
Introduction

For a book that is a central text of Western civilization, *Robinson Crusoe* had a strange early history.¹ In the first edition (1719), the title page announced that the work had been written by Crusoe, and the editor's preface asserted that the book was "a just History of Fact" even as it obscurely acknowledged that some or all of the narrative might be fictitious. A number of the early readers of *Crusoe* read the narrative as a factual account; Charles Gildon's famous attack on the book was rooted in his belief that many readers had been deceived by Defoe. Thus, Gildon's "D—I" tells Friday:

I did not make you speak broken *English*, to represent you as a Blockhead . . . but meerly for the Variety of Stile, to intermix some broken *English* to make my Lie go down the more glibly with the Vulgar Reader.²

Having been branded a liar by Gildon, Defoe offered two defenses of his text and his method. The preface to *The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe* (1719) observes that all efforts to "reproach" the earlier work "with being a romance . . . have proved abortive" and further argues that the "just Application" of the work "must legitimate the Part that may be call'd Invention"; the clear implication is that although *some* of the work might be invented, the account is essentially factual, "Contradictions in the Fact" having never been isolated. The preface to the *Serious Reflections of Robinson Crusoe* (1720) also rejects the claims of the "ill-disposed Part of the World . . . That . . . the Story is feign'd" and counters "that the Story, though Allegorical, is also Historical." Thus, the several explications of *Robinson Crusoe* provided by Defoe do not so much shift ground as repeat themselves, and we are left with a paradox: though the work may be regarded as an allegory, it is nonetheless history. So in *Serious Reflections* the editor asserts

¹ To cite only two arguments as to its classic status, Samuel Johnson linked it with *Don Quixote* and *Pilgrim's Progress*, and James Joyce called it the "English *Ulysses*." Michael Shinagel, ed., *Robinson Crusoe* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 285, 353.

² Paul Dottin, ed., *Robinson Crusoe Examin'd and Criticis'd or A New Edition of Charles Gildon's Famous Pamphlet Now Published with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes* (London and Paris: J. M. Dent, 1923), xvi. On the early reception of *Robinson Crusoe*, also see *The Lives of the Poets* (1753), signed by Theophilus Cibber but now attributed to Robert Shiels, cited in *Defoe: The Critical Heritage*, ed. Pat Rogers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 49–50.

that “when I mention my Solitudes and Retirements . . . all those Parts of the Story are real Facts in my History, whatever borrow’d Lights they may be represented by.”³ Note that Defoe does not simply argue that the work is “true”; it might well be thought both allegorical and true: Bunyan makes that claim in his defense of *The Pilgrim’s Progress*.⁴ Rather, Defoe insists not only that the text is true but also that it contains “Matter of real History” – matters of fact – even as he admits that it is a “Fable.”

Not only Defoe’s repeated, paradoxical defenses of his text but also its early reception suggest the strangeness of *Crusoe*.⁵ Indeed it seems that at first no one knew what to make of this text – not Defoe, who wrote about it in such contradictory terms and explicated its generic status again and again without clarifying the matter; nor Gildon, whose charge that the book was a lie was wholly lacking in subtlety; nor the early readers who read the text either as a memoir or as a fable. Subsequent readers contained the work’s strangeness, familiarizing it by classifying the text as a work of fiction, a “romance” or a “novel,” generally without considering whether such categorizing was justified or whether it resolved formal questions about the text. The present study, by contrast, begins from the premise that we can learn a great deal about the nature of *Robinson Crusoe* as well as Defoe’s other narratives and also about the novel in general by taking Defoe at his word and considering *Robinson Crusoe* as a “just History of Fact” and then asking how that “History” became part of the canon of English novels.

In order to take Defoe seriously, however, it is necessary first to determine what readerly expectations would allow a writer to present such a text as a history and also allow such a work to be read as a species of historical discourse. This study, then, is an attempt to delineate a crucial area of the “horizon of expectations” on which *Robinson Crusoe* appeared in 1719.⁶ To describe that horizon one needs to consider both historical and fictional discourse, since from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, at least, writers persistently asked readers of fiction to situate their

³ Shinagel, ed., *Robinson Crusoe*, 258–65.

⁴ John Bunyan, *The Pilgrim’s Progress*, ed. James Blanton Wharey, rev. Roger Sharrock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 4–5. On the difference between Bunyan and Defoe, see Ian Watt, *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), 80–84; Michael McKeon, *The Origins of the English Novel, 1600–1740* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 121.

⁵ On the reception of *Robinson Crusoe* after Gildon, see Rogers, *The Critical Heritage*, 48–51; C. E. Burch, “British Criticism of Defoe as a Novelist, 1719–1860,” *Englische Studien* 67 (1932), 178–98; and chapter 11 below. The concept of the “strangeness” of a literary work is from the Russian Formalists; see Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in *Russian Formalist Criticism*, ed. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 3–24.

⁶ The term “horizon of expectations” is from Hans Robert Jauss, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory,” in *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, introd. Paul de Man, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 22.

imaginative works in relation to the discourse of history, and the history-fiction problematic was, therefore, an ever-present preoccupation of writers and readers of the texts that we now associate with the early English novel.⁷ This study arises from the view that Defoe's importance – his centrality – in the early history of the English novel derives from the fact that in the period from the publication of Sidney's *Arcadia* (1590) to the appearance of Scott's *Waverley* (1814), Defoe's narratives constituted the most pointed and significant statement of this history-fiction problematic. Crucial to the definition of the form, Defoe's famous texts laid the basis for a sustained attempt by subsequent novelists and readers to elaborate, comprehend, define, and domesticate the dialogue in the novel between historical and fictional discourse.⁸ For this reason, my discussion of

⁷ Aphra Behn presented *Oroonoko* (1688) as “the history of this royal slave” and asserted that she was herself “an eyewitness to a great part of what you will find here set down”; in *The Secret History of Queen Zarah* (1705) Delarivier Manley distinguished the popular romances of the day and her own “little histories”; the “editor” of *Moll Flanders* (1722) acknowledged that “the World is so taken up of late with Novels and Romances, that it will be hard for a private History to be taken for Genuine,” thereby indicating that Moll's narrative should be read as history; Richardson presented *Clarissa* (1747–48) as “a History,” distinguished *Pamela* (1741) from romances, and indicated that he wanted *Clarissa* to be read with a “Historical Faith”; Fielding's narrator in *Tom Jones* (1749) took pains to say “what kind of a history this is”; Sterne likened *Tristram Shandy* (1759–67) to Locke's *Essay*, which Tristram tells us is “a history-book . . . of what passes in a man's own mind,” and Tristram addresses “the hypercritick” on the issue of the author's manipulation of time in order to avoid the critic's “rendering my book . . . a profess'd ROMANCE”; Smollett, as I have argued elsewhere, “presses us,” in *Humphry Clinker* (1771), “to conceive of the novel as a fictional form that does the work of history”; the preface of Frances Burney's *Evelina or the History of a Young Lady's Entrance into the World* (1778) informs the reader that she or he should not “entertain the gentle expectation of being transported to the fantastic regions of Romance”; Maria Edgeworth presented *Castle Rackrent* (1800) as a narrative “taken from facts” – the kind of history one never finds in historiography; and Scott styled *Waverley* (1814) a “historical romance” and presented it to the reader, in the Magnum edition, with learned introductions and footnotes. See the prefaces or introductions to the works cited, except for *Tristram Shandy*, in which case see vol. II, chapters 2 and 8, and Richardson's comment on *Clarissa*, for which see *Selected Letters of Samuel Richardson*, ed. John Carroll (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 85. On *Humphry Clinker*, see my “History, *Humphry Clinker* and the Novel,” *Eighteenth-Century Fiction* 4 (1991–92), 255.

⁸ A fundamental assumption of this study is that fiction and history are qualitatively different forms of discourse. It has not been uncommon for literary theorists to claim that historical discourse is essentially fictive since the historian employs narrative techniques often associated with the fashioning of imaginative stories. See, for example, Roland Barthes, “The Discourse of History,” trans. Stephen Bann, in *Comparative Criticism. A Yearbook*, ed. E. S. Shaffer (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 3–20. The work of Hayden White is also apposite; see the discussion of White at p. 90. Recently, however, a number of theoreticians of history and of narrative have insisted upon the essential difference between history and fiction, and all have pointed in different ways to the fact that history-writing is based upon evidence drawn from the historical record while fiction is not. For three such arguments, from very different perspectives, see Arnaldo Momigliano, “The Rhetoric of History and the History of Rhetoric: On Hayden White's Tropes,” *Comparative Criticism*, 267–68; Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. III, trans. Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer (University of Chicago Press, 1988), chapter 8; and Dorrit Cohn, “Signposts of Fictionality: A Narratological Perspective,” *Poetics Today*, 11 (1990), 775–804. Paul Ricoeur argues that “fiction . . . permits historiography to live up to the task of

“matters of fact” will entail first a fresh look at seventeenth-century historiography and then a reassessment of Defoe’s texts – historical and novelistic – in light of a reexamination of both history- and fiction-writing in seventeenth-century England. All this is aimed at illuminating Defoe’s crucial role in the creation of the English novel, which derives from his having made the nexus of history and fiction a key element in the theory of the novel elaborated by writers and readers in the eighteenth century. The argument of this study entails, then, a sequence of claims: that the historical discourse of seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England (what I shall call Baconian historiography) featured a taste for the marvelous, a polemical cast, a utilitarian faith, a dependence upon personal memory and gossip, and a willingness to tolerate dubious material for practical purposes, all of which led to the allowance of fiction as a means of historical representation; that the novel came into being, in important part, because of a “sudden redistribution” within and among discursive fields that occurred in England in the first half of the eighteenth century, and in the process of which the novel hived off from history; that Defoe’s most famous narratives – issued as histories, branded as lies, and eventually read as novels – were an important element in that far-reaching discursive realignment; that a key feature of the elaboration of a discourse of the novel was the shift in readerly expectations forced upon readers in the early modern period and after, in important part by Defoe’s “novels”; and that the long and complicated history of the reception of Defoe’s “novels” signals the fact that the history-fiction problematic in those narratives became a key feature of the emerging discourse of the novel.

I

This study relies heavily on Hans Robert Jauss’s perception that literary historians can use the study of reception to describe a form such as the novel as the sum of all questions posed and answers proffered by both the works themselves and the readers of those works. According to Jauss, readers as well as writers theorize forms, and the theory of a form *is* the

memory,” and also that “fictional narrative in some way imitates historical narrative,” especially insofar as fiction is “internally bound by its obligation to its quasi-past.” Ricoeur therefore speaks of an “interweaving of history and fiction,” or the

fundamental structure, ontological as well as epistemological, by virtue of which history and fiction each concretize their respective intentionalities only by borrowing from the intentionality of the other.

Yet even as he argues that these two narrative forms are in important ways inextricably linked, Ricoeur insists on the fundamental difference of the two modes of discourse because “the quasi-past of the narrative voice [in fiction] is . . . entirely different from the past of historical consciousness”; 189, 192, 181.

history of the form “viewed . . . within the horizon of a dialogue between work and audience that forms a continuity.” Jauss’s call for “an aesthetics of reception” sought to provide a basis for relating historical studies and formalist inquiries: “to bridge the gap between literature and history, between historical and aesthetic approaches.” Attention to reception *and* production, he argued, could overcome the limitations of historicist procedures that provided a clear view of the historical context of texts and careers but little means of saying how a work-in-its-historical-context is related to a work-in-its-present-context: “the thread from the past appearance to the present experience of literature, which historicism had cut, is tied back together” by an historical analysis of reception and production.⁹ At the same time, attention to reception ensured that formal descriptions would not be severed from historical questions. Jauss’s project amounts to the claim that the novel that we study today – the form that we theorize – has embedded within it, for example, Defoe’s answers to questions embodied in the works of earlier writers as well as questions propounded within his works and the subsequent answers of Defoe’s readers to the questions he posed. Delineating the horizon of expectations of writers and readers of texts associated with the tradition of the novel is a way of describing not only the history but also the theory of the novel.

How does one reconstruct the horizon of expectations against which a work appeared? Jauss has tended to concentrate on individual works as horizontal backgrounds to other works, most recently, for example, on *La Nouvelle Héloïse* and *The Sorrows of Young Werther* as works that responded to the same questions and also as works that were related to each other as question and answer.¹⁰ This method is problematic, however, when one is treating a body of work as initially undifferentiated from a large mass of popular texts as was the work of Defoe. The problem is further accentuated if one is using the equally inchoate set of statements and texts that constituted “history” in early modern England to delineate the horizon against which Defoe’s works originally appeared. Faced with this problem of apprehending and describing such a crowded horizon, the discourse analysis of Michel Foucault has at times proved a more productive means

⁹ Jauss, “Literary History,” 19, 18. Writers are readers of earlier works, and thus Defoe’s texts are acts of reception in respect to earlier works. As Felix Vodička has argued, the “biography” of a work consists of both its “genesis” and a “greater and more difficult part”: the description of “how the work has changed in the minds of those following generations who have dealt with it, who have lived on it, and nourished themselves on it.” Thus the views of other readers – critics and common readers – are also valuable evidence for an understanding of the history and theory of the novel; see “The Concretization of the Literary Work: Problems of the Reception of Neruda’s Work,” in *The Prague School: Selected Writings, 1929–1946*, ed. Peter Steiner, trans. John Burbank, et al. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 105.

¹⁰ Jauss, *Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic Understanding*, ed. Michael Hays (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 148–96.

of seeing Defoe's narratives in relation to historiography. Foucault's work suggests that, rather than focusing on the evolution of a genre from one text to another, the history of the early English novel might better be written as an account of the transformation of an established discursive matrix – history – leading in time to the formation of a new matrix – novel, albeit one with clear links to the older discursive formation.¹¹ Foucault's concept of discourse shifts the historian away from a history of themes, works, narratological features, authors, and schools of thought toward a "systematic description of the discourse-object" with the aim of describing the statements, actual and possible, that comprise the discourse as well as the "rules of formation" that inhere in those statements: "discourses as practices obeying certain rules."¹² As a history of history, this study does not contain a definitive description of, say, ecclesiastical or natural history; it does not argue for the importance or value of a particular historian or work; it does not seek to praise, damn, or rehabilitate any methodologies, writers, or texts. Rather it examines writers, works, statements, theories, themes, techniques, and types of historiography, as species of historical discourse and as indicators of the rules embedded within and governing that discourse.

Foucault, however, was himself notoriously vague about indicating how a discursive formation could be described; the assertion that a discourse is "a vast field . . . made up of the totality of all effective statements (whether spoken or written), in their dispersion as events" only highlights how difficult the task is, especially since often such a "field" seems to be treated

¹¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 23–30, 8, 14, 47, 140, 138; for the original French, see *L'archéologie du savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 33–43, 16, 24, 64, 183, 182. Foucault argues that a discourse exists if a set of statements refers to the same object, if there is a "system of permanent and coherent concepts involved," if one discovers upon examining a set of statements "the identity and persistence of themes," and if, furthermore, there are "rules of formation" that inhere in the discourse and make possible the objects, types of statements, concepts, and themes that signal its existence. Was "history" a discourse in this sense? One could argue that it was perhaps the crucial discourse in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries since Bacon's survey of learning identified it as the fundament of all knowledge; on the importance of history to Bacon's "theory of knowledge," see Lisa Jardine, *Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse* (Cambridge University Press, 1974), 123. In addition, since seventeenth-century historiography, after Bacon, was peculiarly aware of itself as a way of knowing and representing the world, one could argue, despite the great diversity of concepts and themes in historical discourse, that it did constitute a discursive formation and that the "object" to which it referred was "matters of fact." Foucault himself seems to have acknowledged the legitimacy of thinking of "history" as a discourse: "If I made a list of all the sciences, knowledges and domains which I should mention and don't, which I border on in one way or another, the list would be practically endless . . . I haven't even attempted an archaeology of history." Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Gordon, et al. (New York: Pantheon: 1980), 64; for the original French, see *Dits et écrits*, 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), III, 29.

¹² Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 140, 138; *L'archéologie du savoir*, 183, 182.

as if it were roughly unchanging from the beginning to the end of one of Foucault's historical ages or epistemes. Thus, the "totality of all effective statements" potentially includes, for example, all statements made within the discourse of history during a period of approximately 150 to 200 years, if one is considering Foucault's "Classical age." Furthermore, perhaps because Foucault conceived of historical change in terms of discontinuities and ruptures marked by radical transformations of one discursive formation into another, there is little attention paid in his work to the question of how smaller changes within a discursive field inevitably altered that field and affected relations and orientations among the elements within it.¹³

In respect to this problem Jauss can be useful, since he and other like-minded literary historians make us conscious of how every new work alters the horizon against which it appears and thus in its turn creates a new horizon against which other works are viewed. Thus, whereas Foucault provides a spatial frame for plotting the position of Defoe's narratives within the historical discourse of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England, Jauss furnishes a temporal axis along which to chart changes within the discourse of history and between historiography and the emerging discourse of the novel, and this study makes use of both conceptual orientations.¹⁴

¹³ Indeed some historians have insisted upon the "utter incompatibility" of Foucault's work and "the practice of history"; see *Foucault and the Writing of History*, ed. Jan Goldstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 2. Overall, however, this collection of essays argues for the "accessibility" and utility of Foucault for historians; 15.

¹⁴ Foucault seeks not "to rediscover the continuous, insensible transition that relates discourses on a gentle slope to what precedes them, surrounds them, or follows them" but instead simply "to define discourses in their specificity," and yet he acknowledges that he writes "histories of the present." While Jauss focuses our attention upon particular horizons of expectations, he also seeks to link the historical study of reception to the present problem of evaluation and formal definition. Each conceives of the historian's object of study as a verbal field and discusses that field in spatial, even geographical, terms. Each argues that authors, texts, bodies of work, and schools of thought must always be viewed within the matrix of their appearance, operation, or unfolding. One scholar has recently explored affinities between German theory and the thought of Foucault, but he shows that there has been a lack of dialogue between the two; see Robert C. Holub, *Crossing Borders: Reception Theory, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), chapter 4. For some, Jauss is too dialectical a thinker and too focused on authors, genres, and *œuvres* to be compatible with Foucault. I nevertheless use them both in this study because each one's approach seems, for my purposes, incomplete in itself. Foucault seems uninterested in the problem of explaining how shifts take place between discursive formations, and although Jauss focuses on shifting horizons, he does so largely in terms of great authors and major texts and so for all that he is an important theoretician of literary history, his method seems, at least for my purposes, somewhat unhistorical. Foucault's "discursive formation" provides a means of conceptualizing the link among texts, statements, authors, and genres in their "specificity." On the other hand, the present study may seem too traditionally historical – enamored of "matters of fact" – to present itself as written in the spirit of Foucault. Yet Goldstein observes that "a historian need not be . . . a purist who embraces the most radical reading of Foucault . . . in order to find him a . . . stimulating guide to . . . conceptualizing historical phenomena"; *Foucault and the Writing of History*, 15. The present work is, thus, neither a Foucauldian nor a Jaussian study; both models of conceiving of change within

II

“History” was and is a far from simple signifier; in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it meant “narrative” as well as “true account,” and as “true account” it meant both “essentially or morally true narrative” and “factual account.” It also meant both “past events” and an account of such events, what we often call historiography.¹⁵ In the early modern period, as we shall see, “history” often referred to well-made narratives that represented generally accepted versions of events written without reference to any original research, but it also referred to accounts that were rooted in an attempt to establish what was or could be known about a given event or person: “matters of fact.” Historical accounts that some early modern readers regarded as masterpieces of historiography were dismissed by other contemporary readers as “romances.” Similarly, some historical works that were thought important at the time have been ignored by modern historians of history, while other works that were denounced as “party histories” or propaganda have been celebrated by modern scholars as historiographically innovative. So the “history” that I will argue constituted the matrix of the early English novel is a discourse that is far from easy to describe.

Scholars of early modern English historiography have generally told a familiar story about the history of this discourse: the story of an “historical revolution,” effected by antiquarians, in the course of which Elizabethan and Stuart England witnessed a profound and far-reaching transformation of historical practice.¹⁶ The principles and the practice that embodied this great change – a belief that “certitude about what had happened in the past was not unattainable, and, more important, was worth striving for,” new attitudes toward evidence and proof, a new devotion to facts rooted in

a literary field are illuminating and useful. Neither is for my purposes an explicit methodology but instead a fruitful theoretical view of the problems associated with writing literary history.

¹⁵ *OED*; Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, rev. edn. (Oxford University Press, 1983), 146. I use both “history” and “historiography” to refer to history as account of past events, and also to history as a discursive formation.

¹⁶ The principal works are David C. Douglas, *English Scholars, 1660–1730* (1939; repr. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century. A Reissue with a Retrospect* (Cambridge University Press, 1987); F. Smith Fussner, *The Historical Revolution: English Historical Writing and Thought, 1580–1640* (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962); Arthur B. Ferguson, *Clio Unbound: Perception of the Social and Cultural Past in Renaissance England* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979); Joseph Levine, *Humanism and History: Origins of Modern English Historiography* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Levine, *The Battle of the Books: History and Literature in the Augustan Age* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). On antiquarians and antiquarianism, see particularly Fussner, Levine, and Arnaldo Momigliano, *Studies in Historiography* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 1–39. For a critique of the historical revolution model, see Joseph Preston, “Was There an Historical Revolution?” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 38 (1977), 362–63.

the conviction that in historical accounts “truth” was equivalent to “fact,” and the idea that one of the historian’s chief tasks was “the discovery, criticism, and editing of what we would call primary materials” – are all implicit in Barbara Shapiro’s assertion that in the seventeenth century “history” was an account of “matters of fact.”¹⁷ The story of an historical revolution in early modern England (which in its various tellings extends from the career of John Leland [c. 1503–52] to that of Edward Gibbon [1703–92]) undeniably represents an important feature of the history of history in this period, particularly if one focuses on the origins of modern historical practice. In the medieval period, historians were content to present what was generally accepted about the past, but from the sixteenth century certain scholars sought to establish what was known, to criticize that which was believed but seemed improbable, and to uncover new sources of historical evidence. The rejection of conjecture and of invented speeches or scenes, the concentration on secondary (human) rather than primary (providential) explanation, the commitments to impartiality and to a plain style – all these did represent a clear departure from past practice, and many of the best-known historians of the period were in this sense “revolutionaries”: Leland, William Camden, Walter Raleigh, John Stow, John Selden, Francis Bacon, Henry Spelman, James Harrington, Robert Brady, William Dugdale, and Thomas Hearne, all have been discussed as “heroes” of the historical revolution by one or more of the students of this transformation.¹⁸ But although there is much truth in the story of the historical revolution, this narrative has been related so often, and so much to the exclusion of other possible narratives, that it is often taken to be the only story that might be told about early modern English historiography, which it decidedly is not.

The history of early modern English historiography is, in short, Whiggish: F. Smith Fussner represents Raleigh as “the heir of a dying medieval tradition”; F. J. Levy discusses “old-fashioned” history as the product of a “cultural lag”; and J. G. A. Pocock treats the failure to arrive at a modern sense of anachronism as a failure to “attain . . . a historical view.”¹⁹ To be sure, this Whiggishness is a product of the focus or endpoint chosen by historians of early modern English historiography, most clearly indicated

¹⁷ Barbara Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature* (Princeton University Press, 1983), 120; William Nelson, *Fact or Fiction: The Dilemma of the Renaissance Storyteller* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press), 37; J. R. Hale, introd., *The Evolution of British Historiography From Bacon to Namier* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1964), 12; Douglas, *English Scholars*, 16. See also Fussner, *Historical Revolution*, xix. On “matters of fact,” see chapter 6 below.

¹⁸ Momigliano, *Studies*, 10–25; Hale, *Evolution*, 9–21; Levine, *Humanism and History*, 73–105; Fussner, *Historical Revolution*; Douglas, *English Scholars*; Pocock, *Ancient Constitution*.

¹⁹ Fussner, *Historical Revolution*, 245; F. J. Levy, *Tudor Historical Thought* (San Marino: The Huntington Library, 1967), 211; Pocock, *Ancient Constitution*, 68, 89.

by Joseph M. Levine who affirms that his subject is “how and why English historiography found its modern method,” rather than the product of the scholars’ desire to glorify a particular point of view.²⁰ Still, the “presentist” bias remains.²¹ Pocock acknowledges the problem of Whiggishness while also cogently defending his method:

The history of how these capacities were acquired has to be written somehow, and . . . there is much to be said for starting at a time when they did not yet exist and showing why they did not yet exist and what the changes were which led to their being acquired.

He is right to claim that he avoided the “‘vulgar whiggism’ of regarding the time when they [the capacities] did not exist as thereby impoverished,” but even Pocock does not suggest that he has avoided privileging modern historiographical practice and thereby at least implicitly depreciating that which seems unmodern. For example, he dismisses the historical work done on English institutions before Spelman’s “discovery of feudalism” as something other than “genuinely historical” scholarship.²² Herein lies the explanation for why important early modern British historians like Thomas Fuller, Edward Hyde, the Earl of Clarendon, and Gilbert Burnet, not to mention popular writers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries like Sir Richard Baker, Nathaniel Crouch, and John Milton, are consistently ignored by historians of the historical revolution.²³ Fuller’s *Church-History of Britain* (1655), Clarendon’s *History of the Rebellion* (1702–04), and Burnet’s *History of His Own Times* (1724) may have been great works of history, but by the lights of the historians of the historical revolution they are not great *modern* works of history, and they are therefore negligible insofar as the history of history is concerned.

²⁰ Levine, *Humanism and History*, 9. See also Douglas, *English Scholars*, 28; Pocock, *Ancient Constitution*, 1; and Fussner, *Historical Revolution*, xxii. Each in his own way has “emphasize[d] certain principles of progress in the past and . . . produce[d] a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present”; Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), v.

²¹ For this term, see George W. Stocking, Jr. *Race, Culture and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology. With a New Preface* (University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1–12.

²² Pocock, *Ancient Constitution*, 257, 102–03. Pocock’s work is, of course, erudite, subtle, and penetrating; his scholarship along with the work of the other historians cited here who treat seventeenth-century historiography justifies Arthur Ferguson’s assertion that the history of Tudor and Stuart historiography “has been well and truly written.” Arthur Ferguson, *Clío Unbound*, ix. Thus the Whiggishness of the history of seventeenth-century historiography does not derive from inadequate historical imagination but from the inherent limitations of the historical revolution paradigm. As will be apparent, I have learned from and relied upon the scholars whose work I from time to time criticize.

²³ Fuller, Clarendon, Burnet, Crouch, and Milton are discussed at some length in chapters 1, 4, 5, 6, and 2 below, respectively; on Baker, see Martine Watson Brownley, “Sir Richard Baker’s *Chronicle* and Later Seventeenth-Century Historiography,” *Huntington Library Quarterly* 52 (1989), 481–500; on Fuller, see my “The Rhetoric of Historical Truth: Heylyn contra Fuller on *The Church-History of Britain*,” forthcoming.