The Cambridge Companion to

OCKHAM

Edited by

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PAUL VINCENT SPADE

Introduction

Standard histories have long recognized that the three most important figures in the philosophy of the High Middle Ages were Thomas Aquinas (1224/5–74), John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308), and William of Ockham (c. 1288–1347).[1] Of the three, Aquinas is comparatively well known to modern readers, whereas Scotus and Ockham largely remain mere names.

Even Aquinas, however, is more foreign to students than Plato and Aristotle are, much less Descartes or Hume. Indeed, as Kretzmann and Stump have observed in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*,[2] such unfamiliarity is characteristic of all medieval philosophy.[3] This sad fact is partly due to the scarcity of translations but more fundamentally to the lack of reliable modern editions of primary texts and thus of good critical analyses and studies of them in the secondary literature.

The situation does not arise from any lack of raw materials but instead, it might be argued, from just the opposite. There are many early printed editions from the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and an enormous number of surviving manuscripts of medieval philosophy and theology. But the early editions are often unreliable, whereas the manuscripts frequently present wildly different versions of the same work. They are written in a highly compressed and arcane system of abbreviation, a kind of shorthand that requires special training to read; early printed editions often retain the same system. Frequently the manuscripts are incompletely cataloged or not cataloged at all, and thus their contents are discovered only by chance.

In such circumstances, it is a complicated and painstaking business to produce a reliable, modern edition of a philosophical text, and without such editions there can of course be no useful translations or

critical studies. It is no wonder, therefore, that even a major philosopher like Ockham remains largely unknown to modern readers.

Nevertheless, the situation has improved dramatically in recent decades. New and excellent editions of many works and authors have appeared. Ockham in particular has benefited, and we are now in a position to begin to appreciate and assess more confidently his true place in the history of philosophy. This development was made possible by the publication, between 1967 and 1988, of the first modern critical editions of all Ockham's philosophical and theological writings. The speedy completion of this enormous task by Gedeon Gál and his colleagues at the Franciscan Institute is one of the most impressive achievements of modern textual scholarship.[4] Ockham's political writings, which occupied him almost without pause from 1328 until his death in 1347, have likewise now all been critically edited with the exception of *Dial.*, which is in progress.[5]

With these editions, new and reliable translations have begun to appear. Although a much smaller portion of Ockham's work has been translated than, say, Aquinas's, a surprising amount is available in English, including several works in their entirety.[6] Likewise, there is now enough good secondary literature that curious readers can get a thorough grounding in all aspects of Ockham's thought. The most important secondary literature may be found by consulting the chapter notes and the Bibliography at the end of this volume, but the following sources in particular deserve special mention:

(1) For Ockham's philosophy and theology, with the exception of ethics and political theory, the indispensable starting point is Adams 1987a. There is no other work that studies a single medieval philosopher in such breadth and depth. Much briefer, but extremely clear and useful, is Chapter 3 of the introduction to Wood 1997. That chapter includes a discussion of Ockham's ethics as well. Indeed, it offers readers of the present volume an excellent orientation to Ockham's thought generally.

(2) For Ockham's ethics, Freppert 1988 is a good starting point, as is Adams 1986. The translation and commentary in Wood 1997 are superb.

(3) For Ockham's political philosophy, the best single study is undoubtedly McGrade 1974b.

I. OCKHAM'S LIFE AND REPUTATION

Ockham's life was full of controversy. Although his philosophical and theological views were not in themselves especially radical, they generated considerable opposition even while he was still in his thirties.[7] In 1324 he was summoned to the papal court, then in Avignon, to answer charges of heresy. The pope then, John XXII, was engaged in controversy with the Franciscan order, to which Ockham belonged, over the notion of "apostolic poverty" – that is, over whether Jesus and the apostles owned property and had property rights, and therefore over whether the Franciscans' renunciation of all property could be regarded as an "imitation of Christ." On instructions from Michael of Cesena, the Franciscans' minister general, Ockham reviewed the situation and concluded that the pope was in heresy and so had ipso facto renounced his office.[8] In 1328 Ockham fled Avignon with the minister general and ended up in Munich, living out the rest of his life under the protection of Louis of Bavaria, the Holy Roman Emperor. It was during this time that Ockham composed most of his political writings, challenging the claims of John XXII and his successor, Benedict XII. Ockham died, excommunicated, in 1347.[9] So effective was he as a polemicist that at one point the pope threatened to burn down the city of Tournai if it failed to capture him and turn him over![10]

After such a contentious life, it is little wonder that the Franciscans failed to champion his cause, as they did for their confrere John Duns Scotus, or as the Dominicans did for their own Thomas Aquinas. There was never an Ockhamist "school" of philosophy as there was a Thomist or a Scotist school.[11] Indeed, well into this century, Ockham's name continued to carry the faint odor of disreputability and scandal in certain quarters.

Not surprisingly, this reputation sometimes led to Ockham's being cast, depending on a particular writer's sympathies, either in the role of the great destroyer of the medieval worldview or in the role of a herald of the new, modern era. David Knowles has summarized the situation aptly as follows:

> Neglected in his turn for centuries, save as a bogy to scare young Thomists, he was re-discovered as an historical figure by the students of medieval

thought who, followers as they were of Thomas or Duns, regarded him as Apollyon, the grand deceiver and destroyer who ruined the fabric of the golden age of medieval thought. Others again, in more recent years, have seen in him one of the great creators, one of that group of contemporaries in whose writings Cartesian philosophy, anti-papal reform, modern science and the secular state can be seen in embryonic form.[12]

Fortunately, recent scholarship permits a more realistic assessment of Ockham's position in medieval thought. Although it is true that he contributed to, and was part of, the intellectual and social transformations taking place in fourteenth-century Europe, he did not originate them, cannot bear sole responsibility for them (whether credit or blame), and did not even approve of all of them. In fact, the true situation is far more complex, as the essays in this volume show.

Beginning in the 1970s, English-speaking philosophers of a broadly "analytic" training came to regard Ockham as a kindred spirit. This development was prompted by the realization that Ockham and certain other medieval thinkers were not only sophisticated logicians and philosophers of language but had also – like twentieth-century analytic philosophy – applied their logical techniques and skills to a wide variety of philosophical problems.[13] Medieval philosophy, or at least certain parts of it, had suddenly become "legitimate."

No doubt much of Ockham's thinking is genuinely similar to recent analytic philosophical work; it would be foolish to deny it.[14] But it is equally foolish to view Ockham, or any past philosopher, *solely* through a present-day lens.[15] That approach, by filtering out what is unfamiliar, guarantees in advance that we never really learn anything new from the history of philosophy. Ideally, what should happen is that readers will use what seems already familiar in Ockham as a pathway to probe more deeply into his thought and into medieval thought generally, thereby encountering and coming to appreciate problems, techniques, and perspectives that had perhaps never occurred to them previously or that they had never found reason to take seriously before.

II. A CONSPECTUS OF OCKHAM'S WRITINGS

Ockham's writings are conventionally divided into two groups: academic and political works. Except for items 33–4 listed in Section II.1.3, this corresponds to a chronological division into works written

before Ockham fled Avignon in 1328 and those written afterwards. I here list all Ockham's works, with the best Latin editions and English translations. (The translations are not always based on the most recent editions.) Earlier translations of some items are listed in Beckmann 1992. For each item, the Latin title (and, where appropriate, the abbreviation used in this volume) is followed by a translation of that title. Works are listed in the order in which they are printed in the critical editions.[16]

II.1. *Academic Writings*

The academic writings are published in a modern critical Latin edition, Ockham 1967–88, in two series: *Opera theologica* (OTh, 10 vols., 1967–86) and *Opera philosophica* (OPh, 7 vols., 1974–88).

II.1.1. THEOLOGICAL WORKS

1. *In libros Sententiarum* = *Sent.* (*Commentary on the Sentences*). Book I (*Scriptum*, completed shortly after July 1318). Books II–IV (*Reportatio*, 1317–18). Students progressing toward a degree in theology were required to lecture on the four books of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, a standard textbook of the time. Ockham's lectures survive in two versions. For Book I we possess an *ordinatio* or *scriptum* – a text corrected, revised, and approved for dissemination by the author himself. For Books II–IV, we have only a *reportatio*. Unlike a *scriptum*, a *reportatio* is a transcript of actual lectures, taken down by a "reporter." Such *reportationes* are more reliable than modern-day students' "lecture notes" but have not had the benefit of the lecturer's careful revisions and corrections.[17] Ockham's *Scriptum* is divided into several "questions" on Lombard's Prologue and on each of the "distinctions" into which Book I of Lombard's *Sentences* is divided. The three books of the *Reportatio* dispense with "distinctions" (although Lombard has them) and are divided directly into "questions." The edition is distributed over OTh I–VII as follows: OTh I (I. Prol.–1.6); OTh II (I.2.1–3.10); OTh III (I.4. 1–18.1); OTh IV (I.19.1–48.1); OTh V (II); OTh VI (III); OTh VII (IV). Translations: Boehner 1990, 18–25 (from I.Prol.1); Bosley and Tweedale 1997, 335–8, 419–25 (from I.2.3); Spade 1994,

114–231 (I.2.4–8, complete); Boehner 1990, 102–6 (from I.2.9); MacDonald and Pasnau forthcoming (I.27.3); Hyman and Walsh 1983, 679–86 (from I.30.1); Boehner 1990, 133–5 (from I.38), reprinted in Schoedinger 1996, 218–19; Adams and Kretzmann 1983, 80–95 (I.38–9, complete), I.38 reprinted in Bosley and Tweedale 1997, 301–7; Bosley and Tweedale 1997, 78–83 (from I.42), 83–9 (from I.43.1–2); Wippel and Wolter 1969, 447–54 (I.43.2, complete); Bosley and Tweedale 1997, 89–91 (from I.44); Hyman and Walsh 1983, 670–9 (from II.12–13),[18] 689 (from III.4).[19] The passage in Hyman and Walsh 1983, 693–700, described as from III.12, is in fact from item 18 listed in this section.

Two questions (dates unknown) that may be extracts or adaptations of parts of the lost *Reportatio* on Book I of the *Sentences*:

2. *De necessitate caritatis* (*On the Need for Charity*), OTh VIII. 3–27.
3. *Utrum anima sit subiectum scientiae* (*Is the Soul the Subject of Science?*), OTh VIII.28–55.

Three disputed questions, dates unknown:

4. *De aeternitate mundi* (*On the Eternity of the World*), OTh VIII. 59–97. Translation: Bosley and Tweedale 1997, 231–44.
5. *De causalitate finis = De fine* (*On Final Causality*), OTh VIII. 98–154.
6. *De intellectu agente* (*On the Agent Intellect*), OTh VIII.155–91.

Miscellaneous notes, discussions of doubtful points, statements of views (dates unknown except as noted):

7. *De locutione angelorum* (*On the Speech of Angels*), OTh VIII. 195–206. Dated after the *Reportatio*.
8. *Quid totum addit super partes* (*What a Whole Adds to the Parts*), OTh VIII.207–19.
9. *Discursus de peccato originali* (*Discourse on Original Sin*), OTh VIII.220–4. Consists of three brief notes, "*De peccato originali*" ("*On Original Sin*"), "*De necessitate absoluta gratiae*" ("*On the Absolute Need for Grace*"), and "*De speculo et obiecto*" ("*On the Mirror and Its Object*").
10. *De peccato originali in Beata Virgine* (*On Original Sin in the Blessed Virgin*), OTh VIII.224–7.
11. *De nugatione* (*On Nugation*), OTh VIII.228–33.

12. *De univocatione entis* (*On the Univocation of Being*), OTh VIII. 233–7.
13. *De intellectu possibili secundum Averroem* (*On the Possible Intellect According to Averroes*), OTh VIII.237–43. Before *Reportatio* IV.4.
14. *De donis spiritus sancti* (*On the Gifts of the Holy Spirit*), OTh VIII.243–50.
15. *Circa delectationes et dolores* (*On Pleasures and Pains*), OTh VIII.251–72. After the *Reportatio* but before item 18.
16. *Circa virtutes et vitia* (*On Virtues and Vices*), OTh VIII.272–86. After the *Reportatio* but before item 18.
17. *Dubitationes addititiae* (*Additional Doubtful Points*), OTh VIII. 286–320. Five discussions: "*Utrum caritas habeat aliquam causalitatem respectu actus meritorii*" ("Does Charity Have Any Causality with Respect to a Meritorious Act?"), "*Quomodo de potentia dei absoluta aliquis ex puris naturalibus posset esse acceptus deo sine aliquo absoluto*" ("How, by God's Absolute Power, Could Someone on the Basis of His Purely Natural [Powers] Be Accepted by God Without Anything Absolute [Added]?"), "*In quo consistit perfecta delectatio et quietatio potentiae beatae*" ("What Do the Perfect Delight and Repose of a Blessed Power Consist in?"), "*An dilectio et delectatio distinguantur* ("Are Love and Delight Distinguished?"), "*Utrum actus exterior habeat propriam bonitatem*" ("Does an Exterior Act Have Its Own Goodness?"). Probably after item 18.
18. *De connexione virtutum* = *Connex.* (On the Connection of the Virtues), OTh VIII.323–407. Dated 1319.[20] Translation: Wood 1997. The translation preserves the line numbers of the edition.
19. *Utrum voluntas possit habere actum virtuosum respectu alicuius obiecti respectu cuius est error in intellectu* = *Act. virt.* (Can the Will Have a Virtuous Act with Respect to Some Object About Which There Is Error in the Intellect?), OTh VIII.409–50.

Other theological writings:

20. *Quodlibeta septem* = *Quodl.* (*Seven Quodlibets*), OTh IX. Probably based on disputations held in London 1322–24, but revised and edited in Avignon 1324–25. Translations: Freddoso and Kelly 1991 (complete);[21] Bosley and Tweedale 1997, 425–7 (from IV.35), 427–30 (from V.10), 430–3 (from V.12–13), 433–5 (from V.23), 125–36 (VII.11 [with parts of III.1], VII.15, VII.17).

21. *Tractatus de quantitate* = *Quant.* (*Treatise on Quantity*), OTh X.3–85. Probably 1323–24.
22. *De corpore Christi* (*On the Body of Christ*), OTh X.89–234. Probably 1323–24.

Items 21–2 are sometimes (wrongly) treated as constituting a single work, *De sacramento altaris* (*On the Sacrament of the Altar*). In this form they are translated in Birch 1930.

II.1.2. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

23. *Summa logicae* = *SL* (*Summa of Logic*), OPh I. Dated c. 1323. Divided into three parts, the third with four subparts. Translations: Loux 1974 (I, complete); Spade 1995 (Wodeham's Prologue, Ockham's Preface and I.1–5, 6, 8–13, 26–8, 30–1, 33, 63–6, 70, 72); Bosley and Tweedale 1997, 235–6 (from I.70); Freddoso and Schuurman 1980 (II, complete); Boehner 1990, 83–4 (from III-1.1), 92–5 (III-2.27); Kretzmann and Stump 1988, 314–36 (III-3.10–6); Adams and Kretzmann 1983, 110–14 (from III-3.30); Boehner 1990, 84–8 (III-3.38).[22]
24. *Expositio in libros artis logicae, prooemium et expositio in librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus* = *Prooem. et Porph.* (*Exposition of the Books of the Art of Logic: Prologue, and Exposition of Porphyry's Isagoge*), OPh II.3–131. Translation: Kluge 1973–74 (*Exposition of Porphyry* only).
25. *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* = *Expos. Praed.* (*Exposition of Aristotle's Categories*), OPh II.135–339.
26. *Expositio in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis* = *Expos. Perih.* (*Exposition of Aristotle's On Interpretation*), OPh II.345–504. Translations: Boehner 1990, 43–5 (from I.Prol.6); Adams and Kretzmann 1983, 96–109 (I.6.7–15, on *On Interpretation* 9).
27. *Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia dei respectu futurorum contingentium* = *Praedest.* (*Treatise on Predestination and God's Foreknowledge with Respect to Future Contingents*), OPh II.507–39. Translation: Adams and Kretzmann 1983.

Items 24–7 were published together under the title *Summa aurea* (*Golden Summa*) in Ockham 1496. Dated 1321–24.

28. *Expositio super libros Elenchorum* = *Expos. Elench.* (*Exposition of the Sophistic Refutations*), OPh III. After items 24–6, before item 29.

29. *Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis* = *Expos. Phys.* (*Exposition of Aristotle's Physics*), OPh IV (Books I–III); OPh V (Books IV–VIII). Incomplete. Dated 1322–24. Translation: Boehner 1990, 2–16 (Prol. only).

Parts of item 29 were loosely excerpted by an early scribe and combined into a separate work known as the *Tractatus de successivis* (*Treatise on Successive* [*Entities*]). Only in this indirect sense is the latter "authentically" Ockham's. It is edited, Boehner 1944. Partial translations: Grant 1974, 229–34 (from III.2.4–6); Hyman and Walsh 1983, 686–8 (from III.2.6).

30. *Brevis summa libri Physicorum* = *Brev. Phys.* (*Brief Summa of the Physics*), OPh VI.2–134. Dated 1322–23. Translation: Davies 1989.
31. *Summula philosophiae naturalis* = *Phil. nat.* (*Little Summa of Natural Philosophy*), OPh VI.137–94. Incomplete. Dated 1319–21.
32. *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis* = *Qq. Phys.* (*Questions on Aristotle's Books of the Physics*), OPh VI.397–813. Before 1324. Translation: Boehner 1990, 115–25 (from qq. 132–6).

II.1.3. DOUBTFUL AND SPURIOUS WORKS

33. *Tractatus minor logicae* (*Lesser Treatise on Logic*), OPh VII.3–57.
34. *Elementarium logicae* (*Primer of Logic*), OPh VII.61–304.

The authenticity of items 33–4 is suspect; recent opinion leans toward accepting them.[23] Both probably from 1340–7.

35. *Tractatus de praedicamentis* (*Treatise on Categories*), OPh VII. 307–32. Probably inauthentic. If authentic, probably before 1323.
36. *Quaestio de relatione* (*Question on Relation*), OPh VII.335–69. Spurious.
37. *Centiloquium* = *Centil.* (*One Hundred Theses*), OPh VII.373–505. Spurious.
38. *Tractatus de principiis theologiae* (*Treatise on the Principles of Theology*), OPh VII.507–639. Spurious. Dated 1328–50.

II.2. *Political Writings*

With the exception of items 49–50, Ockham's political writings are published in critical Latin editions in Ockham 1956–97. Item 53 is a "special case."

II.2.1. AUTHENTIC WORKS

39. *Octo quaestiones de potestate papae* = *OQ* (*Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope*), OPol I.13–217. Fall 1340–summer 1341. Translations: Fairweather 1956, 437–42 (II.1, 7); McGrade and Kilcullen 1995, 303–33 (III).
40. *An princeps pro suo succursu, scilicet guerrae, possit recipere bona ecclesiarum, etiam invito papa* = *AP* (*Can the Ruler Take the Churches' Goods to Aid Him in War, Even If the Pope Is Unwilling?*), OPol I.230–71. Incomplete. August 1338–end of 1339.
41. *Consultatio de causa matrimoniali* (*Advice about a Marriage Case*), OPol. I.278–86. Late 1341–February 1342.
42. *Opus nonaginta dierum* = *OND* (*The Work of Ninety Days*), OPol I.292–368 (Chapters 1–6), OPol II (Chapters 7–124). Between 1332–34. Translation: McGrade and Kilcullen 1995, 19–115 (Chapters 2, 26–8, 65, 88, 93); William of Ockham 1998 (complete).
43. *Epistola ad fratres minores* = *Epist.* (*Letter to the Friars Minor*), OPol III.6–17. Spring 1334. Translation: McGrade and Kilcullen 1995, 3–15.
44. *Tractatus contra Ioannem* (*Treatise Against* [*Pope*] *John* [*XXII*]), OPol III.29–156. Dated 1335.
45. *Tractatus contra Benedictum* = *CB* (*Treatise Against* [*Pope*] *Benedict* [*XII*]), OPol III.165–322. Dated 1337–early 1338.
46. *Compendium errorum Iohannis papae XXII* (*Compendium of the Errors of Pope John XXII*), OPol IV.14–77. Late 1337–early 1338. Probably authentic, although there is some doubt.
47. *Breviloquium* = *Brev.* (*Short Discourse*), OPol IV.97–260. Translation: McGrade and Kilcullen 1992. Between 1341 and 1342.
48. *De imperatorum et pontificum potestate* = *IPP* (*On the Power of Emperors and Pontiffs*), OPol IV.279–355. Dated 1346–47.
49. *Dialogus* = *Dial.* (*Dialogue*), Goldast 1614, 398–957; the last portion, lacking in Goldast, published in Scholz 1911–44, II.392–5. An "on-line" critical Latin edition and complete translation are being prepared in Ockham forthcoming; portions of the project are being posted on the Internet as they are completed. *Dial.* has three parts. Part I (seven books, subdivided into chapters) was completed before 1335. What now survives as Part II was not part of the *Dial.* but instead is item 50. Part III (two tracts, each in several books, subdivided into chapters) is variously dated

1338–46. Translations also in Lewis 1954, II.398–402 (from I.vi.84); McGrade and Kilcullen 1995, 121–207 (III-1.ii complete), 207–19 (III-1.iii.8–11), 219–26 (III-1.iv.8–11), 226–9 (III-1.iv.22), 235–81 (III-2.Prol., i.1–17); Lewis 1954, I.302–10 (from III-2.ii.20, 23, 26–8); Lerner and Mahdi 1963, 494–9 (III-2.ii.26–8); McGrade and Kilcullen 1995, 281–98 (III-2.iii.5–7); Lerner and Mahdi 1963, 499–505 (III-2.iii.6).

50. *De dogmatibus Johannis XXII* (*On the Teachings of* [*Pope*] *John XXII*), Goldast 1614, 740–770. Dated 1334. Treated as Part II of item 49.

II.2.2. DOUBTFUL WORKS

51. *Allegationes de potestate imperiali* (*Dispatches on Imperial Power*), by Ockham and others. OPol IV.367–444. Dated 1338.
52. *De electione Caroli quarti* (*On the Election of Charles IV*), OPol IV.464–86. Probably spurious.
53. *Allegationes religiosorum virorum* (*Dispatches from Religious Men*), Eubel 1898, 388–96. By Ockham and others, 1329. "This work explicitly names Ockham among its authors, . . . But it has proved quite impossible to enucleate Ockham's specific contribution to this collaborative production."[24]

III. THE ESSAYS IN THIS VOLUME

The essays below touch on all main aspects of Ockham's life and thought.

In Chapter 1, William J. Courtenay describes the major events and influences in Ockham's career as an academic and as a political polemicist. It should be emphasized that much of what Courtenay reports has only recently been uncovered, particularly the details of the fourteenth-century Franciscan educational system and the persons interacting with Ockham. Courtenay also discusses Ockham's influence into the fifteenth century, both in England and on the Continent.

In Chapter 2, Calvin Normore surveys the main outlines of Ockham's logic. He inventories the explicitly logical works, as well as the nonlogical writings in which the working out of logical issues is a prominent component. After describing the scope of what Ockham regards as logic, Normore turns to an account of Ockham's

views: his semantics, including signification and supposition; the theory of truth conditions for simple and more complex propositions, including their tensed and modal variants; the theory of consequence; his reworking of the theory of topical "middles"; and his sophisticated treatment of categorical and modal syllogistic.

In Chapter 3, Claude Panaccio further describes Ockham's semantics and the role "mental language" plays in it. He explains Ockham's account of signification, connotation, supposition, truth conditions, and "exponible" propositions. He then describes how Ockham uses this machinery in arguing against universals and other entities his contemporaries favored and concludes that it serves a primarily metaphysical role for Ockham and should not be thought of as formulating an ideal "deep structure" of thought, as many scholars have supposed.

In Chapter 4, David Chalmers takes up the "standard" view that Ockham rejected synonymy in mental language. He notes that Ockham's texts are ambiguous and offers an array of theoretical arguments that Ockham *ought* to have allowed mental synonymy, even if he did not. It is striking to find Chalmers, in a paper drafted in 1991, pushing on largely philosophical grounds toward a view Panaccio and others have recently reinterpreted Ockham as actually having held, that there *is* mental synonymy after all and that synonymy is forbidden only between *simple* mental terms.[25]

In Chapter 5 I set out some main themes of Ockham's nominalist metaphysics, concentrating on his so-called "Razor" and his attempt to reduce ontological commitment by "paraphrasing" away certain entities. I argue that he remains committed to more than is usually thought. I claim too that his arguments against universals are not decisive, although they do weaken the case for realism.

In Chapter 6, Gyula Klima takes up Ockham's criticism of "old way" (*via antiqua*) semantics that he thinks leads to "multiplying entities according to the multiplication of terms." Ockham's alternative semantics avoids such a commitment and allows him to reduce the number of ontological categories. But Klima argues that Ockham's criticisms are misdirected. *Via antiqua* semantics is quite capable of avoiding the ontological commitment Ockham objects to. This suggests that what motivated Ockham was not so much ontological parsimony as it was his semantic project of simplifying the conceptual basis of all the theoretical sciences.

In Chapter 7, André Goddu surveys Ockham's natural philosophy. He shows that, although Ockham was an Aristotelian here, his Aristotelianism serves his own agenda. For instance, Ockham's views on matter and form are in some respects compatible with atomism. Again, he was uncomfortable with Aristotle's theory of final causality. Goddu goes on to outline Ockham's views on motion, infinity, place, void, time, eternity, continuity, and other physical notions.

In Chapter 8, Eleonore Stump examines some important features of Ockham's epistemology, using Aquinas's theory for comparison. She asks why Ockham felt compelled to reject the theory of sensible and intelligible "species" in cognition and suggests that the development of the notion of "intuitive" and "abstractive" cognition after Aquinas may have been in part a response to a lingering puzzle for the species theory. She explores Ockham's own account of intuitive and abstractive cognition in this context. Finally, she suggests that Ockham's epistemology may not have all the theoretical economy he claims for it.

In her discussion of Ockham's theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition, Stump puts what has become the "standard" reading of that theory into a historical context, providing what may be part of the motivation for the theory. It is all the more important, therefore, that in Chapter 9, Elizabeth Karger argues that the "standard" reading is a mistake based on a misunderstanding of key texts. She traces the origins of this reading through the modern secondary literature and argues that the texts in fact support a quite different understanding of Ockham's theory, according to which abstractive cognition is not by nature capable of causing false judgments, intuitive cognitions are not by nature incapable of causing false judgments, and there is no privileged connection between intuition and evidence.

The opposing views in Chapters 8 and 9 provide a perfect example of a current lively debate in Ockham scholarship. Readers are invited to study these chapters carefully and to form their own conclusions.

In Chapter 10, Peter King sets out the main features of Ockham's ethics. He shows how Ockham combines normative principles from Christian revelation with a conceptual apparatus derived from Aristotle. King also discusses Ockham's views on the moral neutrality of exterior acts, the claim that the only intrinsically virtuous act is loving God, Ockham's theory of five levels or stages of moral

action, the role of "right reason" and divine commands, the sense in which humans are obliged to subordinate their will to God's, and Ockham's theory of the virtues.

In Chapter 11, Marilyn McCord Adams examines Ockham's controversial doctrine of "liberty of indifference": that even if it is aware of decisive reasons for an action, the will can choose to do it, not to do it – or even to do the opposite! This is the basis for the criticism that Ockham cuts morality off from nature, reducing ethics to obeying an arbitrary God whose choices can be as irrational as ours can. She defends Ockham against this charge, and along the way compares his views with those of his predecessors' – particularly Anselm's, Aquinas's and Scotus's.

In Chapter 12, A. S. McGrade combines the ethics in Ockham's academic writings with the politics in his later works. The question prompting his essay is how to reconcile the emphasis in the former on obeying God's will, who can command anything whatever, with the appeal to reason and natural law in the political writings. McGrade concludes that the shift of emphasis is not a change of mind and that the two are parts of one unified view.

In Chapter 13, John Kilcullen discusses the political issues and writings that occupied Ockham's last twenty years. He explains the facts and questions surrounding the controversy over "poverty" that was the kernel of Ockham's dispute with Pope John XXII. Kilcullen also surveys Ockham's views on property, legal and natural rights, heresy and heretics, the authority of the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, the limits on that authority, and the role of women.

In Chapter 14, Alfred J. Freddoso takes up Ockham's views on faith and reason, contrasting them with those of his predecessors – particularly Aquinas. Freddoso argues that, although Ockham had a great admiration for natural reason, especially as represented by Aristotle, he did not – unlike Aquinas – regard Christian faith as fulfilling classical pagan metaphysics and ethics according to intellectual standards accepted by the pagan philosophers themselves. Accordingly, Freddoso concludes, Ockham was much more willing than Aquinas to allow irresoluble conflicts between faith and reason.

In Chapter 15, Rega Wood defends Ockham against the frequent charge that his theology of salvation is in effect a version of the ancient heresy known as Pelagianism, which denies the doctrine of original sin and holds that humans can reach salvation without any

special divine grace. She argues that Ockham affirmed the necessity of grace for salvation, merit, and divine acceptance but *not* for virtue; unlike Saint Augustine, Ockham allowed for genuinely virtuous pagans. Wood further argues that, although Ockham maintained that an act of human free will is needed for merit and salvation, he is not thereby committed even to the more attenuated heresy of semi-pelagianism, which regards grace as necessary for salvation but questions the Augustinian doctrine of predestination by holding that the human will can take the initiative and thereby "control" God's grace. For Wood, Ockham's theology is orthodox here as well.

NOTES

All references are given by author and date. Full particulars may be found in the Bibliography.

1 Copleston 1947–75, for example, devotes eleven chapters to Aquinas, six to Scotus, and seven to Ockham and Ockhmism. Each is more than is devoted to any other late-medieval thinker, although Bonaventure with five chapters is a contender.
2 Kretzmann and Stump 1993, 2–3. Sections II–V of their introduction (ibid., 2–10) contain much background information useful to readers of the present volume as well.
3 This is true even though the medieval period is the longest in the history of Western philosophy. If we include Saint Augustine (354–430), as we must in any serious account of medieval philosophy, it lasted for more than a thousand years.
4 The story is told in Gál and Wood 1991. By contrast, the first volume of the Scotus Commission's critical edition of John Duns Scotus (Scotus 1950–) appeared almost fifty years ago and, although the project is arguably more complicated than the Ockham edition, it is still very incomplete. The critial "Leonine Edition" of Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas 1882–) is far from complete after more than a century.
5 See Section II.2.1, item 49.
6 See Section II.
7 Courtenay in Chapter 1. For insightful speculation on why Ockham's views generated such resistance, see Wood 1997, 12–13.
8 On the issues and personalities involved, see Kilcullen in Chapter 13.
9 Courtenay in Chapter 1. On Ockham's death, see Gál 1982.
10 Wood 1997, 6.

11 Boehner 1990, li. This needs to be stated carefully. Boehner explains (ibid.), "Ockham's philosophy had an enormous influence. But it seems that he had few disciples. It is difficult to find an 'Ockhamist' school in the same sense as we encounter a Thomist or Scotist school. Ockham's teachings had, rather, a stimulating effect. They awakened many somewhat independent thinkers who were united at least against the realism of the older scholastics. The *'Nominales'* (in the mediaeval sense) constituted the *via moderna*, which was not so much a school as a trend of thought." See also Courtenay in Chapter 1, Section V.
12 Knowles, 1962, 318–19.
13 Moody 1935 had already called attention to Ockham's logical accomplishments and some of their applications, as had Boehner 1952, Moody 1953, Bocheński 1961, and Kneale and Kneale 1962 (although the Kneales were far from sympathetic to Ockham). Real interest among analytic philosophers in medieval logic and semantics did not emerge, however, until the publication of Kretzmann 1966 and 1968, and Scott 1966.
14 For a good example of the fruitfulness of reflection from a modern point of view on issues raised by Ockham, see Chalmers in Chapter 4.
15 Freddoso stresses this point in Chapter 14.
16 Some of the chapters in this volume give dates other than those given here. I have taken my own dating from discussions in the critical editions, but these matters are not yet fully settled.
17 Wood 1997, x–xi.
18 Described in Hyman and Walsh as II.15.
19 Described ibid. as II.26.
20 See Wood 1997, x, "Ockham's *Connex.* was his *Quaestio Biblica*, a formal academic exercise that a met a degree requirement in theology for a public lecture or lectures on a biblical topic."
21 The translation includes page references to the Latin edition.
22 Listed as III-3.36 in Boehner 1990.
23 See the introduction to Wood 1997, 10–11, n. 22.
24 OPol IV.x.
25 Since I have been party to this dispute, I should report that I do not find the textual support for this as compelling as Panaccio and others do, although I agree with both Panaccio and Chalmers that it makes the best overall sense out of the evidence.