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978-0-521-58101-1 - The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies

Edited by David L. Weimer

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

Contents

<i>List of figures and tables</i>	<i>page</i> ix
<i>List of contributors</i>	xi
<i>Series editors' preface</i>	xiii
<i>Preface</i>	xv
1 The political economy of property rights	1
<i>David L. Weimer</i>	
2 Credible commitment and property rights: The role of strategic interaction between political and economic actors	20
<i>Daniel Diermeier, Joel M. Ericson, Timothy Frye, and Steven Lewis</i>	
The political commitment to markets and marketization	43
<i>Barry R. Weingast</i>	
3 Political determinants of the success of economic transition	50
<i>Nikolai Mikhailov</i>	
Comment on "Political Determinants of the Success of Economic Transition"	80
<i>Adam Przeworski</i>	
4 Russian privatization and the limits of credible commitment	84
<i>Timothy Frye</i>	
Three issues of credible commitment and Russian privatization	109
<i>John M. Litwack</i>	
5 Legislative politics and the political economy of property rights in post-communist Russia	113
<i>Brendan Kiernan and Francis X. Bell</i>	
Commitment, coordination, and the demise of the post-communist parliament in Russia	139
<i>Steven S. Smith</i>	

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Table of Contents

[More information](#)*Contents*

6	Private firms, city government, and arbitration: Enforcing economic legality in St. Petersburg <i>Joel M. Ericson</i>	150
	Comment on “Private Firms, City Government, and Arbitration” <i>Anthony Jones</i>	179
7	Property rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovak republics <i>Mariusz Mark Dobek</i>	182
	Comment on “Property Rights and Institutional Change in the Czech and Slovak Republics” <i>Sharon Wolchik</i>	205
8	Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization bargains in Poland <i>Lorene Allio</i>	208
	Comment on “Institutional Structures, Labor Interests, and Evolving Privatization Bargains in Poland” <i>Bartłomiej Kaminski</i>	232
9	Privatization as institutional change in Hungary <i>László Urbán</i>	239
	Comment on “Privatization as Institutional Change in Hungary” <i>Kálmán Mizsei</i>	256
10	Marketization and government credibility in Shanghai: Federalist and local corporatist explanations <i>Steven Lewis</i>	259
	Federalist and local corporatist theories: A comment on an empirical test <i>Victor Nee</i>	288
11	Learning about the economy: Property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy <i>Hannes Wittig</i>	294
	Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the collapse of the East German economy <i>Susanne Lohmann</i>	314
12	Post-communist privatization as a test of theories of institutional change <i>Lorene Allio, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolai Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer</i>	319
	Explaining the complexity of institutional change <i>Jack Knight and Douglass C. North</i>	349
	<i>Indexes</i>	355