The Politics of Social Risk

The book provides a systematic evaluation of the role played by business in the development of the modern welfare state. When and why have employers supported the development of institutions of social insurance that provide benefits to workers for various employment-related risks? What factors explain the variation in the social policy preferences of employers? What is the relative importance of business and labor-based organizations in the negotiation of a new social policy? This book studies these questions by examining the role played by German and French producers in eight social policy reforms spanning a century of social policy development. The analysis demonstrates that major social policies were supported by cross-class alliances comprising labor-based organizations and key sectors of the business community.

Isabela Mares is assistant professor of political science at Stanford University. She is the author of articles on social policy and political economy that have appeared in World Politics, Politics and Society, Governance, Journal of Public Policy, and edited volumes. She has been awarded the Sage Prize by the Comparative Politics section of the American Political Science Association for her research on the role of business in the development of the modern welfare state.
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BUSINESS AND WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT

ISABELA MARES

Stanford University
For my parents
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