1 Power in global governance

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The idea of global governance has attained near-celebrity status. In little more than a decade the concept has gone from the ranks of the unknown to one of the central orienting themes in the practice and study of international affairs of the post-Cold War period. The intensifying connections between states and peoples, better known as globalization, are now frequently presumed to create the need for governance and rule-making at the global level. According to such a view, only with global governance will states and peoples be able to cooperate on economic, environmental, security, and political issues, settle their disputes in a nonviolent manner, and advance their common interests and values. Absent an adequate supply of global governance, states are likely to retreat behind protective barriers and re-create the conditions for enduring conflict. Global governance, then, is thought to bring out the best in the international community and rescue it from its worst instincts. Although the study of global governance has a long pedigree, its prominence increased dramatically after the Cold War. A scholarly journal now bears its name. Several presses now have series on the subject. Although scholars have been less likely to invest global governance with the same heroic qualities as do policymakers, they have tended to see it as capable of helping states overcome conflict and achieve their common aspirations. For policymakers and scholars, global governance is one of the defining characteristics of the current international moment.

We thank Neta Crawford, Kathryn Sikkink, Helen M. Kinsella, Jon Pevehouse, Mike Williams, Kurt Burch, Thomas Diez, Tom Donahue, William Duvall, Ayten Gundogdu, Colin Kahl, Amit Ron, Latha Varadarajan, Stefano Guzzini, and especially Duncan Snidal, Charles Kupchan, Alex Wendt and Bob Keohane. We also acknowledge the bibliographic assistance of Emilie Hafner-Burton and Jonathan Havercroft.

This impressive attention to the concept and workings of global governance, however, has not included a sustained consideration of power. This is paradoxical because governance and power are inextricably linked. Governance involves the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of power. To account for how global activities are guided and how world orders are produced, therefore, requires careful and explicit analysis of the workings of power. Moreover, the classical questions of governance, particularly in the liberal tradition, are centrally concerned with power. Scholars and policymakers regularly address questions of who governs, how institutions might be designed to check the potential abuse of power, and how individual autonomy and liberty can be preserved. Certainly some of these issues have trickled into the conversation on global governance, but not nearly enough. There seems to be something about how global governance is understood, conceptually and empirically, that de-centers power as an analytical concept.

Yet injecting power into discussions of global governance is not as simple as it might seem because of the discipline's tunnel vision when identifying power. Ever since E. H. Carr delivered his devastating rhetorical blow against the "utopians" and claimed power for "realism," much of the discipline has tended to treat power as the ability of one state to use material resources to get another state to do what it otherwise would not do. The readiness to rely on this concept would be warranted if it captured the full range of ways in which actors are constrained in their ability to determine their policies and their fates. But it does not, which is hardly surprising. As famously noted by W. B. Gallie (1956), and as repeated by social theorists ever since, power is an essentially contested concept. Its status owes not only to the desire by scholars to "agree to disagree" but also to their awareness that power works in various forms and has various expressions that cannot be captured by a single formulation. Therefore, the tendency of the discipline to gravitate toward realism's view of power leads, ironically, to the underestimation of the importance of power in international politics.

This volume revisits power, offers a new conceptualization that captures the different forms it takes in global politics, and demonstrates how these different forms connect and intersect in global governance. This volume, then, makes two critical contributions. First, it offers a richer and more nuanced understanding of power in international relations. Such an undertaking at this historical moment is both propitious

and necessary. September 11, the war on terrorism, the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, the perceived willingness of the United States to either use or abuse international organizations, law, and treaties, and the debate over American empire have fixated scholars on the most visible and destructive dimensions of power. We certainly need to know about the ability of actors to compel others to change their foreign policies. Analysis of power in international politics, then, must include a consideration of how, why, and when some actors have "power over" others. Yet we also need to consider the enduring structures and processes of global life that enable and constrain the ability of actors to shape their fates and their futures. For example, the extension of sovereignty from the West to the Third World gave decolonized states the authority to voice their interests and represent themselves, and the emergence of a human rights discourse helped to make possible the very category of human rights activists who articulate human rights norms. Analysis of power, then, also must include a consideration of the normative structures and discourses that generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals.

To understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained requires a consideration of different forms of power in international politics. Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate.[1] But power does not have a single expression or form. It has several. In this volume we identify four. *Compulsory power* refers to relations of interaction that allow one actor to have direct control over another. It operates, for example, when one state threatens another and says, "change your policies, or else." *Institutional power* is in effect when actors exercise indirect control over others, such as when states design international institutions in ways that work to their long-term advantage and to the disadvantage of others. *Structural power* concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another. One expression of this form of power is the workings of the capitalist world-economy in producing social positions of capital and labor with their respective differential abilities to alter their circumstances and fortunes. *Productive power* is the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification. A particular meaning of development, for

[1] This definition slightly amends John Scott's (2001: 1–2).

instance, orients social activity in particular directions, defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters. These different conceptualizations, then, provide distinct answers to the fundamental question: in what respects are actors able to determine their own fate, and how is that ability limited or enhanced through social relations with others? Later in this chapter we provide the conceptual groundwork for the taxonomy that generates these four forms of power.

This conceptualization offers several advantages for scholars of international relations theory. It detaches discussions of power from the limitations of realism, encourages scholars to see power's multiple forms, and discourages a presumptive dismissal of one form in favor of another. It provides a framework for integration. Taxonomies not only highlight distinct types but also point to connections between them. In this way, it discourages thinking about forms of power as competing and encourages the consideration of how these different forms interact and relate to one another. It does *not* map precisely onto different theories of international relations. To be sure, each theoretical tradition does favor an understanding of power that corresponds to one or another of the forms. As we will see, realists tend to focus on what we call compulsory power, and critical theorists on structural or productive power. Yet scholars can and frequently do draw from various conceptualizations of power that are sometimes associated with another theoretical school in international relations. We believe that such poaching and cross-fertilization is healthy, is needed, and might, in a small way, help scholars move away from perpetual rivalry in disciplinary "ism" wars and toward dialogue across theoretical perspectives. Indeed, the contributors to this volume, who come from very different wings of the discipline, demonstrate how a healthy recognition of power's polymorphous character, and a willingness to look for connections between these different forms, enhances and deepens our understanding of international politics.

Our second goal is to demonstrate how a consideration of power reshapes understanding of global governance. Global governance without power looks very different from global governance with power. With only slight exaggeration, much of the scholarship on global governance proceeds as if power either does not exist or is of minor importance. We suspect that this state of affairs exists because of how post-Cold War politics, organized around liberalism and globalization, imprinted the meaning, practice, and definition of global governance.

The vocabulary of "global governance" appeared at the very same moment that the Cold War receded from view.[2] The Cold War was not only a description of a bipolar threat system; it also represented a mode of organizing the analysis and practice of international politics. With the end of the Cold War, the issue became what would and should take its place. For many, global governance represented a way of organizing international politics in a more inclusive and consensual manner. In contrast to the Cold War and the Soviet–American rivalry that permeated all global institutions and injected them with principles of exclusivity and hierarchy, various commissions and inquiries into the post-Cold War order gravitated to this concept precisely because it offered to equalize and tame power relations, and create a more inclusive and egalitarian governance system. Alongside the eclipse of the Cold War was the emergence of globalization. Although globalization has various dimensions, a unifying claim was that intensifying transnational and interstate connections requires regulatory mechanisms – governance, although expressly *not* a government – at the global level.

To the extent that global governance entails only the mechanisms of coordination, it could appear to be merely a technical machine, but in fact there are strong values running this machine. Liberalism is the spirit in the machine. There are, of course, many different definitions of liberalism, but as a category in theory and in practice in international relations it has typically revolved around the belief: in the possibility, although not the inevitability, of progress; that modernization processes and interdependence (or, now, globalization) are transforming the character of global politics; that institutions can be established to help manage these changes; that democracy is a principled objective, as well as an issue of peace and security; and that states and international organizations have an obligation to protect individuals, promote universal values, and create conditions that encourage political and economic freedom (Doyle, 1997, 1995; Zacher and Matthews, 1995; Keohane, 1990; Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999a).[3]

The belief was that the end of the Cold War provided the opportunity to create a more desirable world. The very language of global governance conjures up the possibility and desirability of effecting progressive political change in global life through the establishment of a

[2] For a useful overview of the concept that also situates it in disciplinary and global context, see Hewson and Sinclair, 1999.
[3] For an interesting analysis of the different forms that liberalism can take, historically and conceptually, see Richardson, 1997.

normative consensus – a collective purpose – usually around fundamental liberal values. The language of interests is often married to the language of values of the "international community," values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and markets. These values are seen as desirable not only because of their inherent goodness but also because they would help to create a more peaceful and prosperous world. Expanding the boundaries of the community, then, expands the zones of peace and freedom. The end of the Cold War also created a new opportunity to foster and manage the growing interstate and transnational connections. International organizations are central to this enterprise. They could coordinate and regulate a more interdependent world, and thus help states and others further their interests. But they also could help spread the fundamental values of the "international community." Indeed, the heads of many international organizations asserted that many ills could be cured with a liberal dose of these liberal values. This emphasis on how the international community could come together to advance their collective interests, solve collective problems, and further the community's collective values has tended to deflect attention away from power.

The prevailing definitions of global governance also have liberal undertones and mask the presence of power. Most definitions revolve around the coordination of people's activities in ways that achieve more desirable outcomes.[4] Governance, in this view, is a matter of resolving conflicts, finding common purpose, and/or overcoming inefficiencies between actors in situations of interdependent choice. This definition rests on liberal precepts, the analytics of social choice, and the claim that political actors may have shared interests that require collaboration and coordination. Power rarely figures in these discussions. Certainly scholars are aware that power is frequently important for solving collective-action problems (though sometimes this is called leadership); that hard bargaining can take place between grossly unequal states; that some actors are better positioned than others to affect outcomes and influence the distribution of goods and services; and that causal

[4] The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 2) defined global governance as "the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is the continuing process through which conflict or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken." Similarly Oran Young (1994: 53) defines governance as the "establishment and operation of social institutions . . . capable of resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or more generally alleviating collective-action problems in a world of interdependent actors." See also Prakash and Hart, 1999: 2; Gordenker and Weiss, 1996: 17; and Keohane and Nye, 2000a: 12.

effect is assigned to particular actors. But the choice-theoretic perspective frequently masks relations of imposition, domination, structural determination, or cultural hegemony.[5]

Scholarly developments over the last decade also reinforced the decoupling of global governance and power. Because Andrew Hurrell addresses this issue in chapter 2, we can be brief here. Although disciplinary attention to global governance is of recent vintage, the concept represents not fashion-mongering but rather accessorizing the wardrobe of international institutions. The field of international organization has long been concerned with the general question of international governance, the creation of international order from norms and rules rather than from coercion (Ruggie and Kratochwil, 1986). This general concern with international governance in the absence of a sovereign became a dominant feature of the post-Cold War literature, whether in the guise of "governance without government," international regimes and institutions, global civil society, transnational actors, or international law. Significantly, many of the theoretical rivals to realism, most notably neoliberal institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism, have been drawn to these areas precisely because it potentially allows them to demonstrate the relevance of institutional, ideational, and normative variables and the limitations of a traditional realist, "power"-oriented analysis (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Consequently, these scholars have tended to position their arguments regarding international governance against "power."[6] The result is that explicit and systematic attention to power disappears from their analyses of global governance.

By using the optics of power, we transform the image of global governance. No longer is it solely concerned with the creation and maintenance of institutional arrangements through consensual relations and voluntary choice. It now becomes a question of how global life is organized, structured, and regulated. Such a re-visioning of global governance not only reshapes understanding of global governance. It also forces us to consider basic normative issues of international relations theory. The concern with power, after all, brings attention to global structures, processes, and institutions that shape the fates and life chances

[5] Those who are more inclined to critical approaches have an easier time seeing power in governance. See Rosenau, 1995; Sewell and Salter, 1995: 377; Latham, 1999; and Wilkenson and Hughes, 2003.

[6] Because these rivals to realism have attempted to demonstrate just how limited a power-centric analysis is, realists have responded by insisting that power is quite alive and well in the international system and present in global governance (Grieco, 1997a; Waltz, 1999; Gilpin, 2002).

of actors around the world. We become concerned with the legitimacy of particular governing arrangements, who gets to participate, whose voice matters, and whose vote counts. An examination of international institutions, accordingly, concerns not only whether they are efficient but also whether they are fair and legitimate. The focus on power, in short, compels us to engage the analytics, the empirics, and the ethics of global governance.

Conceptualizing power

Although the discipline frequently adopts a realist conception of power, in fact there have been many attempts to modify, supplement, or displace it.[7] Yet the realist approach remains the industry standard. This is a problem. The failure to develop alternative conceptualizations of power limits the ability of international relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates. Our alternative begins by identifying the critical dimensions of power, and then uses these dimensions to construct a taxonomy that captures the forms of power in international politics.[8]

Our starting point for opening the conceptual aperture is to identify the critical dimensions that generate different conceptualizations of power. In general terms, power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate. This definition informs our argument that conceptual distinctions of power should be represented in terms of two

[7] See Enloe, 1996; Hirst, 1998; Guzzini, 1993, 2000; Baldwin, 1980, 1989, 2002; Nye, 1990, 2002.

[8] This taxonomy bears some resemblance to, but is distinct from, the conventional "four-faces" approach to power because, we contend, ours is analytically more systematic and precise, and conceptually more general. Peter Digeser (1992: 980) nicely summarizes the differences among the four faces in the following way: "Under the first face of power the central question is, 'Who, if anyone, is exercising power?' Under the second face, 'What issues have been mobilized off the agenda and by whom?' Under the radical conception, 'Whose objective interests are being harmed?' Under the fourth face of power the critical issue is, 'What kind of subject is being produced?'" For other summaries of these faces, see Hayward 2000: chap. 1; Clegg, 1989; and Hay, 1997. Because the four faces developed sequentially through a progressive debate about gaps and absences in prior conceptions, they are not elements in a systematic typology. There are no analytical dimensions that distinguish across all four faces, and the faces overlap and blur into one another. While they point to crucially important issues in theorizing power, for the purposes of conceptual precision they can be improved upon with a systematic taxonomy that captures most of the key distinctions that the four-faces scholars seek to make, while sharpening the analytical differences that give rise to them.

analytical dimensions that are at the core of the general concept: the *kinds* of social relations through which power works; and the *specificity* of social relations through which effects on actors' capacities are produced. The first dimension – kinds – refers to the polar positions of social relations of interaction and social relations of constitution. Accordingly, power is either an attribute of particular actors and their interactions or a social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, their social identities and capacities. It can operate, for example, by the pointing of a gun and the issuing of commands, or in underlying social structures and systems of knowledge that advantage some and disadvantage others. The second dimension – specificity – concerns the degree to which the social relations through which power works are direct and socially specific or indirect and socially diffuse. It can operate, for example, at the very instant when the gun is brandished or through diffuse processes embedded in international institutions that establish rules that determine who gets to participate in debates and make decisions. Below we explore each dimension, then show how the polar positions within each dimension combine to generate our taxonomy of power.

How power is expressed: interaction or constitution

The first dimension concerns whether power works in interactions or social constitution. One position on this dimension treats social relations as composed of the actions of pre-constituted social actors toward one another. Here, power works through behavioral relations or interactions, which, in turn, affect the ability of others to control the circumstances of their existence. In these conceptions, power nearly becomes an attribute that an actor possesses and may use knowingly as a resource to shape the actions and/or conditions of action of others.

The other position consists of social relations of constitution. Here, power works through social relations that analytically precede the social or subject positions of actors and that constitute them as social beings with their respective capacities and interests. Constitutive relations cannot be reduced to the attributes, actions, or interactions of given actors. Power, accordingly, is irreducibly social. In other words, constitutive arguments examine how particular *social* relations are responsible for producing particular kinds of actors. As Alexander Wendt (1998: 105) puts it, "Constitutive theories . . . account for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist." Because these social relations, in effect, generate different social kinds that have

different self- (and other-) understandings and capacities, they have real consequences for an actor's ability to shape the conditions and processes of its existence.

This conceptual distinction between power working through social relations of interaction or in social relations of constitution tracks fairly closely with a distinction that frequents the literature on power: "power over" and "power to." Concepts of power rooted in action and interaction point to actors' exercising control over others; they are, then, "power over" concepts. Concepts of power tied to social relations of constitution, in contrast, consider how social relations define who are the actors and what are the capacities and practices they are socially empowered to undertake; these concepts are, then, focused on the social production of actors' "power to." Some scholars, who examine how constitutive relations make possible certain types of action, focus on how community or collective action is facilitated, while others stress how the social relations of constitution can have a disciplining effect and therefore lead to self-regulation and internalized constraints.[9] In either case, though, the concern is with the effect of social relations of constitution on human capacity.

This interaction/constitutive distinction also foregrounds particular features of the *effects* of power. Because power is a property of actors' actions and interactions in behavioral conceptions, there is a strong tendency to see its effects primarily in terms of the action of the object of power. In contrast, constitutive power is generally seen as producing effects only in terms of the identities of the occupants of social positions. We want to stress, though, that there is no ontological or epistemological reason why scholars working with one of those concepts need exclude the effects identified by the other. If power works through the actions of specific actors in shaping the ways and the extent to which other actors exercise control over their own fate, it can have a variety of effects, ranging from directly affecting the behavior of others to setting the terms of their very self-understandings; behavioral power, then, can shape actors' subjectivities and self-understandings. Similarly, if power is in social relations of constitution, it works in fixing what actors are as social beings, which, in turn, defines the meaningful practices in which they are disposed to engage as subjects; constitutive power, then, shapes behavioral tendencies. Thus, scholars examining power through

[9] For the former, see Arendt, 1959; Habermas, 1984; and Barnes, 1988. For the latter, see Foucault, 1995; Isaac, 1987; and Hayward, 2000.