Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure takes sociology in a new direction. It examines key aspects of social structure by using a fresh understanding of emotions categories. Through this exciting synthesis emerge original perspectives on rationality, class structure, social action, conformity, basic rights, and social change. As well as giving an innovative view of social processes, J. M. Barbalet’s study reveals unappreciated aspects of emotions by considering fear, resentment, vengefulness, shame, and confidence in the context of social structure. While much has been written on the social consequences of excessive or pathological emotions, this book demonstrates the centrality of emotions to routine operations of social interaction. Dr. Barbalet also re-evaluates the nature of social theory, for once the importance of emotions to social processes becomes clear, the intellectual constitution of sociology, and therefore its history, must be rethought.

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Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure

*A Macrosociological Approach*

J. M. Barbalet
For my eldest son, Tom
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Note on citations

In the text and the References section, reference to sources indicate the year of first publication and that of the edition used, so that Smith ([1776] 1979) refers to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776, and indicates that the 1979 Oxford University Press edition was used. This is to preserve something of the historical context of authors who have contributed to the discussion.