Most writing about strategy – the balancing of ends and means by rulers and states in conflict with their adversaries – has focused on individual theorists or great military leaders. That approach has its uses, but it normally ignores the messy process through which rulers and states have actually framed strategy. Understanding how that process has worked or failed to work in the past is nevertheless of vital practical importance to strategists, and of the greatest interest to students of strategy and statecraft.

The Making of Strategy is about the strategic process. It consists of seventeen case studies that range from fifth-century Athens and Ming China to Hitler’s Germany, Israel, and the post-1945 United States. The studies analyze, within a common interpretive framework, precisely how rulers and states have made strategy. The introduction emphasizes the constants in the rapidly shifting world of the strategist. The conclusion tries to understand the forces that have driven the transformation of strategy since 400 B.C. and seem likely to continue to transform it in the future.
The making of strategy
The making of strategy

Rulers, states, and war

Edited by

WILLIAMSON MURRAY
Ohio State University

MACGREGOR KNOX
London School of Economics and Political Science

ALVIN BERNSTEIN
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
To those – comrades, friends, acquaintances, and strangers – who died in Vietnam because their leaders had no patience with history or with the imponderables that are the stuff of history.
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributors</th>
<th>page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of illustrations and tables</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction: On strategy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Donald Kagan</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The strategy of a warrior-state: Rome and the wars against Carthage, 264–201 B.C.</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Alvin H. Bernstein</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Chinese strategy from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Arthur Waldron</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 The making of strategy in Habsburg Spain: Philip II’s “bid for mastery,” 1556–1598</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Geoffrey Parker</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 The origins of a global strategy: England from 1558 to 1713</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>William S. Maltby</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 A quest for glory: The formation of strategy under Louis XIV, 1661–1715</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>John A. Lynn</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783–1865</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Peter Maslowski</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

9 Strategic uncertainties of a nation-state: Prussia-Germany, 1871–1918
   Holger H. Herwig
242
10 The weary titan: Strategy and policy in Great Britain, 1890–1918
   John Gooch
278
11 The strategy of the decisive weight: Italy, 1882–1922
   Brian R. Sullivan
307
12 The road to ideological war: Germany, 1918–1945
   Wilhelm Deist
352
13 The collapse of empire: British strategy, 1919–1945
   Williamson Murray
393
14 The strategy of innocence? The United States, 1920–1945
   Eliot A. Cohen
428
15 The illusion of security: France, 1919–1940
   Robert A. Doughty
466
16 Strategy for class war: The Soviet Union, 1917–1941
   Earl F. Ziemke
498
17 The evolution of Israeli strategy: The psychology of insecurity and the quest for absolute security
   Michael I. Handel
534
   Colin S. Gray
579
19 Conclusion: Continuity and revolution in the making of strategy
   MacGregor Knox
614
Index
647
Contributors

Alvin H. Bernstein  
Director of the George C. Marshall  
European Center for Security  
Studies

Eliot A. Cohen  
Professor of Strategic Studies  
Johns Hopkins University

Wilhelm Deist  
Research Director  
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt

Robert A. Doughty  
Chairman, Department of History  
United States Military Academy

John Gooch  
Professor of History  
University of Leeds

Colin S. Gray  
Professor of International Politics  
Director of Center for Security Studies  
University of Hull

Mark Grimsley  
Professor of History  
Ohio State University

Michael I. Handel  
Professor of Strategy  
Naval War College

Holger H. Herwig  
Professor of Strategy  
University of Calgary

Donald Kagan  
Professor of History  
Yale University

MacGregor Knox  
Stevenson Professor of International History  
London School of Economics and Political Science

John A. Lynn  
Professor of History  
University of Illinois/Urbana Champaign

William S. Maltby  
Professor of History  
University of Missouri/St. Louis

Peter Maslowski  
Professor of History  
University of Nebraska/Lincoln

Williamson Murray  
Professor of History  
Ohio State University
Contributors

Geoffrey Parker
Professor of History
Yale University

Arthur Waldron
Professor of Strategy
Naval War College

Brian R. Sullivan
Senior Fellow
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

Earl F. Ziemke
Professor of History
University of Georgia
Acknowledgments

Many individuals helped make this volume possible, and it would be churlish not to give them the thanks that are their due. The Mershon Center and its director Charles Herman provided the financial support that got this project off the ground and maintained it for six years; equally important was Chuck’s moral support of the editors. Along with the Mershon Center, as a co-equal partner, the Smith Richardson Foundation provided matching funding and enthusiastic support. William Brodie and Devon Cross were invaluable supporters as well as friends in keeping the project on course.

Here at Ohio State a number of colleagues devoted considerable time and energy to various aspects of the project. Allan Millett and Don Lair organized and ran the startup conference in Newport and provided support and help throughout the course of the project. At the Mershon Center, Joe Kreuzel and Paul Tiberi were especially helpful. Claudia Riser and Josie Cohagen ran the office of the Program in International Security and Military Affairs at the Mershon Center with efficiency and good humor. Several graduate students participated in making The Making of Strategy from its inception through final editing: Steve Glick, Matt Oyos, Al Palazzo, Thomas Arnold, and David Thompson all provided valuable help. A number of student workers at Mershon did the interminable mailing, photocopying, telephone answering, and other duties: of these, Jessica Montgomery, Doug Plummer, Todd Miller, and Anita Limbacher were particularly helpful.

We would also like to thank our contributors. They took our criticisms, editing, and deadlines with great good humor and patient attention to the task at hand. We are profoundly grateful to Cambridge University Press for its willingness to publish a manuscript of this size. And we thank Ronald Cohen, our manuscript editor, whose conscientious editorial hand and eagle eye smoothed out the rough edges in the text and corrected the occasional oversights that inevitably occurred in a work of this extent.

We believe we have achieved a coherence within this volume that is un-
Acknowledgments

usual in collective works. But we readily accept responsibility for whatever errors and weaknesses may have crept in during the book's long gestation. This volume's strengths are those of its contributors. Its weaknesses are above all our own.

Williamson Murray    MacGregor Knox    Alvin Bernstein
Illustrations and tables

MAPS

2.1 Classical Greece/Athenian Empire, ca. 450 B.C.  page 26–27
3.1 Roman expansion  58–59
4.1 China’s inner Asian frontiers: The Yellow River loop and the Ordos  86
4.2 China’s inner Asian frontiers: The late Ming defense line  87
5.1 Philip II’s European empire/Armada campaign  116–117
7.1 Wars of Louis XIV  180
8.1 U.S. Civil War  206
9.1 The Schlieffen Plan  244
10.1 World War I: The Western Front  280
11.1 Italy/Mediterranean in World War I  308–309
12.1 World War II: German offensives, 1939–1942  354
13.1 Interwar Europe with 1936–1939 crises  394
14.1 World War II: Defeat of Germany, 1942–1945  430–431
15.1 French interwar strategy of defense: The Maginot Line and occupation of Germany  468
16.1 The Russian Civil War, 1917–1922  500
17.1 Israel’s vulnerability  536
18.1 Cold War Europe, ca. 1949–1989  580

FIGURES

13.1 British perception of the German threat  410
17.1 Comparison of the rate of growth of Israeli GNP and military expenditure as a percentage of GNP  548
18.1 National defense outlays  586
Illustrations and tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>The cost of Philip II's imperialism, 1571–1577</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Military strength of Philip II and his enemies, 1587–1588</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>Annual indices of manufacturing production, 1913–1938</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>British balance of payments, 1933–1938</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>British balance of trade, 1929–1938</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>Interwar army and navy budgets</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>Resources and military power, 1940</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>Production of motor vehicles</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>Relative magnitude of munitions production, 1944</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>Trend of combat munitions production of the major belligerents</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>Mobilization of the labor force of the U.K. and the U.S. for war, June 1944</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>Four possible combinations of offensive or defensive strategic and operational doctrines</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>The Arab-Israeli balance of power: Different possible estimates according to fronts, coalitions, or worst case analysis (an Israeli view)</td>
<td>538–539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>Number of Israelis killed in road accidents and terror attacks, 1973–1987</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>A summary: Israeli strategy in six wars</td>
<td>566–569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>