

## INTRODUCTION

Directly related to modern man's pride are his *irony* about himself, his awareness that he must live in a historicizing and twilight atmosphere, as it were, his fear that in the future he will be quite unable to preserve his youthful hopes and vigor. Here and there some go further, they become *cynical*, quite literally justifying the course of history, indeed the evolution of the world, for modern man's convenience according to the cynical axiom that everything was destined to be precisely what it now is. Men had to become what they now are and not something else, and against this "necessity" there can be no rebellion. The comfort afforded by this kind of cynicism is a refuge for those who cannot bear to live ironical lives.

Friedrich Nietzsche<sup>1</sup>

### 1. ENLIGHTENMENT'S SHADOWS

We find ourselves in a curious situation. Never in history have so many enjoyed so high a level of material prosperity, political and economic liberty, and peace and security. The benefits of the flourishing arts, sciences, and humanistic disciplines are within reach of an unprecedented

<sup>1</sup> "History in the Service and Disservice of Life," trans. G. Brown, in *Unmodern Observations*, ed. W. Arrowsmith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 130.

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number of people. We may praise the strict virtues of ancient Sparta or the high artistic and philosophical accomplishments of ancient Athens, but who among us would willingly return to either, or to any of the great medieval cities, let alone to a less distinguished polis? We are the children of the Enlightenment, and scarcely any of us would gladly claim a different patrimony. Life in premodern society strikes us as thoroughly undesirable. So widely shared is this conviction that in extraordinary numbers the peoples of the globe vote for it with their feet. The march of the liberal Enlightenment seems irresistible. It has all but destroyed its fraternal enemy, the illiberal Enlightenment fathered by Marx, and premodern cultures collapse under its advance with astonishing speed.<sup>2</sup>

And yet scarcely any of us still defend our patrimony without heavy qualifications. Criticism of the modern age and the Enlightenment from which it stems is a staple of our intellectual and spiritual lives, within academia and outside it. The “crisis” literature of the last century and a half remains a prominent part of contemporary rhetoric, especially among those who would seem to have least need for it. The period’s greatest philosophers – Husserl, Heidegger, and Nietzsche among them – and legions of others have distinguished themselves in part by announcing and diagnosing our illness.<sup>3</sup> It may be that the future is always so opaque and the fear of loss so great that, given half a chance, the imagination will brood on the present with high anxiety. Yet our continuing failure of confidence, and our general despair about who we are in the midst of our plenty, cannot be dismissed with a psychological observation.

<sup>2</sup> When I speak of “liberalism” I refer to the “classical liberalism” of the sort generally shared by the founders of the tradition rather than to the contemporary American credo currently contrasted with “conservatism.” In using the term “liberal” to characterize a political regime, I refer to a regime whose institutions are structured so as to protect in reasonable measure the freedoms of religion, speech, assembly, accumulation and possession of property, and emigration (I do not mean the list to be a complete one). A “liberal regime” is thus one which holds that citizens are to be left relatively free to pursue their vision of the good life, within constraints of justice.

<sup>3</sup> M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, certainly ranks as an important contribution to the genre, especially in its focus on the roles of technology, domination, objectification, and on the self-destruction of the Enlightenment. The historical context in which the book was written (namely, the horrors of the Second World War) helps make its point. The debate about what “enlightenment” comes down to is not new, of course; as James Schmidt reminds us, it is well represented in the eighteenth-century German context. See his introduction to the volume he edited, *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 1–44.

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We do find ourselves faced with unsettling questions, some especially characteristic of our period and others *quaestiones perennes* that now press with particular force. I began these introductory comments with the pronoun “we”; it is very often used in philosophy, especially in ethics, as it is in politics. But the question might immediately be put to my use of the word, whether parochialism does not lurk just beneath the surface. True, “we” enjoy a high level of material prosperity, liberty, and other treasured goods, but how many of our brethren toil in misery just outside the palace door? Is there a sense in which their misery is necessarily the price of our happiness?

Put the nasty suspicion underlying these questions another way: Might the seeds of our manifold troubles also, paradoxically, be the very same seeds that have yielded the fruits we enjoy? Might the world be structured in such a way that its flourishing is the natural cause of its decay, thanks to some relentless “invisible hand” that, like the divinities invoked by the ancient tragedians, transforms the good into the bad and even the bad into the good? Or, stated summarily with reference to several widely discussed contemporary developments, Might the apparent devolution of liberty into spontaneity, of pluralism into relativism, of knowledge into technology and thence into the self-vitiating mastery of nature, of science into a “worldview” produced by a given historical milieu, of culture into vulgarity, of reason into imagination and then into fantasy – in short, the devolution of the Enlightenment into what is widely termed “postmodernism” – itself be a natural consequence of the very premises of the Enlightenment?<sup>4</sup> And if this disturbing thought persuades, where to go from here?

The answer to this last question depends in part on how we analyze the virtues and vices of the Enlightenment. Accounts of the rise and fall of the modern Enlightenment usually place Bacon and Descartes at the birth and Nietzsche at the demise of the movement. One well-established camp offers a critique of the Enlightenment by holding that the period is to be understood as a fundamentally mistaken rejection of ancient and

4 J.-F. Lyotard remarks that at the core of “postmodernism” is a skepticism about the ability of philosophy to ground or “legitimate” itself, to provide what Lyotard calls a “metanarrative,” or, in the current jargon, a “story” that explains and justifies the enterprise in question. Hence Lyotard’s remark: “I define *postmodern* as incredulity toward meta-narratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it.” This is just to say that scientific progress is self-vitiating. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. xxv and xxiv.

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medieval philosophy. Partisans of this camp would have us secure the future by recovering the earlier phases of the Western tradition. Alasdair MacIntyre and Leo Strauss are among the best-known proponents of this approach, and we may think of them as oriented by the now traditional “quarrel between the ancients and the moderns.” As the title of MacIntyre’s *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* intimates, however, some difficult questions await any effort to turn back.<sup>5</sup> Among those who in some sense wish to return to the Greeks, there is remarkable consensus that the political offspring of the Enlightenment are, at least in good part, worth preserving. (I refer to liberal institutions and political arrangements.) Enlightenment liberalism, however, is difficult to found on Aristotelian, let alone Platonic, moral theory. How can the older, virtue-centered tradition be made to mesh with modern political, jurisprudential, and economic practice?<sup>6</sup>

Another pressing difficulty with any return to the ancients is that, particularly in Aristotle, talk about human excellence or virtue seems tied to a teleological biology, and virtually no one today defends such a biology against the claims of modern science. Hence in MacIntyre, for example, the arguments in favor of an appropriation of classical “virtue” are explicitly severed from any moorings in a teleological biology.<sup>7</sup> This comes down to something like preserving Aristotle while replacing his notion of “nature” with that of “culture,” and perhaps finally “history.” Similar results arise given what is usually taken as the near impossibility of reviving anything like Platonic, Aristotelian, or indeed Stoic metaphysics. It then becomes doubtful that a modern revival of ancient

5 A. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).

6 Consider MacIntyre’s verdict: “Modern systematic politics, whether liberal, conservative, radical or socialist, simply has to be rejected from a standpoint that owes genuine allegiance to the tradition of the virtues; for modern politics itself expresses in its institutional forms a systematic rejection of that tradition.” *After Virtue*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 254–5.

7 See *After Virtue*, p. 196 and context, and p. 148. Also B. Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 44, 120. For a fine discussion of the Enlightenment critique of teleology, see S. Salkever, *Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 21–36. For general discussion of the difficulties of returning to the ancients, consider P. Simpson, “Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle,” *Review of Metaphysics* 45 (1992): 503–24; Williams’s remark that “in many substantial respects . . . no modern discussion [of ethics] can share the outlook of an ancient writer,” *Ethics*, p. 49; S. Hampshire, *Two Theories of Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 54–7; and J. Casey’s remarks on pp. viii–ix of *Pagan Virtue* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

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thought can depend on any premodern (specifically, any pre-Humean or pre-Kantian) “metaphysics.” This in turn suggests that ancient *philosophy* cannot be revived. A now classic criticism of such critiques of modernity maintains that they either accept much more of the ancients than can possibly be justified by contemporary standards or accept so little as to be, willy-nilly, exponents of a thoroughly anti-ancient modernism.<sup>8</sup> Any effort to revive the ancients begins to look like an exercise in nostalgia.

A second, equally well-established camp takes a different tack. In contrast to the critique of the Enlightenment that turns on a rivalry between ancients and moderns, more sweeping versions of the critique – such as those by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Richard Rorty – see the Enlightenment as in some respects an extension of Platonism, with Christianity understood as carrying through the basic tenets of Platonism. The story is told variously, one thinker stressing the continuity of the theme of “self-empowerment” and the “revenge against time,” another the dominion of “subjectivity” culminating in the eclipse of *Sein* (Being), and yet another the continuous variations on the theme of the mind as the “mirror of nature.” These global criticisms of the Enlightenment come close to (and often explicitly affirm) a rejection of “philosophy” as such, at least insofar as the term denotes an effort to articulate “how things really are.”<sup>9</sup> If the ancients and moderns are fundamentally one, if the Enlightenment is Platonism by other means, then the return to

8 C. Larmore argues that MacIntyre “is a pluralist, *malgré lui*,” where “pluralism” entails the acknowledgment of “the existence of rationally irresolvable moral conflicts” so characteristic of modernity. *Patterns of Moral Complexity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 39, 38. In their “Toward *Fin de siècle* Ethics: Some Trends,” S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. Railton note the self-reflexive problem faced by MacIntyre and Williams *qua* moral theorists and refer to them as “les théoriciens malgré eux.” In *Moral Discourse and Practice*, ed. Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 32. Similarly, in the course of a searching critique of Leo Strauss, S. Rosen remarks that Strauss’s “conception of [the nature of] classical philosophy was inadequate because at bottom Nietzschean or modern, and therefore postmodern.” *Hermeneutics as Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 123 (interpolation in the original).

9 At this writing, the latest major global critique of the Enlightenment is J. Gray’s *Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age* (London: Routledge, 1995). In his preface Gray writes that the Enlightenment project “was self-undermining and is now exhausted” (p. viii). On pp. 151–2 Gray rejects MacIntyre’s effort to return to a premodern tradition: “There can, in my view, be no rolling back the central project of modernity, which is the Enlightenment project, with all its consequences in terms of disenchantment and ultimate groundlessness. The modernist project of Enlightenment, though it broke with premodern, classical and medieval, thought at many points, was also continuous with it in its universalism and its foundationalist and representationalist rationalism” (p. 152).

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the post-Socratic ancients is as pointless as satisfaction with modernity is unwarranted.

This sweeping critique of the Enlightenment faces its own quandaries. It undermines key Enlightenment moral and political notions, such as that of “natural rights,” a phrase intimately tied to the political as well as philosophical defense of modern liberal regimes. Today the vocabulary of “rights” remains omnipresent but without the now strange-sounding qualification “natural.”<sup>10</sup> How are we to retain (we again ask) the praiseworthy political fruits of the Enlightenment while rejecting the philosophical doctrines from which they grew? A formidable problem concerns the standpoint from which the obituary of the “Western tradition” is itself uttered. The problem is famously illustrated in Nietzsche. His announcements about the passing of the whole tradition since Plato struggle with the self-reflexive paradox generated by the fact that such announcements about the “death of philosophy” tend themselves to be articulated in the language of the very tradition being rejected.<sup>11</sup> Having cut out the ground from beneath their feet, global critics of modernity seem left with nothing to stand on. To change metaphors, we are told that we cannot go backward and cannot remain where we are, but the march forward seems to lead into darkness.

The two camps of critics are in sharp disagreement as to what the problem of the Enlightenment consists in exactly. We may safely say, however, that the learned and passionately stated obituaries of the modern age urged by both leave us with the pressing challenge of deciding what to do next, whether to rescue *some* version of premodern thought or whether to abandon the entire effort of justifying the assumptions and projects of an epoch. No matter which direction we take in the debate, we seem blocked by the inevitable difficulties. Correspondingly, the question of the foundations of Enlightenment liberalism (if talk

10 For a survey of the current debate about rights, see W. A. Galston, “Practical Philosophy and the Bill of Rights: Perspectives on Some Contemporary Issues,” in *A Culture of Rights*, ed. M. Lacey and K. Haakonsen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 215–65. Cf. the dismissal of the notion of (natural) rights in R. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 84, and in MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 69.

11 The problem is discussed by MacIntyre in *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), ch. 2 (“Genealogies and Subversions”). In *After Virtue* (p. 239) MacIntyre notes that although Nietzsche is the “ultimate antagonist of the Aristotelian tradition,” it turns out “that in the end the Nietzschean stance is only one more facet of that very moral culture of which Nietzsche took himself to be an implacable critic.” This is in effect another “malgré lui” objection (see n. 8 to the present chapter).

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about “foundations” be accepted at all) is now wide open and is certainly the subject of vigorous debate. The net result is a widespread queasiness about the survival of our enlightened age. We sense that we have spent our moral and intellectual inheritance and lack the means to generate it anew.

An age of self-doubt has this advantage: it is fertile territory for philosophy. When the ground under our feet feels like terra firma, philosophy tends to degenerate into scholasticism; when it shakes, there follow not only a great deal of madness but also opportunities for true philosophical mania. Self-examination need not signal the ending of an epoch; it may, indeed, signal renewal. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at dusk, as Hegel remarked, but dusk is eventually followed by a new day that may provide nothing less than new light on the same ground.

We must make certain that we have mined that ground thoroughly before declaring it exhausted. Are there overlooked or misunderstood resources for self-criticism and justification in the Enlightenment itself, especially ones that also provide for the preservation of desirable aspects of ancient thought? If so, we should examine them with care. Adam Smith is one such resource.

## 2. ENLIGHTENMENT AND COUNTER-ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE WORK OF ADAM SMITH

It is Adam Smith’s legacy, in part, that we now enjoy as well as question. He was a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment and tied to the French and American Enlightenments. These Enlightenments are crucial chapters in the story of modernity. Smith’s standing and influence were established early on. The publication of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* in 1759 quickly made him famous, and not long afterward the work was translated (several times) into both French and German. It went through six editions in English during his lifetime. The book earned him high praise and respect from thinkers of the stature of Hume, Burke, and Kant. Smith’s only other published book, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (first published in 1776), was similarly received and won the careful scrutiny of Bentham, Hegel, and Marx, among many others.<sup>12</sup> Gibbon paid tribute to Smith’s work on the evo-

<sup>12</sup> The six editions of *TMS* were published by Smith in 1759, 1761, 1767, 1774, 1781, and 1790, and editions of *WN* in 1776, 1778, 1784, 1786, and 1789. The number of editions

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lution of society; Boswell, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, John Millar, Lord Kames (Henry Home), Hugh Blair, Dugald Stewart, and Voltaire learned a great deal from him; the list of admirers could go on and on.<sup>13</sup> *The Wealth of Nations* clearly influenced thinkers in the American Founding and has served as a touchstone in scholarly discussions about the workings and defensibility of liberal economic arrangements ever since.<sup>14</sup> Scientists and philosophers of science have noted the contribution of Smith's work, as have sociologists.<sup>15</sup>

In spite of his influence and fame, Smith's fate has for some time resembled that of Epicurus. Epicurus became known as an "Epicurean," and so as an advocate of a hedonism at odds with his true teaching. Today Smith's name is widely known and ceremonially cited in support of certain economic and political programs, but his teachings are rarely studied with care by those enlisting him in their cause.

published during his lifetime indicates the popularity of the works. On the reception of *TMS*, see again the editors' Introduction, pp. 25–34. For this and other abbreviations of Smith's works used in my citations and notes, see "Texts and Acknowledgments" at the front of the present volume. For Bentham's response to Smith, see *CAS*, app. C (pp. 386–404). For further general discussion, see J. H. Hollander, "The Founder of a School," in J. M. Clark et al., *Adam Smith, 1776–1926* ([1928] rpt., New York: Kelley, 1966), pp. 22–52, and M. Palyi, "The Introduction of Adam Smith on the Continent," in *ibid.*, pp. 180–233. For discussions of Smith's reception in Germany, France, the United States, Italy, Russia, India, Japan, and China, see the essays collected in H. Mizuta and C. Sugiyama, eds., *Adam Smith: International Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). On the relation between Smith and Hegel, see N. Waszek, *The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of "Civil Society"* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988).

- 13 See Smith's letter to Edward Gibbon of Dec. 10, 1788, *CAS*, p. 317 (as well as the editor's note); ch. 10 ("Smith and Gibbon") of C. R. Fay, *Adam Smith and the Scotland of His Day* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956). Smith's influence appears in some unexpected quarters. For some indications of Smith's influence on Emerson, for example, see J. C. Gerber, "Emerson and the Political Economists," *New England Quarterly* 22 (1940): 336–57. On pp. 345–6 Gerber notes that Emerson's praise of *WN* as a "book of wisdom" suggests "that, on the whole, Emerson considered Adam Smith one of the great men of the ages, whose controlling principles are intuitively perceived." I. Ross comments that "Smith had his first success as a man of letters, and became famous as a contributor to the European Enlightenment, with the publication of his ethics lectures, new-cast as *TMS*, in 1759." *The Life of Adam Smith* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. xxi.
- 14 Thomas Jefferson praised Smith's *WN* highly in his letter to J. Norvell of June 14, 1807. See *Thomas Jefferson: Writings*, ed. M. D. Peterson (New York: Viking [Library of America], 1984), p. 1176.
- 15 T. H. Huxley's high opinion of Smith is cited in K. L. Brown, "Dating Adam Smith's Essay 'Of the External Senses,'" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 53 (1992), p. 337, n. 22. Cf. C. Darwin's reference to Smith in *The Descent of Man* (London: J. Murray, 1871), vol. 1, p. 81. See also A. Swingewood, "Origins of Sociology: The Case of the Scottish Enlightenment," *British Journal of Sociology* 21 (1970): 164–80.

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He is seen solely as an economist, to the exclusion of his work in ethics, moral psychology, jurisprudence, rhetoric, and belles lettres, as well as political, economic, and intellectual history. Even worse, he is seen as an economist of a particular ideological bent. In short, he tends now to be known just as an advocate of crude laissez-faire capitalism and, to add insult to injury, of a capitalism inseparable from imperialism and colonialism.<sup>16</sup>

Given the breadth of Smith's work, his interest in political economy rather than economics alone, his insistent moral reservations about the unfettered operation of the free market, and his critique of imperialism, colonialism, and various forms of oppression – including slavery – these misinterpretations of Smith are striking.<sup>17</sup> Smith knew the Western philosophical tradition well. He was versed in ancient and modern languages, history, rhetorical theory, science, jurisprudence, religion, and literature, and his learning is evident throughout his work. It would be the envy of anyone claiming a liberal education. Above all, these familiar misinterpretations occlude the fact that Smith was first and foremost a philosopher, educated in philosophy by a great philosopher (Francis Hutcheson), close friend of one of the best philosophers in the history of Western thought (David Hume), and widely read and admired by philosophers. While in France he made the acquaintance of a number of the *philosophes*.

Many of the great themes of the Enlightenment, themes that inspire the modern age, are promulgated by Smith. To be sure, if one may speak of “the Enlightenment” in the singular at all, it is of a quarrelsome family. Critics of the movement were part and parcel of it from the start, and Smith himself may in some respects be counted among them. We may nonetheless say with confidence at the outset that when this period of several centuries is viewed from the general perspective I am adopting in

16 “Capitalism” is not a word that Smith uses, and in the body of the text when discussing his views I shall use expressions that are less encumbered with associations, less anachronistic, and more congenial to his own outlook.

17 These misconceptions are largely dead among the scholars who have studied Smith's work, and the last twenty years or so have witnessed a remarkable outpouring of work on Smith, including, increasingly, studies by philosophers. G. Harman remarks that he believes that *TMS* “is one of the great works of moral philosophy” and then goes on to note: “it is perplexing that Adam Smith's ethics should be so relatively unread as compared with Hume's ethics when there is so much of value in Smith.” See “Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator,” the Lindley Lecture, published by the Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas (1986), pp. 13–14. M. Nussbaum refers to *TMS* as “a central inspiration for the project” of her recent *Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life* (Boston: Beacon, 1995), p. xvi.

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these introductory comments, Smith is a supporter of the Enlightenment.<sup>18</sup>

To begin with, Smith seeks to free us from war and faction. At least since Hobbes, it has become axiomatic that disagreement, conflict, and war are basic features of human political life that must orient any viable political theory. In contrast to much of ancient political theory, the moderns often regard as fundamental the absence of agreed-upon norms for the “good life.” For the moderns, we begin with the potential for disharmony, not with the fact of consensus.<sup>19</sup> The primacy of conflict contributes to the special status of justice in much modern political theory, including in Smith. Conflict is taken to be ultimately reflective of “nature,” of the world we live in; its background story is cosmological, which makes conflict an ineradicable feature of human life. The catastrophic collapses of moral sensibility and the corresponding butchery in our own century lend credence to this view of the world and render Smith’s careful attention to moral sensibility all the more worthy of study.

Smith also takes it as his task to free us from repressive institutions, especially religious institutions. What he polemically calls “superstition” is frequently subjected to attack, and he provides a compelling analysis of religion as a political problem – that is, of religious strife and oppression – that foreshadows James Madison’s famous solution in the *Federalist Papers* to the problem of political faction. Smith’s moral, political, and economic doctrines are geared toward explaining how individuals as well as nations can live together harmoniously in spite of the ever-present potential for conflict. The regulation of religion by morality, and

18 Although Smith uses “enlighten” and its cognates in various senses, he does not use the term “the Enlightenment” (though see his reported comment about the “more enlighten’d age” at *LRBL*, p. 146, also p. 111, and *TMS* II.ii.3.5). This ought not to prevent us from understanding the important ways in which his thought forms part of the movement. Cf. Dugald Stewart’s reference to *WN* as containing the “most profound and enlightened philosophy of the age.” *Biographical Memoirs of Adam Smith*, William Robertson, Thomas Reid, ed. W. Hamilton ([1858] rpt. New York: Kelley, 1966), p. 320. Cited hereafter as *Memoirs*.

19 Of course the view that conflict is of crucial analytical importance has roots in “state of nature” theories in Hobbes and Locke and is carried farther in Kant’s discussion of conflict in his essays on history, in Hegel’s discussion of the master–slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and in Marx’s theory of the struggle between classes. For a sampling of recent invocations of the same theme (at times put in terms of the deep disagreement about notions of the human good), see C. Larmore, *Patterns of Moral Complexity*, pp. 38–9; J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. xvi–xviii; S. Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”: 1640–1740* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 4; and R. A. Putnam, “Reciprocity and Virtue Ethics,” *Ethics* 98 (1988), p. 381.