HEIDEGGER’S CONCEPT OF TRUTH

This major new study of Heidegger is the first to examine in detail the concept of existential truth that he developed in the 1920s. Daniel O. Dahlstrom critically examines the genesis, nature, and validity of Heidegger’s radical attempt to rethink truth as the disclosure of time, a disclosure allegedly more basic than truths formulated in scientific judgments.

The book has several distinctive and innovative features. First, it is the only study that attempts to understand the logical dimension of Heidegger’s thought in its historical context. Second, no other book-length treatment explores the breadth and depth of Heidegger’s confrontation with Husserl, his erstwhile mentor. Third, the book demonstrates that Heidegger’s deconstruction of Western thinking occurs on three interconnected fronts: truth, being, and time.

Dealing with a crucial aspect of the philosophy of one of the great thinkers of the twentieth century, this book will be important to all scholars and students of Heidegger, whether in philosophy, theology, or literary studies.

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HEIDEGGER’S
CONCEPT OF TRUTH

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Boston University
For Eugenie
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INTRODUCTION

Without certain stock beliefs and practices that are simply taken for
granted, there would be neither scientific research nor political col-
aboration, neither confidences nor humor. We experience our first
prejudices on our mothers’ laps, and we grow up with and into the
everyday assumptions of all those who in one way or another command
our attention, affection, or respect. Prejudices and the habits informed
by them thus become the bonds of culture and daily life as well as the
stuff of dreams, wishes, and despair. As deep-seated sources of identity,
such seemingly self-evident beliefs and practices are seldom articulated
and even more rarely subjected to critical investigation. This neglect is,
to be sure, not unfounded, since it is far from obvious what would qual-
ify as an adequate examination of prejudices. Would such an examina-
tion, for example, have to be unprejudiced? If so, how is that possible
and how would it be determined? “The notion of having no prejudice”
may not be “the greatest prejudice,” as Heidegger contends, but it is dif-
ficult to gainsay the conclusion that the notion is a prejudice and a self-
defeating one at that.

Perhaps it is not possible to examine our prejudices in a completely
unprejudiced or adequate manner, one is tempted to reply, but this fact
does not rule out the possibility of a degree of adequacy, the minimal
condition of which would be logical consistency. Of all our basic as-
sumptions, probably none occupies a higher rank. Indeed, if prejudices
are unavoidable, then the least that one can hope for is that they are
logical and, indeed, that the principles of logic are among them. Ock-
ham’s old saw still holds: *logica est scientia scientiarum et ars artium.* The
prejudices and principles of logic are seemingly so self-evident and fun-
damental that we stumble over our own logical feet, as it were, with
every attempt to ground or even clarify them.
Yet self-evident beliefs or principles could hardly be called “prejudices,” according to some prevailing uses of the term. Nor could the assumption that all prejudices are unjustified be considered an unjustified prejudice, if prominent pejorative senses of the term are invoked. A person’s theory or viewpoint is said to be “prejudiced” if certain unexamined beliefs or practices prevent her from considering evidence to the contrary. Even more typically, ‘prejudice’ is a label today not merely for prejudging some subject matter but for maintaining quite deleterious beliefs and practices. A prejudice in the latter sense is not simply an unstated premise of an argument or part of the background knowledge needed for a particular inquiry. Such a prejudice is, instead, an inauspicious habit of thinking and behaving that need not be explicit and can be detected and dismantled only with great difficulty, if at all. In fact, despite one obvious reading of its etymology (from ‘praejudicare’), a prejudice such as racism is not, properly speaking, a judgment at all but rather a fateful pattern of response.

If the term “prejudice” is understood in this standard way, the expression ‘logical prejudice’ seems an oxymoron. The term ‘logical’ is principally employed to designate specific connections and inferences, either because certain assertions (assumptions or considerations) do not contradict one another or because a conclusion may be validly drawn from one or more of them. There is arguably no more justified presupposition, no more legitimate prejudice than that of abiding by the principle of noncontradiction and the rules of inference, a practice that enables us to speak and think about things further and to do so together. Far from leading us down some shadowy and potentially perilous path, logic steers us clear of what is unthinkable, what is nonsense.

Nevertheless, it would make good sense to speak of a “logical prejudice” – a prejudice of logic (genitivus subjectivus) – if logic itself were to presuppose a belief or practice that can have the effect of disabling rather than enabling genuine discourse and thinking. The expression ‘logical prejudice’ is employed in the following study in this sense. The specific logical prejudice in question is a certain way of speaking and thinking about truth or, equivalently, a theory of suitable uses of ‘truth’ and its cognates that is traditionally construed as a cornerstone of logic. Logic typically begins with analysis of assertions (propositions, statements, judgments, or the like) and their possible combinations as the elements of any scientific theory that is open to verification or falsification. In other words, logic assumes that assertions and their kin are the site of truth, indeed, in the sense that they must be in place for there
to be anything that might be termed the “truth.” This assumption can take different shapes. Truth has been characterized as itself a judgment, as a property of an assertion or judgment, as a relation obtaining between a judgment and a reality, or even as the confirmation or confirmability of such a relation. Truth has also been conceived as the complete agreement (identity) between something meant by a judgment and some state of affairs that is given or presents itself as such. The common bond of these diverse ways of construing truth is the assumption that truth is to be understood primarily in terms of assertions and in view of the presence of what is asserted. There may be more than one logical prejudice, but in the following study the expression ‘logical prejudice’ refers to the thesis, as Heidegger puts it, “that the genuine ‘locus’ of truth is the judgment” (SZ 226).

During the years prior to the completion of Being and Time, Heidegger was preoccupied with the task of exposing and undermining the logical prejudice. This preoccupation is particularly evident in the Marburg lectures, especially those of the summer semester of 1925, published as Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time, and the following winter semester of 1925/26, published as Logic: The Question of Truth. His reasons for undertaking a critique of the logical prejudice are not difficult to discern. Heidegger can agree with proponents of the logical prejudice that truth is, if anything, itself a way of speaking and thinking and, indeed, the very way of speaking and thinking that presumably speaks and thinks what is. A conception of truth is, in other words, a way of speaking and thinking about speaking and thinking, about what they are, including both what it means for them to be “about” something and what they are about. In short, a conception of truth is essentially reflexive and ontological. In order to mount anything approaching an adequate analysis of truth, the analysis must give an account of itself and the sense of being that it presupposes.

In the case of the logical prejudice, however, the reflexivity remains largely unreflected and the significance of ‘being’ is, if not preontological, then typically the offspring of an ontology that is insufficiently fundamental. As a result, presumptive restrictions on the proper uses of ‘true’ have counterparts in similar strictures placed on the proper uses of ‘exists’ and its cognates. ‘True’ is restricted to use as a predicate of certain propositions, and truth is equated with propositional truth, on the assumption (or, equivalently, as an indication) of the presence or onhandness (Anwesenheit or Vorhandenheit) of the states of affairs corresponding to those propositions. In this way the logical prejudice is tra-
ditionally linked to the identification of the significance of ‘being’ with presence. This identification takes a variety of forms, from the crass equation of ‘being’ with ‘what is now on hand and available’ to the more imaginative supposition that ‘being’ is an abbreviation for being presently present (a slice of space-time or merely a logically idealized equivalent of it) and thus potentially, if not actually, present to someone. In Heidegger’s view, the obtuseness of this identification is symptomatic of the ontological obliviousness (Seinsvergessenheit) at the heart of Western philosophy, its loss of itself, its true potential and its vocation. Demonstrating that the logical prejudice is not the last word on truth is necessary in order to recover the question and the sense of being.

The main objective of the following study is to elaborate Heidegger’s early conception of truth (formulated in the Marburg lectures and in Being and Time) as it proceeds from his critique of a particular history of the logical prejudice. Heidegger argues that the disclosedness of being-here (Da-sein) or, more precisely, the disclosure of the timeliness of being-here, is a truth more fundamental than any propositional truth. In this way he aims to outflank what he sees as the hallmarks of traditional alethiology and ontology, the companion conceptions of truth as a proposition’s property and being as an entity’s presence or onhandness. While the maneuver meets with some success, I argue that the degree of success depends upon a tacit but unexplained complementarity between truth as disclosedness and propositional truth (between ontological and ontic determinations of truth). In other words, even in the exposure of the logical prejudice, the latter remains in some sense a préjugé légitime.

Following a sketch of the sense and scope of the logical prejudice, Chapter 1 begins with Heidegger’s assessment of its place in the debate over psychologism around the turn of the century. While many philosophers of logic were confident that psychologism had been refuted, Heidegger has his doubts, not least because the purported refutation is, in his eyes, largely an expression of the logical prejudice. In order to expose the roots of this confidence, he directs his students’ attention to the writings of Hermann Lotze. In particular, Heidegger sketches how Lotze’s characterization of “true judgments” as the ontological sense of truth’s “actuality” cemented the logical prejudice in the minds of an entire generation.

In Heidegger’s view, however, there is a pivotal exception to this general trend among Lotze’s successors: Edmund Husserl. “It hardly needs to be admitted,” Heidegger notes in the summer of 1925, “that, oppo-
site Husserl, even today I still consider myself a novice.” Chapter 2 takes up the question of the significance of Husserl’s logical investigations for Heidegger’s critical engagement with the logical prejudice. Together, the lectures given by Heidegger in the summer semesters of 1923 and 1925 contain his most comprehensive treatment of Husserlian phenomenology. Largely on the basis of these lectures, the chapter details Heidegger’s account of “the three decisive discoveries of Husserlian phenomenology” and the breakthrough that they represent toward a sense of truth presupposed by propositional truth and a sense of being (Sein) presupposed by but not reducible to an entity, entities, or even the general character of entities as such (Seiendes, Seiendheit). Heidegger nonetheless faults Husserl for not appreciating the full import of his discoveries, as evidenced by his failure to elaborate what it means for intentionality to “exist.” Heidegger traces this failure, at least in part, to the fact that Husserl supposedly remains caught up in the logical prejudice. But Heidegger also shows his hand by suggesting that the ultimate reason for Husserl’s continued commitment to the logical prejudice’s ontological presuppositions is a fear or anxiety in the face of being-here itself.

The force of some of Heidegger’s criticisms is substantially mitigated, as Chapter 2 also recounts, by the fact that they are directed at a stage of intentional analysis that Husserl had long since gone beyond by the summer of 1925 when Heidegger is reciting those criticisms to his students. Heidegger’s silence on this development is significant, since he was plainly aware of it and since it anticipates his existential analysis in certain essential respects. For example, in Husserl’s investigations of the temporal constitution of intentionality, he breaks with the act-object schema of his earlier analyses and, in the process, with the senses of being and truth implied by that schema, senses that Heidegger links to the logical prejudice and makes the object of criticism. By way of conclusion, Chapter 2 attempts to give some reasons both for Heidegger’s silence on Husserl’s later development and for the divergence in the paths that they chart for phenomenology.

Long before and long after Lotze and Husserl, defenders as well as critics of psychologism cite the authority of Aristotle as the thinker who originally recognized that truth must take the form of judgments or assertions. One of Heidegger’s aims in the winter semester of 1925/26 was to show how mistaken this interpretation of Aristotle is. According to Heidegger, Aristotle’s complex views on the subject of truth, even more so than those of Husserl, point to the phenomenon of disclosedness as
a truth that is more basic than any propositional truth. As a means of making this point, Heidegger makes a startling connection between what he calls “hermeneutic and apophantic ‘as’-structures of understanding” and Aristotle’s treatment of truth in *Metaphysics*, Theta 10. Chapter 3 attempts to demonstrate that connection, as provocative as it is precarious. In *Metaphysics*, Theta 10, Aristotle gives an account of how utterly simple, uncombined entities (*asyntheta*) are grasped in a way that, as Heidegger puts it, never conceals but only uncovers. The way in which *asyntheta* are uncovered is, in Heidegger’s mind, instructively analogous to the manner in which the senses of being disclose themselves in the existential-hermeneutic “‘as’-structure” of a “primary” understanding, that is, in being-here itself.

In his early lectures Heidegger provides detailed commentaries on Lotze’s, Husserl’s, and Aristotle’s analyses of truth. The commentaries are part of a strategy of exposing the roots of the logical prejudice as well as the ways in which those analyses point past the logical prejudice in the direction of his own account of truth. The aim of the first three chapters of the following work is accordingly to examine Heidegger’s historical reading of these eminent predecessors. By contrast, Chapter 4 reconstructs the argument for the so-called existential truth: the original disclosure of the senses of being in being-here. This truth, as it is presented in the course of the existential analysis of *Being and Time*, is the disclosure of time as the sense of being-here.

The argument here is broken down into five steps. The first three steps correspond to the three structures that constitute the specific way in which we exist and disclose ourselves as being-in-the-world, namely, at work procuring things (*Besorgen*), worrying about each other (*Fürsorge*), and taking care of ourselves (*Sorge*). Since the crowd and public opinion – the anonymous world to which we are prone to relinquish responsibility for our way of being-here, that is, caring – regards these structures as something handy or on hand, a fourth step is required to recover what it means to be-here genuinely. The fourth step demonstrates that a certain timeliness constitutes the sense of being-here precisely as the site of the disclosure of the senses of being. Since, however, time can also be viewed as merely on hand, a final step becomes imperative: a determination of the original meaning of ‘timeliness,’ namely, insofar as it constitutes the sense of existence. In addition to the analysis of timeliness in *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s lectures in 1927 at Marburg, published as *Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*, are an important source of this part of the investigation.
Among the more influential criticisms of Heidegger’s arguments against the logical prejudice and for his account of truth as a primitive disclosedness is that advanced by Ernst Tugendhat. According to Tugendhat, the primary significance of ‘truth’ consists in indicating that something is being uncovered or asserted precisely as it is. This significance, he charges, is lost when the term is expanded, as it is by Heidegger, to encompass the mere display of things and not, more restrictively, the display of them as they are. Using Tugendhat’s influential criticisms as a springboard, Chapter 5 focuses on problems besetting Heidegger’s account of truth. Tugendhat’s specific criticisms miss the mark, I contend, but they point to a dilemma in Heidegger’s conception of fundamental ontology. His investigation of the senses of truth, being, and timeliness, styling itself as a science, proves incompatible with the senses that he manages to retrieve.

One might well contend that this difficulty is reason enough for Heidegger to abandon, as he does, a conception of philosophy as “transcendental phenomenology.” As contended in the final chapter, however, the problems that beset his philosophical quest (i.e., the problem of objectifying the themes of truth, being, and time) survive his abandonment of the scientific approach of Being and Time. Fully cognizant of these problems, Heidegger contends, both before and after this turn in his thinking, that the way to meet them “at least in a relative way” is to understand philosophical concepts as “formal indications.” The final chapter addresses how, in this connection, Heidegger’s method, while ending up quite self-consciously in the neighborhood of poetry and theology, remains dependent upon the presence of its theme. One patent indication of this dependency is the fact that Heidegger invokes propositional truths as part of the self-conscious, philosophical retrieval of truth as disclosedness. As a result, the problem of mediating these two senses of ‘truth’ takes center stage (much as does the problem of mediating ontic and ontological considerations or, alternatively, what it means to be “within-time” and what it means to be “timely”). In conclusion I argue that the problems of thematization and mediation need not have the effect of negating Heidegger’s analyses, but that these problems do demonstrate just how urgently and in what sense his analyses need to be supplemented.

Heidegger, following Husserl, does not reserve the term ‘sense’ (Sinn) for linguistic usage. Unlike Husserl (in 1913), he also employs the term ‘meaning’ in a way that is broader than any linguistic sense or expression. These uses of ‘sense’ and ‘meaning’ present a stumbling
block for anyone who insists on restricting the application of these
terms to signs, words, and complexes of them. As discussed in Chapters
3 and 5, Heidegger is willing to indulge and even exploit ordinary uses
of these terms (particularly insofar as they nominalize corresponding
verbs with sometimes foreboding or purposive connotations, as in the
Wallace Stevens line “Crispin . . . sensed an elemental fate” or “they were
meant for each other”). Yet, however the terms are used, it is necessary
to respect the distinction between use and mention. To this end refer-
tence to a word or expression is always indicated by single quotation
marks in the present study; double quotation marks are reserved chiefly
for directly quoted words or sentences, as exemplified in this para-
graph. Accordingly, the sense of being is one thing, the significance of
‘being’ quite another.

For years my students have heard me preach the necessity of writing
and rewriting, with the plea that we generally do not know what we
mean until we hear what we say. A first version of this book appeared in
German in 1994 under the title Das logische Vorurteil: Untersuchungen zur
Wahrheitstheorie des frühen Heidegger. People often asked: “Why did you
write the book in German, given the wider audience in English?” My
standard answer was that it was easier to write in German, given Hei-
degger’s nomenclature. Being presented with the opportunity to trans-
late what I wrote in German into English has been a truly humbling ex-
perience, revealing to me how little I understood in either language.
The supposed greater ease of writing on Heidegger in German was,
more often than not, a way of avoiding hard interpretive decisions. But
Heidegger’s jargon can be a trap in translation no less than in German.
For this reason, no German term, whether Heidegger’s or my own, is
left untranslated. When a term that serves a systematic function is in-
troduced, the German original is cited along with the translated term
and an explanation for the translation. In keeping with this attempt to
avoid substituting terminological consistency or orthodoxy for critical
examination and understanding, all quotations from Heidegger are
also translated, even in the footnotes.

Pursuit of this policy is obviously treacherous for reasons familiar to
students of Heidegger’s thought. In the 1920s he insisted on distin-
guishing entities from their manners of being (though he would later
acknowledge certain pitfalls associated with that insistence). Few would
dispute the difference between considering what sort of thing an entity
is or what relations it has to other entities and considering whether it
exists. Heidegger’s insistence on the distinction between entities and
their manners of being is intended not to reassert this obvious distinc-
tion but to raise the question of what it means for something to exist. According to Heidegger, failure to maintain the distinction in such a way that this question is raised is symptomatic of Western thinking or, more precisely, what he calls “being’s forgottenness” (Seinsvergessenheit) in the West. This obliviousness to being is supposedly evidenced by the way in which Western thinkers repeatedly collapse a consideration of being itself, that is, ontology, into metaphysics, that is, an ontic science of entities and the relations, typically causal relations, among them. In large measure as a means of avoiding the collapse of this distinction and retrieving the question of the sense of being from oblivion, Heidegger develops a distinctive terminology in his pursuit of a “fundamental on-
tology.” This terminology contains some neologisms rooted in the or-
dinary uses of certain terms, for example, ‘alreadiness’ (Gewesenheit) or ‘presenting’ (Gegenwärtigen). More often, however, Heidegger takes or-
dinary expressions — for example, ‘palaver’ (Gerede) or ‘on hand’ (vorhanden) — and twists and turns them until their generally over-
looked ontological significance cries out in pain. Such is Heidegger’s way with words.

The challenge facing any translation of Heidegger’s terminology is to convey the ontological significance that he assigns his terms, without losing sight of the roots in ordinary (ontic) usage on which he also re-
lies. There is no more formidable instance of this challenge than the term that Heidegger employs to designate the manner of being that is the object of his investigation in Being and Time and his Marburg lec-
tures: ‘Da-sein,’ ‘Existenz.’ In the first half of the eighteenth century, ‘Da-
sein’ was introduced by Wolff and Gottsched into German philosophi-
cal nomenclature as a replacement for the Latin derivative, ‘Existenz.’ Heidegger in fact employs ‘existence’ and ‘being-in-the-world’ as equivalents to ‘Dasein,’ though not synonyms for it. In other words, ‘Da-
sein,’ ‘Existenz,’ and ‘In-der-Welt-sein’ each say something different, but they all say it of the same entities. Further complicating matters is the fact that ‘Dasein’ strategically does double duty in Heidegger’s analysis, standing not only for a distinctive, indeed, exemplary manner of being, but also for the sort of entity that enjoys that manner of being.

For German as well as English readers, however, what creates special problems for understanding Heidegger’s use of the term is his ex-
ploration of its compound character, that is, the combination of ‘da’ and ‘sein.’ ‘Da’ has a wide array of uses in German, ranging from uses as an adverb of place or time to uses as an adverbial and even causal con-
junction. Heidegger also cites Humboldt’s observation of pronominal uses of the term (SZ 11f; P 342ff; these and other abbreviations are explained below). Given the two ways in which ‘da’ is used adverbially, ‘Da-sein’ might be construed as the original manner of being of time-space. The most prominent adverbial use of ‘da,’ however, is to indicate a place, a sense exploited by Heidegger as he attempts to demonstrate that the very sense of this manner of being is to be “outside itself” or “ecstatic.” But in this respect, too, matters are complicated by the fact that ‘da’ can signify equivalents of both ‘here’ and ‘there.’ Thus, ‘here and there’ can be a translation of both ‘hier und da’ and ‘da und dort’ in German.

Heidegger makes it clear, however, that, while ‘da’ points to what is signified by ‘here’ and ‘there,’ the proper synonym for ‘da’ in the term ‘Dasein’ is ‘disclosedness.’ Moreover, on at least two occasions he observes that a here and a there are only possible on the basis of this disclosedness (SZ 132; P 342ff). But since ‘disclosedness’ is a translation of another systematic term in Heidegger’s nomenclature, namely, ‘Er-schlossenheit,’ it is necessary to find some other term. One possibility is ‘openness’ (the suggestion comes from Thomas Sheehan, via William Richardson). This translation has the advantages of being similar to ‘disclosedness’ and retaining some sense of spatiality conveyed by some uses of ‘da.’ Yet it also has the disadvantage of forfeiting the direct, ordinary significance of ‘da,’ even as it ambiguously straddles the significance of ‘here’ and ‘there.’ In other words, use of ‘openness’ runs the risk of overcorrecting Heidegger’s own choice of terms.

Two other possibilities present themselves: ‘being-there’ and ‘being-here.’ Both expressions have the disadvantage of suggesting senses of ‘there’ and ‘here’ that are supposed to be derivative of the disclosedness of ‘Dasein.’ Yet they also have the virtue of preserving the continuity (between ontological and ontic senses) that makes that derivativeness possible. That is to say, with the proper qualifications, each translation might convey the fundamentally ecstatic sense of ‘Dasein’ as being ‘always already outside-itself’ or being-in-the-world. Of these two possibilities, however, “being-there” has the distinct disadvantage of introducing a distance where there is none or, at least, at such a remove from us that we might be impartial or even indifferent toward it. In other words, ‘there’ in English (like ‘yonder’ or the German ‘dort’) frequently denotes the very opposite of what is often signified by ‘da.’ “Here is your book,” for example, best translates the remark “Das ist dein Buch,” made while handing someone her book. In many parts of Ger-
many, not least in parts where Alemannic, Swabian, and Bavarian dialects are spoken, it is common to announce one’s arrival by saying, “Da bin ich,” signifying “Here I am.” These colloquial uses of ‘da’ and ‘sein’ suggest a nearness that is lost if ‘Da-sein’ is translated ‘there-being’ or ‘being-there.’ More importantly, translating ‘Da-sein’ as ‘being-there’ runs the risk of rendering the theme something that need not be a matter of intimate, pressing concern, or in other words something that we do not necessarily care about.

While there is clearly no perfectly adequate English translation for ‘Da-sein,’ as Heidegger uses the term, both ‘openness’ and ‘being-here’ appear to be suitable translations. Because ‘being-here’ is a more straightforward translation and conveys senses of the German expression that are not retained by ‘being-open’ or ‘openness,’ I have opted to employ it as the translation for ‘Da-sein’ in the following study.

Nonetheless, it deserves iterating that disclosedness remains the primary significance of the term for Heidegger. To be-here is to disclose and to disclose is to be-here. Various manners of being disclose themselves prereflectively to us in theory and practice and in all the myriad behaviors that make a mockery of the distinction, from looking in a microscope to driving a car, from arguing to praying. According to Heidegger, this disclosure “defines” human existence more basically than does any set of sensory, kinesthetic, and imaginative capacities, any combination of motor skills and powers of concentration, computation, or inference, as well as any subliminal urges to survive, propagate, or dominate. By ‘define’ here, I do not mean the sortal process of locating a specific difference within some genus. Such a process presupposes the givenness of things (the manners of being of entities) and the issue for Heidegger is precisely not to take the meaning of that ‘givenness’ for granted. By ‘define’ I mean an articulation of what is equivalent to existence itself. In other words, whatever else might be said of a human being (including the animality that traditionally constitutes the

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genus for humans), it must be said of this disclosedness. “To be-here” is to disclose prereflexively to oneself what it means – for oneself and others, for things handy and on hand – to be. This disclosure is not “one’s doing” in any ordinary sense of the word and, though our various projects and projections play a role in the disclosure, it is also not something that we direct. Moreover, contrary to the logical prejudice, it is also not a matter of human judgment.

A list of abbreviations for the principal texts used follows this introduction. References are given parenthetically in the text and by means of footnotes. Occasionally a phrase or word may be quoted but not directly followed by a reference. In such cases, the source of the quotation is given in the very next parenthetical reference or footnote in the same paragraph in which the quoted phrase or word occurs. Unless otherwise indicated, all numerals following works cited in the text and the footnotes refer to page numbers. If a text is quoted, followed by more than one page number, the first number cited is always the source of the text, followed by other page numbers (in order of appearance) that refer to pages containing similar or relevant information. If no text is quoted but a list of numbers is cited, the order of numbers corresponds to the relevant pages in order of importance.
ABBREVIATIONS


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ABBREVIATIONS

GA Martin Heidegger. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975–. All references to this complete edition are followed by a number indicating the volume.


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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title and Editors</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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References to Plato and Aristotle follow the standard convention of Stephanus and Bekker numbers respectively.