A Court in Exile
The Stuarts in France, 1689–1718

EDWARD CORP

with contributions by
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France, Rome and the exiled Stuarts, 1689–1713

Edward Gregg

Well before James, Duke of York became king in 1685, English suspicion of France in general, and of Louis XIV in particular, was universal, common to all classes and parties; ‘His grand designe . . . is to make himself Master of all Europe’, an Anglican bishop opined in 1676.¹ In 1691, when George Legge, first baron Dartmouth and James’s favourite courtier, was being examined by the Privy Council, Dartmouth protested that he would defend England:

Lord Dartmouth: I am . . . not so weake as to fancy the King of France will conquer England only for King James. No, my Lords, if we should ever be so unfortunate, he will doe it for himselfe, or at least make us but trybutary.

Lord President [Marquis of Carmarthen]: Nay, any man that can thincke at all can’t surely imagine the King of France will doe it for King James, or any body but himself.²

After the Nine Years’ War, Matthew Prior had no doubt that James’s decision to flee to France had fatally injured his prospects in England: ‘King James cast himself into the hands of the Enemyes of his Country, and justified in great measure the suspicions that were against him upon that account; a great many that were for him before, grew cold in his interest from the fear and hatred they had of his being restored by a French power.’³

Repeatedly throughout his career, James II displayed an incredible degree of self-delusion concerning the French and their intentions. What made James II’s decision in 1688 to throw himself into the arms of Louis XIV even more fatal was the suspicion which that monarch had long borne of him. After the Anglo-French alliance of 1670, Louis had harboured thoughts of marrying his

¹ University of Glasgow, Hunterian Collection, MS 3708, f. 18: G[eorge Morley], bishop of Winchester, to Clarendon, 6 November 1676, Farnham Castle. All letters written in Great Britain are dated Old Style; those written from the Continent are dated New Style, unless otherwise indicated.
² HMC Dartmouth 1, 289: Dartmouth’s account of his examination by the Privy Council, 14 July 1691.
³ BL Add. MSS 70,367, n.f.: Matthew Prior’s private journal, ‘a reflexion’ for May 1699.
only legitimate son, the dauphin, to the elder daughter of the Duke of York. Instead, in November 1677, James consented to the marriage of Lady Mary to her first cousin, William III of Orange, Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic and Louis XIV’s most intransigent enemy. The French court took umbrage: ‘it is certain the ministers and those of the council I converse with seem to consider that match as a thing done without any communication, counsel or consent asked or given from this side’, the English chargé d’affaires in Paris notified Whitehall. Louis XIV never entirely forgave James for this ‘betrayal’ and his discontent was well known in London: ‘Heere is a fable about the towne’, one newsy lady reported in April 1678, ‘that the King of France should break a jesyt of the Prince of Orange and Lady Mary of two beggars well mett, which they say gave great offense to the Duke of Yorke.’ To compound Louis’s anger, the Duke of York was prepared that spring to assume joint command of the allied armies in the Spanish Netherlands against the French.

Between 1678 and 1681, in order to divide England internally and weaken the government of Charles II, Louis XIV supported the opposition Whig party financially throughout the Popish Plot, while the Whigs were working to exclude the Duke of York from the succession to the throne on the grounds that he was a Roman Catholic. Nevertheless, James continued to believe that Louis XIV was his firm friend. In 1679–81, fearing that the English Parliament would push him to extremities, James contemplated raising Scotland and Ireland on his behalf, a scheme in which Louis (who wished to stir up all possible trouble in the British Isles) encouraged him. In 1683, Richard Graham, Lord Preston, Charles II’s last envoy to France and a close friend of James, lamented that ‘I am sorry that the Duke [of York] thinketh that France is firm to him. If I see anything, notwithstanding all promises, the old rancour against him

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5 HMC Fourteenth Report, App. ix, 387–9: John Brisbane to Danby, 27 November 1677, Paris: this discontent was confirmed by Brisbane’s further conversations with Honoré Courtin, newly returned from London where he had been French ambassador: ibid., 394: Brisbane to Danby, 9 July 1678, Paris.
6 HMC Rutland ii, 50: Grace, Lady Chaworth, to Lord Roos, 23 April 1678, London.
remaineth...I wonder that the practices about the bill of exclusion can so soon be forgotten, and other marks of kindness which he received from hence in his distress.'

From the beginning of James II’s reign, Louis XIV was suspicious of the new king’s protestations of pro-French feelings. Opinion at the French court was deeply divided as to whether James’s pro-Catholic policies were wise or precipitate. In April 1685, Louis XIV refused to continue to James the annual French subsidy which Charles II had received, and he later refused to provide financial aid during the Monmouth rebellion. After a display of unexpected national unity on his behalf and his easy victory over the rebels, James II became even more difficult from the French point of view. Paul Barillon, Louis’s resident in London, found James ‘less docile than the late King, and more headstrong on what are called the true interests and honour of England’. Not only was Louis suspicious of James’s continuing relationship with William III, but he was also irritated by James’s instructions to his envoys to act on behalf of the principality of Orange and of English Protestants residing in France, as well as James’s financial support of French Huguenot refugees arriving in England. By 1688, there was not only no Anglo-French alliance, but Louis also had the deepest suspicions both of James’s intentions and of his abilities.

Nothing happened during that year to change Louis’s opinion. The inconsistency and willingness to reverse his policy completely which James displayed in domestic affairs was repeated in his foreign policy. Two weeks before the birth of a Prince of Wales on 10/20 June, Louis warned Barillon that William III was arming a fleet, possibly for an invasion of England; Louis offered to send sixteen French ships to join the English fleet, an offer which James initially accepted, but he then changed his mind, seeing no possibility of a Dutch invasion. On 2/12 August, Louis again repeated his warning that James should prepare on land and sea for an invasion; at first, James seemed alarmed by the warning conveyed by Barillon, but by 20/30 August he had reverted and scarcely believed that his son-in-law would undertake such a

12 Paul de Noailles, duc de Noailles, Histoire de Madame de Maintenon (Paris, 1858), iv. 145. 154–5: Louis XIV to Paul Barillon, 6 April, 26 July 1685.
14 Grovestins, Histoire, v. 440, citing Louis XIV to Barillon, 27 May/7 June 1688.
Undeterred by the fact that James had twice rebuffed his offers of an alliance, on 2/12 September Louis XIV instructed his envoy at The Hague, the comte d’Avaux, to make a formal declaration to the States-General that Louis would regard an attack on England as an attack on France, and respond accordingly. To Louis’s chagrin, James angrily and publicly disavowed the French declaration and (suspecting his envoy to Versailles of complicity in arranging it) recalled Bevil Skelton, and threw him into the Tower. Even worse from the French point of view, after France began a siege of the imperial fortress at Phillipsburg on 17/27 September, James made a formal declaration at The Hague that this violated the Treaty of Ratisbon and that England, Spain and the Dutch Republic should unite in protest. In June and August, James had privately rejected offers of an Anglo-French alliance; in September he had publicly disavowed Louis’s friendship and had effectively suspended diplomatic relations by recalling and imprisoning his envoy; now, in October, he had made something tantamount to a declaration of war. Small wonder, then, that by 10/20 September Louis had abandoned all hope of saving James, speaking scathingly of his ‘foibesse’. Nevertheless, on 7/17 October Louis sent 300,000 livres for James’s use, but with instructions to Barillon to give James the money only if it appeared that he had a chance of winning.

William III and a force of approximately 15,000 soldiers landed at Torbay on 5/15 November and rapidly proceeded to establish a base at Exeter. James dispatched his army towards the West Country and, on 17/27 November, left London to join them at Salisbury. There he was deserted by his son-in-law, Prince George of Denmark; his trusted servant and protégé, John Lord Churchill; his nephew, the Duke of Grafton; the young Duke of Ormonde, and a large number of less prominent officers. The French court was astonished by

15 Ibid., 444.
16 Ibid., 442. Skelton was released and on 27 November OS as a sop to Protestant opinion was appointed lieutenant of the Tower immediately after James II’s return to London from Salisbury: HMC Dartmouth i, 281: Philip Musgrave to Dartmouth, 28 November 1688, London; cf. HMC Hastings ii, 197: J. Smithedy to Earl of Huntingdon, 27 November 1688, London; Edward Irving Carlyle, ‘Bevil Skelton’, Dictionary of National Biography, xviii, 325–6, gives 6 November 1688 as the date of appointment.
17 Noailles, Maintenon, iv, 197, 208–11; Camille Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire depuis la paix de Nimègue (Paris, 1862–63), iv, 103–4.
18 Noailles, Maintenon, iv, 199; Louis XIV to Barillon, 20 September 1688; cf. Grovestins, Histoire, v, 444–5, quoting Louis to Barillon, 30 September 1688.
19 Noailles, Maintenon, iv, 217.
the army desertions and the lack of support for James which they revealed.²⁰ During his return to London, James heard of the flight from Whitehall of his daughter, Princess Anne, news which seems to have ‘disordered his understanding’.²¹ From the moment of his return to the capital, the king’s only view was to save first his wife and son, and then himself.

On 9/10 December, the queen, Mary of Modena, and the Prince of Wales left Whitehall under cover of darkness; their guide and protector was Antonin Nompar de Caumont, comte de Lauzun. They arrived at Calais on 14/24 December, but so little confidence did the French court have in James II that initially the queen and the Prince of Wales were treated as hostages. The minister of war, François Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois, after consultations with Louis XIV, instructed de Béringhen, the premier ecuyer who had been sent to receive the queen, that despite any orders from James II to the contrary, the queen and the Prince of Wales were to be brought to Vincennes (which served as both a royal château and a prison). Louvois repeated these instructions to Lauzun the following day, urging that they be carried out ‘sous tous les pretextes les plus honnêtes que vous pourrez vous imaginer’.²²

On the night of 11/22 December, the same day his son-in-law Henry, Lord Waldegrave had his first audience of Louis XIV as James’s envoy extraordinary, James II fled the palace of Whitehall.²³ His first attempt to flee the country was foiled when he was apprehended by fishermen at Faversham in Kent, and he was eventually forced to return to London.

William III, who had advanced to Windsor, ordered James to retire to Rochester, accompanied by Dutch guards. William correctly anticipated that his father-in-law would make a second attempt to escape, which he did, landing near Gravelines on 25 December/5 January 1688/89.

From the time of James’s arrival in France, Louis XIV was to treat the exiled Stuarts with the utmost courtesy, immediately making the château

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²⁰ Marie Madeline de Motier, marquise de La Fayette, Mémoires de la Cour de France pour les années 1688 et 1689, ed. Gilbert Sageux (Paris, 1963), 132. This sense of astonishment is reflected in contemporary diary accounts, such as Sourches and Dangeau.

²¹ Edward Gregg, Queen Anne (London, 1980), 66, quoting Bevil Higgon [a noted Jacobite], A Short View of English History (London, 1731), 429.

²² Rousset, Louvois, iv, 151.

²³ Sourches, ii, 312–13: entry for 22 December 1688; Waldegrave, who in 1683 married Henrietta FitzJames, the king’s illegitimate daughter by Arabella Churchill, was appointed on 23 October 1688 OS and left London for Paris about 20 November, accompanied by Father Edward Petre, the king’s Jesuit confessor: Gary M. Bell, A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives, 1509–1688 (London, 1990), 125; HMC Le Fleming, 220: Newsletter of 20 November 1688, London.
of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (his own birthplace) available to them, furnishing it lavishly from the royal storehouses, and assigning the 'Jacobite' court an annual subsidy of 600,000 livres (approximately £50,000). Medals were struck depicting a beneficent Gallia receiving the British royal family, all depicting the magnanimous 'most Christian king'. In reality, however, Louis XIV and his court regarded 'cette royauté vagabonde' with more disdain than pity. On James II's arrival at Saint-Germain on 7 January 1689, the marquise de La Fayette commented: 'La figure du roi d'Angleterre n'avait pas imposé aux courtisans: ses discours firent moins d'égard que sa figure.' Louis XIV had almost no choice but to support James II against William III, not so much from personal or professional sympathy with a dethroned king as in the interests of the French state. It was clear that William III would now lead a powerful international alliance, while France would not have a single important ally. Louis's best hope was that civil war in the British Isles not only would weaken William there, but might also ultimately undermine his position in the Dutch Republic.

For his part, James II regarded himself as a martyr for his religion, and assumed that the Catholic princes of Europe would readily agree. He was quickly to be disabused of this idea. In early February 1689, he appointed the ubiquitous Bevil Skelton, who had joined him at Saint-Germain, as his envoy to Leopold I, the Holy Roman Emperor. In his appeal, James portrayed himself as a martyr for the faith, who had fallen victim to the unnatural ambitions of his son-in-law. Leopold refused to receive Skelton; in his reply, which addressed James merely as 'serene highness' rather than as 'majesty', the emperor retorted that James had brought his troubles upon himself, and that as an ally of France, he could hope for no aid from the house of Habsburg. Throughout the Spanish empire of Leopold's Habsburg cousin, Carlos II, the story was the same: 'the Spaniards in Messina', it was reported to

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26 La Fayette, *Mémoires*, 146.
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Paris, ‘sung the te deum for the prince of orang[e’s] coronation with the greatest solemnity imaginable’. The continuing hostility of the Habsburgs to Franco-Stuart pretensions was to prove crucial in influencing the attitudes of Catholic princes in both Germany and Italy.

Simultaneously, James II also turned to the pope, Innocent XI, despite his rocky relations with the Holy See. Far from endorsing James II’s policies as king, the pope had deplored them, fearing that they endangered the Roman Catholic community in Great Britain; James’s ill-judged appointment of the most famous cuckold in Europe, Roger Palmer, Earl of Castlemaine, as his first ambassador to Rome did little to enhance the king’s reputation there. Of overriding importance, however, was Innocent XI’s hatred and fear of Louis XIV and France, stemming from a series of disputes over government of the Gallican church and fear of French expansionism in the Italian peninsula. Lewis Innes, principal of the Scots College in Paris and one of the exiled court’s most important advisors, was warned from Rome: ‘assure yourself we would crucifie Christ again to be revenged of the French’. During his reign, James had largely ignored the advice (‘slow, calm, and moderate courses’) of the official cardinal-protector, Philip Howard (popularly known as Cardinal Norfolk), in preference for the counsels of his queen’s uncle and contemporary, Rinaldo, Cardinal d’Este; in November 1687, he had replaced Howard with d’Este as cardinal-protector. In January 1689, Father William Leslie, resident in Rome for forty years, predicted that ‘his Majestie may seeke help from this place, but sure will obtaine none’. In early February 1689, James selected his vice-chamberlain, Colonel James Porter, as his special envoy to plead his case in Croissy, 2 July 1689, Turin. In January 1690, Melfort informed James II that ‘the house of Austria . . . persecutes your Majesty’s interest with all ye ill nature imaginable, even to that degree as to print that abominable letter the Emperor sent last to your Majesty, in which he reflects on your conduct as the cause of your own misfortunes and this war’. BL Add. MSS 37,360, f. 59v: Melfort to James II, 17 January 1690, Rome.


SCA, bl. 1/129/9: Lorenzo Leslie to [Lewis Innes], 26 April 1689, Rome.

Gilbert Burnet, History of My Own Times (Oxford, 1833), iii, 78–9, quoting Cardinal Howard whom the future Anglican bishop met in Rome in the autumn of 1685.

Sir Henry Ellis, Original Letters Illustrative of English History third series, iv (London, 1846), 313: Sunderland to [John Caryll], 4/14 November 1687, Whitehall; SCA, bl. 1/115/5: James Lawrence Leslie to Charles Whyteford, 6 April 1688, Rome: ‘The Jesuits stryves to do him [Cardinal Howard] all the mischief and is alleged caused the King to take the title of protectour from him and give it to Cardinal d’Este which I asur you has mortified him’.

case in Rome, where he arrived on 28 February. Porter resided and conferred with d’Este.36 Despite a papal audience of three and a half hours, Porter came up against a stone wall: ‘On Saturday last [16 April] . . . parted from hence Collonel Porter, but without any help at all from his Holynesse for either our King or Catholikes, his H. alledging that he hass to doe with his mony to defend this estat against the French.’37 Porter left Rome leaving Cardinal d’Este as James II’s unofficial representative, but with 4000 crowns sent by Cardinal Howard.38

While contending with the indifference or barely concealed hostility of his fellow Catholic princes abroad, James also had to contend with the scepticism of the French court. The powerful Louvois was convinced that James had little or no support in England,39 his younger brother, Charles Maurice Le Tellier, archbishop of Rheims, openly ridiculed James ‘avec un ton ironique: “Voila un fort bon homme; il a quitté trois royaumes pour une messe”’.40 The foreign minister, Charles Colbert, marquis de Croissy, knew James from his earlier service as French ambassador to England, when he had predicted that the ‘zeal inflexible et precipite’ of the Duke of York would cause France great trouble.41 Indeed, of those closest to Louis XIV, only Jean Talon, secrétaire du cabinet from 1670 until his death in November 1694,42 and – much more importantly – Louis’s morganatic wife, Françoise d’Aubigné, marquise de Maintenon, were sympathetic to James. From the moment of her arrival in France, Mary of Modena shrewdly set out to cultivate this powerful and intelligent woman, and

36 Porter’s instructions of 4 February 1689 are found in Bodleian, Carte 209, ff. 11–16, and are printed in Charles Gréin, ‘Le Pape Innocent XI et la révolution anglaise de 1688’, Revue des Questions Historiques 14 (1876), 477. Porter’s mission is noted in a series of letters found in SCA, BL 1/123–6 passim.
37 SCA, BL 1/123/19: William Leslie to Charles Whyteford, 19 April 1689, Rome; in the same letter, Leslie described Porter as ‘a most reasonable, most capable, and most well enclined man’.
38 AAE, CP Angleterre 168, ff. 166–7; Melfort to Croissy, 7 May 1689, Dublin; BL Add. MSS 37,360, ff. 21v–22v; Melfort to Lewis Innes, 21 December 1689, Rome: in this letter, Melfort labelled Porter ‘a drunkend neglocator of affaires’.
39 HMC Seventh Report, 359: Letter from Paris [to Dykevelt], 20/30 December 1688: ‘Le Marquis de Louvois auroit dit . . . hier qu’il y avait trois partis en Angleterre sans qu’il en eust aucun pour le dit Roy [James], apparently referring to Whigs, Tories, and a third party headed by the Earl of Halifax.
40 La Fayette, Mémoires, 148.
41 Calendar of State Papers, Venice, xxxvii (1671–72), 226, fn. quoting Croissy’s letter to Louis XIV, 21 April 1672.
42 Talon was a longtime friend of Lewis Innes and the Scots College, and a financial supporter of Catholic missions in Britain: in August 1688 a priest in London had spoken of Talon’s ‘incomparable charitie and bountie towards us’: SCA, BL 1/111/4: Alexander Dunbar to Innes, 16 August 1688, London.
they were soon having private conferences. Although Maintenon frequently referred to the queen as 'cette sainte Reine', she shared the irritation of her husband’s ministers at what they regarded as the Jacobite court’s total lack of secrecy.

From the beginning, Versailles attempted to control Jacobite intrigue and diplomacy in so far as possible. Jacobite diplomats not only were subsidised by the French government, but were expected to confer with their French counterparts at their place of posting. In some cases, their primary energies were directed towards serving French rather than Stuart interests. Toby Bourke, who later served as James III’s ambassador to Madrid from 1705 to 1712, also acted as a secret agent for the French war minister, the marquis de Chamillart, for 6000 francs per annum. Rigorous censorship was imposed on any Jacobite publications printed in France. Postal surveillance of Saint-Germain’s correspondence was maintained, as was a strict rule that all aliens (including Jacobite agents) entering and leaving France had to have passes from Versailles. This requirement remained a continual problem: one Jacobite exile arriving at Calais on the Dover packet boat in May 1689 told the local commandant that ‘I intended too make my Court at St Germans’, an explanation which resulted in his confinement: ‘No English entering ye town without a pass from the King of France.’ Four months later, another agent reported to Lewis Innes from Calais that ‘Our Governour sais he can’t let me goe to Eng- land without a Passport, therefore I beg the continuance of your favour to Monsieur Tallon about it, that I may have it in readyness, tho’ I never use it.’ The problem only worsened as French distrust of the Jacobites grew; in 1691, James Porter, acting as James’s ‘ambassador’ to Versailles, complained that Croissy had given him only five passes ‘that least concerned my Master’s

43 Martin Haile, Queen Mary of Modena, Her Life and Letters (London, 1905), 245, quoting Rizzini to the Duke of Modena, 2 March 1689.
44 Miscellanies of the Philobiblon Society 13 (1871–72), 65: Mme de Maintenon to maréchal de Villeroy, 11 December 1716, Saint-Cyr. Emile Raunié (ed.), Souvenirs et correspondance de Mme de Caylus (Paris, 1889), 166–7. Mme de Caylus was Mme de Maintenon’s niece.  
45 Valentine Emmanuel Patrick, Marquis MacSwiney of Mashanaglass, Two Distinguished Irishmen in the Spanish Service. Sir Toby Bourke and Dr John Higgins (Dublin, 1939), 5–6. 
46 AAE, CP Angleterre 170, ff. 6–7: de la Reynie to Croissy, 6 February 1689, Paris, refusing to print a French version of a letter from Melfort which raised ‘une question odieuse’: that the ‘Pope can excommunicate or depose kings that are of another religion or contrary to the interests of his own religion.’ 
47 SCA, bl 1/122/1: Andrew Hay to Lewis Innes, 30 May 1689, Calais.
48 SCA, bl 1/128/1: [J.B. to Lewis Innes, 17 June 1689, Calais. 
49 SCA, bl 1/120/9, 11: R. Clerke to Lewis Innes, 9 August, 1 September 1689, Calais.
service . . . All the rest . . . were all positively refused.” The requirement to obtain French passes often hindered what the Jacobite court considered urgent business.

The greatest point of contention, however, between Versailles and Saint-Germain concerned the quality of Jacobite intelligence, especially from England. The propensity of the exile community to gross exaggeration of the slightest favourable news alarmed the French court. In the spring of 1689, Charles Whyteford, assistant principal of the Scots College in Paris and a lifelong associate of Lewis Innes, assured his Roman correspondent that ‘Sir John Fenwick, Sir Theophil Ogilthorp & several others are raising men in the North & declare for their true King . . . My Lord Preston, Lord Griffin, Collonel Graheme & many more are joyned to them . . . daily several, nay whole regiments flock to them . . . as for Scotland we heard that all unanimously are for the King.’ This Jacobite propensity for wishful thinking was to last throughout the Stuarts’ residence in France, much to the irritation of the court of Versailles. By the spring of 1689, Louis XIV was convinced that French intelligence from both England and Scotland was clearly superior to anything being received by the court of Saint-Germain.

Most distressing to the French court, however, was the fact that very few men of ability – and even fewer Protestants – had joined James II in exile. The most prominent Protestant was Sir Edward Herbert, whose brother Arthur had commanded William III’s fleet in 1688. Herbert, as lord chief justice of the king’s bench, had endorsed the dispensing power in *Godden v. Hales* (1686) and had subsequently served on the illegal ecclesiastical commission. As a Protestant, however, he was never fully trusted by James and was never a member of the inner councils of Saint-Germain. The outstanding figure

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52 Westminster Diocesan Archives (WDA), London, Browne MSS, f. 201: James Porter to [Henry Browne], 1 April [1691], Mons; cf. f. 75: Sir James Geraldine to Sir Edward Hales, 16 March 1691, Dunkirk.
53 BL Add. MSS 37,611, f. 169: Melfort to James Scott, 15 December 1692, complaining that it sometimes took eight days to obtain passes.
54 SCA, BL i/126/15, 16: Charles Whyteford to William Leslie, 28 March, 4 April 1689, Paris. Whyteford displayed a blind faith that Louis XIV would restore James II against all odds and all enemies.
55 Sourches, xi, 269–70, entry for 14 February 1709 with news at Saint-Germain that Queen Anne was dead ‘mais souvent les nouvelles de cette cour-là n’étoient pas trop certaines’.
57 When Herbert (created titular Earl of Portland in 1692) died in November 1698, Matthew Prior, secretary of the British embassy, recorded: ‘they [the Jacobite court] pretend to be sorry for his death, though they despised and neglected him when alive, for he remained a Protestant, so
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at Saint-Germain-en-Laye was John Drummond, Earl of Melfort. With his elder brother, James Drummond, Earl of Perth, Melfort had converted to Roman Catholicism soon after James II’s accession in 1685 and subsequently Perth and Melfort – as lord chancellor and secretary of state respectively – had established a virtual condominium over Scotland. Melfort, because of his office, was primarily resident in London and consequently participated in James’s English councils as well. Eight days before James II first attempted to escape, Melfort fled London on 3/13 December (‘and has they say abundance of money with him’) and landed at Ambleteuse on 6/16 December.56 Melfort immediately notified his friend, Father Lewis Innes (who had met Melfort both in London and in Scotland) of his arrival; Innes in turn promptly wrote to Jean Talon and, on the morning of 10/20 December, the secrétaire du cabinet personally informed Louis XIV (who was still in bed) of Melfort’s arrival.57 Initially, the French welcomed Melfort: as the only obvious candidate they endorsed James II’s decision to make him his principal minister in exile. As Louis XIV later recorded, even though the English, the Scots and the Irish seemed united in their hatred of Melfort, in the early spring of 1689 he seemed better suited than anyone else to give James II good advice.58 Versailles’s goodwill soon evaporated. Not only was Melfort insatiably ambitious, but he was also excessively suspicious and vindictive towards his enemies, real and supposed. Even James II admitted that Melfort ‘avoit deux deffauts essentiels aux Escossois, qui sont d’estre fort colleres, et extremement jaloux de la moindre chose’.59 Finally, Melfort zealously pursued those policies which he knew best appealed to his master, and was absolutely opposed to James II making any concessions whatsoever towards his rebellious subjects: ‘God Almighty forbid that the King be restored by Composition with the People’ was his motto60 and it was his authorship of James II’s uncompromising declaration to the Convention of the Estates of Scotland in April 1689 which

none of his services were held meritorious, and his good works went for nothing for want of faith’. HMC Bath iii, 285: Prior to James Vernon, 8 November 1698, Paris.
57 SCA, bl. 1/118/12: Talon to [Lewis Innes], 20 December 1688, Versailles.
58 D’Avaux, 166–7: Louis XIV to d’Avaux, 16 March 1689, Versailles. Louis’s favourable opinion of Melfort was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that Melfort had been virtually alone among James II’s advisors in urging the king to flee to France: AAE, CP Angleterne 170, ff. 15–16: Lewis Innes to [Croissy], 13 March 1689, Paris.
59 Ibid., 437: d’Avaux to Croissy, 30 August 1689 NS, Dublin, quoting James II.
60 BL Add. MSS 37,360, f. 74v–75: Melfort to Queen Mary, 24 January 1690, Rome.
destroyed what small hope there was for a peaceful restoration in the northern
kingdom.61

To the French, the first logical move seemed to be an invasion of Ireland,
where James’s lord-lieutenant, Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnell, had man-
aged to maintain his government and his dominion over most of the island.
Louis had earlier toyed with the idea of French intervention there with a view
to making Ireland a satellite state;62 if a Stuart restoration was impossible
in Great Britain, as seemed probable, a permanent Franco-Jacobite presence
in Ireland would hinder British participation in a continental war against
France. James II, encouraged by Melfort, argued for an immediate invasion
of either Scotland or England. Like the Stuarts before and after, James re-
garded the Celtic kingdoms as merely stepping stones to the great prize, the
English throne. He was totally uninterested in Ireland. Louvois, with the rest
of Louis XIV’s ministers, was adamantly opposed to any attack on Scotland
or England until Ireland had been completely secured, warning Melfort that
a precipitate invasion could lose James all three kingdoms.63 ‘To demonstrate
the importance he attached to the campaign, Louis XIV appointed one of
his most accomplished diplomats, Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux
(who had just completed nine years at The Hague, the diplomatic centre
of Europe) as his ambassador-extraordinary to accompany James to Ireland,
providing d’Avaux with 500,000 livres to finance the effort. Louvois, who
was suspicious of James’s abilities and was convinced that the expedition
could be conducted on the cheap, sent only ‘des plus mediocres officiers
des troupes du Roi’.64 James could barely conceal ‘his disappointment of
men, money, and arms from the French king’.65 Madame de La Fayette con-
cluded that the departure of James II for Ireland did not leave Louis XIV
with any great hopes of seeing him restored to his throne. James had quickly
been summed up by the French for what he had become: ‘c’est a dire un
homme entêté de sa religion, abandonné d’une maniere extraordinaire aux
jesuites. Ce n’eut pas eté pourtant son plus grand défaut à l’égard de la Cour;

62 HMC Seventh Report, 337: Preston to Halifax, 20 September 1682, Paris; ‘I believe this King [Louis
XIV] would be very glad to possess himself of a country [Ireland] so advantageously situated for
his designs, but whether or no he will endeavour to do it so hastily is what is to be considered.’
63 Rousset, Louvois, iv, 192: Louvois to Melfort, 13 April 1689.
64 La Fayette, Mémores, 158.
65 HMC Eighth Report, App. ii, 399: Architel Gray to Sir Philip Gell, 28 February 1689, London,
relaying intelligence reports from Brest.
mais il estoit faible, et supportut plutot ses malheurs par insensibilité que par courage.

The expedition began badly. Even before departing Brest on 7/17 March 1689, d’Avaux complained to Croissy of James’s inability to keep secrets, and his propensity to speak of everything to everyone. During the voyage, d’Avaux found James disorientated, plagued by irresolution and changing his mind constantly, not always for the better. ‘Il s’arreste aussi beaucoup à des petites choses, ou il emploie tout son temps et passe légèrement sur les plus essentielles.’

From the beginning, the Irish campaign proved a débâcle, not least because from the beginning James II was convinced the expedition was a folly. D’Avaux’s instructions were to do everything to promote religious reconciliation between Irish Protestants and Catholics; instead, James presided over an overwhelmingly Catholic parliament in Dublin, whose anti-Protestant legislation was manna from heaven for Williamite propagandists in London. In England, it was claimed that ‘All things in Ireland are governed by the French Ambassador, as if Ireland were the French King’s, and King James under him.’ In reality, d’Avaux’s position could hardly have been more difficult. He found himself refereeing continual struggles between the Irish nationalists, led by Richard Talbot, newly created Duke of Tyrconnell, and James II’s English and Scottish advisors, headed by Melfort. Because French objectives were closer to those of the native Irish, d’Avaux naturally sympathised with Tyrconnell, while Melfort continually fed James II’s ‘strange jealousy’ of the French, shamelessly flattering the king by assuring him that he was so well loved by his subjects that he needed only to appear somewhere in England or Scotland to make them lay down their arms.

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66 La Fayette, Mémoires, 161.
68 D’Avaux, 23–5; d’Avaux to Louis XIV, 23 March 1689, Kinsale.
69 Ibid., 379: d’Avaux to Louis XIV, 14 August 1689, Dublin, quoting James II.
71 HMC Fifth Report, 345: Charles Thompson [surgeon-general of Ireland] to Henry Gascoigne [secretary of the Duke of Ormonde], 9 April 1689, Chester; cf. HMC Ormonde, new series, viii, 18–19: Thompson to Gascoigne, 13 April 1689, Chester: ‘Ireland is put into French Government, and it is believed given to that King. Everything is ordered by the Count d’Avaux, and all the revenue in the possession of the French, and French officers expected daily to take possession of the army.’
72 D’Avaux, 104–5, 109–13; d’Avaux to Louis XIV, 27 April, 6 May 1689.
d’Avaux with a memorandum urging an immediate invasion of Scotland or England, based not on particular assurances of support there, but on a general confidence that James’s subjects loved him: ‘I well believe there are many of them who have been duped by the Prince of Orange and are discontented with his conduct, but I do not know if that suffices to dare to count on them’, d’Avaux sensibly commented.73 By the end of June, even James was lamenting Melfort’s lack of ability and had decided to replace him. In d’Avaux’s opinion, the decision came none too soon: Melfort, he reported to Louvois on 10 July, was hated by everyone, especially by the despairing French commander, General Rosen, who complained ‘qu’il ne lui étoit possible de pratiquer avec un homme qui n’avoir ni foi ni parole et qui ne dit pas un mot de vrai’.74

By this time, Louis XIV and his ministers had lost what little hopes they may have had for Jacobite success in Ireland. As early as 13 June, Louvois had noted darkly that if James II was driven from Ireland, ‘il ne rentrera jamais en Angleterre’.75 He was soon seconded by Louis XIV, who on 20 July informed d’Avaux that James II’s irresolution on all important matters had ruined his chances of retaining Ireland.76 As he had done in 1688, James II refused to believe Louis XIV’s warning that the English were preparing for an invasion of Ireland, and in early August was thunderstruck by news from Chester that maréchal de Schomberg was there with an army of 20,000 men, preparing to embark.77 On 22 August, the day James II left Dublin for Drogheda to head the army against Schomberg, Melfort left Dublin, having been assured by James II’s confessor that a cabal of Tyrconnell and other Irish officers intended to assassinate him.78

Melfort, who sailed as James II’s official envoy to the court of France,79 returned to Saint-Germain in September 1689 to discover that Mary of Modena had assumed an importance which she had never had before the Revolution. In light of her husband’s lethargy and his physical absence from France, the queen, with virtually no experience, had assumed the central political role in the court of Saint-Germain, one which she was to maintain for the

73 Ibid., 136: d’Avaux to Louis XIV, 16 May 1689, Dublin.
74 Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, iv, 206–7: d’Avaux to Louvois, 10 July 1689.
75 Ibid., 203–4: Louvois to d’Avaux, 13 June 1689, Versailles.
77 Ibid., 350–1: d’Avaux to Louis XIV, 9 August 1689, Dublin.
78 For Melfort’s departure. National Library of Scotland (NLS), Edinburgh, MSS 14,226; Journal of David Nairne, introduction; Nairne was Melfort’s secretary. For the assassination plot, D’Avaux, 507–14: d’Avaux to Croissy, 21 October 1689, Ardee.
remainder of her husband’s life and her son’s regency. The queen exercised considerable influence with Louis XIV (always susceptible to feminine appeals) and Madame de Maintenon, but unfortunately she was vulnerable to political adventurers, particularly to Melfort and the comte de Lauzun to whom she attributed her safe escape from England. After James II’s departure for Ireland, Lauzun had advised the queen to press Louis XIV to have control of the war taken out of Louvois’s hands and placed in those of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Seignelay, the naval minister. Well aware of the tenor of d’Avaux’s dispatches concerning her husband, she increasingly welcomed Lauzun’s insinuations that his presence in Ireland, rather than that of d’Avaux, would soon rectify matters. Tyrconnell, among others, warned the queen that Lauzun’s appointment would offend all career officers in Ireland, that Lauzun was a bitter enemy of Louvois, ‘and Mons. De Louvois is soe too, which I fear will cost us dear, for if that man be against us, what can we expect from thence but delays if not denayalls?’ Having consented to petition her husband for Melfort’s recall, Mary managed to extract Louis’s reluctant agreement to reinforce James II. Against his better judgement, in September Louis promised that by December he would send an additional 6000 French infantry, and 7000 or 8000 arms and other supplies, for which he asked in return for 6000 Irish recruits. Louvois, in notifying d’Avaux that Lauzun would replace Rosen, spoke of ‘la douleur avec laquelle le Roy voit les mauvaises mesures que l’on a prises au pays où vous estes, et l’apparence qu’il y a qu’on en va voir des fruits bien amers’.

The French were furious with James II’s reluctance to part with his Irish troops, but in November 1689 both d’Avaux and Rosen were formally recalled to France. D’Avaux responded with a long letter of bitter complaints of James II’s irresolution, his inability to administer, and – above all – his unwillingness to hear bad news.

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81 Latian Tate (ed.), *Letter Book of Richard Talbot*, *Analecta Hibernica* 4 (Dublin, 1932), 101: Tyrconnell to Queen Mary, 20 October 1689 NS, Camp at Ardes; for ministerial hatred of Lauzun, see La Fayette, *Mémoires*, 141.
84 D’Avaux, 585: Louvois to d’Avaux, 11 November 1689, Versailles.
By the end of the year, Schomberg’s army had managed to occupy virtually all of Ulster and thus acquired a springboard for the next year’s campaign. Incredibly, however, James II continued to press the French for an immediate invasion of England, making it the touchstone of French sincerity. From Ireland, Tyrconnell opined that if France did not immediately transport James II to England, where conditions appeared so favourable, ‘I . . . must conclude we are only destined to serve a present turne, and att last be a sacrifice to our enemies.’ On 22 October, after his return from Ireland, Melfort had a long conference with Louvois to explain why the time was ripe for an invasion of England, but Louvois proved evasive. Seignelay was even more adverse to the prospect of hazarding the French fleet than Louvois. Louis XIV proved reluctant to risk the loss of his fleet against those of the combined Maritime Powers. Louis repeatedly refused James’s demands that an invasion be launched from Ireland, convinced that those who thus advised James were inspired by William III, who wished James to make a fatal mistake. James II was equally convinced that the French ministers had been consistently wrong in their assessments of English affairs.

By April 1690, Louvois was predicting privately to Louis XIV that if God did not perform a miracle in favour of James II, ‘I fear the Prince of Orange will conquer Ireland much more easily than he imagines.’

Lauzun, whose instructions were to avoid battle and to fatigue the enemy, arrived in Ireland in mid-May 1690 (a month before William III) with 7380 French troops. He promptly informed Louvois that James II’s court ‘is a chaos similar to that in Genesis before the creation of the world’. Lauzun soon denounced James’s principal advisors as anti-French, and even before the Franco-Jacobite army met that of William III, both he and Tyrconnell realised that defeat was inevitable.

The battle of the Boyne, so crucial to Ireland’s future, was fought on 1/11 July 1690; in reality, it was less a battle than a rout of an ill-trained, poorly supplied Franco-Jacobite force. James II, to the lasting disgust of the French, fled the field of battle, returning to Dublin where he only spent three hours,
and on 3/13 July sailed from Kinsale to Brest. To the local intendant who greeted him there, James did not appear at all concerned at the disastrous state of his affairs: ‘le roi d’Angleterre paroit aussi insensible au mauvais etat de ses affaires, que si elles ne le regardaient point; il raconte ce qu’il sait en riant et sans aucune alteration’. James also assured him that the English people were entirely for him: ‘Ce pauvre prince croit que ses sujets l’aiment encore!’ Maréchal de Luxembourg aptly summarised the attitude of the French king and court: ‘Those who love the King of England should be very happy to see him in safety’, he told Louvois, ‘but those who love his gloire will much deplore the personage he made.’

Incredibly, immediately after his return to Saint-Germain, while Lauzun and Tyrconnell were struggling to extricate themselves from the mess he had left behind in Ireland, James appealed to Louis to launch an immediate invasion of England with 10,000 infantry and 2000 horse and dragoons, claiming improbably that public opinion there was overwhelmingly in his favour. Louis XIV’s refusal was peremptory: he demanded that a Jacobite rebellion in England should be underway before France undertook any invasion. ‘On ne croit pas icy un mot de tout ce que nous disons’, Queen Mary complained bitterly to Lauzun, ‘et on n’a voulu escouter aucune de nos propositions pour faire une descente en Angleterre devant que le Prince d’Orange y retourne’. For the next year, the Jacobite court was to find its proposals routinely rejected by Versailles.

Instead, Saint-Germain looked to Rome for aid, both financial and diplomatic. Innocent XI, so fiercely anti-French, had died on 12 August 1689, and the election of his successor, Alexander VIII, on 6 October served as a plausible excuse to send Melfort into another sort of political exile. Like subsequent representatives to Rome, Melfort was in French pay and subject to French

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93 Grovestins, Histoire, vi, 231: M. Foucault to [?Louvois?], 25 July 1690, Caen.
94 Rouset, Louvois, iv, 423: Luxembourg to Louvois, 25 July 1690.
95 A.W. Thibaudeau (ed.), Catalogue of the Collection of Autograph Letters and Historical Documents formed . . . by Alfred Morrison, first series, 1 (London, 1883), 332–3: James II to duc de Lauzun, 10 August 1690, Saint-Germain (hereafter cited as Thibaudeau, Morrison Collection). Thomas Bruce, Earl of Ailesbury and a leading English Jacobite, agreed that if a French army had been sent to England in the summer of 1690, it would have been successful (Memoirs of Thomas, Earl of Ailesbury (Roxburghe Club, London, 1890), 257–8); however, other evidence suggests that the overwhelming loyalty of the public lay with the government: HMC Fitzherbert, 27–8: Sir John Elwell to Sir George Treby, 21, 23, 28 July 1690 OS, Exeter.
97 Thibaudeau, Morrison Collection, first series, iv (London, 1890), 164: Mary of Modena to duc de Lauzun, 13 August 1690, Saint-Germain.
orders. Melfort reported not only to Croissy, but also corresponded with Louvois, Seignelay and Talon and frequently consulted the French ambassador, the duc de Chaunes. Melfort, who had no greater wish than to return to Saint-Germain at the first opportunity and realising the new-found political importance of Queen Mary, did everything in his power to cultivate her uncle, Cardinal d’Esté. On his arrival in Rome in December 1689, Melfort absolutely refused to be accompanied to his papal audience by Cardinal Howard, and was later chagrined to discover that Alexander VIII (like Innocent XI before him) treated the latter as though he were still Protector of England rather than d’Esté. Melfort’s hostility to Cardinal Howard may have stemmed in part from his instructions from Croissy, that while d’Esté had been faithful to James II’s interests, Howard had been lukewarm and, more importantly, had opposed French interests at Rome.

Melfort quickly discovered that the Austrian interest in Rome was, if anything, stronger under the new pope than under the old. His instructions were to gain papal influence with Catholic princes on James II’s behalf, as well as to secure financial assistance for the Irish campaign, which Alexander VIII had already refused to d’Esté: ‘if he should give it to ye King, the Emperor & family of Austria would look upon it as an indirect helping of France’. Melfort was no more successful: in his first audience of the pope on 19 December, he was met with a flat refusal of money, and the assertion that peace was impossible at that time. The pontiff ignored not only Stuart appeals on great matters, but their claims on small ones as well (Melfort was particularly disturbed when Alexander VIII made his nephew, Cardinal Ottoboni, Grand Prior of Ireland without consulting James II, who was still in that kingdom).

On the question of money, the pope later relented, giving a total of 30,000

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99 See Melfort’s letter books for this embassy. BL Add. MSS 37,360 and BL, Lansdowne 1163 a, b & c passim. Even before his departure from Saint-Germain, Louvois predicted that Melfort’s embassy would end in failure: BL Add. MSS 37,360, f. 96: Melfort to Louvois, 31 January 1690, Rome.

100 BL Add. MSS 37,360, f. 14: Melfort to Cardinal d’Esté, 17 December 1689, Rome; BL, Lansdowne 1163a, ff. 22v–24: Melfort to Queen Mary, 14 March 1690, Rome.


102 BL Add. MSS 37,360, f. 5: Melfort to Queen Mary, 13 December 1689, Rome.

103 ibid., ff. 15–18: Melfort’s speech to Alexander VIII, 19 December 1689; ff. 18v–21: Melfort to Queen Mary, 21 December 1689, Rome.

crows (partly in March, partly in July 1690) for the relief of specific English, Scottish and Irish Catholics named by the papacy, hardly the munificent papal bounty routinely described by Williamite propagandists. Melfort also noted that no cardinal, apart from Howard and d’Este, volunteered to give any money to James II. ‘I am doing all I can here, and that to no great purpose’, Melfort informed James II’s Jesuit confessor, ‘the hearts here are harder than marble’.

As early as February 1690, Melfort asked to be recalled, but the continued hostility of the French ministers (especially Louvois) was such that the queen found it impossible. Melfort was bitterly disappointed when he was not summoned back upon James II’s return to France, and in October 1690 appealed to both the king and the queen to secure his return, again without result. In November, Melfort complained that France failed to pay him regularly because the ministers were convinced his stay in Rome was useless; and one sympathetic observer noted of Melfort and his wife that ‘as to their own table it is rather the table of a poor Religious man than of a King’s minister’. As Father William Leslie of the Scots College, Rome, noted: ‘All the help that wee have gotten, is a number of faire and bonnie Words, well trimmed compliments, Wishes, protestations of earnest desyrs of our good and prosperitie . . . Which all in true and plaine language is to say, We will not help you, and we would willingly wish you should be so simple as to beeleeve, that we cannot help you, and that wee doe well not to help you.’

French resistance to his recall and the death of Alexander VIII on 1 February 1691 served to keep Melfort in Rome. The new pope, Innocent XII, was not elected until 12 July, and at the end of that month Melfort’s lettre de congé was dispatched from Saint-Germain. When Melfort left Rome at the beginning

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105 BL, Lansdowne 11658, ff. 96v–97: Melfort to Queen Mary, 22 July 1690; f. 126v: Melfort to Father Anthony Lucas, 12 August 1690, Rome.

106 Ibid., f. 11: Melfort to Father John Warner, 6 June 1690, Rome.


108 BL Add. MSS 37,160, f. 110: Melfort to Queen Mary, 14 February 1690, Rome.

109 BL, Lansdowne 11638, f. 132: Melfort to Innes, 26 August 1690; Lansdowne 1163c, ff. 84v–86: Melfort to Innes, 28 October 1690, Rome.

110 BL, Lansdowne 1163c, ff. 105–7: Melfort to Innes, 11 November 1690, Rome.


112 SCA, BL 1/131/116: William Leslie to [Lewis Innes], 18 November 1690, Rome.

113 BL Add. MSS 37,662, f. 40: Melfort to Henry Browne, 3 March 1691, Rome.
of September 1691, the prospects for French support of a direct invasion of England appeared to have improved immensely.\footnote{Bodleian, Carte 181, f. 426: James II to Innocent XII, 30 July 1691, Saint-Germain; BL Add. MSS 37,622, f. 269v: Melfort to Henry Browne, 4 September 1691, Rome.}

After James II’s ignominious return from Ireland in July 1690 the French court – beneath the veneer of formal courtesy – had treated him with profound indifference, and began to drop hints abroad that they ‘would be glad of a peace, and that the interests of the late King James should be no obstruction to it.’\footnote{BL, Lansdowne 1163c, ff. 7v–8: Melfort to Lewis Innes, 2 September 1690, Rome: ‘There are stories which show me that ye King has many unfriends [sic] at ye Court of France.’ HMC Finch 1, 438: Nottingham to Sir Robert Southwell, 30 August 1690 NS, Whitehall, citing a reported conversation between Croissy and the Venetian envoy in Paris; HMC Downshire 2, 368: Nottingham to Sir William Trumbull, 13 February 1691, The Hague: ‘It is certain that France has...insinuated its desire of a peace and to a degree as to hint also that (notwithstanding the pretended kindness to the late King) the interest of their Majesties should be no obstruction to it.’} Although James and Mary joined the French court in September for its annual excursion to Fontainebleau, an accompanying English courtier complained there was ‘all this while not a word of England or anything that looked like thinking wee deserved ever to goe back’.\footnote{BL Add. MSS 37,622, f. 4v: Col. Robert Fielding to Henry Browne, 19 October 1690, Paris; cf. HMC Hastings 11, 219: P. Barchman to Earl of Huntingdon, 8 August 1690 OS, London: ‘King James diverts himself with hunting and good meat and drink, and leaves the King of France to study how he shall get his three Kingdoms again.’} James II was particularly hurt by Louis XIV’s refusal to allow him to accompany the French king to the siege of Mons in the spring of 1691.\footnote{Lord Acton (ed.), ‘Letters of James the Second to the Abbot of La Trappe’, Miscellanies of the Philobiblon Society 14 (1872–76), 9: James II to abbé de la Trappe, 26 March 1691, Saint-Germain.} In part, French disdain sprang from the universal conviction that the court of Saint-Germain was rife with spies, particularly when the English government was successful in apprehending a number of Jacobite agents: even Melfort reflected that it was ‘most scandalous that no man goes from St Germains but is taken, this is such a misfortune that I am tempted freely to believe foul play’.\footnote{BL, Lansdowne 1163b, f. 44v: Melfort to Lewis Innes, 1 July 1690, Rome. Even Madame de Maintenon believed that Mary of Modena was surrounded by spies: Raunié, Souvenirs...de Mme de Caylus, 166–7. Many English Jacobites were convinced that the court of Saint-Germain ‘had many pensioners to England amongst them’ and ‘swarms of spies’: Ailesbury Memoirs, 275, 316.} James II was particularly hurt by Louis XIV’s refusal to allow him to accompany the French king to the siege of Mons in the spring of 1691.\footnote{In 1693, the assistant principal of the Scots College in Paris assured his Roman correspondent that ‘Our court at St Germins imitat that at Versailles, that is, not a word of newes is spoken there, if this method had been kept from ye beginning, things would have been better.’ SCA, Bl. 1/168/11: [Charles Whyteford] to Walter Lorenzo Leslie, 4 May 1693 [Scots College, Paris].} To compound matters, the Stuart court was notoriously indiscreet.\footnote{In 1693, the assistant principal of the Scots College in Paris assured his Roman correspondent that ‘Our court at St Germins imitat that at Versailles, that is, not a word of newes is spoken there, if this method had been kept from ye beginning, things would have been better.’ SCA, Bl. 1/168/11: [Charles Whyteford] to Walter Lorenzo Leslie, 4 May 1693 [Scots College, Paris].} Furthermore, the French