THE LOGICAL CONCEPTION OF TRUTH:
THE LOGICAL PREJUDICE AND
LOTZE’S CONCEPT OF VALIDITY

Logic is the only science that,
strictly speaking, treats of truth.

Heidegger, 1925

Heidegger’s philosophy is not at odds with logic, at least what is traditionally understood as formal logic. Though he has serious reservations regarding the discipline’s place in a university curriculum and ultimately questions the range of its principles’ validity, his inquiry into the meanings of ‘being’ does not violate logical principles that sustain any genuine communication. Nor would he concede that the truth allegedly revealed by his early phenomenological analyses is extralogical or even prelogical, so long as the logical domain is understood broadly enough to include the original uses of ‘logos’ and their contemporary equivalents. In certain respects, to be sure, this last observation may seem like little more than a clumsy sleight of hand. For if logic is anything today, it is “the science of deduction” and “its most conspicuous purpose . . . the justification and criticism of inference.” To study logic is to study implication, the validity of a conditional relationship between two or more statements, and develop techniques for showing that such a relation obtains. Yet with this aspect of logic, too, Heidegger has no basic quarrel. But if the assumption is made that logic can be ade-

quately pursued in relative isolation from the ordinary or scientific contexts in which statements are made (“irrespective of their subject matter”) and, even more fundamentally, from the question of the sense of the truth of such statements, then Heidegger can fully agree with the spirit—though not the letter—of Emil Lask’s claim that “it is necessary, of course, to come to a halt at something ultimate; but the logical is precisely not that ultimate something.”

While theories of truth and questions of the suitable uses of the predicate ‘true’ are not generally considered part of courses in “logic proper,” they are often addressed under the rubric of ‘metalogic’ or ‘philosophy of logic.’ However, as an extension of formal logic, metalogic is generally limited to a consideration of the consistency, completeness, or decidability of systems of formal logic. As a result, these formal concerns dominate metalogical treatments of truth. By contrast, philosophy of logic does examine theories of truth and the question of truth-bearers as part of its focus on questions of the scope and aim of logic, the differences among formal systems, and their relations to informal arguments.

Philosophy of logic, so conceived, has affinities with what Heidegger in 1925 understands by logic, though with the important difference that formal logic continues to set the stage for philosophy of logic much as science does for the philosophy of science. Thus, the philosopher of logic critically examines the meaning, parameters, and competing paradigms of a more or less established discipline. Within this context theories of truth also come up for consideration, but they are theories that generally take their bearings from the application of the predicate ‘true’ to assertions, propositions, statements, sentences, or beliefs. By contrast, Heidegger’s “logic” is a “philosophical logic,” the chief concern of which is the meaning and possibility of truth, a forward-looking discipline that is “the prolegomenon for all logic” (L 20). As this last remark indicates, Heidegger’s use of the term ‘logic’ is somewhat elastic; like many of his contemporaries, he employs it at times to signify tradi-

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tional logic (including formal logic and mathematical logic) or transcendental logic, and at other times he uses it as a synonym for his own self-styled “philosophical logic.” In spite of this occasional ambiguity, his philosophical logic distinguishes itself in not taking formal logic and the possibility of the truth or falsity of premises and conclusions for granted. Far from canceling the propriety of formal logic or even merely considering deviations from it, Heidegger's philosophical logic investigates what makes it possible and, for that very reason, is not fully circumscribed by it.

Heidegger’s interest in logic, it bears noting, is neither superficial nor passing. His second academic publication, “Recent Research on Logic,” is a critical, albeit cursory survey of an array of studies by logicians from Heymans and Meinong to Geyser and Russell. Though the 1912 review is prefaced with an acknowledgment of “the persisting lack of an unequivocal, unanimous definition of logic,” the young Heidegger endorses the Fregean repudiation of psychologism. He also notes that the specific question of whether psychologism or transcendentalism is essentially grounded in Kant’s philosophy has probably been decided for the present in favor of the “transcendental-logic view represented by Hermann Cohen and his school as well as by Windelband and Rickert.” The importance of this development, Heidegger adds, is the fact that through it “the distinctive value of the logical” was emphasized (FS 19). More significantly, in this essay Heidegger gives some indication of his own early understanding of logic by defending the Husserlian conception of it as a “theory of theories, a doctrine of science,” concerned with “fundamental concepts (categories) and the connections among them” but also with the logical structure of individual sciences and their place in a system of sciences. Thirteen years later, remnants of this view of logic continue to be discernible in Heidegger’s characterization of phenomenology as “productive logic,” an extension of “the process of the original logic” developed by Plato and Aristotle, the task of which is to disclose the manner of being of a particular domain before it is worked over by science (P 21).

6 FS 166f: “Precisely because we want to find the access to the judgment of logic, we cannot take it as the point of departure.”
7 FS 18, 23. In this connection (FS 23 n. 9) Heidegger makes explicit mention of the “valuable” works by Wundt, Sigwart, and Lotze. It is noteworthy that, while unwilling to count Kant among the psychologists, Heidegger also is not ready to join “the side of the extreme Neo-Kantians” (FS 22); see, too, the references to the “naturalization of consciousness” implicit in psychologistic theories (FS 19). See also FS 63f.
In Heidegger’s 1914 dissertation (“The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism”) he makes what he calls “a critical-positive contribution to logic” by examining four theories of judgment in order to show that, while each is representative of a different sort of psychologism, all are inapplicable to logic, not simply because they misrepresent this “primitive element of logic,” but because they uniformly fail to recognize “the distinctive reality of the logical object” (FS 64f, 160f). For Heidegger that distinctive reality can be gathered from the identity of an iterated judgment or, equivalently, the sense of a sentence that is true or false of some object. What makes logic more than “a merely technical discipline” and distinguishes judgments, logically considered, from any psychological activity of judging is a judgment’s capacity to be true or obtain (gellen) for some object.8 “A psychological activity can never be true or false; it exists or not like the ‘flowing’ of electrical current, that lies outside the either/or of ‘true and false’” (FS 175). Pervading the dissertation is accordingly a conception of “pure logic,” a discipline that must take care of itself, establishing the objectivity of its subject matter both for itself and for every other science.9

While holding fast to the distinction between the psychological reality and the validating content of a judgment, Heidegger acknowledges in the dissertation that he is shelving the question of how to characterize the relation between these spheres and, indeed, “whether in this question a profounder solution can be aimed for.”10 Yet logical issues continue to dominate his thinking, so much so that, in his Curriculum Vitae of 1915, he declares logic “the philosophical discipline that still interests me most.”11 From his lecture “The Concept of Time in the Science of History” of the same year, it is clear that he continues to consider logic “a doctrine of science” and categories its “ultimate basic elements” (FS 416f). Heidegger does not himself use the term “trans-
scendental logic’ to designate what he means by ‘logic,’ but the issues subsumed by him under ‘logic’ – specifying the distinctive “reality” and “value” of logic, determining the categories, and elaborating the relation of an objectively logical sphere to a judging subject – make it clear that his understanding of logic is closer to what his contemporaries were dubbing “transcendental logic” than to anything else on the horizon of academic philosophy at the time.12

That Heidegger has the issues of transcendental logic in his sights, even if not by name, is particularly evident in his habilitation on Duns Scotus the following year, which he himself describes as an attempt “to bring about a deeper understanding of medieval-scholastic thinking with respect to the problem of categories and logic in general” (FS 412). A theory of categories, the most general ways in which objects are determined, is described by Heidegger as a “particularly intensive preoccupation of modern logic,” spawned by the work of Windelband and von Hartmann.13 Sorting out possible domains of what can be thought or experienced, according each domain its specific “logical place” and value, is a basic requirement of such a theory (FS 210ff, 400). Among the paramount categorial differences, for example, is the difference between a true judgment’s manner of being and that of what it is true of (or the difference between it and the words in which it is expressed). A theory of categories thus serves a purpose loosely akin to those of Aris-


totelian and Kantian categories inasmuch as the former are supposed to determine what kinds of things there are and the latter what can be experienced. Yet these traditional lists of categories draw on a specific domain of beings or objects for their determinacy and validity and, because of that, they are insufficiently formal (FS 211, 263, 287f). In addition to its clear recognition of the irreducibility of logical reality to psychological facts (FS 271–279, 284–288), Scotus’s logical theory is said to have the virtue of appreciating the utter universality of logical categories, their applicability to sensory, supersensory, and nonsensory realms (the realms of natural sciences, metaphysics, and mathematics) as well as to themselves.14 Paradigmatic among logical categories are the transcendentals, beginning with “being,” the “category of categories” that indicates a “logically-theoretical value,” namely, that of objectivity, and thus signifies “the condition of the possibility of knowledge of an object at all.”15

In Scotus’s appreciation of the universality of certain logical categories, particularly in his account of truth as a transcendental, Heidegger also finds a clear anticipation of the subjective and reflexive turn on which transcendental logicians insist. For example, Scotus’s characterization of “being” as the maximally knowable (“maxime scibile”) and his claim that “the true” is not something prior to the act of understanding meet in advance the demand to take the “judging subject” into account without confounding the content of what is judged truthfully with the passing reality of the subject (FS 270f, 275, 285, 402). His rejection of an infinite regress of knowing judgments is interpreted by Heidegger as having its basis in an act remarkably akin to what Husserl describes as a

14 In the habilitation, Heidegger investigates Scotus’s theory of categories only to the extent necessary to be able to determine the particular domain of meanings in his doctrine. But Heidegger also makes a more fundamental qualification, based upon his rejection of attempts to determine categories in abstraction from experience of the “material” formed by them. Adopting Lask’s conception of categories as forms intrinsically oriented to particular material ordered by them, Heidegger emphasizes the necessarily nondeductive, ostensive, and open-ended character of such an undertaking. From this standpoint, the very generality of Scotus’s theory (elaborated without the benefit of the various newly developed sciences) is at odds with the demands of a modern theory of categories. Nevertheless, Heidegger defends taking Scotus’s “general reflections” as his point of departure with the observation that general reflections are necessary if justice is to be done to one’s own way of proceeding. Moreover, despite the advances of transcendental philosophy, contemporary theory of science has not moved beyond problems at such a general level (FS 200f, 212ff, 274f).

15 FS 215; nor does the analysis stop at this point, since the meaning of ‘being’ can be unpacked in terms of other transcendentals (the predicates unum, verum, and bonum, which are convertible with it). See PS 122ff for Heidegger’s remarks on agathon.
categorial intuition (FS 273; see 2.12 below). Finally, for Scotus, as for most scholastic logicians, logical theory is essentially reflexive since its subject matter is composed of “second intentions.” According to Scotus, anything that is entertained can be made an object of logical consideration insofar as consideration shifts from what is initially entertained (“first intentions”) to the way it is entertained and the entertaining itself (“second intentions”). Heidegger construes Scotus as introducing in this way “the absolute hegemony of logical sense,” anticipating in the process Lask’s demand that logic be truly universal by determining not only constitutive categories for various regions of being but also reflexive categories for the determination itself.16 Echoing Lask’s demand for a “logic of philosophy,” Heidegger declares: “Logic itself requires its own categories. There must be a logic of logic” (FS 288).

Though most of the habilitation pursues the problem of categories principally in the spirit of the transcendental logic of Lask and others, its concluding chapter, written after the habilitation was completed and added as a supplement, provides the problem with a new, translogical orientation. “One is unable to see logic and its problems in their true light if the context out of which they are interpreted is not a translogical one.”17 “Translogical” in this connection stands for a consideration that transcends not simply any formal or symbolic logic but especially any transcendental logic. An adequate theory of categories has not only to differentiate distinct regions and relate the categories to a judging subject (as Scotus begins to do, anticipating transcendental logicians in the process), but also to interpret the historical meaning that underlies the positing of values, including the logical value of the categories (FS 408f). Philosophy must aim for a “breakthrough into the true actuality and actual truth”; orienting itself to the concept of a living, historical

16 FS 404ff; see FS 279: “Everything existing in the world of metaphysical, physical and mental objects, mathematical, even logical objects is taken up into the realm of the ‘secunda intentio.’” Lask’s constitutive categories are conceived as forms for the material of sensory, supersensory, and nonsensory domains (or, equivalently, natural science, metaphysics, and mathematics), whereas reflexive categories work, not with a form-material matrix, but rather with a subject-object one. The expanded logic is supposed to be a logic of philosophy; hence, the two parts of his Logik der Philosophie, “the logic of the categories of being” and “the logic of the philosophical categories.” For a discussion of Lask’s influence on the habilitation, see T. Keitel, The Genesis of ‘Being and Time’ (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), 25–57.

17 FS 405; see Lask, Die Logik der Philosophie, 211, for a similar view. On the import of the supplement, see Claudius Strube, Zur Vorgeschichte der hermeneutischen Philosophie (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993), 78f; J. van Burren, The Young Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1994), 87–112.
spirit and guarding against exclusively restricting itself to the study of structures, “epistemological logic” must make “logical sense a problem in its ontic meaning as well.” Only in this way, Heidegger concludes, will a satisfactory answer be possible as to how an unreal, transcendent “sense” secures us the “true reality and objectivity” (FS 406ff).

Though Heidegger offers a course on “Basic Questions of Logic” in the winter semester of 1916/17, the new “translogical” orientation dominates his ensuing lectures before he explicitly returns to the subject in the Marburg lectures of 1925/26 (here dubbed the “logic lectures”). Not that logic is ignored in those intervening years. In the spring of 1919, for example, after making a plea for replacing logic as a “theory of theories” with a “nontheoretical science, a genuinely original science [Ur-wissenschaft],” Heidegger takes Natorp (and Husserl) to task for “absolutizing logic” and sharply criticizes Rickert’s attempt to construe logic as a “doctrine of value.”18 Two years later, in the course of elaborating the task of defining philosophy, Heidegger challenges formal logic’s idea of definition for not being sufficiently formal, in other words, for being uncritically oriented toward a specific material region of objects and way of grasping them. After charging that this tendency is facilitated by the lack of the basic experience in which philosophizing comes to be spoken (“‘zur Sprache’ kommt”), Heidegger maintains that the want of that experience also prevents a radical problematizing of logic, with the result that “since the time of Aristotle philosophy has not understood the problem of the authentic logic.”19

This last remark, made in the winter semester of 1921/22, is particularly prescient for Heidegger’s subsequent development. His mention of an “authentic logic” signals a willingness, once again, to construe his own project as a kind of logic, albeit one that problematizes logic (formal and transcendental). It is a willingness that he continues to display in his Marburg lectures. This willingness is joined, moreover, by a conviction that Aristotle’s writings provide important lessons for understanding this authentic logic. Study of those writings largely shapes Hei-

18 ZBP 96ff, 107ff, 192–200. Heidegger makes similar criticisms of Natorp’s conception of logic a year later in the lectures of the summer semester of 1920; see PAA 102ff, 119.

19 PIA 20ff, 162ff, 178; in these lectures of 1921/22 Heidegger maintains that even the principle of noncontradiction is said to be conditioned by a “specific logic of ordering” (PIA 163ff), a point he iterates two years later, claiming that Husserl has come to the same conclusion (see EpF 255ff, 316ff). In lectures of 1920/21 Heidegger frames his account of a phenomenology of the formal (by way of formal indications) in contrast to formal logic and formal ontology; cf. PRI 62–65, L. 25.
degger’s research program and lectures for the next four years, leading up to the publication of *Being and Time*. Over that period, including his first two years at Marburg, when he is not lecturing on Aristotle’s logic and philosophy, he introduces treatments of Husserl and Plato with extensive discussions of Aristotle’s conceptions of *logos* and *aletheia.*

By itself, this brief survey does not explain what Heidegger means by “Logic. The Question of Truth,” the title he gives his Marburg lectures of 1925/26. Providing such an explanation is one of the tasks of the present chapter. However, the survey serves its purpose if it manages to show that consideration of logic, formal and transcendental, is never far from the center of Heidegger’s thinking from the outset. When Heidegger fashions his project as a philosophical “logic” in these Marburg lectures, he is using the term in a distinctive but not wholly unprecedented or unconventional way. What Heidegger considers the specific difference in his philosophical logic is the way in which it raises the question of truth. Traditional philosophical reflections on truth generally presuppose that truth is one of two (or more) possibilities of a sentence or its equivalent. In addition to ignoring the fact that truth and falsity do not compete on a level playing field, while also foreclosing inquiry into truth as the preeminent possibility, a wholesale commitment to this presupposition fails to question whether there is a measure of its own truth. Insofar as this sort of presupposition preempts any serious entertaining of these questions, it may be dubbed “the logical prejudice.” Disabling the logical prejudice and all that it entails constitutes a considerable part of Heidegger’s philosophical logic, his effort to investigate the senses of truth.

The focus of the present chapter is the first leg of Heidegger’s critique of the logical prejudice, as presented principally in the lectures entitled “Logic. The Question of Truth.” The first section (1.1) sketches Heidegger’s idea of a philosophical logic and the sense in which the question of truth is central to it. Attention then shifts (1.2) to the logical prejudice, the presupposition that, in Heidegger’s mind, forces the question of truth to be bracketed as meaningless or superfluous. The final section (1.3) is devoted to Heidegger’s examination of the thinker

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20 See EpF 6-4: PS 14–225. In the summer of 1922 Heidegger gives lectures not yet published but entitled “Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik.” In Marburg, lectures on Husserl (EpF) and on Plato’s *Sophist* (PS) flank lectures not yet published from the summer semester of 1924 entitled “Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie.” But both EpF and PS begin with extensive treatments of Aristotelian texts.
who in his mind succeeded more than anyone else in cementing the logical prejudice in the minds of a generation at the outset of the twentieth century: Hermann Lotze.

1.1 The Question of Truth and the Idea of a Philosophical Logic

In Heidegger’s logic lectures, one looks in vain for any doctrine of formal implication or inference, any treatment of how or why – purely on the basis of their forms – one proposition follows another. The object of his lectures is, as already stressed, a “philosophical” or “philosophizing logic” and what he understands by this has little to do with the traditional logic taught in the university curriculum. Indeed, one has to wonder what sort of instruction in logic Heidegger personally had that he could attack the discipline with such vitriol. The logic taught in the classroom is for him “a product of decline.” What traditionally passes for instruction in logic is largely nothing more than a recounting of “a fixed and thoroughly milled stock” of formulas, containing merely “the externalized, uprooted, and thereby hardened content” of the ancients’ originally philosophical inquiry. Such a logic is “an abomination for actual philosophizing and unworthy of the university.” There is certainly nothing more worth striving for than learning to think, the alleged motive of logic; but one learns to think, Heidegger insists, not by acquiring some free-floating rules of thought, shorn of all content, or by attending a collegium logicum, but only by active engagement with reality or through concrete research of some specific scientific domain.21

Yet if thinking is not learned in abstracto, but only in practical life or the concrete work of scientific research, the question arises what sort of science a philosophical logic is supposed to be. If Heidegger is seriously proposing the removal of formal logic from the university curriculum because such a logic claims to be purely formal, that is to say, to be unconnected with any content, then the question presents itself: what is the object of a “philosophical” logic supposed to be? Is there some matter or content that is to be regarded as the genuine domain of logic and thus the theme of a philosophizing logic?

21 L. 12–18. An anecdote may illustrate more recent dismay at university instruction in logic. In a lecture at the APA convention in the late 1970s (if my memory serves me correctly) Michael Scriven upbraided those of us teaching symbolic logic to undergraduates, claiming that, like teaching informal logic, it is a waste of their time and ours (except that, outrageously, we are paid for doing so). Instead, he argued, we should be teaching them computer programming.