Martin Heidegger is now widely recognized alongside Wittgenstein as one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. He transformed mainstream philosophy by defining its central task as asking the “question of being,” and he has had a profound impact on fields such as literary theory, theology, psychotherapy, political theory, aesthetics, and environmental studies. His thought has contributed to the recent turn to hermeneutics in philosophy and the social sciences and to current postmodern and poststructuralist developments. Moreover, the disclosure of his deep involvement in the ideology of Nazism has provoked much debate about the relation of philosophy to politics. This new edition of The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger brings to the fore new works that appear in Heidegger’s collected works, as well as new approaches to scholarship that have emerged since the original publication of the first edition. It presents new essays by distinguished Heidegger scholars Julian Young, William Blattner, Taylor Carman, and Mark Wrathall. Their essays cover topics such as Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology, his relation to Kant and Husserl, his conception of the a priori, his account of truth, his stand on the realism/anti-realism debate, and his later conceptions of “dwelling,” “place,” and the “fourfold.” This edition includes a new preface by the editor, revised versions of several essays from the first edition, and an exhaustive and up-to-date bibliography, providing guidance for both newcomers and established scholars to the most recent sources on Heidegger’s work.

Charles B. Guignon is professor of philosophy at the University of South Florida. He is the author of Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge and On Being Authentic and editor of The Good Life, The Existentialists, and Richard Rorty.
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WILLIAM BLATTNER, Associate Professor of Philosophy at George- town University, specializes in early Heidegger and the American pragmatists, especially John Dewey. Author of Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism [1999] and Heidegger’s “Being and Time” [forthcoming], he has also published papers on temporality, Heidegger, and Dewey.

JOHN D. CAPUTO, David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy at Villanova, is the author of Radical Hermeneutics [1987], Heidegger and Aquinas [1982], The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought [1978], and Demythologizing Heidegger [1993] as well as a number of articles on Heidegger. His more recent books include More Radical Hermeneutics [2000] and On Religion [2001].

TAYLOR CARMAN is Professor of Philosophy at Barnard and Columbia University, specializing in nineteenth- and twentieth-century continental philosophy. He is the author of Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in “Being and Time” [2003], has written on various topics in phenomenology, and is co-editor of the Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty [2005].

ROBERT J. DOSTAL, Rufus M. Jones Professor of Philosophy at Byrn Mawr College, is the author of numerous articles on Kant, Heidegger, and hermeneutics. He is the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer [2002].

HUBERT L. DREYFUS is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s “Being and Time,” Division I [1991] and co-editor of Heidegger: A Critical Reader [1992], the Blackwell Companion to Heidegger [2005], the Companion to Phenomenology
Contributors

Dorothea Frede is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hamburg in Germany. Her main field is ancient philosophy, and she has published widely in classical and Hellenistic philosophy. She has also published essays on Heidegger, emphasizing his criticism of, and dependence on, the history of Western philosophy.

Charles B. Guignon, Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Florida, is the author of *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* (1983) and *On Being Authentic* (1983). He is the editor or co-editor of a number of collections and readers such as *Existentialism: Basic Writings* (2nd edition, 2001) and *The Existentialists* (2004).

Piotr Hoffman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nevada, Reno. His most recent books include *Violence in Modern Philosophy* (1989) and *Doubt, Time and Violence* (1987). He has also written a number of articles about time in Heidegger’s early thought.


Charles Taylor has taught at Oxford and McGill Universities and is currently Professor of Law and Philosophy at Northwestern University. His writings include the two-volume *Philosophical Papers* (1985), *Sources of the Self* (1989), and, more recently, *Varieties of Religion Today* (2002) and *Modern Social Imaginaries* (2004).

Mark A. Wrathall, Professor of Philosophy at Brigham Young University, specializes in philosophy of mind and modern European
philosophy. He is editor, with Hubert L. Dreyfus, of collections and companions on Heidegger and phenomenology, and he is editor of Religion after Metaphysics (2003). His forthcoming book from Granta is titled How to Read Heidegger (2005).

Julian Young is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. He specializes in aesthetics and continental philosophy, especially Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, and has collaborated in the translation of Heidegger’s Off the Beaten Track (2002). He is the author of Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism (1997), Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art (2001), and Heidegger’s Later Philosophy (2001).

Michael E. Zimmerman is Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University. He has published many scholarly works on Heidegger as well as two books: Eclipse of the Self [rev. ed., 1986] and Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity (1990). He has also written on radical ecology and postmodernity.
ABBREVIATIONS: WORKS BY HEIDEGGER


Abbreviations


GA 34 Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 34: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theâtê. Edited by
Abbreviations


I


ID


IM


KPM


KPM2


MFL


N1


N2


N3


N4


OGSU


OHF


OWL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Translator(s)</th>
<th>Publisher and Year</th>
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## CHRONOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 26, 1889</td>
<td>Born in Messkirch, Baden-Württemberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903–11</td>
<td>Studies for the priesthood at the Seminary of the Archdiocese of Freiburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903–9</td>
<td>Concurrent high school studies: State Gymnasium, Constance (1903–6); Berthold Gymnasium, Freiburg (1906–9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Receives a copy of Franz Brentano's <em>On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle</em> (1862), the book that led him to formulate the “question of being”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Spends two weeks in the Jesuit novitiate, Feldkirch, Austria; leaves because of poor health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909–13</td>
<td>Studies at the University of Freiburg, theology until 1911, then mathematics and philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>First philosophical publications: “The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy” and “New Research on Logic”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Habilitation (teaching qualification dissertation) under Heinrich Rickert, “The Doctrine of Categories and Signification in Duns Scotus”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915–23</td>
<td>Privatdozent (lecturer) at the University of Freiburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915–18</td>
<td>Military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Married to Elfride Petri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919–23</td>
<td>Assistant to Husserl at Freiburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919, 1920</td>
<td>Birth of sons Jörg and Hermann</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chronology

1923–8 Associate professor, University of Marburg
1927 *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) published
1928 Appointed Husserl's successor, professor of philosophy, at the University of Freiburg
1929 Break with Husserl
1929 Publishes *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*), “Was ist Metaphysik?” (“What Is Metaphysics?”), and “Vom Wesen des Grundes” (“The Essence of Reasons”)
Apr. 22, 1933 Becomes rector of the University of Freiburg
May 1, 1933 Joins the National Socialist Party
Nov. 11, 1933 Radio address supporting Hitler's withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations
Apr. 27, 1934 Resigns as rector
1934–42 Lectures on Hölderlin and Nietzsche
1935 Lectures: “Der Ursprung des Kunsterwerkes” (“The Origin of the Work of Art”) and *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (*Introduction to Metaphysics*)
1936–8 Composes *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (*Contributions to Philosophy*)
Nov. 1944 Drafted into the People's Militia (Volkssturm)
1945 Denazification hearings; banned from teaching
1946 Nervous breakdown
1947 “Brief über den Humanismus” (“Letter on Humanism”) published
1950 Reinstated to teaching position
1951 Granted emeritus status
1953 *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (*Introduction to Metaphysics*) published
1957 *Der Satz vom Grund* (*The Principle of Reason*) published
1959 *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (*On the Way to Language*) published
1961 Two-volume *Nietzsche* published
May 26, 1976 Dies in Freiburg
Preparing the second edition of a volume that has become a sort of mainstay turns out to be more difficult than one might suspect. For one thing, it is hard to select from among the many fresh and intelligent new Heideggerians on the scene a limited number of authors who will write the newly commissioned essays. Much harder was satisfying the editor’s demand that some of the original contributions be removed. All of the original essays have proven valuable over the years, so none of them seemed “dispensable.” Then there was the need to revise the bibliography, cataloguing the “complete works” edition (Gesamtausgabe) now finally worked out and selecting representative works from the massive output on Heidegger over the past twelve years. Finally, there was the somewhat distressing task of rereading my own Introduction to the volume from the 1993 edition. So many new Heideggerian texts have become available since then, and so many interesting insights have appeared in the literature, that the original introduction is showing its age. In this preface to the second edition, I will limit myself to discussing each of these tasks in turn.

The brightest moment in compiling a second edition came from reading the essays contributed by relatively new scholars working on Heidegger. The first addition is Taylor Carman’s “The Principle of Phenomenology,” a detailed and informative study of Heidegger’s relationship to the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. Carman’s paper helps clarify Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenological method, while showing how this differed from Husserl’s original conception. Over the years it has become increasingly clear that assessing the role and force of phenomenology is
xxii  Preface to the Second Edition

one of the crucial tasks for those who would make the Heideggerian outlook part of their own.

William Blattner’s “Laying the Ground for Metaphysics: Heidegger’s Appropriation of Kant” provides a much needed addition to the original volume. Though Heidegger drew on many sources in composing *Being and Time*, the most striking and philosophically interesting of these sources would seem to be Kant. With great care and precision Blattner examines the reasoning found in Heidegger’s Marburg lectures of 1927/28, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,”* delivered during the same time frame in which *Being and Time* appeared and shortly before the publication of the better known but notoriously difficult *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. The story is often told of Heidegger, uncomfortably ensconced among Marburg neo-Kantians, trying to “out-Kant the neoKantians” by interpreting the first *Critique* through the lens of his phenomenological “fundamental ontology.” Given his solid grasp of both Kant and Heidegger, Blattner is able to show the advantages and shortcomings of Heidegger’s short-lived attempt to appropriate Kant. With this interpretation of Heidegger’s Kantianism we can get a better understanding of the Kantian vocabulary and moves made in *Being and Time* as well as a grasp of the vehement rejection of everything “transcendental” in Heidegger’s *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning).*

No concept in Heidegger’s life’s work is more pivotal or more contentious than the notion of “truth.” Finding roots for this concept in the ancient Greek concept of *aletheia*, a term that etymologically suggests “un-forgetfulness” or “un-concealment,” Heidegger sought to show that the ordinary understanding of truth as correspondence between proposition and fact is dependent upon an older, more basic understanding of truth as disclosure, the interplay of un concealing and concealing. Whatever one thinks of this bit of etymological derivation, the Heideggerian conception of truth raises a number of problems connected with the well-known “realism/anti-realism” debate. Most strikingly, the question arises of whether we can say, for example, “Water is H₂O” is *true* in the full-blooded, non-relativistic sense in which we tend to think it is true. Mark Wrathall,
in his rigorous and textually grounded essay “Truth and the Essence of Truth in Heidegger’s Thought,” shows how carefully Heidegger thought through issues of this sort. The outcome is a plausible and philosophically astute account of Heidegger’s views.

One of the limitations of the first edition of the Cambridge Companion to Heidegger was the paucity of studies of the “later” Heidegger, that is, the works produced by Heidegger after the mid-1930s. One reason for this shortcoming was the difficulty in finding the sort of clear, illuminating exegeses of these works accessible to the audience the companion was supposed to reach. This is why I am especially pleased to add Julian Young’s remarkable essay, “The Fourfold,” to this edition. Young has written a number of works on Heidegger in recent years, proving himself to be one of the clearest and most engaging scholars in this field. His contribution to this volume reflects the mastery and insightfulness characteristic of all his writings. Using vivid examples drawn from familiar cultural practices and ways of thought (quite a few of them from his home in New Zealand), he illuminates such Heideggerian concepts as earth, sky, mortal, gods, and, above all, dwelling and place. In Young’s hands, obscure Heideggerian texts come alive and display their contemporary relevance.

Adding new essays led me to reorganize the volume as a whole. In this new edition, the first eight chapters deal primarily with the sources and themes of Heidegger’s work up to and including Being and Time. Chapters 9 through 13 deal with issues and topics that span Heidegger’s life’s work. And the final chapter focuses on themes from the later writings.

The most challenging task for me in rethinking the volume was determining which chapters to remove. I felt comfortable removing Richard Rorty’s essay because it is readily available in his Philosophical Papers. Harrison Hall’s essay, “Intentionality and World: Division I of Being and Time,” an essay I find especially helpful to students and nonspecialists, found a home in my recently published collection, The Existentialists, and so is still available. Finally, Frederick A. Olafson has produced a large body of valuable works on Heidegger that is worth reading as a whole.

Revising the bibliography required incorporating some of the many fine secondary sources that have appeared since 1993. That also meant deleting some of the works that had appeared in the earlier
Preface to the Second Edition

edition. In working on the bibliography, and in many other tasks connected with producing a second edition, I was aided by Kevin Aho, Indrani Bhattercharjee, Chris Kirby, and Richard Polt. My deep thanks to them for their help.

In addition to the new entries in the bibliography, I would like to acknowledge here some exceptionally good new works that have appeared in the past twelve years. These include Karin de Boer’s *Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger’s Encounter with Hegel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), Michael Friedman’s *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), Hans Ruin’s *Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity through Heidegger’s Works* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1994), two volumes by Theodore Kisiel: *The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) and *Heidegger’s Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts* (New York: Continuum, 2002), John van Buren’s *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), and a number of essays by Thomas Sheehan. I have also benefited immensely from works by, and conversations with, Iain Thomson, Hubert Dreyfus, Julian Young, Taylor Carman, Stephen Crowell, Richard Polt, and Benjamin Crowe. These influences, together with the revelations in the new volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe* and their English translations, have done much to shift my ways of thinking about Heidegger in recent years. Despite these pressures to change my interpretation, I have chosen not to revise my Introduction to the first edition beyond some minor changes. I think I would stand by most of what I said back then, including my assessment of Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis. But if I were to write an introduction to the companion today, it would certainly be different from what I wrote then. Perhaps a few hints of how my views have changed might be of interest.

First, thanks to Michael Friedman’s and Theodore Kisiel’s writings on Lask and Heidegger, I am less inclined than ever to think of Heidegger as an anti-realist in a strong sense. What misled me in my earlier thinking about Heidegger was the tendency on the part of translators to read the technical term *Seiende* as “beings” or “entities.” Such translations ignore the fact that *das Seiende* is singular and refers not to a collection of items or (even more misleadingly)
“things” or “objects.” I have become convinced that the best way to translate this term is the way it was translated in some of the earliest translations of Heidegger’s writings: as “what-is.” In contrast to the constructivism of the Kantian tradition, which treats objects of experience as built up from a manifold of intuition, Heidegger holds that Dasein “always already” finds itself thrown into the midst of what-is, already conditioned by something it can never master or fully grasp. Seen in this light, then, the question Heidegger asks is not “How are objects constituted from raw data?” but rather, “What are the conditions that make it possible for us to apprehend what-is in the ways we do apprehend it?” In his earliest writings, this was thought of as world; later it came to be thought of more as language; and in the late appropriations of early Greek thought, it comes to be thought of in terms of the old and rich concept of logos.

When the guiding question of Heidegger’s life’s work is seen as asking about the possibility of apprehension, then it becomes clear that what is at issue in his thought is not “Being,” where this is seen either in the traditional sense of essentia and existentia or as mystified into some crypto-theological invention. Instead, what is at issue is the possibility for anything to emerge into presence as such and such, that is, to be taken as something or other. What Heidegger is concerned with is the play of identity and difference, the schema of “this-and-not-that,” which provides the “Opening,” leeway or realm of free play by virtue of which things can be freed up and allowed to show forth in some distinctive way. On Heidegger’s account, humans, as occupying a site in the midst of what-is (i.e., by “being there”), play a pivotal role in this event of coming-into-presence. But they do not create “entities” in the sense of making them. It is better to say that humans are participants in an event of emergence and that they are as much dependent on that event as the event is dependent on them. On this reading of Heidegger’s thought, it is impossible to regard his views as “idealist” or “anti-realist” in the sense of a metaphysical claim about where all extant beings come from. Dasein’s finitude includes its thrownness into and conditionedness by what-is. This is why in the later writings human beings (“mortals”) make up only one point in a field of force called “the fourfold.”

This shift in emphasis in reading the Heideggerian corpus has important consequences for Heidegger scholarship. First, it is now
possible to see the discussion of the “ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand,” which seemed so important in *Being and Time* but was never taken up again after that work, as an example of how what-is can show up and how one mode of manifestation can be derivative from another. Second, we can see more clearly the import of Heidegger’s claims that there are certain crucial ways of being for humans – early on he mentions anxiety and boredom, later it is “startled dismay” or “shock” (*Erschrecken*) – in which we are able to apprehend what-is in its raw “*that it is*.” So it seems that Heidegger also leaves room for a sort of realism according to which we can gain some access to what-is as it is in itself, independent of any human perspectives.

Finally, the conception of what-is as apprehended in different ways given different stances of Dasein makes it possible to distinguish [a] modes of apprehension that conceal more than what they reveal from [b] modes of apprehension that free things up so they can come into their own as what they are. In terms of this distinction, we can get clearer about Heidegger’s contrast between technology, which treats everything as part of a “standing reserve” on hand for our use, and “releasement” (*Gelassenheit*), a stance toward what-is that lets it be what it can and should be. What is important in taking a stance toward things, Heidegger suggests, is to maintain the questionable-ness of all that is if we are to let things show up as what they are “properly” (one meaning of the German word *eigen*).

It should be obvious that this reading of the overarching viewpoint of Heidegger’s life’s work generates a set of puzzles about relativism, truth, and the idea of a “thing-in-itself.” These are the sorts of puzzles that Heidegger scholars will want to hammer out before they can assess the overall plausibility of Heidegger’s thought. But the fact that Heidegger’s thought leads to interesting questions of this sort shows why it has proven to be such a fertile ground for philosophical excavation.

### Notes

Preface to the Second Edition

2. This translation of the major work, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University), appeared in 1999.

3. See the three books by Julian Young listed in the bibliography.


9. For this reason I would no longer say, as I did in footnote 10 of the Introduction to the first edition, that the ready-to-hand is "more real" than the present-at-hand. Certainly it is true that encountering what-is as ready-to-hand is "more primordial" than the encounter with the present-at-hand, and it is presumably also less constrictive and distortive. But from that we cannot conclude that the ready-to-hand is "the real." At the same time, however, I would still disagree with Dreyfus' "minimal hermeneutic realism about nature." There is no justification for equating what-is with nature in the "naturalistic" sense of that term.


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12. Iain Thomson, in his Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), shows how important the ideal of maintaining questionableness is to Heidegger's philosophy of education. It is because of this role of open-ended questioning in all thinking that Heidegger calls his writings "paths, not works" (Wege, nicht Werke).