselves are unlikely to be democratic by Dahl's criterion. An important resulting challenge, that Dahl thinks has not yet been satisfactorily tackled by anyone, is to come up with plausible criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of undemocratic international institutions.

James Tobin brings an economist's perspective to bear on Dahl's challenge in chapter 3. He notes that most international institutions are not democratic in Dahl's sense because they result from treaty agreements among participating nations which generally have equal voting power regardless of their domestic populations. Tobin suggests a perspective for thinking about their legitimacy, drawing on the work of Hirschman (1970). Whether our sense of an institution's legitimacy should be linked to how democratic it is depends on the institution for Tobin. In particular, if the costs of exit from it are low, requiring it to operate democratically may be unnecessary and even unwise. Allowing members of transient groups a say in democratic governance may reasonably be judged unfair because of their different stakes in the collective decision. Like Dahl, Tobin sees the demands of international competition between national states as undermining democracy, particularly when this involves handing over monetary, exchange rate, and even fiscal policies to independent authorities so as to insulate them from the demands of electoral competition. Because there is no escape from the effects of international monetary and exchange rate regimes in the modern world, on Tobin's logic they ought to be subject to

democratic control. The fact that they are not contributes to what is sometimes termed the "democratic deficit" of legitimacy in contemporary politics, and exacerbates domestic sources of democracy's erosion such as the role of money in shaping the public agenda.

Elmar Altvater furthers the skeptical critique of transnational democracy in chapter 4, by arguing that whether or not international political institutions are democratically designed, they are unlikely to be democracy-enhancing. Most supranational institutions have emerged partly as a result of, and partly in response to, the globalization of economic relations. More often than not, global economic institutions assist transnational economic forces in undermining national democratic sovereignty, contributing to the retrenchment of welfare states and of institutional protections for the vulnerable that have been hard won over generations of domestic democratic conflict in the world's older democracies. Moreover, the recent proliferation of electoral politics to many of the world's countries is itself affected by globalization, since people gain formal democratic rights without much substantive scope for policy-making. In these circumstances, democratization legitimates the processes of deregulation and privatization called for by those who control international economic institutions. While agreeing with Dahl and Tobin that globalization contributes to the democratic deficit in the older democracies, Altvater believes the prospects to be even bleaker in the younger ones, which are less well placed in the world economy.

Altvater also broaches what may be one of the most serious challenges to democratic politics – not to mention the human species – in the coming decades: heading-off planetary-wide ecological catastrophe. Even if one takes a comparatively benign view of the possibilities for transnational modes of democratic governance, Altvater notes that there is no obvious reason to suppose that such institutions will have the capacity to limit global economic growth to ecologically sustainable levels. On the contrary, in light of the political imperatives unleashed by the structured dynamics of economic globalization, the potential of "ecological democracy" is limited. Social movements and NGOs working for ecologically sensitive economic policies confront an incongruence between the boundaries which divide the world's peoples into separate national states – which set the internal space for formal democratic institutions – and the boundary of humanity's natural environment. The obstacles to effective political action are compounded in this area, because ecological questions are intertwined with distributive ones. The national state system preserves global inequalities of income and wealth that would have to be challenged as part of any serious attempt at international environmental regulation.

Russell Hardin takes up this question as part of a general discussion of democracy and collective bads in chapter 5. Although democracy's messy procedures have not generally been thought adequate to the handling of collective bads such as environmental pollution, Hardin alleges that in fact democracies have managed these problems better than autocratic states in the past several decades. At the same time as pollution was limited consistent with maintaining economic growth in the West, ecological disaster accompanied economic catastrophe in the East. The reason, Hardin argues, is that democracy is much better suited to solving coordination problems than to problems that exhibit significant distributive dimensions. Pollution problems were widely seen as universal bads in the Western countries, making collective response to them feasible. Unfortunately, the international environmental problems that are emerging as a by-product of globalization involve manifest distributive conflicts. Newly industrializing countries, with populations in the hundreds of millions or even billions, threaten to overwhelm the planet's capacity to support life if they develop on the same basis of cheap fossil fuels that the advanced countries utilized over the past 150 years. But if industrializing countries are to be diverted from cheap development paths, the costs of this diversion have to be distributed. This is what democracy does poorly.

Nor does Hardin think we can take heart from the European Union, NAFTA, and GATT as models for the sort of institutions that are required. Such institutions emerged to solve coordination problems: to eliminate barriers to better results that had emerged as by-products of the nation-state system, barriers that prevent economic and other activities that would have occurred spontaneously but for their presence. Solving international collective bads problems such as global environmental damage would require stronger transnational institutions, not the mere weakening of national institutions. Moreover, given the substantial distributive dimensions to such collective bads problems, it is unlikely that such institutions can be democratic if they are to be effective. Thus, despite national democracy's track record of relative success in managing domestic environmental problems, Hardin agrees with Altvater's pessimism when these problems take on an increasingly transnational character.

In contrast to these skeptical views, David Held argues in chapter 6 that democratic theory and politics can respond constructively to the challenges of globalization. Like Altvater, Held notes that the internationalization of many dimensions of social interaction – economic, cultural, and political – has circumscribed the nation state's policy autonomy in multiple ways with the result that many national governments

increasingly play the role of "decision-takers" – they react to the actions of transnational players and more powerful foreign governments. Global financial markets, multinationals, and banking institutions can act, increasingly, in unilateral ways with decisive effects for national policies and strategies. Contrary to many discussions of these processes, however, Held is careful to distinguish the matter of nation states' *policy autonomy* from their sovereignty. Nor is it only multinational forces and institutions that circumscribe national policy autonomy. While emphasizing the crucial distinction between legal–political sovereignty and policy autonomy, Held illuminates how some of the world's governments are increasingly powerful beyond their spheres of legitimate sovereignty. They take decisions about trade, crime, environmental, and regulatory policy that have reverberations around the world. Such decisions affect populations whose governments may be impotent with respect to these policies, no matter how much recognition of national sovereignty may in fact be a well-observed (though qualified) norm in international relations.

Held's distinctive insight derives from his observation that the dynamics surrounding globalization are not as novel as they are often alleged to be. In important respects, he notes, they parallel developments that accompanied the emergence of the modern nation-state system over the past several centuries. It, too, involved the emergence of power relations that cut across traditional units of political authority: absolutist states that centralized power internally and operated on the Westphalian model externally; they acknowledged no superior authorities, limiting international law to rules of coexistence among formally equal entities in a Hobbesian order.

Held usefully points out that modern democracy emerged after absolutism, and to some degree as a response to it. The challenge of refashioning a democratic ideal that had originally been conceived for governing small homogeneous polities for a world of large heterogeneous nation states was met with the idea of representative government. It transformed democratic theory from a piece of quaint antiquarianism into an ideology equal to its age, shaping the form that democratization of the nation state was to take. What is needed now, he argues, is a comparably innovative idea, to respond to the globalization that is eroding national democratic polities. Held's candidate is the idea of a transnational democratic legal order or *Rechtstaat*: an international order that is circumscribed and legitimated by democratic public law. Democratizing international law will require "the establishment of a community of all democratic communities"; a kind of cosmopolitan community that can command the allegiance of all democrats. Held's

suggestion is thus that a transnational democratic *Rechtstaat* might domesticate transnational authoritarian forces and institutions, just as representative government domesticated the absolutist state. Such domestication should not come at the expense of allegiance to democratic nation states on Held's account; rather, democrats should begin to discern that they are citizens of multiple polities to which allegiances are multiply owed. But the basic elements of a transnational rule of law system are essential to this endeavor, and democrats should see it as a central – if not primary – obligation in the coming decades to work toward its creation.

In chapter 7 Will Kymlicka takes issue with the view that globalization is eroding the capacity for meaningful democratic citizenship at the domestic level. Kymlicka argues that there is greater room for optimism regarding the prospects for domestic citizenship than he takes Held to suggest. Not only do nation states still possess considerable decision-making autonomy, he argues, but their citizens still prize this autonomy, which allows them to act in distinctive ways, reflective of their national political cultures and inherited solidarities. So much is recognized, if not emphasized, by Held. But, in so far as citizens no longer find political participation meaningful, Kymlicka contends, the explanation has little to do with globalization. Rather, it is traceable to flaws in the electoral and legislative systems which existed prior to, and independent of, globalization, and which can be remedied whenever we find the political will to do so. A flourishing democratic citizenship at the national level remains a viable possibility within Western democracies, despite globalization. Concurring with the position advanced by Dahl and Altvater, Kymlicka also questions the view that whatever democratic deficit exists at the national level can be redeemed by democratizing the transnational institutions which increasingly shape important economic, environmental, and security decisions. The preconditions for mass participation in transnational organizations do not yet exist, and it is difficult, he argues, to see how they could arise in the foreseeable future

Alexander Wendt explores these ideas further in chapter 8. He distinguishes *cosmopolitan democracy*, in which individuals cast votes in the governance of transnational institutions, from *international democracy*, in which sovereign states are the voting members. The former is less likely to be attainable than the latter in the medium term, in Wendt's view, for several reasons. Although powerful constituencies – particularly in the financial world – are open to political globalization, other relevant forces are hostile to it. States are jealous guardians of the sovereignty created by the Westphalian system which remains the order of the day in international politics. Populations have been socialized into

national political orders, so that they tend to be hostile to the trans-
nationalization of political power. Accordingly, Wendt argues that
international state formation should be expected to differ from the
domestic state formation of the early modern period to which Held
alludes. Unlike the process by which political power was concentrated in
the hands of centralized states, often through conquest, the path-
dependencies of sovereignty may lead to *de facto* internationalization of
the state without much *de jure* internationalization. More likely than
institutions of world government, we should expect that state power will
increasingly be dispersed or "de-centered" among nominally indepen-
dent states. On Wendt's account, it is likely to be a long time – if ever –
before there is any centralized apparatus of international governance,
any commanding heights of institutional power for transnational demo-
crats to capture. For this reason Wendt is skeptical about how far Held's
comparison between domestic and international state formation holds.

Reflecting on this limitation leads Wendt to pose the question whether
international democracy should be deemed as objectionable by demo-
crats as Dahl and others have suggested. International democracy, on
Wendt's account, depends on a notion of group rights. Although demo-
crats often count themselves hostile to the idea of group rights, Wendt
notes that there is an important sense in which the group is inevitably
prior to the individual in democracies. Just because of the chicken-and-
egg problem, individual democratic rights are bound to be parasitic on
some form of group membership. Moreover, Wendt speculates that if
one surveyed people asking them to imagine a cosmopolitan democracy,
many of those who are unalterably opposed to group rights within their
country would want strong protections for their nation at the inter-
national level, whether this took the form of federalism, subsidiarity,
governance based on an international "Senate" rather than "House," or
other institutions to shield national identities. Protecting groups among
nations may be more compelling than it is within them from the
standpoint of democratic theory, on Wendt's view, and should not be
dismissed as a viable basis for transnational democratic legitimacy.

In chapter 9 Brooke Ackerly and Susan Moller Okin argue that
although globalization threatens democracy in some respects, in others
it may actually enhance democratic possibilities. Their case study is the
international women's movement, particularly those parts of it that have
sought to redefine the notion of human rights, embraced by many
international institutions and national governments, so as to include
explicit acknowledgment of women's rights. Although globalization has
had a mixed impact on democratization, activists around the world have
combined global awareness and communication with knowledge of the

real, diverse, and dispersed local experiences of women, to make international policy on human rights more inclusive of them. In their organizing around women's issues or for women's interests, activists have developed a method of social criticism that makes use of deliberation without relying on the ideal conditions required by deliberative democratic theorists. Using the example of the women's rights as human rights movement, Ackerly and Okin describe the methods that activists in the real world have used to try to make international fora more inclusive. While in general skeptical about the democratic credentials of transnational politics in the contemporary world, Ackerly and Okin's paper aims to call attention to a democratic bright spot on the landscape of non-democratic global organizations.

II.   Inner edges

Douglas Rae refocuses our attention from democracy's outer edges to its undernoticed inner ones in chapter 10. A central development in what he describes as the United States' evolving spatial economy since World War II has been the growth of "enclave-seeking" behavior by large numbers of those who have the wherewithal to engage in it. Until the 1940s, urban residential locations were sought after because they offered privileged access to nodes of heavy transportation and employment around which prosperity revolved. Growing inner-city density meant declining quality of life, however, and suburban commuting presented itself as a logical alternative, buttressed by subsidized road systems and motor-vehicles affordable to the middle class. In most northeastern and mid-western cities the white middle-class flight to the suburbs coincided with the exodus of poor blacks from the south, away from segregation and in search of economic opportunity. This migrating population filled the inner-city vacuums left by the white middle class, accelerating the pace of their departure. The result was that migrating blacks exchanged the south's *de jure* segregation for a new and no less potent form of *de facto* apartheid. This trend has accelerated since the 1970s, as the incomes and life chances of poor blacks have diverged ever more sharply from those of the middle class and the wealthy.

   Rae goes on to argue that the information revolution and the "home office" phenomenon that has accompanied it reinforce spatial segregation patterns, as those who are not members of the substantially black urban poor have fewer and fewer reasons to set foot in inner cities at all. Whether made inaccessible by fact of distance or by "gated communities" – privately guarded enclaves of which there are now upwards of

50,000 in the United States – they live lives in which their democratic liberties are protected by the space from which they are able to exclude others. The flipside of this is that the only truly public realm left is the inner city, public in the sense that no one needs resources to enter it. There democratic liberties exist in principle only, since people who must live in it lack the minimal protected space that even negative freedom requires. They lack the freedom to move about without fear of violence, the chance for meaningful educational aspiration for their children, the realistic possibility of competing for employment or accumulating assets, and the right to participate on more or less equal terms in collective decisions that impose laws on themselves and their families. Thus deprived of the basic incidents of democratic liberty, for practical purposes they are excluded from democratic citizenship. On Rae's account we do not need to travel far to discover democracy's edges. They are all around us – or, rather, we are all around them. In this world of "segmented democracies," those who are excluded are tyrannized both by being kept out and because in their daily lives the basic problem of political order is unresolved. For them no less than for the states confronting one another in the international realm of which Held writes, the Hobbesian threat is unconstrained by democratic principles.

What of those who seek to transform democracy's inner edges into its outer edges by reconstituting accepted boundaries? In contrast to Tobin's suggestion that this problem may be beyond resolution within the confines of democratic theory, Elizabeth Kiss and Ian Shapiro advance different, though complementary, democratic ways of tackling subgroup aspirations in the next two chapters. In chapter 11 Kiss argues for case-by-case scrutiny of subgroup claims. She focuses on specific alleged harms rather than desires for self-expression. Such harms can include cultural and symbolic harms, but the onus should be on the claimant, in her account, to establish that this is so. Context is all; each case must be understood in all its idiosyncratic complexity in order to determine which subgroup claims should be recognized, and how this can be done democratically. Kiss illustrates this approach by considering the demands for recognition by the Hungarian minority in Romania, where the peculiarities of the particular harms they confront suggest remedies that are not easily generalized to other circumstances.

Shapiro also thinks context is critical to evaluation of subgroup aspirations, but in chapter 12 he makes the case that democratic theory none the less suggests the appropriateness of some general criteria for evaluating them. He begins by noting that much of the philosophical literature on this subject is artificial in defining the problem as an abstract consideration of what different groups and subgroups might be

alleged to "want." In reality, he argues, because group rights are typically asserted by political parties and leaders with particular goals, their claims can be fairly evaluated only when those goals are taken into account. Appropriate criteria for evaluating demands for group rights – up to and including rights of secession – have to do with their likely impact on democratic politics, where this is understood to require inclusive participation of those affected by collective decisions and the toleration of loyal opposition within a democratic order. Shapiro explores these criteria by reference to a variety of recent competing group aspirations in South Africa and the Middle East. He notes that although some conflicting group claims cannot be satisfied simultaneously, some can. In zero-sum situations, preference should be given to the groups that fare better by the democratic criteria, but the more valuable institutional challenge is to find ways of transforming group aspirations that are incompatible with democracy so that they can be realized consistently with it. Developing this claim leads Shapiro to a more general discussion of the foundations of politicized group identities, and of institutional arrangements that are more and less likely to induce these identities to evolve in democratic directions.

An alternative to re-engineering threatening identities so as to render them compatible with democracy is to keep them out of politics altogether. Pursuing this goal, by creating and fortifying inner limits to the domain of legitimate politics, distinguishes the enterprise of liberal democracy from other variants of the species. To this end, an alleged moral of the English and European wars of religion, taken to heart by the authors of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, is that mutual insulation of religious and public identities from one another can afford valuable protection to both. Such institutional "gag rules" are held by liberal democrats to be essential to both political legitimacy and stability (Holmes 1988). The most sustained recent defense of this view is perhaps John Rawls's insistence that the edges of legitimate politics are those of "public reason"; that in a world of multiple competing conceptions of the good the only arguments that should hold sway in shaping public institutions are those that appeal to an "overlapping consensus" of the different competing views. This "political, not metaphysical" approach eschews the thought that the state should aspire to adjudicate among different comprehensive world views; rather it should recognize as valid public arguments only those that rest on premises that adherents of the competing views can all affirm (Rawls 1993).

This is the view taken up and found wanting by Jeffrey Isaac, Matthew Filner, and Jason Bivins in chapter 13. They make the case

that the liberal democratic view, which came of age during the postwar era of relative growth and prosperity in most Western countries, is less appropriate for the world that we know now which is marked by harder times and a resurgence of identity politics. In today's world, they argue, liberalism's overlapping consensus is in danger of collapsing, as groups such as the New Christian Right discover that the consensus in question seems to include secular and moderate religious world-views while excluding their more fundamentalist ones. The liberal democratic impulse is to push such groups out of public life, often fortifying this stance with heavy reliance on judicial review rather than accountable democratic institutions. Isaac, Filner, and Bivins agree with those who say that this undermines liberal democracy's legitimacy. They argue instead for constructive democratic engagement with such groups. By enticing them into public debate on their own terms, they argue, democrats are more likely to get fundamentalists to consider alternative views than their own than by adopting strategies of exclusion. Moreover, they argue, such engagement could open the way to exploring common interests in other matters that are currently over-determined by a polarizing identity politics.

Courtney Jung takes issue with Isaac, Filner, and Bivins's argument in chapter 14. On the one hand, she argues that they reify religious identity politics as a fixed feature of the political landscape that must be accommodated into the political order lest they undermine it. In fact, she argues, identities become politicized or depoliticized in response to the incentives built into institutions and the activities of political entrepreneurs. There are always choices to be made as to which forms of politicization to permit and encourage, and some are more sustaining of democracy than others. On the other hand, she argues, religious fundamentalism is peculiarly recalcitrant from a democratic point of view because it is often by its terms hostile to principles of inclusive toleration that democracy requires. Fundamentalists make use of these principles in opposition (perhaps while complaining that the principles are loaded against them), but on coming to power they seldom extend such inclusive toleration to their opponents. This should not surprise us, on Jung's account, because it is part of the nature of fundamentalist commitments that they involve insisting on the truth of single comprehensive doctrines, rendering them particularly resistant to the sorts of institutional engineering discussed by Kiss and Shapiro in earlier chapters. From Jung's point of view Isaac, Filner, and Bivins are thus naive to suppose that fundamentalists can be domesticated by the constructive engagement they propose, or that fundamentalists are likely to be diverted from their central focus on identity politics by coalition-

building on other questions. The better course, for democrats, may indeed be to seek out ways of depoliticizing their aspirations.

In different ways the discussions by all our contributors question the conventional view that plotting democracy's edges is exogenous to the operation of democratic principles. On the one hand, even when questions about borders are settled, they may be perceived to lack legitimacy if they have been imposed without reference to democratic considerations or cannot be revised in democratic ways. Moreover, many dilemmas of inclusion and exclusion will remain, suggesting that no democratic theory worth the name can regard boundary questions as wholly exogenous. By their nature boundaries reproduce inequalities in decision-making power that can always be questioned by reference to democratic values. On the other hand, the chicken-and-egg problem, while real, can be approached in more or less democratic ways, and with consequences that are better or worse from the standpoint of democratic values. These reflections naturally raise the question taken up by Susan Hurley in chapter 15: is it perhaps not better to conceive of the boundary problem as wholly endogenous to democracy's operation? Jurisdictional decisions have implications for democratic values of self-determination, autonomy, respect for rights, equality, and contestability, and they are best made, arguably, so as to preserve or maximize these values.

Hurley's point of departure is by analogy to the role of rationality in competing views of cognitive science. On traditional accounts, the mind is seen as depending on vertically modular underlying processes, in which different modules perform stages of processing, passing the resulting representations on to the next module for further processing. Perceptual modules extract information from inputs about such things as color, motion, and location, and once they have been processed through the vertical scheme they are combined in cognition, the central module that interfaces between perception and action. This is where the processes occur on which rational thought and deliberation depend. Rationality is conceived of as an internal process, the manipulation of internal symbols passed on by prior modules. Against this vertical view, Hurley and others have advanced a horizontally modular view, in which the mind is conceived of as layer upon layer of content-specific networks. The layers, which are dedicated to specific tasks, are dynamic: they extend from input through output and back through input in various feedback loops. On the horizontally modular view, vertical boundaries, such as those around sensory or cognitive or motor processes, or indeed around the organism as a whole, do not disappear; but they are relatively permeable or leaky. Rationality, on this account, can

no longer be conceived as wholly internal. Since there is no linear sequence of separate stages, rationality is instead reconceived as emerging from a complex system of decentralized, higher-order relations of inhibition, facilitation, and coordination among different horizontal layers. It is a higher-order property of complex patterns of adaptation between organisms and their structured environments.

Hurley suggests that whereas the exogenous view of the boundary question is similar to the vertically modular view of the mind, the endogenous view parallels the horizontally modular view. She explores the implications of this fertile comparison, recasting many traditional questions about democracy's edges along the way. Among the advantages of Hurley's approach are that it encourages us to consider the ways in which democracy in some domains of collective life affects it in other domains, and in particular how varying amounts of democracy in transnational activities and organizations affects the chances for democracy at the national level. Democracy, on this view, is conceived of as an emergent property of a complex, globally distributed, dynamic system or network. Democracy need not be perceived in internal and procedural terms, wedded to vertical modularity. It can coexist with, and even depend on, horizontal relationships among different components of the system. Institutional design – or redesign – challenges can thus be considered in their parts but also in relation to the system as a whole, so that it – as well as they – might gradually evolve in more democratic directions. Hurley's philosophical outlook thus supports and renders coherent several of the enterprises argued for in different ways by the other contributors to this volume. Her suggestive elaboration of it offers a host of novel avenues for theorizing about democratic innovation in the future.

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