GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Similarities and differences

These three texts share an important common focus, but there is an equal attraction in their differences.[1]

Their common focus is the problem of government. Aristotle defined this at the beginning of his *Politics* as how to organize and direct the *polis* (or any other κοινωνία or association of interests) with a view to securing its success (εὐδαιμονία)[2] through promotion of the common good. Yet these texts treat this common problem from very different perspectives, use very different political systems as illustrations, have very different literary forms, and differ even in their authorship and consequently also in their style.[3]

Hiero is the first work we have that is entirely devoted to rulership, and is in the form of a dialogue between a wise man and a tyrant about the relative happiness of the ruler and the non-ruler. The tyrant proves to be a suffering human being whose tyranny prevents him achieving personal εὐδαιμονία, but the wise man shows him that he can achieve it through service to the εὐδαιμονία of those he rules. *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum* (*Lac.*) is the first comprehensive account we have of the laws that Lycurgus created for the εὐδαιμονία of the Spartans. It contains the earliest description of his eugenic programme, his educational system, his various other arrangements for the promotion of virtue, his army practices, and the customs for the Spartan kings, and it provokes questions about the function of law and the relationship of law to custom. *Respublica Atheniensium* (*Ath.*) is the first extant analysis of how the Athenian democracy secured the happiness of its members, and the only extant analysis of democracy from the point of view of the *demos*; it contains among other things the first account of the theory of imperial sea power. Indeed, *Ath.* offers starting points to the reader for a full examination of the realities of the Athenian democracy and empire in all its aspects,

[1] I therefore thank P. E. Easterling, a foundation editor of this series, for suggesting them to me.

[2] In discussing *eudaimonia*, I tend to say 'happiness' when thinking of the experiences of individuals, and 'success' when speaking of the experience of the community of individuals. So, by ensuring the 'success' of the *polis* in *Hiero* (11.5), the ruler will achieve personal 'happiness' (2.4); and by ensuring the 'success' of the *polis* in *RL*, Lycurgus brought his citizens the individual happiness of conquering enemies such as is described at *Hiero* 2.14–16.

[3] Xenophon of Athens is the author of *Hiero* and *Lac.* Anderson (1974) gives a balanced and accessible account of the life. Diogenes Laertius (third century AD) wrote an account of his life and works (2.48–59), drawing on writers such as Ephorus and Dinarchus (fourth to third centuries BC) and Diocles and Demetrius of Magnesia (first century BC); these supplement the information Xenophon gives about himself in *Anabasis*. The author of *Ath.* is unknown, but is commonly referred to as the 'Old Oligarch'. Diogenes lists *Ath.* among Xenophon's works, but he surely did not write it; see pp. 19–20 below.

political, social, cultural, administrative, and *Lac.* offers a similar range of Spartan historical realities, as well as their 'mirage'.[4]

Their different perspectives enrich their contribution to political thought. The author of *Ath.* challenges the idea that success depends on securing the common good when he shows that the Athenian *demos* rules in its own interests, but still prospers. In contrast, Xenophon connects success and happiness with the common good in both his works. Nevertheless *Hiero* focuses on the happiness of the ruler in such an arrangement, whereas *Lac.* focuses more directly on the success of the community.[5] As paradigms of successful communities, they could even appear polarized: *Hiero* secures the success of his community through personal rule, *Lac.* through the rule of law. *Hiero* envisages a society in which the brave and wise and just find their place, warriors as well as the farmers and traders, thus addressing the twin needs of peace-time prosperity and of wartime, while *Lac.* educates a small population in mainly military virtues to give leadership to others in war, barely mentioning the economy, which we know was left in the hands of helots and other inferiors. *Lac.* reflects historical realities to some extent, which may partly explain the difference, but both governments are presented as positive paradigms, so it is hard for the student of political thought to decide at first glance whether, in Xenophon's view, the rule of law is preferable to personal rule or whether dedication to military virtue is preferable to economic development. Similar kinds of questions are raised about the relationship between Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, the one offering the paradigm of the philosopher-king, the other a programme of legislation, the one a blueprint for the best society, the other an avowedly second-best constitution.[6]

Fortunately, Xenophon provides a wider framework of political thought in his many other works within which *Hiero* and *Lac.* can be better understood. These works are *Anabasis*, *Cyropaedia*, *Hellenica*, the Socratic works *Memorabilia*, *Symposium*, *Oeconomicus* and *Apologia Socratis*, and the so-called 'minor' works apart from *Hiero* and *Lac.*: *De Re Equestri*, *Hipparchicus*, *Cynegeticus*, *Agesilaus* and *Poroi*. They represent a variety of literary traditions: history, autobiography and encomium, the dialogue, the technical handbook, even a speech to the leaders of democratic Athens telling them how to improve the Athenian economy and make her 'more just' toward her allies (*Poroi*). What they all have in common, however, is an interest in paradigms of government, from Cyrus the Great in *Cyropaedia* down to the Athenian householder Ischomachus and his wife in *Oeconomicus*. Xenophon has liberal and inclusive views on government that are not well represented in the scholarly literature, but they span gender and race

[4] A phrase used to describe the idealized Sparta, from Ollier (1933/43).

[5] The division between the rulers and the ruled may be unpalatable to modern tastes in politics, but was a regular feature of Greek political thought, and obedience to rulers was a requirement in all associations, whether the rulers were the poor majority or their elected representatives, or a hereditary monarch (Arist. *Pol.* 1332b12–15).

[6] Schofield (1999) 31–50 describes the various views of the relations between Plato's *Republic*, *Statesman* and *Laws*. Laks (2000) has argued that *Republic* is to *Laws* as Paradigm is to Best Approximation.

and all types of human organization. As a much older commentator said of him: 'On s'attend à trouver un auteur, on est ravi de trouver un homme.'[7]

Paradigms of political thought

Xenophon was a philosopher, well placed to make a contribution to political thought because political thought was a branch of philosophy. Diogenes presents him as a prominent philosopher,[8] one of the chief pupils of Socrates, alongside Plato and Antisthenes (2.47).[9] Socrates becomes for Xenophon a major mouthpiece of political thought, one through whom he may voice his master's authentic beliefs as well as some of his own.[10] His views give a firm context for *Hiero* and *Lac*. It is convenient to divide these views into those concerning personal rule and those concerning the rule of law; though they have much in common.

Universal rules

Xenophon's Socrates maintains that the principles on which communities should be organized are universal. Aristotle considered the government of a *polis* different from that of households (*Pol.* 1252a7–16), on the grounds that the *polis* was a community of equals whereas the household included natural inferiors (women and slaves), but Socrates found common principles behind all kinds of κοινωνίαι, from empire to *polis* and down through its infrastructures. Xenophon makes him say: 'The management of private affairs is different from the management of public affairs only in point of numbers' (*Mem.* 3.4.12); 'whatever association a man takes charge of, if he knows what is necessary and can supply the goods, he would be a good manager (προστάτης) whether he manages a chorus, a household, a *polis* or an army' (*Mem.* 3.4.6).

Because the principles of leadership were universal, Socrates presents the administration of his provinces by Cyrus the Younger (*Oec.* 4.4–25) as a model for the administration of the householders in that work, and *Memorabilia* shows Socrates using common principles to heal dysfunctional relationships within associations both personal and political, between rulers and the ruled who include mothers and sons, brothers, friends, masters and slaves (2.2–10), elected military commanders and their

[7] Croiset (1873) 421.

[8] He says, presumably of *Cyropaedia*, *Hellenica*, *Anabasis*: 'first among the philosophers he *also* wrote history' (2.48). Marcovich (Teubner 1999) notes the correct translation of the words in his *apparatus criticus*, against Suda, which understands 'he was the first who wrote a history of the philosophers'; cf. also Hicks (*LCL*, 1925).

[9] Antisthenes is a major character of Xenophon's *Symposium* and figures in *Memorabilia* (2.5). Xenophon's only reference to Plato is his observation that neither Plato nor the rest of his family were able to prevent their young relative Glaucon from trying to advise the Athenian *demos* at a very young age, and completely without knowledge (*Mem.* 3.6.1 and *passim*). This may be gently critical of Plato's failure at 'leading' his relatives in the right direction.

[10] Fortunately, eliciting political thought from this paradigm does not involve the 'Socratic problem', which attempts to discover what Socrates really thought, since it is only Xenophon's representation that matters. See the bibliography on the Socratic works (*Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus*, *Symposium* and *Apologia Socratis*) in Morrison (1988).

men (3.1–5), the masses and their champions (3.6–7).[11] Leadership of many different types of communities indeed defined the achievement of those who sought through their education under Socrates to be worthy of the description καλοί τε κἀγαθοί. They are described as those who 'were able to use well i.e. manage their household and householders and relatives and friends and city and citizens' (*Mem.* 1.2.48). Women and slaves were capable of the same achievement. The householder Ischomachus, maintaining that he and his wife contribute equally to the knowledgeable administration of their estate, refers to their partnership in the rule of their common enterprise (κοινωνοί, κοινωνία: *Oec.* 7.11, 13, 18, 30). He goes so far as to tell Socrates that he invites his wife to prove herself 'better' than he is in contributing to their common good and thus rule him as she would a slave (7.42).[12] He even teaches his leading slaves to rule other slaves (*Oec.* 12.3–4, 13.3–5, 14.1).

PERSONAL RULE

Definition of the leader

Xenophon's Socrates defines the ideal personal ruler in the paradigm of Agamemnon as one who secures the εὐδαιμονία of his community.[13] This is the calling to which Hiero is asked to respond (*Hiero* 11.7) as well as the purpose of Lycurgus' laws (*Lac.* 1.1–2). Socrates had asked: 'What is rule over men? What is a ruler over men?' (*Mem.* 1.1.16: τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων). He found an answer in Homer's descriptions of Agamemnon as the paradigm 'shepherd of his people' and as 'both a good king and a doughty warrior too' (*Mem.* 3.2.2), which he interpreted as proof that the ruler served the happiness of his people, securing their lives and livelihood, and making them good warriors like himself. 'For a king is elected [sic] not to take care of himself, but to ensure that those who elected him do well through him; and people go to war to secure the best possible livelihood and they elect generals for this, to lead them toward that' (*Mem.* 3.2.3). 'By his reflections on what is the virtue of a good leader, he stripped away the rest and left the definition that he made those he ruled happy' (*Mem.* 3.2.4: τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἡγῆται).

The common good

Agamemnon served the common good (τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν) in order to achieve εὐδαιμονία. Socrates recognized different types of government (kingship and tyranny,

[11] Gray (1998) surveys the contents and general thrust of this work.

[12] There is a lot of interest in the wife of Ischomachus: Pomeroy (1994).

[13] See Schofield (1999) 3–30 for comment on Homer's paradigms of Greek political thought. Since Antisthenes, Socrates' close associate, was a leading interpreter of Homer, Agamemnon's paradigm may represent the interests of the authentic Socrates in Homeric interpretation; see Richardson (1975); Navia (2001) 39–52. Plato saw Homer of course as a major source of instruction for the young, editing out the corruption and leaving only the positive paradigms, including that of obedience: *Rep.* 389d–391a.

aristocracy, plutocracy, democracy: *Mem.* 4.6.12), but judged them all by that standard. Hiero is encouraged to serve this common good (11.1), and the *eudaimonia* of the Spartans is the evident focus of Lycurgus' laws. The definition of the good proved slippery when subjected to dialectical investigation, which challenged the validity of even the most obvious 'goods' (*Mem.* 4.2.31–6), but the power to 'increase' the 'greatness' of the community is a basic constituent. This 'increase' might take various forms: improving the economy, or enhancing the virtues and abilities of the membership – their military capacity or their justice toward one another. The shorthand for improvement of the people themselves was to make them 'as they should be' (οἵους δεῖ: *Mem.* 2.3.10, *Cyr.* 1.6. 7, *Lac.* 2.13). Agamemnon made his army great by preserving their lives, securing their livelihood, improving their warrior qualities and giving them success in war (*Mem.* 3.2). Ischomachus and his wife teach their woman housekeeper justice, and also to take her share of the success and the failure of the household, so that she will 'increase the household' in partnership with them (συναύξειν τὸν οἶκον: *Oec.* 9.11–16). The laws of Lycurgus increased the power of Sparta by improving the quality of the citizens in ensuring that they acquired 'all the virtues', making them as they should be to secure their prosperity (10.4). Hiero considers that his citizens derive great satisfaction from 'increasing' their *polis* through war, while he is obliged to 'diminish' it as tyrant because of his fear of the citizens, reducing it both in terms of their numbers and their quality (*Hiero* 2.15–17; 5, 6.12–16); in response, Simonides shows him how he can achieve success by 'increasing' it without fear in military and other ways (11.13). Xenophon's Socrates criticized Critias and Charicles as leaders of the Thirty, for diminishing the *polis* of Athens – killing innocent citizens, forcing the rest to commit injustice, and thus making the citizens both 'fewer and worse', since the elimination of the good reduced the population and left only the worse to flourish (*Mem.* 1.2.32). The improvement of other members is an act of leadership even in an 'association' of brothers (*Mem.* 2.3): Socrates encourages one to make the other 'as he should be', i.e. fit to secure the many benefits that arise from the association of brothers, by becoming 'more leaderly in securing his friendship' (*Mem.* 2.3.10, 14). In contrast, the *demos* in *Ath.* seeks only to 'increase the democracy' (*Ath.* 1.4), and entirely eschew the promotion of the good, which perverts this ideal.

Knowledge

Xenophon was of course at one with Plato that to secure the common εὐδαιμονία, the ruler needed superior knowledge. His Socrates concluded that his brightest pupils would produce success for themselves and their households, and for fellow citizens and entire *poleis* – 'if they were properly educated' (*Mem.* 4.1.2). 'Kings and rulers', his Socrates said, 'were not those who held the sceptre of power, nor those elected by sundry persons nor those who won it in the ballot or used force or deceit, but those who understood how to rule' (*Mem.* 3.9.10). The wise poet Simonides teaches Hiero this knowledge in *Hiero*. Lycurgus is wise even though no instruction is recorded (*Lac.* 1.2).

Xenophon came to think of rulers as those who take the initiative from knowledge in creating success in any partnership and the ruled as those who benefit from it and give willing obedience as a result:

> When a person agreed that the function of the ruler was to give orders about what to do, and the function of the ruled to obey, he showed how in a ship the one who understood how to rule was the captain, and the owners and all others in the ship obeyed the one who understood; and that in farming those who had estates, and in disease those who were sick, and in exercise those who were in training, and all the rest who did anything that needed care and attention, that these people took the care and attention themselves if they thought they understood, but otherwise they obeyed those who did understand, not only in their presence, but sending for them in their absence, so that they could obey them and do what was necessary.

He adds as his final example of rulership that women because of their superior knowledge 'rule' men in wool-work (*Mem.* 3.9.11).

Various 'orders' of knowledge were required for rule. When Socrates educates Euthydemus (*Mem.* 4.2–3 and 5–6) in 'the kingly art' of being a man of the *polis* and of the household, able to rule, able to assist oneself and others (4.2.11), he shows that the highest order of knowledge is dialectical. Socrates used dialectical definitions to show Euthydemus how ignorant he was (4.2 passim), then encouraged him to be pious (4.3), just (4.4), and in possession of the self-control needed for practical leadership and for the further practice of dialectic (4.5.11–12). As a culmination, he made him 'dialectical' by teaching him how to define the good so as to avoid the bad (4.6). This gave him a vision of the common good and the personal qualities to implement it. Even at the most basic level, dialectic allowed a commander to recognize which men were good and which were bad, so that the good could be stationed both in front of and behind the cowards, so as to contain them (*Mem.* 3.1.8–9).

Socrates endorsed the need for another kind of knowledge in a series of conversations with elected leaders of the democracy (*Mem.* 3.1–7). This was implementation of the good through 'man-management', the art of knowing how to 'use men', without which human affairs could make no progress (*Mem.* 3.4.12). The art was to win their obedience and make them as they should be for the part they would play in securing the good. This is the skill that the brother is asked to develop in handling his sibling (cf. p. 5) and that Simonides teaches to Hiero.

The ruler also had to have the required technical knowledge for rule or the ability to muster second-order expertise, and to be able to communicate. So that in conversation with an elected cavalry leader, Socrates stresses the need for him to make technical improvements in the horses and their riders, as well as secure obedience by demonstrating the greatest knowledge about horsemanship and communicating the benefits of obedience (*Mem.* 3.3).

Willing obedience

'Willing obedience' was the outcome of successful personal rule and an essential ingredient of the success of the association. Those with superior knowledge were invited to rule because they were recognized as a source of benefit in the various associations at *Mem.* 3.9.11. *Mem.* 3.9.12–13 shows that disobedience meant failure even within the association of the wise and the powerful; the man of power could disobey his wise advisers, but was automatically punished by not having the wisdom to make the right decision. Willing obedience was necessary for the ruler's happiness too. Ischomachus contrasts the happiness of the ruler who secures assent (τὸ ἑθελόντων ἄρχειν) with the unhappiness of ruling without it (τὸ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν: *Oec.* 21.12). The inability to win willing obedience proves to be the main obstacle to Hiero's personal happiness, and the winning of it the main solution to his dilemma. Lycurgus also wins assent to his laws (*Lac.* 8.5) and the Spartans as a community enjoy the willing obedience of other Greeks in *Lac.* 14.6 because of the virtues that his laws instilled in them.

To secure willing obedience was not just a matter of serving the common good in the cold sense of supplying its needs. The ruler needed also to be a servant of those he ruled, looking to their emotional, as well as their physical and moral welfare. In this he shared the προθυμία of the ideal friend. Socrates makes the connection between friendship and politics explicit when he observes that 'friendship slips through and unites the best people'; they renounce those desires that stand in the way of harmony, share the goods on offer, and assist one another, competing only for their mutual improvement, considering their own wealth as their friends', and eventually sharing political office as partners in power rather than competitors (*Mem.* 2.6.21–6, esp. 26). Cyrus the Younger was so intent as a ruler on winning the friendship of those he ruled that Xenophon found no man who was more 'beloved' (*An.* 1.9.28: οὐδένα κρίνω ὑπὸ πλειόνων πεφιλῆσθαι). Hiero also seeks friendship as a remedy to his personal unhappiness as a ruler, and like Cyrus, who won more friends from small kindnesses than from his large wealth, he is also encouraged to begin with these (*Hiero* 8.1–3; cf. *An.* 1.9.24–7). The ideal friend took as much pleasure in his friends' achievements as his own, worked constantly for their good, and sought to win the paradoxical victory over them in serving their interests (*Mem.* 2.6.35).[14] Hiero also recognizes that one friend 'willingly serves another without compulsion' in a free and equal partnership (1.37), envies the emotional support and the protection that comes of the friendship between citizens (3.1), and is encouraged to the paradoxical victory of service over those he rules (*Hiero* 11.14). The Spartan King Agesilaus is another friend to his people

[14] Socrates found this friendship even in the oldest profession, in the association of courtesan and client: 'You . . . know how to best please him with your glances or cheer him with your words, how to receive gladly one who cares for you, but shut out the pleasure-seeker, take special thought for a sick friend and share his great pleasure when he does something fine, and be a delight in all your soul to one who cares strongly about you' (*Mem.* 3.11.10).

(*Ages.* 7.3). Even Lycurgus' laws produce friendly *homonoia* among the Spartans 'living together at home on moderate means' (*Lac.* 14.1), training citizens to 'assist their companions' (*Lac.* 7.4).

The ruler's happiness

Because sensual and material pleasures (food and drink, sex and sleep, wealth) were a potential source of corruption and could distract the ruler from pursuit of the common good, he had to guard against any indulgence in them, but his pursuit of friendship brought other rewards. Aristippus takes a negative view of the experience of a leader in the democracy as no pleasures for himself and constant service to the pleasures of the *demos* (*Mem.* 2.1), but Socrates concludes that the pleasure lies in acquiring the goods that are the common desire of all men: many friends, and no enemies, the ability to benefit these friends and the entire *polis*, and to earn praise and envy (*Mem.* 2.1.18–19). The renunciation of sensual and material pleasures also made the ruler more appealing to those he ruled. Lycurgus cultivated austerity in his Spartans to such an extent that the Greeks sought their leadership as a result (*Lac.* 7,14.2, 6). Pleasures were empty without successful relations with others in the community. Hiero had all the pleasures he could wish for, but was unable to enjoy them without friendship; yet once he acquired friends, he would have the greatest pleasures that came from friendship, and they would willingly give him in addition the wealth he won them as a ruler of excellence (*Hiero* 11.13; cf. also *Cyr.* 8.2.13–23).

Personal rule could not of course achieve complete utopia. Xenophon's Socrates was not so naïve as to think that the ruler would secure from everyone the positive reciprocal response he deserved. He recognized that the competitive side of human nature was a barrier to successful friendship, that there were rogues who did not know how to respond (*Mem.* 2.6.19–20) and that even a brother's kindness might not be repaid (*Mem.* 2.3.17). The best paradigms use punishment and force alongside reward and praise. For this reason, Simonides encouraged Hiero to use different methods with rogues from those he used with men of virtue (*Hiero* 10.1–2). Another non-utopian aspect of the theory was that it was not possible for just any person to become a ruler of an association such as the *polis*, not even in a democracy. Leadership there was the privilege of those who had traditional access to power through birth. Nevertheless, this was not necessarily unwelcome to those they ruled. Socrates considers that Callias has special appeal to the Athenian people precisely because of his ancestors and their achievements, his ancestral priesthood, and his impressive physique (*Symp.* 8.40).

The pambasileia

Xenophon clearly extends his notion of leadership beyond those great men who lead the larger associations of *polis* or empire, but he does envisage praise for Hiero's sole rule of his *polis* after his reform, and it is important to understand the qualifications he places on sole rule. They are in short what we find in *Hiero*: superior knowledge,

dedication to the common good, rule by willing assent and so on. Xenophon is not alone in his endorsement. Aristotle recognized the claims of 'complete kingship' or *pambasileia* and subjected it to the same qualifications (*Pol.* 1284a3–15). He argues that if there is a man whose virtue and political competency to produce justice is so great that it is not comparable with the others in his association, it would be unjust to consider him their equal and therefore unjust to subject him to their law, on the grounds that law is set up for those who are equals, but he is 'like a god among men'. Others would not think it fit to rule him in any case, for that would be like claiming to rule Zeus. Rather they give him their willing obedience because that is 'in accordance with nature'. Aristotle later returns to the proposition that it is unjust for one man to rule others in a *polis* because all are equal, and that the law should therefore rule, because it allows for ruling and being ruled alike. However, he continues to argue the case for the rule of the man whose virtue is so great that it eclipses all the rest (1288a 15–29). Nature does not let the part overtop the whole. The man of virtue represents more of the whole than the part. It is therefore not seemly to make him subject to other parts in any way. The community more or less has an obligation to obey his wishes.

THE RULE OF LAW

Xenophon found personal rule compatible with the rule of law. The holder of the *pambasileia* is above the law in the strict sense, but Xenophon's paradigms indicate that even he created and implemented practices to which those he ruled gave assent; these had the force of law, as the example of Cyrus the Great will show below. Xenophon's Socrates certainly found no tension between the rule of law and the personal techniques of rule because he worked within the Athenian democracy, instructing among others office-holders who had been formally elected by law to implement the laws in their 'rule' of the people. They needed to learn the personal techniques as much as any one-man ruler. The same need is found in Spartan society, in the paradigm King Agesilaus, who put his personal leadership at the service of law (*Ages.* 1.36, 7.2–3).

Socrates endorses obedience to the laws and their officers as the secret of political and personal success within the *polis* in his conversation with the sophist Hippias in *Memorabilia* 4.4.[15] This is prefaced with an account of his own obedience to the laws and their officers even in the face of fearful opposition both oligarchic and democratic (4.4.1–4). Law as he saw it was an education in virtue, making the citizens 'as they should be' for their own prosperity, telling them 'what to do and what not to do',

[15] This has been subject to an attempt to find tension between Socrates' support for positive written law in the first part of the dialogue and his support for unwritten law in the second: Morrison (1995), Johnson (2003), but cf. de Romilly (1971) 32, 120–7. It is hard to imagine that the instances of unwritten law mentioned in the dialogue (respect for gods and parents, taboos against incest and ingratitude) could ever be in conflict with the laws that communities write for themselves.

encouraging virtuous practice as well as discouraging vice (*Mem.* 1.2.42, 4.4.13). In this respect it had the same effect as his teaching in philosophy: to promote the good and deter the bad. This educational function underpins the laws of *Lac.* and of the Persians, which are contrasted with laws that merely punish wrongdoing (*Cyr.* 1.2.3). The rule of law ideally produced the same 'increase' of virtue as the sole ruler.

Willing obedience was as important for the rule of law as for personal rule and takes the form of assent to its implementation. Socrates thus endorses law as 'whatever the citizens write down after consultation', which means that law should be subject to the assent of those who live under it. Alcibiades pushed the need for assent to extremes (*Mem.* 1.2.45) when he argued that, because it did not persuade the wealthy, the rule of the poor majority was based on force and therefore invalid in law (cf. *Mem.* 4.6.12). *Lac.* shows how even Lycurgus ensured assent to his laws (8.1–5). Socrates of course also recognizes the special category of divine or natural laws that do not need to be written down because transgression incurs automatic penalties (*Mem.* 4.4.19–25). One of the purposes of other law was to prescribe penalties.

The laws as Socrates defined them also preserved the harmony of the community as the personal ruler did. Indeed they arise from this harmony since they take the form of the consultative process above. Xenophon's Socrates praises Lycurgus for securing the obedience to his laws that brought the Spartans their *homonoia* (*Mem.* 4.4.15) and extends this praise to personal leaders in other *poleis* for getting the message across that obedience to law ensured success through unity. Those who obeyed the laws enjoyed the personal benefits of social harmony as well as the success of their community as a whole. These are the 'goods' that he endorses elsewhere as the product of friendship, such as Hiero misses: the confidence of fellow citizens, praise rather than blame, benefit rather than harm, being trusted rather than distrusted (*Mem.* 4.4.17). The desire for these 'goods' was a private incentive to obedience to law, just as the desire for community success was a public one.

Political thought in Cyropaedia

Xenophon's ideas about how to organize and direct the community come together in his longest work: *Cyropaedia*.[16] In the introduction, he exhibits the universality of his principles and his basic thoughts on leadership when he observes that associations of all kinds, from democracies, monarchies and tyrannies down to households, have collapsed because they failed to win willing support from the ruled, but that many *poleis* and entire nations gave Cyrus the Great their 'willing obedience' (ἐθελήσαντας πείθεσθαι), which proved that rulership could succeed if a man had knowledge of the art (ἐπισταμένως 1.1.3). This partnership between the ruler and the ruled allowed him

[16] Due (1989) 147–206 surveys the ideal leadership of *Cyropaedia*. This is shaped by his own thought even though it is based on Persian traditions (1.2.1, 1.4.25). Gera (1993) 13–22 discusses the Persian sources for *Cyropaedia*. Xenophon could have heard these while he was on the expedition with Cyrus the Younger.