

Contents

<i>List of tables</i>	<i>page</i> xi
<i>Series editors' preface</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xv
INTRODUCTION	I
1 Historical context	I
2 Property rights and Japanese studies	2
3 This project	3
3.1 Coverage	3
3.2 Caveats	4
3.3 Selection criteria	5
4 Law & economics and history	6
CHAPTER I	
LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH	9
Introduction	9
1 The property rights paradigm	10
2 Law and efficient growth in Japan	11
3 Why relatively efficient law?	16
3.1 General theories	16
3.2 Federalism in Tokugawa Japan	18
3.3 Legal efficiency in imperial Japan	18
4 Conclusion	22

Contents

CHAPTER 2		
PROPERTY: WATER AND LAND		23
	Introduction	23
1	Public order and private claims	24
2	Water law in imperial Japan	27
2.1	Irrigation	28
2.2	Hot springs	32
2.3	Holdups	34
2.4	The abuse-of-rights doctrine	36
2.5	Ambiguities	39
3	Efficiency in water law	41
4	Conclusion	42
CHAPTER 3		
EXTERNALITIES: SMOKE AND NOISE		43
	Introduction	43
1	Law and externalities	43
2	Japanese tort law	46
2.1	Negligence	46
2.2	Strict liability	49
3	Implications	52
4	Conclusion	53
CHAPTER 4		
MARKETS: CHILDREN		54
	Introduction	54
1	The contracts	56
1.1	The data	56
1.2	Indentures	56
1.3	Pledges	58
1.4	Sales and adoptions	60
2	Contractual terms	61
2.1	Sales and pledges	61
2.2	Contractual length	67
2.3	Alternatives	71
3	Infants	73
4	Labor markets and family norms	74
5	Conclusion	78

Contents

CHAPTER 5
AUTONOMY: FAMILY LAW 80

	Introduction	80
1	Scholars and patriarchy	81
2	The power over residence	82
2.1	The issue	82
2.2	The power to expel	84
2.3	The duty of support	87
2.4	The desire to stay in the family	88
3	The power over marriage	92
4	Primogeniture	93
4.1	Introduction	93
4.2	Family heads	93
4.3	Family members	94
5	The power of husbands	95
5.1	Trial marriages	95
5.2	Asymmetries in divorce	103
6	Conclusion	107

CHAPTER 6
PROMISSORY CREDIBILITY: SEX 109

	Introduction	109
1	Scholars and prostitutes	110
2	The regulation of sex	117
2.1	The decrees	117
2.2	The courts	118
3	The indenture contracts	120
3.1	Geisha indentures	121
3.2	Prostitute indentures	122
3.3	Contractual enforcement	123
3.4	Control and credit	126
3.5	Credible commitments	130
4	Conclusion	134

Contents

CHAPTER 7		
CARTELS: COTTON SPINNING		135
	Introduction	135
1	The industry	136
2	The cotton cartel	138
	2.1 Organization	138
	2.2 Leaks	141
	2.3 Temporary local gains?	145
3	Cotton logic	146
	3.1 Efficiency wages	147
	3.2 The evidence of efficiency wages	153
	3.3 Cartels as a corporate governance mechanism	156
4	Conclusion	162
CHAPTER 8		
CONCLUSIONS		163
	<i>References</i>	167
	<i>Index</i>	187