Introduction

It is a commonplace of modern scholarship that the Athenians hated and despised the Persians; indeed by the end of the fifth century the word barbani usually denoted an inhabitant of the Persian Empire, and connoted cowardice, weakness, and effeminacy. Supporting evidence can be found in the rhetoric of the theatre and the assembly, as well as in art.¹ But the claims of contempt are disproved by the evidence of archaeology, epigraphy, iconography, and literature, all of which reveal some facet of Athenian receptivity to Achaemenid Persian culture. On analogy with the early modern European cultural phenomena of Chinoiserie and especially Türkerei, the response in classical Athens can be termed ‘Perserie’.²

This study aims to make better known the evidence for Perserie in Athens and to explain its working; and in so doing to argue that the social culture of classical Athens was not the monolithic construct it now appears. As it is often supposed that the Persians were a faceless, distant enemy, who retired to the heartland after the successful Greek counter-offensive of the 470s,³ an important first step will be to establish the extent of Athenian relations with Persians – on the battlefield, in trade, as visitors, and on embassy. It will appear that the Persians were not so little known to Athens as is claimed, for all that they were (deliberately?) misunderstood and misinterpreted; but Athenians were incapable of fine distinctions between the cultural products of the masters and the subject peoples of the western empire.

The Athenian response was as richly complex as the spheres of interaction: both private and public, elite and sub-elite. It appears in pot-shapes, clothing, luxurious display, and monumental architecture. The contradiction between anti-Persian rhetoric and Persians reality is ideological. Even while diffusing the threat of Achaemenid power and enhancing their own self-definition by portraying barbani as weak, emotional, and incapable of rational thought, the Athenians appropriated and reshaped aspects of Achaemenid culture to their own social and imperial needs.

It is appropriate to comment on method. Throughout this work, and especially in Chapters 7 and 8, images on Attic vases are employed as iconographic evidence. The criticism can be raised that art – especially this art, where generic and mythicising expression are common – cannot be adduced as evidence for life. None the less, the experience shows that even the wildest imagination cannot step beyond the familiar world of sensory

¹ For the literary construction of barbani see Hall (1986), for art, M. C. Miller (1990).
³ See most recently Georges (1994) 52, 84–5, 115.
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experience. Xenophanes recognised the tendency to think of the gods in one’s own likeness; representations not just of their appearance but also of their activities were based on the human model. On vases one must often distinguish between the scenes and subject-matters (which may be imaginary) and the details of clothing, gesture, accoutrements, and social practice (which derive from the known world). The fact that the wares of Attic vase-painters were often exported to the West is less important in this regard than the fact that the vases were produced in Attica. With the exception of the black-figure Perizoma Group, the few documentable instances of ceramic orientation to a foreign market relate to shape rather than decoration; there is no strict correlation of find-spot and subject of decoration.\(^4\) Therefore I take the images on Attic vases as in some sense reflections of reality even if distorted through the lenses of convention and medium.

\(^4\) See chapter 3 below and the introductory comments of M. C. Miller (1993), Perizoma Group: AB 342-5.

Sporey (1991) 144.
PART I SPHERES OF CONTACT

I

Relations between Athenians and Persians to the late fifth century: an overview

When Simonides composed his elegy celebrating the Greek victory at Plataia, he compared the Persian with the Trojan Wars. So extraordinary seemed the victory, so international in its implications, that no other mythical paradigm could serve. Plataia closed Xerxes' invasion, the period of most intense contact between Greece and the Persian Empire; the signal importance of the Greek victory dominated ancient, and so modern, thought. Yet focus on the great events of history has its limitations; it obscures experiences that are inherently less dramatic but in implication no less significant.

The following historical sketch assesses the extent of military and diplomatic contact between Athenians and Persians in the late sixth and the fifth centuries with a view to outlining the framework behind processes of cultural transfer. In pursuing its goal, it does not pretend to settle or even to address the many serious difficulties of chronology and (lack of) evidence for the period. In spite of modern opinion, it can be demonstrated that over the later sixth and fifth centuries a comparatively large proportion of Athenian adult males (hoplites and chetai) had some personal experience of the peoples of the Persian Empire, and even of Persians. Mid fifth-century Athenians accordingly did not have to rely on the memories of the Marathonomachoi; the Persians, though willfully misunderstood (as often in the history of human relations), were not a distant enemy of unknown culture.

THE PERSIAN ADVANCE

The fall of the Lydian Kroisos to the Persian Cyrus in the 540s became a mere metaphor for the fragility of human prosperity for the Greeks, but poetic sentiment masked the real significance of the event, as Herodotos well knew: it marked the start of contact between Greeks and Iranians. Shortly afterwards, in response to an appeal for assistance, the

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2 E.g., most recently, Georges (1994).

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Spartans sent Lakrines to Sards to warn Cyrus off the East Greek cities (Hdt. 1.152). At this first diplomatic encounter the King of Lands is said to have asked: ‘Who are the Lakedaimonians?’

In Athens it took a tyrant to initiate contact with the Persians. Peisistratos captured Sigeion from Mytilene and there established his son, Hegesistratos, under the jurisdiction of the Persian satrap at Daskyleion (Hdt. 5.94.1). Shortly after Peisistratos gained control of Athens in 547/6, the Athenian aristocrat Miltiades III went as tyrant to the Thracian Chersonese (Hdt. 6.34–3). Although this is usually regarded as a private move to escape tyranny in Athens, Graf convincingly argues that Miltiades acted with Peisistratos’ backing, and notes that over time the colony would have had to ‘reach a modus vivendi with the new Iranian power’,6 notably after Darius’ Scythian campaign of 513. In the next generation, after the assassination of Hipparchos, Hippias tried the expedient tactic of developing friendly relations with the Persian king. He married his daughter, Archidice, to the son of the tyrant of Lampaksos, believing that the Lampakesenes had influence with Darius (Thuc. 6.59-3). The strategy worked: when tyranny in Athens was overthrown in 511/10, Hippias was able to proceed to Sigeion and then to Lampaksos (Hdt. 5.65; Thuc. 6.59-4).

The Athenians soon followed the example of their ex-tyrant: in 507/6, to counterbalance a Spartan threat and wanting to make an alliance with the Persians, they sent messengers to Sards (Hdt. 5.73). The satrap, Artaphernes, demanded earth and water as a prerequisite to a treaty, to which the envoys, on their own initiative, agreed. For this they were censured on return to Athens; perhaps they exceeded instructions or perhaps changes in circumstances led to a local change of heart. It is not clear whether the actual delivery of earth and water was necessary as confirmation, or whether in Persian eyes verbal agreement to submission sufficed. There is no indication that the treaty was revoked; Artaphernes from his later actions seems to have supposed that the treaty was valid, and that it was in the King’s interest and in his own power to have a tyrant in control at Athens.8

After the Spartans failed in an attempt to reinstate him, Hippias returned to Sigeion (Hdt. 5.91–94.1). He managed to convince Artaphernes to try to establish him at Athens as a Persian vassal (Hdt. 5.96.1). The Athenians learned of Hippias’ manoeuvring, and sent further envoys to demonstrate with Artaphernes. This embassy seems to have been just before the start of the Ionian revolt and has been dated c.502/1.9 At the satrap’s reply that they should take back their old tyrant, the Athenian assembly resolved on open hostility towards the Persians (Hdt. 5.96); thereafter, to the Athenian mind, cooperation with Persians equated love of tyranny. Hippias spent at least twelve years with his supporters in the area of Sigeion and Lampaksos, actively trying to procure his return to Athens with the support of the Persian satrap. When this failed, he went to the Persian court (at Susa?), only to return with the force of Datis in 490 (Thuc. 6.59-4).

5 Graf (1959) 265-4, with references.
8 See Raubitschek (1954) 154, with references to G. A. Robinson; Schachermeyer (1973); Orfèn (1976).
9 Berve (1957) 172.
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Shortly after Hippias left Asia Minor, the Ionian Greeks revolted. At the appeal of Aristogoras in 498, the Athenians and Eretrians sent respectively twenty and five ships to Ionia (Hdt. 5.97) and were involved in the initially successful attack on Sardis, fighting both Lydians and Persians (Hdt. 5.100–1). There was evidently some hand-to-hand combat before the Greeks withdrew across Mount Tmolos to Ephesos. Nothing had been accomplished beyond the burning of citizens’ houses in the lower town; the satrap and other resident foreigners with administrative and military responsibilities evidently remained safe behind fortification walls. An organised force of Persians who held land-grants within the Halys River followed and defeated them at Ephesos (Hdt. 5.102). After this reverse, the Athenians gave up their part in the Ionian revolt (Hdt. 5.103.1). This had been their first military contact with Persians, although they had apparently not met regular troops.

The Athenian Miltiades (IV) fled to Athens from the Thracian Chersonese about 494/3 as a sympathiser with the Ionian revolt (Hdt. 6.41). He had lived for some time as a Persian vassal, as he took over his uncle’s tyranny about 520.16 At Athens Miltiades stood trial for tyranny; it seems that the cause of complaint was not the fact that he had lived within the Persian Empire (Hdt. 6.39–41, 104). In fact his experience of Persian military style and strategy later made him very useful to the Athenians.

After Mardonios’ abortive northern campaign of 492 (Hdt. 6.43–5), heralds from Darius began to appear in Greece in 491, asking for earth and water (Hdt. 6.44; cf. 7.133, the tradition that Athens and Sparta threw them into a pit and a well respectively). There is unfortunately no indication whether these were Persians or Ionian subjects. In the following year came the invasion of Datis which resulted in the battle of Marathon.17

The symbolic, rather than military, significance of the Athenian victory at Marathon cannot be overstated; the symbolic significance, increasingly played up as it was by the Athenians during and after the Pentekontaeti, has long coloured practical understanding of the battle. Herodotos’ comment that the Athenians and Plataeans were the first Greeks to endure the sight of Medes has a poetical rather than historical truth (Hdt. 6.112): here a good portion of the adult male population of Attica, for a brief time, was able to observe Persians at close hand.18 Indeed, the shield signal reported by Herodotos shows that there were secret dealings directly with the Persians on the part of at least one group of aristocrats (6.115).

There is little direct evidence for the composition of the Persian force at Marathon. Herodotos identifies the centre as Persai and Sakai (6.113.1); throughout the campaign, he refers generically to Medoi and barbari (cf. Hdt. 6.109, 112, 113). The parallel of Xerxes’ fleet suggests that it included Kilikian, Phoenician, Cypriot, and Egyptian contingents, which is supported by the fact that the rendezvous between army and fleet was in Kilkia (Hdt. 6.93.1). A recent study of the evidence argues that Cambyses constructed a Persian navy to be manned by the peoples of the empire, rather than simply continuing to rely

13 Holten’s (1978) No. 224; Casabianca (1972); Kial (1968) 8–90.
16 For the Greek tendency to confute Medoi and Persians, see Graf (1984).
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on naval contributions from the seaboard states. So soon after the Ionian revolt, it would seem dangerous for the Persians to use Ionian contingents, but a late source suggests their presence (Suda, χαρᾶς ἤττητο). Again, on the parallel with the invasion of Xerxes, the fleet probably carried Persian, Median, and Sakai epithetai. The cavalry was doubtless primarily composed of Iranian contingents, but it seems not to have taken part in the battle (Hdt. 6.102; Suda, χαρῆς ἤττητο). Herodotos makes no mention of spoils or prisoners from the battle (see below, Chapter 2).

Some twenty-five years later, the battle of Marathon was immortalised by a painting by Mikon or Panainos in the Stoa Poikile in the Agora, which doubtless served to shape subsequent understanding of the action. The representation was tripartite: Greeks fighting Persians; Persians fleeing and floundering in the marshes; the battle at the ships. Very probably, careful attention was paid to details of Persian armour and equipment.

In advance of Xerxes’ invasion ten years later, his envoys traversed Greece over the winter 481/80, but avoided Athens and Sparta (Hdt. 7.32, 133); the two states had already demonstrated their lack of respect for heralds. Meanwhile in Athens a number of prominent aristocrats were ostracised, many under suspicion of supporting the Persians.

THE INVASION OF XERXES THROUGH MYKALE

Xerxes’ invasion of 480–479 allowed more Greeks more opportunity to see more Persians than ever before or after. In ancient warfare close scrutiny of the enemy’s dress and ornament was possible. For example, examination alone could reveal to the Athenians that the armour beneath Masiadis’ tunic was of gold (plated) scales (Hdt. 9.22.2) and they thereafter paraded his body (presumably with its corset) around for everyone to see (9.25.1). The fact that battlefield contact could play a major role in the acquisition of cultural information makes it important to know the number of Iranians – Persians, Medes, and Sakai – in Xerxes’ army, and their proportional relationship to the contingents from other peoples.

It is in fact very difficult to come up with such figures, thanks to the lack of precise and reliable evidence about numbers and the apparent Persian diplomatic imperative to include troops from all over the empire. Even though we cannot accept as factual the inflated figures of the international host given by the ancient sources, it is reasonable to suppose that at least 10,000 Iranian infantrymen, the so-called ‘Immortals’, from the outset took an active role in the fighting on land (Hdt. 7.41; 83.1; 211.1); these were composed of Persians, Elamites, and Medes. The troops selected by Mardonius to stay in Greece with him for the second campaign season consisted of Iranians and Indians only, and, of this force, the Persians were the strongest contingent (Hdt. 8.113.2–3). Similarly...

14 See now Evans (1986–7).
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The Persian cavalry was conspicuous (Hdt. 7.40.3, 41.1, 84; 8.119.3). By sea, although it was the subject peoples (Hdt. 7.89–95.2: Phoenicians, East Greeks, Egyptians, Kilikians) who rowed the fleet, again Iranians were to be seen: Persia, Medoi, and Sakai served alongside the contingent marines as *epikatai*, thirty to a ship (Hdt. 7.96.1; 7.184.2; cf. 8.190.1). A Babylonian text, dated to the sixth year of Cambyses, adds independent testimony to the use of Sakai as marines.18 We hear that ‘the Persians who served as epibatai on the ships’ saved from execution one Pytheas of Aigina because of his valour in defending himself when captured by a Sidonian ship (Hdt. 7.181.2; 8.92.1). The hand-to-hand combat that characterised this warfare inevitably familiarised Iranians.

In principle prisoners could serve as a source of cultural information, but references to prisoners of war are very few; in all the years before 433, Pritchett could find references to prisoners taken in battle only after the battle of Eurymedon, but there is no specific indication of their subsequent fate (Diod. 11.62.1).19 There are two possible explanations for the silence about Persian war captives: our sources were simply not concerned to note such an obvious aspect of war; and/or the prevailing custom was to execute those captured alive, as the experience of Pytheas seems to show.

The evidence for the nationalities of the *epibatai* on each ship suggests that a significant number of Iranians fell into Greek hands as a result of naval battles, though they probably did not long survive capture. For example, after the storm off Sepias, fifteen ships, evidently from the East Greek and Karian contingents, sailed straight into the hands of the Greeks by mistake (Hdt. 7.194–5). Herodotos specifies that two Karian captains were saved for questioning. The Persian commander of this squadron, Sandokes, was evidently executed along with the rest of those captured. Later, at Artemision, the Greeks took thirty ships with their crews (Hdt. 8.11.2); presumably many more were captured at the battle of Salamis. Herodotos does not attempt to indicate the number of Persian ships lost or captured at Salamis; Diodorus gives the figure of over 200 (11.19.3), which some regard as exaggerated.20 Ktesias gives a certainly exaggerated number: 500 (*FHG* 688 f 13.30).21 Probably few Persian marines escaped the enthusiasm of the victorious Greeks who killed all enemy troops on the island of Pytalleia (Hdt. 8.95; *contra. Plut. Artis. 9.1–2*). At the battle of Mykale in 479, the Phoenician contingent had already been dismissed from the Persian fleet, so that the majority of Near Eastern troops must have been Iranian (Hdt. 9.96–106.1). From the account of Herodotos, it appears that again the fighting was so fierce that few prisoners were taken.

On land, the only occasion when Greeks certainly captured foreign prisoners is the attack on the camp of Mardonios after the battle of Plataia, where the non-combatants were taken (doubtless of all nationalities of the empire; see below, Chapter 2). Herodotos

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19 Pritchett (1971):86–9; expanded: (1991) 203–312, compelled by lack of evidence to telescope periods; most examples are cases of Greeks fighting Greeks. Many of the sources are unreliable. Similarly, Dreyer (1968) 229–70, was compelled to telescope evidence of all periods.
20 E.g. A. R. Burn (1994) 467.
21 For critical assessment of the evidential value of Ktesias, the dissertation and articles by J. M. Bigwood are fundamental; a recent dissertation (Brown University, 1995) by H. Melchert usefully addresses specific historical issues.
notes that of all the troops in the Persian army ‘less than three thousand’, a very small proportion, survived the slaughter in the camp (9.70.5). What happened to them? We do not know their fate. The range of possibility for these (and any other prisoners captured during the Persian Wars) was: execution, enslavement, or ransom. From the period after the invasion of Xerxes, we do hear of live Persian prisoners, but they appear in the context of the capture of a city rather than a battle, which may be a significant difference (see further below). Surprise at the profit later made from ransom (see below) suggests that ransom was not common practice over the course of the invasions. Though Greeks had ransomed Greek prisoners in the archaic period, the mechanisms of ransom of Persians and other barbaroi had possibly to be worked out; ransom in general appears to have been a rare treatment of captives, involving as it did a certain amount of effort. Execution of captives after battles was a very common practice. Though a tiresome process if captives were numerous, it saved the bother of retention. Enslavement, the third option, is not explicitly attested for barbaroi. The question is very important for the demographics of slave-holding in early classical Athens, for which there is no specific evidence. If captives were enslaved, it would provide a large influx of Iranians into a slave population that had probably been predominantly Greek or of peoples bordering the Mediterranean. Much later in the fifth century, some evidence for the ethnographic make-up of the slave population at Athens does surface in the form of the ‘Attic Stelai’ (see below, Chapter 3). Here we find that many slaves originate in countries on the western borders of the Persian Empire, but no slave comes from further east than Syria. The Athenian practice of getting slaves from the peoples of the western empire may have started with the invasion of Xerxes, but if so, at first it must have reflected more closely the ethnic divisions of the Persian army.

The one record of a Persian captive from Plataia is highly dubious. Pliny preserves a confused tradition of an Ostanes or Oshanes, who supposedly survived capture to introduce to the Greeks the precepts of Zoroastrianism (Pliny, NH 9.68). If Ostanes was historical, he was markedly unsuccessful in his teaching. The earliest reference to Zoroaster in extant Greek literature is in Plato, about 350, who mentions Zoroaster the son of Oromazdes (Alk. 1.122a). The identification of the prophet as the son of the god, Ahura Mazda, leads one to suspect the depth of Plato’s knowledge. In fifth-century Hellas there seems to have been no familiarity with the work of Xanthos of Lydia, who also referred to Zoroaster (Diog. Laert. 1.2 = FGH 765 ff 92).

One group of Athenians had a different experience of Persians, as prisoners: the 500 Athenians captured in Attica (Hdt. 9.99.2). They were taken aboard the Persian fleet, and delivered to Samos. It had possibly been intended to settle them as a population somewhere within the Persian Empire, but the Samians released them, to return to Athens.

28 Ibid., 205–9. Louis (1969) 43 f: lack of references to execution of non-Greek prisoners. The practice was too common to merit attention.
29 There is very little evidence of the practice for this period.
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The records of the spoils from all these battles will be examined in detail below (Chapter 2). Suffice it to note at this point that a significant quantity of Near Eastern luxury goods fell into Greek hands, particularly (but not exclusively) after the battle of Plataia. Herodotus' lengthy description betrays the impact that Plataia's booty had on the Greeks (e.g. 9.86–2). Even a generation after the event, when more accustomed to Near Eastern luxury goods and lifestyle, Greeks were still discussing and displaying their prizes.

THE EARLY PENTEKONTAETIA TO THE BATTLE OF THE EURYMEDON

Though Gomme described the situation as one of a few Persian stragglers in the area that had to be 'mopped up',26 the Greek victory at Mykale did not cause the immediate collapse of the Persian presence in Europe and Asia Minor. Xerxes was prepared to defend his patrimony despite the impression of the sources that after the defeat of his invasion, he retired to the heartland of Persia (Hdt. 9.107.3–115; Ktesias FGH 688 f 13.32–3).27 The 470s and early 460s were filled with campaigns in Europe against pockets of Persians trying to maintain a toehold for the King and elsewhere against regions that had been under Persian control for at least three generations. Herodotus gives an impression of extended struggle when the Greek offensive began (8.3.2), and the old jurors in Aristophanes' Wasps reminisce how they were 'many cities' from the Medes (1098–1100; see also Plato Menex. 241d). Only after several years of fighting had the combined Greek force succeeded in driving out all the Iranians from the North Aegean; control of Cyprus and parts of western Asia Minor was never assured.

In the spring of 478, the allies reconvened under Pausanias 'to free those Greek cities that were yet occupied by foreign garrisons' (Diod. 11.44.1; see Thuc. 1.94). Cyprus was deemed the most important target as it provided a forward base for the Persian fleet, and its strategic location made it the critical point of control between East and West (Thuc. 1.94; Diod. 11.44.2; 14.98.3). When most of Cyprus took part in the Ionian revolt ten years earlier, the Persians had moved quickly to regain the island. Xerxes had employed a significant Cypriot contingent in his fleet; though there is some question about their quality, there is no suggestion that they were anything but loyal throughout his campaign (Hdt. 7.90; 8.689; 8.100.4). Yet in 478, despite the small size of the reconvened Greek fleet (perhaps 100 ships), the Greeks, according to Thucydides, conquered 'most of Cyprus' well before the end of one season (1.94.1; cf. Diod. 11.44.1–2). This is explicable only as the result of demoralisation on the part of the Phoenicians normally active in this area; or as the result of deliberate retirement from Cyprus, to regroup elsewhere; or, Badian suggests, as hyperbolic reporting after a couple of Cypriot cities expelled a Persian garrison.28 The secure hold of Cyprus seemed vital to Greek recovery of the coastal cities of

26 Gomme [1945] 205; contra ATL III 205.
28 Personal communication.
Asia Minor (cf. Hdt. 5.104, 108–16.1). Its mixed population and recent history made Cyprus a highly significant locus of Greco-Phoenician and possibly Greco-Persian contact.

Not long after the departure of the Greeks, Cyprus was once again the first major target for Persian military action; her strategic significance as bulwark of the Levantine coast made her control imperative. Unfortunately, our sources give no hint of the subsequent activity. When we next hear about the island, in the mid-sixties, it is again under Persian control: the Persians at the Eurymedon River are waiting for a Phoenician reinforcing squadron from Cyprus (Plut. Kím. 12.5).

In the same campaign season (478), the Greek fleet sailed against Byzantium whose strategic location presumably demanded a strong garrison prepared against attack; against the consensus that the siege did not continue into winter it is now argued that Byzantium did not fall until the spring of 477 (Thuc. 1.94; Diod. 11.44.4). Here a number of high-ranking Persian prisoners were taken, friends and relations of the King – the first recorded instance of important Persians taken captive. Pausanias allegedly released them secretly with the help of Gongylus of Eretria and claimed they had escaped (Thuc. 1.128.5–6; Diod. 11.44.4; rewarded Xen. Hdt. 3.1.6). One modern interpretation suggests, rather, that he ransomed them, with Gongylus acting as the King’s agent; the charges of Medism among Pausanias’ first tenure at Byzantium are now generally doubted, with some suspicion that they were ‘invented to facilitate the Athenian seizure and retention of the hegemony’ of the Hellenic alliance. Thucydides’ report of Pausanias’ adoption of Persian-style dining at Byzantium, if true, suggests he had access to the Persians’ attendants (Thuc. 1.130.1). The case with which Pausanias assumed ‘Persian’ customs in Byzantium reflects the extent to which the city was acculturated, having been under direct Persian control for only a generation. Other evidence points in the same direction: one citizen of Byzantium who died fighting for Athens in 465/4 bore the Persian name Zopyros (IG 1114.1125; also adopted by Thracians, e.g. Plato Alé. 1129b).

On his way to Greece Xerxes had followed Darius’ practice in establishing hyparchoi (the word can mean satrap or governor) throughout the Hellespont and Thrace (Hdt. 7.106–7). Herodotos’ description of the institution suggests many more than those specified: Artayctes at Sextos (Hdt. 7.33, 78; 9.115.1–120), Maskames at Doriskos (7.105), and Bages at Eion on the Strymon (7.107, 113.1). The presence of hyparchoi in Asia Minor, separate from the administrative hierarchy, suggests that they held royal land-grants (see below, Chapter 4). At least one hyparch, Sandokes at Kyme, had control of a major naval base (Hdt. 7.104.1). It is from such men that we expect, and find, evidence of determined resistance against the aggression of the Greeks.

Sextos, the object of the last campaign mentioned by Herodotos, had been the first target after the victory at Mykale in 479; it was taken early in 478 at the departure of the Persians after a siege that lasted the winter (Hdt. 9.112; Thuc. 1.89.2). The siege of Eion 59 Lecomte (1990). 60 Forina (1996), Evans (1988), esp. 2, ransom; Badian (1995) 130–2, esp. 131 (proclamation). 61 ABL III 219 add Abdera. Possibly Artachais at Akarnai (Hdt. 7.7.17–18). Toplin (1973b) 121–4 on hyparchoi. Toplin (1973a) esp. 184, 219–20. 62 Wallinga (1984) 408, n. 10.