This book offers a sustained re-evaluation of the most central and perplexing themes of Leibniz’s metaphysics. In contrast to traditional assessments that view his metaphysics in terms of its place among post-Cartesian theories of the world, Jan Cover and John O’Leary-Hawthorne examine the question of how the scholastic themes which were Leibniz’s inheritance figure – and are refigured – in his mature account of substance and individuation. From this emerges a fresh and sometimes surprising assessment of Leibniz’s views on modality, the Identity of Indiscernibles, form as an internal law, and the complete-concept doctrine. As a rigorous philosophical treatment of a still influential mediary between scholastic and modern metaphysics, their study will be of interest to historians of philosophy and contemporary metaphysicians alike.

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SUBSTANCE AND INDIVIDUATION IN LEIBNIZ

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JOHN O’LEARY-HAWTHORNE
For
Jonathan Bennett
and
José Benardete
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In Treatise (‘‘Advice to Authors’’) of his Characteristics (1711),
Shaftesbury bemoans that stratagem which in his day common practice
had made ‘‘a necessary part of elegance,’’ whereby an author ‘‘patheti-
cally endeavors in the softest manner to reconcile his reader to those
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