Jurisprudence

Jurisprudence is about the nature of law and justice. It embraces studies and theories from a range of disciplines such as history, sociology, political science, philosophy, psychology and even economics. Why do people obey the law? How does law serve society? What is law’s relation to morality? What is the nature of rights?

This book introduces and critically discusses the major traditions of jurisprudence. Writing in a lucid and accessible style, Suri Ratnapala considers a wide range of views, bringing conceptual clarity to the debates at hand.

From Plato and Aristotle to the medieval Scholastics, from Enlightenment thinkers to postmodernists and economic analysts of law, this important volume examines the great philosophical debates and gives insight into the central questions concerning law and justice.

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To Vidura Ravindranatha, Rusri and Adrian Surindra
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Suri Ratnapala
2009
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