How do pictures represent? In this book Robert Hopkins casts new light on an ancient question by connecting it to issues in the philosophies of mind and perception. He starts by describing several striking features of picturing that demand explanation. These features strongly suggest that our experience of pictures is central to the way they represent, and Hopkins characterizes that experience as one of resemblance in a particular respect. He deals convincingly with the objections traditionally assumed to be fatal to resemblance views, and shows how his own account is uniquely well placed to explain picturing's key features. His discussion engages in detail with issues concerning perception in general, including how to describe phenomena that have long puzzled philosophers and psychologists, and the book concludes with an attempt to see what a proper understanding of picturing can tell us about that deeply mysterious phenomenon, the visual imagination.

Robert Hopkins is lecturer in philosophy at the University of Birmingham. He has published a number of articles in journals including Philosophical Review, Mind and Philosophical Quarterly.
Picture, Image and Experience
A Philosophical Inquiry
Robert Hopkins
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For Marion
1  The question

1 Introduction

How do pictures represent? Consider for a moment Picasso's Guernica (figure 1). It is a large flat surface covered with paint, broken by differing areas of colour into angular shards of blue-grey, brown and black. This surface has a history, having been painted in 1937 in response to the German bombing of the Basque town; and a location, now residing, after many years of controversy, in Madrid. In these respects - having a distinctive composition, history and location - it is like many objects of the sort which fill our world. Unlike many others, however, the painting also represents. It is a powerful evocation of a terrible event. It shows a scene of suffering, carnage and mutilation, scattered with the bodies of man and beast alike. Thus there are two aspects to the picture's nature. It is on the one hand a material object, on the other a representation. One way to present our problem is to ask how one thing can fill both these roles. How can a paint-covered surface represent other objects and scenes at all?

We can ask a parallel question about language. A written description of a scene is on the one hand a set of marks on a surface, and on the other a representation of absent objects and events. Here too we may wonder how one item is able to play both roles. Yet there is a difference between the two cases. We may begin to suspect this if we note some obvious contrasts between examples of the two. A written description has to be read in a certain order, but the eye is free to roam over a picture without confusing the viewer. The colour of the marks rarely matters to what a description says, but often affects what a picture represents. The relative location of different bits of the picture dictates the spatial relations between the objects they stand for, but the same does not seem true for the words in the description, not at least in any very direct way. And one might go on.

These differences suggest that pictures and words represent in different ways, that the form of representation involved is different in the two cases.

Thus one way to reformulate the question with which we began is this. What is pictorial representation? What is the form of representation which
Figure 1. Pablo Picasso, Guernica
pictures display, and how does it differ from representation in language? Much of this book will be spent trying to understand this form of representation, which I shall for variety’s sake consider under several names – ‘pictorial representation’, ‘depiction’ and ‘picturing’.

Now, we will get nowhere with this issue unless we immediately take note of something. It is that pictures themselves represent in a variety of ways. I do not mean by this that pictorial representation may itself fragment into a largely disparate collection of subspecies. That may indeed be so; but if it is, it should be a conclusion of our enquiry, not a preliminary to it. Rather, I mean that pictorial representation may be only one of several forms which pictures exhibit. An example helps make this suggestion more plausible.

Many pictures from the religious art of the West represent the Holy Spirit by depicting a dove. I suggest that there is not one form of representation here, but two. The dove is depicted, but the Holy Spirit is represented in some other way. After all, the Spirit is only represented by virtue of the fact that the dove is, but the converse is not true. This suggests that the representation of the Holy Spirit is a more complex, more derived phenomenon than the representation of the dove. Further, a description of the scene which mentioned a dove might represent the presence of the Holy Spirit in a similarly derived manner. This provides at least some reason for thinking that the description and the picture represent the Spirit in the same way, a way that will not therefore be distinctively pictorial. In contrast, they represent the dove in very different ways, and the difference is precisely that between pictorial and linguistic representation.

If pictures can represent in several different ways, we will never be clear about pictorial representation unless we take care not to confuse it with those other forms. We must, then, be prepared first to isolate depiction and then to attempt to understand it. Before we engage in either task for ourselves, however, we should see what answers to our question are already available.

2 Resemblance

There is a natural thought with which to begin consideration of these matters, and which has appealed to many. It is that depiction is intimately connected to resemblance. Pictures, the thought runs, look like or resemble what they represent. A photograph of someone resembles that person, and an oil painting of a well-groomed horse looks like a horse. In contrast, written descriptions of these things, whatever tongue they are in, do not resemble them. For how could a series of
letters on a page resemble a flesh-and-blood person or stallion? Here, then, is the crucial difference between representation by pictures and by words: the former depends on resemblance and the latter does not. Here, indeed, is the essence of depiction: one thing depicts another only if the first resembles the second.

Attractive as this idea may seem, it has been subject to copious and powerful criticism. From this onslaught three problems emerge as sufficiently difficult to require tackling by any serious version of the resemblance view. I will briefly expound each.

Before I can outline the first problem, we must consider the logical framework on which the fabric of depiction rests. Some depiction is depiction of a particular item. For example, Elisabeth Vigée-Lebrun’s Portrait of Countess Golovine (figure 2) depicts that woman, the eighteenth-century Russian aristocrat. However, not every picture depicts a particular. Although Guernica depicts a mother weeping over her dead child, there is no particular woman represented here. Pictures such as this depict some, but no particular, thing with certain properties – in this case the property of being a woman, being a mother, being wracked by grief, holding a child and so on. However, if we leave matters at that we implicitly exaggerate the differences between the two sorts of picture. For even those pictures which do depict particular things must depict them as having certain properties. The Vigée-Lebrun portrait, for example, depicts the Countess as alert, as holding her shawl to her chest in a striking way, as wearing a distinctive scarf in her tousled hair. Vigée-Lebrun did not have to attribute these properties to the Countess – she might have depicted her without her shawl, dozing peacefully. But what she could not do was to depict Golovine without attributing any properties to her. Thus the distinction we want is really between pictures representing some set of properties, though not some particular which possesses them; and pictures representing some set of properties as possessed by a particular thing.

Against this background we may formulate the first problem for the resemblance view. It is that it seems only to cope with the depiction of particulars. The problem is that resemblance is a relation between two particulars – one resembling the other. It is hard to know how to make sense of resemblance between a particular thing and some, but no
particular, item of a certain sort – a horse, say. For resemblance is presumably a matter of shared properties – A resembles B provided both have a certain property F. Yet only what exists has properties, and thus can share them with anything else. Since there are no horses which are not particular horses, there are no properties enjoyed by some, but no particular, horse. So there can be no resemblance between a picture and such a horse, and thus no prospect for understanding the depiction of a (no particular) horse in terms of resemblance. It seems that what we have here is at best a way of understanding some depiction, not even the beginnings of an account of it all.

The second problem strikes at the heart of the resemblance view. The view is motivated by intuitions that particular pictures do indeed resemble what they depict, but there is reason to doubt that any such intuition is sound. Resemblance must be resemblance in certain respects. If two things resemble, they must do so in respect of some property or other, perhaps in respect of many. Unfortunately, when we ask in what respect picture and object resemble, it is easier to find difference than likeness. Consider a case as likely to motivate the view as any, that of a photograph of someone. Picture and person are not the same shape, and need not be the same colour (the photograph might be black and white). It is hard to suggest that the two resemble in texture, and while patterns of light and dark might here be shared, they would not be in the case of an outline pencil sketch of the person. Moreover, photograph and person are clearly made of different materials, and are patently different in their capacities and proclivities – the latter being, for example, animate and mobile, the former not. In short, for any respect on which we alight, resemblance is lacking and difference is plentiful. Thus we must question the intuition from which we began. Unless we can say something about the points of similarity, we must abandon the idea that there are any.

The third problem consolidates the attack begun by the second. The latter undermined the idea that any intuition concerning resemblance is sound. The former suggests that for some pictures it is not even initially tempting to say that they resemble what they depict. What drives the resemblance view is consideration of photographs and other realistic depictions. But the range of pictures is far wider than that, and so also is the range of depiction itself. Is it even superficially plausible that

\[\text{What of depiction of fictional entities, such as Pegasus? The problem is just as acute here, since again there is no possession of properties to sustain resemblance. For it is not the case that Pegasus has properties, though it is fictional that he does. However, the depiction of fictional entities is both complex and parasitic upon non-fictional depiction. In what follows, I will not be offering an account of fictive depiction, although I hope that what I do say could provide the basis for such an account.}\]
Figure 2  Elisabeth Vigée-Lebrun, Countess Golovine

resemblance holds between picture and object in the case of caricatures, or stick figure drawings, or even of post-cubist pictures such as Guernica? These depict, but do not, apparently, resemble what they depict. Unless these examples can be accommodated, resemblance can provide at best the core of realistic depiction, not of picturing itself.
3 Goodman

One way to react to these difficulties would be to reject, not simply the resemblance view, but the attitude to depiction which it embodies. Resemblance draws the contrast between pictorial and linguistic representation very sharply, the one turning on resemblance, and therefore on some relation which might be thought to hold independently of human contrivance; the other presumably depending on conventions, deriving its power to represent entirely from our decisions and practices. Perhaps instead picturing is no less conventional than describing, but simply exploits different conventions. The problem this presents is to say what is special about the conventions governing depiction. The finest exponent of this approach is Nelson Goodman.  

Goodman begins by developing the means to describe many different forms of representation. The fundamental notion is that of the symbol system. A symbol system consists of a set of characters correlated with a field of reference. Characters are ways of grouping marks on surfaces. Thus the following three marks fall into two groups: a a d. The first two both fall into the group constituted by inscriptions of the first letter of the Roman alphabet, the third falls into the group consisting of inscriptions of its fourth letter. A set of characters is just that – the Roman alphabet provides one example, its first eight letters provide another. A field of reference is a set of items the characters refer to – the notes of the musical octave, or the stars, for instance. Combining a set of characters with a field of reference yields a symbol system. Examples are the names for the notes of the octave, or, at a higher level of complexity, written English.

What is special about symbol systems which are pictorial? Goodman identifies three features which are important. First, such systems are syntactically dense. That is, they ‘provide for infinitely many characters so ordered that between any two there is a third’ (1969 iv, p. 2). Second, they are semantically dense. The field of reference of the characters is so ordered that between any two referents there is a third (1969 iv, p. 5). Finally, they are relatively replete – a relatively wide range of properties of the mark affect which character it inscribes (1969 vi, p. 1). Roughly, what all this amounts to is the following. Pictorial systems are ones in which, for a wide range of properties of the mark on the surface, the tiniest differences in that property matter to what is represented. For any such difference may alter which character the mark inscribes, and thus which item in the field of reference is being represented. Thus the precise colour of a patch of paint

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4 See Goodman 1969 and, for some minor clarifications and revisions, Goodman and Elgin 1988, chapter 8. For some of the widespread discussion of this view, see Wollheim 1977; Schier 1986, chapter 1, section 6; Peacocke 1987; Walton 1990, chapter 8, passim.
on the surface of a portrait may affect exactly what colour the sitter’s coat is represented as being. In contrast, the exact shape of the marks on a page of script is irrelevant to what they describe – provided that the words remain the same, we could change the style of script without altering its meaning.

Now, an example shows that Goodman’s conditions cannot be sufficient for depiction. We might use a graph to track the temperature of a quantity of colourless gas over time. With time elapsed along the x-axis, various features of the plotted line might feed, in a weighted manner, into the temperature represented. These features might include the line’s height against the y-axis, its thickness, its hue, its saturation, its brightness, and so on. The graph would be a symbol in a system which is both syntactically and semantically dense, and relatively replete. Yet, as has been noted by those who offer such examples, it would not depict anything.

This claim would not by itself alarm Goodman. He accepts that he has not defined depiction. His claim is instead that the three features he describes are all exhibited by pictorial systems, and that they are not all exhibited by those which represent linguistically. So although depiction has not been defined, it has been differentiated from description (1988 viii, section 5). However, I think that the modesty of Goodman’s ambitions may not entirely dispense with the unease the gas example created. For the graph seems, as it were, very distant from depiction; the way it represents seems at best only peripherally related to the way that pictures do. Since the graph has all the features Goodman identifies as distinctive of depiction, we may wonder whether he has provided what we were looking for. After all, we did not merely want to separate depiction from description, but to understand the nature of the former. The example encourages the idea that Goodman’s view somehow fails to do this. However, this can remain only an unfocussed anxiety until the next chapter, where we will find out more about depiction.

4 Experiential accounts

One source of worry about Goodman’s account might be that it takes insufficient account of the visual nature of picturing. Goodman does not require that symbols in pictorial systems be seen, and certainly does not insist that the things they represent be visible – as the gas graph demonstrates. Yet it seems no accident that there are no spoken pictures, the way that a description can be spoken as well as written; and that

5 I have adapted this example from Peacocke 1987, p. 405.
pictures seem especially suited to representing the visible world. Thus in some way depiction seems bound to the visual, although this thought certainly needs clarifying. One way to do that is to claim that depiction essentially involves a special visual experience on the part of the viewer. What might this option amount to, and what could its justification be?

Sometimes, when you look at a picture, you do not at first see what it depicts. You can see the patterned surface before you, and can see quite clearly what marks lie where. You may even be able to tell that something is depicted, from the obvious care with which the surface has been marked, but not what is. Then, in a moment, the way you see the surface is transformed. You can now see, let us suppose, that the picture is of a horse, that the strange shaped lump that had puzzled you depicts its head, those straggly lines of colour its legs, and so forth. It need not be that you now see any of those marks as lying differently from how they seemed to before. You need not think that you previously mistook or overlooked the position of some mark. It is simply that you now see the marks as organized in a particular way.

There seem to be two different experiences here, one preceding understanding the picture, the other accompanying it. The thought behind the approach to depiction we are now considering is that every picture admits of an experience akin to this latter experience. Moreover, the idea is that this second sort of experience holds the key to depiction. If we can discover what is special about it, in particular how it differs from the ‘before’ experience, then, the thought runs, we can analyse picturing. I call this the experiential approach to the topic. Its claims will seem more plausible if we make some further observations about the ‘after’ experience.

Let us follow common practice and dub this experience seeing-in, since it is both convenient and natural to describe you as seeing a horse in the picture.\(^6\) There are four features of seeing-in which are of immediate relevance.

First, seeing-in is an experience with a distinctive phenomenology. By this I mean that there is something it is like to have that experience, and that what it is like to have it differs from what it is like to have other experiences. One crucial difference in this respect is with the ‘before’ experience above, since the move from that to seeing-in involves a change in phenomenology. But there are other important contrasts too, and in fact they fall into two groups. On the one hand, seeing a horse in the picture differs from visual experiences of other kinds. It differs, in its

\(^6\) ‘Seeing-in’ is Wollheim’s term, at least in his later writings (cf. 1980, supplementary essay v). Its use is now widespread, and I follow custom in using it without adopting Wollheim’s own account of the experience.
phenomenology, from failing to see a horse therein, but also from the experience of seeing a horse in the flesh, or the experience of visualizing a horse. So seeing-in is a special kind of experience, one marked out by what it is like to have it. On the other hand, particular experiences of seeing-in also differ from one another in this way. To see a horse in a picture is to have an experience with a different phenomenology from seeing a donkey, a man or anything else therein.

Second, seeing-in is an experience whose content somehow includes the picture's object. That is, it is in some way experience as of something other than the picture - in this case a horse. The thought (or some such) of a horse enters your experience of the picture.

Third, despite the last point, seeing-in remains a way of seeing the picture. It is not merely an experience induced and sustained by exposure to the patterned surface. That would be all that was involved in, for example, a case where seeing a familiar picture sends you into reverie, a series of vivid visualizings of past or fantasized events. In seeing-in, in contrast, the patterned surface is seen to be before you. Seeing-in is in important part an experience which represents the surface of the picture - as is shown by the crucial fact that it represents it as organized in a special way.

The second and third features are connected to the first. That the phenomenology of seeing-in differs from that of other types of experience is due both to the thought of an absent object and to the awareness of the marked surface before one. The former is not necessarily present in ordinary seeing, i.e. seeing something in the flesh; nor in seeing a picture without seeing anything in it. The latter does not hold for visualizing something. Furthermore, differences between specific experiences of seeing-in also turn on these two features. In fact, if one such experience differs phenomenologically from another, it is either because it involves the thought of a different absent object (a cow, rather than a horse, perhaps); or because it involves an awareness of a differently marked surface (e.g. of an etching rather than the oil painting it copies); or both.

Fourth, seeing-in is an integrated whole. The thought of an absent object and the awareness of the marked surface before one are both present, but not in such a way as to fragment the experience. To see the point here, consider another example. Suppose that while looking at a castle you visualize a horse. This complex experience lacks a feature I want to ascribe to seeing-in. It is a whole composed of two clear parts - the seeing and the visualizing. Each component could occur in isolation from the other - you might have seen the castle without visualizing the horse, or vice versa. Had either component occurred singly, its phenomenology would be just as it is in the case where it occurs with the other. Thus what
we have here is at most an experience formed by the simple concatenation of two elements, and perhaps only the co-occurrence of two different experiences. In seeing-in, by contrast, there are no elements which can be torn from the whole without doing violence to them. If either the thought of the absent object or the awareness of the marked surface occurred in isolation, the phenomenology of each would be different. Thus the experience cannot be broken down into elements which could stand alone.

These four features of seeing-in help us make sense of the experiential approach to depiction. The idea is that every depiction may be experienced in this distinctive way. The resulting experience will be an integral whole, with its own distinctive phenomenology. It will owe that phenomenology to the fact that it is a way of seeing the picture, but also that it somehow involves the thought of something else, the picture's object. Pictures sustain such experiences, and they depict by virtue of sustaining them. Moreover, the precise nature of the experience determines what each picture depicts. If it sustains an experience permeated by the thought of a horse, it depicts a horse. If it sustains one permeated by the thought of the Countess Golovine, it depicts the Countess. Thus we have the beginnings of an account of what picturing is, and of what is required to depict one thing rather than another.

However, there are only the beginnings of such an account here. For one thing, what is in many ways the crucial feature, the second, remains hopelessly vague. I presented it as the claim that experience of the picture somehow involves the thought, or some such, of something else. This is really only the sketch of a claim. Until we have been told more about what is involved in the experience, and the nature of its involvement, it is far from clear what the second feature amounts to. For another thing, as matters stand it is not obvious that the four features suffice to distinguish seeing-in from other experiences. Consider, for example, that of seeing a horse through a dirty window pane. Here there is awareness of a 'patterned' surface, and of a second thing (the horse), producing an experience which has a distinctive phenomenology and is a phenomenally integrated whole. Yet clearly this is not the same experience as seeing-in. For, to mention just one important difference, seeing the horse through the marks on the window is not to see them as organized in a special way.

The upshot is that we need to say more. We need a characterization of seeing-in, something to take us beyond the four features above. And we need that characterization to help clarify the second feature, the nature of the involvement of the absent object in the experience. And this means that there will be several different views which embody the experiential approach. For the four features take us to the boundaries of the territory
within which agreement is to be found. From now on all will be controversy and discord.\footnote{For accounts of seeing-in other than those discussed below, cf. Schier 1986, chapter 10; Peacocke 1987; Budd 1993.}

It is helpful to begin with the simplest account of these matters. That is to suggest that pictures are experienced in exactly the same way as their objects. In other words, when you see a horse in the picture, your experience is identical, in its phenomenal nature, to the experience you have when you see a horse in the flesh. Note that this view makes no claims about the beliefs to which seeing-in gives rise. In particular, it does not claim that you are led to believe that a horse is before you when you see the picture. I will call this position the illusionist view.\footnote{Although I do not know of anyone who has held a position as strong as the one here described, there are many who are tempted to try and weaken it. Cf. Gombrich 1977.}

Illusionism is a useful position to bear in mind when thinking about depiction, as I hope will become clear as we proceed. Its utility is, however, somewhat surprising in the light of the obvious fact that the view is false. It is simply untrue that looking at a picture is just like looking at the picture’s object. This is plain for pictures which are not realistic – caricatures, pencil sketches, cave paintings, and the like. But it is also true of almost all other pictures too. For if illusionism were right, seeing-in would not have the third feature identified above. Seeing something in a picture would not then be a way of seeing the picture, but merely a matter of having an experience induced and sustained by exposure to the picture’s surface. For as we have defined the view, it does not allow the experience to represent the picture as before the viewer at all. If it did so, it could hardly match in phenomenology the experience of seeing a horse in the flesh, an experience for which there is no painted surface to be seen, and which in no way represents the environment as containing such a surface.\footnote{Are there any pictures we see in the way the illusionist describes? It is certainly the goal of trompe l’oeil painting to generate that experience, and no doubt that goal is attainable, although probably only if the picture is seen in rather special circumstances. However, if the third feature is right, this illusionist experience is not seeing-in.}

A more promising line is offered by Richard Wollheim.\footnote{Wollheim’s view has altered over the years in both substance (compare his 1980 with 1987) and terminology (compare the text of his 1980 with its supplementary essay vi). I discuss the latest, and best, version.} In his view, the primary feature of seeing-in is what he calls ‘two-foldness’, the property of being a single experience comprised of two ‘distinguishable but also inseparable’ aspects (1987, p. 46). One aspect, the ‘configurational’, is analogous to the experience of seeing the picture without seeing anything in it. The other, ‘recognitional’, aspect is analogous to seeing the picture’s object face-to-face.
It is clear what role two-foldness is to play. It allows Wollheim to accommodate the second and third features of seeing-in, that its content somehow involves the picture’s object, and that it represents the picture’s surface. Seeing a horse in the flesh clearly involves awareness of a horse. Equally, seeing the picture without understanding it clearly involves experience of its surface. So if seeing a horse in the picture involves elements analogous to each of these two experiences, it will both somehow involve a horse and include awareness of the picture.

However, we might wonder whether this way of accommodating the two features is satisfactory. For one thing, it looks like it might repeat the errors of the illusionist view. It would do so if it claimed that one fold in seeing-in were phenomenally identical to seeing, for example, a horse in the flesh. For those pictures for which illusionism was not at all plausible—caricatures, pencil sketches, and the like, do not seem better suited even to the weaker claim that part of the experience matches that of seeing the picture’s object. Certainly, as I argued in discussing the fourth feature, there is no part of the experience which can simply be excised from the whole; yet if some part matched ordinary visual experience of the object, that would surely prove separable in just that illicit way. Perhaps this merely shows that we should not understand Wollheim’s ‘analogous’ as ‘phenomenally identical’. But if not, how are we to take it?

Wollheim anticipates this objection, and builds into his account a response to it. He makes it clear that the two aspects are to be analogous to their corresponding experiences in a way that does not involve their being phenomenally identical to them. Moreover, it is a mistake to ask in what way either fold is analogous to the relevant experience:

We get lost once we start comparing the phenomenology of our perception of the boy when we see him in the [surface], or the phenomenology of our perception of the [surface] when we see the boy in it, with that of our perception of the boy or [surface] seen face-to-face . . . . The particular complexity that one kind of experience has and the other lacks makes their phenomenology incommensurate.

Unfortunately this line is not one we are able to accept. Above we rejected illusionism as fundamentally implausible. That left us needing an alternative way to understand seeing-in. Wollheim now enters, confirming that it would be wrong to do this by identifying any part of seeing-in with seeing face-to-face, but refusing to offer an alternative. This is not in the least informative. It does not answer our earlier question about the way in which the notion of a horse enters the experience of seeing one in a picture. For all we are told is that some element in seeing-in is somehow analogous to seeing a horse. Equally, since all we are told about the other element is...
that it is somehow analogous to ‘before’ experience of the picture, we are no wiser in trying to incorporate the third feature of seeing-in.

Now, all this caution might be tolerable were Wollheim’s reason for it a good one. The reason we are offered is that the complexity of seeing-in as a whole renders the phenomenology of the two folds ‘incommensurate’ with that of their analogues. Unfortunately, it is not clear why this should be. After all, the complexity of the whole is just that, a feature of the complete experience. Why should it affect our ability to grasp the nature of one of the components of that complex whole?11 True, I myself have argued that seeing-in’s integrated nature means that it does not break down into separable independent components. But it does not follow from this that we should see it as composed of elements which are indescribable. Perhaps we should understand it as a whole, rather than attempting to identify strands in it which cannot be teased apart from the rest. Since Wollheim just ignores this possibility, his caution begins to look like defeatism.

One view which does attempt to say more about seeing-in is Kendall Walton’s.12 He makes use of the attractive idea that seeing-in involves the visual imagination. The appeal to imagination is what enables Walton to accommodate seeing-in’s second feature, the involvement of the absent object: in seeing a horse in a picture, one imagines seeing a horse. But one does this by virtue of seeing the picture, and hence the third feature, awareness of the marked surface. Now, simply imagining one thing while seeing another will not produce an experience with the distinctive, and integrated, phenomenology of seeing-in, as was demonstrated by the case of visualizing a horse while looking at a castle. So Walton adds the final requirement that one is to imagine of one’s seeing the picture that it is one’s seeing the horse (1990, p. 293).

One might wonder whether this final requirement is up to the job. Visualizing a horse is an experience with its own distinctive phenomenology. So is seeing a marked surface as before one. How can these two combine to form an integrated whole?13 There are really two problems here. First, how is there room, as it were, in a single experience for two elements each of which has a phenomenology sufficiently rich to constitute an experience in its own right? Combining two such elements in the castle case merely produced a composite experience. How is the experience described by Walton better placed? In the case of the castle integration would not be achieved if the subject acquired the belief that her seeing the castle caused her to imagine seeing a horse. Why should it

11 This and many other incisive criticisms of Wollheim’s view are made in Budd 1992.
13 Walton stresses that seeing-in is indeed integrated (1990, p. 295).
be any more help, in the case of the picture, for her to imagine seeing the marks to be her seeing the horse? Second, if the two elements are to be integrated, they presumably must be transformed in the process. If not, the resulting experience must be composite as the experience of the castle was, and as seeing-in is not. But if the elements are transformed in their union, what is their phenomenology once changed? Unless Walton can say something about them in their altered state, he has not succeeded in characterizing seeing-in in terms of its phenomenology, as he hoped to do; rather, he has at most characterized it in terms of the resources which go into it.

However, these difficulties only hold if we take Walton to be saying that seeing-in involves a particular sort of imagining, visualizing. For visualizing has a distinctive phenomenology of its own, and this generates the problems above. But there are other sorts of imagining to which Walton might appeal; imagining has propositional, as well as experiential, forms. Walton himself notes that imagining covers many different sorts of activity (1990, pp. 13, 43), and considers the difficulty of distinguishing propositional imagining from merely entertaining a proposition (pp. 19-20). Perhaps, then, we would do better to take the imaginative seeing which, on his account, seeing-in involves to be something other than visualizing. There seems no reason to deny that one can imagine, in these other ways, seeing something, and since other forms of imagining lack the rich phenomenology of visualizing, we might thereby hope to avoid the problems encountered above. Better still, when challenged to clarify his position on seeing-in, Walton suggests that he may indeed intend something other than visualizing (1991, pp. 423-27).

Unfortunately, this second reading of the view faces troubles of its own. The account now certainly avoids the difficulty of capturing the fourth feature of pictorial experience, that is the difficulty of integrating the imagining and the seeing. The trouble now is from the first feature, providing an experience which is phenomenologically distinctive at all.

To see this, consider the making of an episode of Star Trek. The cast are rehearsing a scene in which the covers on a window on the ship’s bridge are pulled back to reveal the inert wreck of a friendly spacecraft. All they see is a plain blue screen, onto which film of a model of the ruined hulk will later be projected. Finding the actors’ performances unusually wooden, the director tells them to concentrate on imagining their reaction to the sight as it is unveiled. He explicitly instructs them to imagine that, as the covers are slowly pulled back, their seeing this bit of the screen is their catching sight of the ship’s engines, their seeing that bit their making out

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14 For much more on this phenomenology, see chapter 7 below.
what remains of the hull, and so on. It seems to me that in obeying the
director’s instructions the cast will meet all the conditions imposed by the
second reading above. But they will surely not see a spacecraft in the
screen. They simply continue to see a plain blue, undifferentiated surface.
Thus this second version of Walton’s view is also in trouble. At least this
time the analysans does not have features inconsistent with the analysan-
dum, but the analysis offered does seem to be insufficient.¹⁵

Thus neither Walton’s view nor any of the others discussed above is free
from difficulties. On the other hand, none is entirely without appeal. What
is needed now is some way of structuring the debate between these various
positions, to allow us to weigh the merits of each. That structure is what
the next chapter is intended to provide.

¹⁵ Walton mentions two other requirements on seeing-in to which he might appeal here. He
states that for seeing-in to occur the games of imagination played with the surface must be
sufficiently rich and sufficiently vivid (1990, p. 296). Richness amounts to there being a
wide range of visual actions such that the viewer really performs that action on the picture
and imaginatively performs it on the object depicted. I do not see that this will help deflect
the Star Trek example. As for vividness, it is hard to make sense of in the context of
imagining which is not visualizing.