Chapter 1

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF WYCLIF’S

DOMINIUM THOUGHT

In 1377, John Wyclif had need of powerful political support. He had been summoned to Saint Paul’s by Archbishop Sudbury to account for heretical arguments threatening to the foundations of the church in England. So on February 19, Wyclif appeared at the arraignment with John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster and arguably the most powerful man in the kingdom. Wyclif, once an Oxford metaphysician, had become an associate of John of Gaunt two years earlier, and had begun arguing for the reduction of the church’s political influence and her material wealth shortly thereafter. Gaunt was, and still is, widely believed to be eager to supplement his political power at the expense of the church, and Thomas Walsingham encourages us to believe that Gaunt’s support of Wyclif that February afternoon was that of a patron for his valued servant.

Had Gaunt been self-interestedly using Wyclif as his polemicist, he had made an odd choice. Wyclif’s arguments for the absolute power of the king were framed neither in the theocratic kingship language of the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman tradition, nor were they couched in the more contemporary Aristotelian terms favored by other champions of secular authority. On the contrary, Wyclif used language that had, until then, usually been employed by papally sponsored churchmen. His arguments were framed in terms of Grace-founded dominium, redolent of Archbishop Richard Fitzralph’s defense of ecclesiastical property-ownership. Talk of Grace as the true source of earthly justice was part of an established Augustinian tradition in England that had its immediate foundation in

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the papal hierocratic thought of Giles of Rome. While Wyclif’s clerical opponents might have labored to refute Aristotelian arguments similar to those of John of Paris or Marsilius of Padua, dealing with terms that most English churchmen held dear to their hearts would not be difficult. Wyclif made it easier by using dominium to refer both to proprietas, which had been its chief reference in Fitzralph’s thought, as well as to iurisdictio, which canonists had long since ceased to see as necessarily dominative.

Joseph Dahmus effectively argues that Gaunt was doing nothing more than providing support for a loyal servant of the Crown, suggesting that contemporary chroniclers’ and more recent scholars’ antipathy for Gaunt motivates the popular impression that Wyclif constructed his arguments on the duke’s behalf. What remains unresolved is why Oxford’s most eminent philosopher would suddenly turn away from metaphysics and risk all by putting forth dangerous, possibly heretical, arguments about the present state of the church. Recent scholarship has suggested that Wyclif’s motives were political, or that they were theologically founded, as was the Mertonian Bradwardine’s anti-Pelagian De Causa Dei a generation earlier. Wyclif’s own account is not terribly helpful, for his only explicit reference to the shift of his attention is to note that he felt it was time to introduce practically applicable issues to his theoretical pursuits.

One way to understand Wyclif’s interest in practical matters is to discover why dominium had captured his attention, for he makes occasional reference to it in his Tractatus de Universalibus, the last of his expressly metaphysical treatises. Why Wyclif used dominium as the concept central to his political writing has not been addressed. Given the English Augustinian tradition’s century-old association with Grace-founded dominium, it is sensible to wonder what prompted Wyclif to appropriate it for his own, apparently unorthodox, purposes. If there were significant grounds for Wyclif’s use of the concept in his earlier, more traditionally scholastic thought, we might be able to understand better the place of dominium in his political thought.

If the goal is to see why Wyclif appropriated Grace-founded dominium as the concept to wield in his political writings, it is tempting to suppose

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6 For discussion of recent scholarship, see below, pp. 10–23. See Thomas Bradwardine, De Causa Divi contra Pelagium et De Virtute Causarum, ed. H. Saville (London, 1618), I. 5. 308C.
7 “[T]erme sumus et totum residuum vitae meae tam speculativa quam practice, secundum mensuram quam Deum donaverit, inimic virtutibus, ut sic salubriam discam morti.” De Domino Divino, ed. R. L. Poole (London, 1890), Incipit, 1.6–8.
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that his aim was to hoist the papacy and its supporters with their own petard. But this raises more problems than it answers, for it suggests that Wyclif, a priest and theologian, would subvert his theology by using it for mundane ends, namely the glorification of secular power. This casts a doubtful aura on all of his later works, which were devoted to expressly theological issues. Secondly, this answer avoids the difficulty of the question of how dominium can involve both proprietas and iurisdictio by explaining it all as so much cynical political maneuvering. This is unsettling, because Wyclif’s use of the term dominium is recognizably in line with, and to a degree founded in, Fitzralph’s in De Pauperie Salvatoris. Fitzralph’s position is a mixture of Augustinian theology, hierocratic papal theory, canon law, and Aristotelian political thought designed to show that the Franciscans could not rightly claim to practice apostolic poverty without relying on the church’s material dominium. Are we to suppose that an accomplished metaphysician and theologian took this position and used it to his own private ends, without paying serious attention to the philosophical consequences of doing so? And if he did this, why did Wyclif devote such care to the relationship of Creator to Creation in De Dominio Divino, going so far as to make his metaphysical realism, as it appears in the Tractatus de Universalibus, consonant with it?

To understand why Wyclif characterized his union of theological and political thought in terms of a dominium that combined both proprietas and iurisdictio, we must do several things. First, we should ask whether other philosophers before him had done this. We have already mentioned that Fitzralph framed his thought in these terms; tracing the development of the tendency to frame political discourse in this specific theological language will better prepare us to argue that Wyclif was doing more than trying to make a name for himself among monarchists. Second, we should look carefully at the substance and argument of both De Dominio Divino and De Civili Dominio. What aspects of each of these works unite the two, and what aspects refer back to his metaphysics? Can we use Wyclif’s metaphysical and theological language to explain his political thought as a coherent realization of his philosophical program?

Wyclif was a confirmed realist about universals, believing that individual created beings have their reality by virtue of the prior being of universals. He wrote the dominium treatises shortly after having finished writing Tractatus de Universalibus, his clearest explanation of the reality of universals. Are there sufficient grounds for holding that he believed the divine dominium relation functions as a universal, from which individual instances of just human dominium derive their reality? If sufficient grounds for this argument exist, it is reasonable to suppose that Wyclif would have been aware of the possibility of his educated readers recognizing
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this structure, and understanding the argument of *De Civili Dominio* as a practical articulation of his realism. This would mean that his radical conclusions, including the need for a strong, Grace-favored civil lord or king to reduce the office-holders of the church to Christ-like poverty, were evident as wholly consistent with a realism evocative of Augustine’s own thought.

To show this, we must look at *dominium* as Wyclif does, as the relation between Creator and Creation most expressive of the on-going governance and maintenance God provides for his creatures. We will examine the definition of *dominium* Wyclif provides in *De Dominio Divino* as founded in his metaphysics, and as it plays out in his thought on how men ought to live together. Next, we shall look at the *dominium* described in *De Civili Dominio* as a concept entailing both private ownership and political jurisdiction. If these two issues are explicable as articulations of Wyclif’s realism by contributing to the conception of *dominium* as a clear causal connection between divine and just human *dominium*, it is difficult to avoid concluding that his conception of just human *dominium* is related to God’s *dominium* as is a particular to a universal. This will show how unfounded are the charges that Wyclif’s political writings are philosophically unrelated to his later, more explicitly polemical writing. Rather than study these works to see how they fit in the body of Wyclif’s work, this study will examine them for their philosophical content and reliance on his earlier metaphysics. While it will show that these two works are founded in Wyclif’s realism as it appears in the *Tractatus de Universalibus*, this study is not meant to suggest that the *dominium* treatises make up a part of the broader, theological program established in the *Summa Theologica*.8

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8 Wyclif’s two chief Latin works are the *Summa de Ente* and the *Summa Theologica*. The *Summa de Ente* includes most of his metaphysical works, including the *Tractatus de Universalibus*, and was
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Peter Brown has suggested, regarding Augustine’s thought on religious coercion, that we cease looking for one set doctrine, and instead be open to the shifts and developments in positions characteristic of an active thinker.9 This might prove a more useful way of handling Wyclif’s thought on dominium with regard to the bulk of his writings, for it figures as something more than what we now consider to be political theory, while more practically orientated than straight theology.

This chapter will serve as an overture in which we briefly survey the scholarship relating to Wyclif’s political thought, beginning with analysis of the scholars responsible for introducing him to twentieth-century eyes. As the study of the history of medieval philosophy has grown more philosophically sophisticated, some thinkers like Wyclif have received less attention than the complexity and theological innovation of their work deserve. The reasons for this vary, ranging from a vested institutional interest in more theologically orthodox thinkers to the relative absence of edited versions of later fourteenth-century philosophical texts. Most twentieth-century scholars of Wyclif’s thought have concluded that his metaphysics has no bearing on his dominium treatises. It will be best if we lay out their conclusions and their reasoning, not only to give us a starting point for our own discussion, but also to show how contemporary historians of thought have approached Wyclif’s philosophy.

Following this introduction, we will assess the influence of several figures whose ideas were influential on Wyclif’s realism, or on his political thought, or on both, including Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Archbishop Richard Fitzralph. This discussion will outline Wyclif’s place in the philosophical dialogue, and provide a perspective from which to understand specific aspects of Wyclif’s theory. In the third chapter we will recount the argument of De Dominio Divino, both as a carefully articulated piece of philosophy in its own right, as it is related to the earlier Tractatus de Universalibus, and as it will relate to De Civili Dominio. Here we will examine how the realism articulated in De Universalibus is borne out in Wyclif’s conception of God’s dominium over Creation and its relation to just dominium in Creation. Understanding how the determinist metaphysics of De Universalibus relates theoretically and

written while Wyclif was in Oxford, between 1365 and 1372. Williel Thomson describes the Summa Theologiae as an “extended dissection of the leading religious and political problems of his day, seen through the lens of an Augustinian realist.” De Civili Dominio and related ecclesiastical and social writings comprise the early treatises of this Summa, which was written between 1375 and 1381. While De Dominio Divino is not included in the Summa Theologiae, having been written just after Wyclif completed the Summa de Ente, it serves as the beginning point for this Summa’s arguments. See Williel Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif (Toronto, 1983), pp. 18–88.

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Philosophically to his dominium thought is also important, for at least one scholar has argued that Wyclif's political agenda is unrealizable because of it. Accordingly, we will examine both the foundation of Wyclif's determinism and its implications for his thought on dominium. Finally, we will look at other treatises of Wyclif's Summa Theologiae contemporary with the two dominium treatises, notably De Statu Innocentie and De Mandatis Divinis, insofar as they are useful in helping us to unravel the arguments of the two principal works in question.

At this point, we will be set to explore Wyclif's thought regarding just human dominium as expressed in De Civili Dominio and also in the related work De Office Regis. We will look first, in a fourth chapter, at what Wyclif says about the institution of private ownership in postlapsarian society, for this topic directs his thought on kingship as such. Wyclif devotes half of De Civili Dominio to explaining his thought about the evils of private ownership for members of Christ's body on earth, and the other half to explaining why it is important that just civil lords, owners of large amounts of property, should be Grace-favored, and how they should relieve the church of its material burdens. Wyclif believes Grace should function as a precondition of just private ownership, and that private ownership is a sin-stained perversion of the communal state of Eden, and resolving this apparent contradiction is necessary to a complete understanding of his thought on dominium. Further, Wyclif's concept of private ownership has direct bearing on our understanding of his later works, most importantly De Ecclesia, which was to be particularly influential in the Hussite movement.

This done, we will be ready to analyze in a fifth chapter Wyclif's picture of the duties and nature of civil dominium, which is functionally equivalent to kingship. His description of a monarch who must serve and protect his realm as well as the church therein has all the trappings of monarchical absolutism. But Wyclif's picture of kingship has Christian caritas as its chief characteristic; we will see how this is related to his thought on Grace as a precondition for just civil dominium. Consequently, it will be evident that this conception of the lord–subject relation is indicative of his view of the way that just human dominium functions as an instantiation of divine dominium. Thus, we will have discussed civil dominium in terms of proprietas and iurisdicito, and we will see how Wyclif believed these two concepts to be necessarily connected.

In a final chapter we will be set to conclude by showing how Wyclif's joint conception of private ownership and political power in just civil dominium depends upon his thought on divine dominium, which, in turn,

The historiography of Wyclif’s dominium thought is explicable only in terms of his metaphysical realism. This will allow us to characterize the status of divine dominium as being a universal in which all instances of just human dominium participate as instantiations in terms fully compatible with Wyclif’s definitions. Many students of England in the later Middle Ages have had to come to grips with the phenomenon of Lollardy. A careful examination of Wyclif’s dominium treatises will allow us to make some headway in two important aspects of the study of this unique heresy. First, we shall be able to analyze the validity of the following hypothetical syllogism:

(a) If one adheres to a Wycliffite realist metaphysics, one can coherently adhere to the social/political conclusions of the dominium treatises.

(b) If one coherently adheres to the social/political conclusions of the dominium treatises, one can consistently embrace the political notions of early Lollardy.

Therefore, if one adheres to a Wycliffite realist metaphysics, one can coherently embrace the political notions of early Lollardy.

This does not mean that all Lollards were metaphysical realists, nor that all Lollards had read the dominium treatises. But it does point to a potential causal relationship between metaphysics and a praxis-oriented movement that would imply that modern scholars have been premature in their assessments of the relevance of Wyclif’s metaphysics to his later thought.

MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY’S RELATION TO SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICS

An important element in the scholarship concerning medieval political thought has been the understanding of its relation to medieval metaphysics. Martin Grabmann’s 1934 characterization of the relation of a philosopher’s respective Augustinianism or Aristotelianism to his respective papalism or monarchism served as a landmark in this study.\(^\text{11}\)

He argued that political philosophers who advocated the supremacy of faith tended towards papalism, and those who desired to strike a balance between faith and reason generally favored a Thomistic Aristotelian compromise between monarchy and papacy, while those who saw reason as autonomous supported a lay monarchy founded on the consent of the governed. Grabmann divided philosophers who wrote on recognizably political issues into Augustinian hierocratic theorists, Thomistic

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Aristotelians, and Averroist Aristotelians. In the first group he includes Guido Vernani, Ptolemy of Lucca, Augustinus Triumphus, Giles of Rome, and James of Viterbo.\textsuperscript{12} In the next, he includes Aquinas and John of Paris.\textsuperscript{13} And in the group advocating reason’s autonomy he includes Marsilius of Padua and William Ockham.\textsuperscript{14} It is not hard to see a certain tendency: the Aristotelians tend towards monarchism, while the Augustinians tend towards papalism.

The most fully developed response to Grabmann’s approach appeared in Alan Gewirth’s “Philosophy and Political Thought in the Fourteenth Century.”\textsuperscript{15} He argues that it is simplistic to line up realists with extreme papal sovereignty and hierocratic theory, and nominalists with monarchism, and moderate realists with a “two spheres” argument.\textsuperscript{16} Gewirth agrees that Wyclif belongs in the Augustinian political tradition, and recognizes his reliance on Giles’ hierocratic thinking, but points out that Wyclif’s conclusions are an equally Augustinian species of anti-hierocratic reasoning. Gewirth is not arguing that no connection exists between philosophy and practical politics, only that agreement in practical politics does not necessarily entail a correlative agreement in metaphysics. He suggests that Wyclif and Marsilius of Padua, though certainly in agreement regarding several desired political outcomes, can by no means be said to share the same values.\textsuperscript{17} Gewirth argues that historical conditions warrant careful consideration in any attempt to relate philosophical doctrine with political program, and that one cannot suppose either metaphysics or political theory to be so open to correlativity as to allow adherence to one sort of belief to dictate adherence to another. In some thinkers, theoretical and practical philosophy were arguably correlative, while in others such an argument is bound to involve stretching the truth to the breaking point. It is best, Gewirth suggests, to take it on a case-by-case basis.

Michael Wilks’ The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages effectively supports Grabmann’s thesis that a tendency towards metaphysical realism was directly proportional to a tendency towards the papal hierocratic position.\textsuperscript{18} Wilks suggests that Grabmann’s approach is useful in illustrating how medieval positions on universals had real political implications, leading one to recognize the social import of the scholastic metaphysical disputes. Adherence to realism means recognizing that the

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\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., pp. 61–129.  \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 8–40.  \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 41–60.  
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 134.  
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 141.  
\textsuperscript{18} Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1963), p. 17, also p. 84.
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church is an Augustinian whole more important than its members. Accordingly, we would assume that Wyclif’s political thought and his earlier metaphysics were either unconnected, or that one of the two projects was not in earnest, for Wyclif is at once a realist about universals and an anti-hierocratic, ecclesiastically reforming monarchist. B. Wilkinson refers to Wyclif as an extremist in matters of religious reform while a political moderate; can one reconcile this with his earlier, hearty realism about universals? Wilks believed that one could, and set about addressing this problem. In so doing he set the tone for further discussion of the relation of Wyclif’s Oxford metaphysics of the Summa de Ente to the political and reformist thought of the Summa Theologiae.

Charles Zuckerman rightly points out that regarding the church as a universal of some sort is not commensurate with the medieval view of the church’s nature. Zuckerman suggests that Wilks’ intuition, based on Grabmann and Otto von Gierke, is not wholly ill-founded; many of the important positions regarding the place of the church in the world were formulated by philosophers who had well-developed metaphysical standpoints, and it would be natural to look for some sort of connection. Better, though, to look to other possible explanations for the political opinions of these philosophers, for it is as likely that they formulated their ecclesiological thought for political reasons as for ontological ones. Wyclif’s case will allow for at least one instance of such a connection, but the universal in question is not the church, but divine dominium itself.

A CENTURY OF WYCLIF SCHOLARSHIP

An outline of the chronology of Wyclif’s Latin works will be useful in gaining fuller appreciation of the assessments of Wyclif scholars of the relations between the treatises. We are aware of often expressly philosophical treaties that Wyclif wrote between 1360 and 1372, including three logical works (De Logica, Logice Continuatio, and De Logica Tractatus Tertius) and

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99 Ibid., p. 21.
102 Ibid., p. 594.
103 Zuckerman notes Wilks’ argument that Wyclif’s monarchism is evidence of the possibility of his conversion from realism to nominalism (which I will examine below), and pays little attention to Wyclif thereafter. cf. ibid., p. 585, n. 12.
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seven metaphysical works, which include the massive Summa de Ente and the Tractatus de Universalibus. In 1373 he wrote De Domino Divino, which served as the beginning point for the Summa Theologie, which he began in 1375 and ceased work on in 1381. In this latter Summa are his politically and ecclesiastically reformatory works, as well as treatises on scriptural interpretation and the Eucharist. We will examine the earlier works of the Summa Theologie, including De Mandatis Divinis (early 1376), De Statu Innocentie (mid-1376), De Civili Dominio (1375–76), De Ecclesia (1378–79), and De Officio Regis (mid-1379).

The end of the nineteenth century saw a rebirth in interest in Wyclif’s thought, and most of the Latin works now available were edited by the now-defunct Wyclif Society. The first important piece of modern Wyclif scholarship was G. V. Lechler’s Johann Wyclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation, which contributed most in its biographical sketch of Wyclif.

R. L. Poole, later the editor of De Divino Dominio and of several volumes of De Civili Dominio, laid the groundwork for the Grace-founded dominium reading of Wyclif’s political thought in two works, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning, and Wycliffe and Movements for Reform. In neither does Poole consider there to be an important connection between Wyclif’s metaphysics and his political thought; Poole’s contribution is his understanding of the relation of Fitzralph’s De Pauperie Salvatoris to Wyclif’s thought, and of the importance of dominium in Wyclif’s Summa Theologie. Johann Loserth’s “The Beginnings of Wyclif’s Activity in Ecclesiastical Politics” did much to found the contemporary belief among Wyclif scholars that ecclesiastically reformative concerns were absent from Wyclif’s mind before 1376. Another contribution to the general scholarly attitude towards Wyclif’s political thought was made in C. H. McIlwain’s Growth of Political Thought in the West. Perhaps following Poole’s lead, McIlwain dismisses Wyclif’s originality and relevance.